First off, tremendous props to LoBrau, who saw Ukraine coming well in advance and started a record setting thread. May that record stand forever, because nothing would please us more than for there to no longer be anything to talk about.

What has become evident since February of 2022 is that there is a global reshuffling taking place, with three primary players behind most of the conflict in the world today. Discussion of current geopolitics cannot be constrained to one country or conflict.

What this thread is:
News and discussion related to political / military actions by Russia / Iran / China and their proxies, chief among those, North Korea.
News and discussion of the relationships between Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
News and discussion of responses to Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
Related Grey Zone / hybrid warfare / “competition short of war.”
Relevant or interesting technical discussion.
Relevant economic / social / historical discussion.
Reliable reporting from Russian / Iranian / Chinese sources.
Russian / Iranian / Chinese perspectives and factual evaluation thereof.
Political topics in the US and / or elsewhere which bear directly on these issues, including the politics of foreign aid.
Current focus is on the Russian war against and in Ukraine, however this could change if the Ukraine war cooled off and Taiwan heated up.  Related topics are always allowed.
Secondary but related topics like Wagner in Africa, uprising in Georgia, or a Third Chechen War.
Reasonable tangents.

What this thread is not:
US and / or foreign political issues which do not directly bear on these topics, including campaigning / advocating for one party or candidate.

General rules:
Discussion is expected to be conducted in good faith and assertions of fact should be substantiated.
In case of a question on whether a subtopic or line of discussion is relevant to this thread, the following members should be considered co-owners with decision making authority- AlmightyTallest, Capta, and SaltwaterHillbilly.

The Axis of Upheaval
How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order
By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine
May/June 2024
Published on April 23, 2024

In the early morning of January 2, Russian forces launched a massive missile attack on the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv that killed at least five civilians, injured more than 100, and damaged infrastructure. The incident was notable not just for the harm it caused but also because it showed that Russia was not alone in its fight. The Russian attack that day was carried out with weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran. Over the past two years, all three countries have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Moscow has deployed more than 3,700 Iranian-designed drones. Russia now produces at least 330 on its own each month and is collaborating with Iran on plans to build a new drone factory inside Russia that will boost these numbers. North Korea has sent Russia ballistic missiles and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, just as Ukrainian stockpiles have dwindled. China, for its part, has become Russia’s most important lifeline. Beijing has ramped up its purchase of Russian oil and gas, putting billions of dollars into Moscow’s coffers. Just as significantly, China provides vast amounts of warfighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar- and communications-jamming equipment and jet-fighter parts. Customs records show that despite Western trade sanctions, Russia’s imports of computer chips and chip components have been steadily rising toward prewar levels. More than half of these goods come from China.

The support from China, Iran, and North Korea has strengthened Russia’s position on the battlefield, undermined Western attempts to isolate Moscow, and harmed Ukraine. This collaboration, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Cooperation among the four countries was expanding before 2022, but the war has accelerated their deepening economic, military, political, and technological ties. The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval—a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape.

The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance. It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system. When these four countries cooperate, their actions have far greater effect than the sum of their individual efforts. Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to enforce global rules. Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States.

Too many Western observers have been quick to dismiss the implications of coordination among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The four countries have their differences, to be sure, and a history of distrust and contemporary fissures may limit how close their relationships will grow. Yet their shared aim of weakening the United States and its leadership role provides a strong adhesive. In places across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the ambitions of axis members have already proved to be destabilizing. Managing the disruptive effects of their further coordination and preventing the axis from upsetting the global system must now be central objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

THE ANTI-WESTERN CLUB

Collaboration among axis members is not new. China and Russia have been strengthening their partnership since the end of the Cold War—a trend that accelerated rapidly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. China’s share of Russian external trade doubled from ten to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021, and between 2018 and 2022 Russia supplied a combined total of 83 percent of China’s arms imports. Russian technology has helped the Chinese military enhance its air defense, antiship, and submarine capabilities, making China a more formidable force in a potential naval conflict. Beijing and Moscow have also expressed a shared vision. In early 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint manifesto pledging a “no limits” partnership between their two countries and calling for “international relations of a new type”—in other words, a multipolar system that is no longer dominated by the United States.

Iran has strengthened its ties with other axis members as well. Iran and Russia worked together to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power after the onset of civil war in 2011. Joining Russia’s efforts, which include major energy agreements with Iran to shield Tehran from the effects of U.S. sanctions, China has purchased large quantities of Iranian oil since 2020. North Korea, for its part, has counted China as its primary ally and trade partner for decades, and North Korea and Russia have maintained warm, if not particularly substantive, ties. Iran has purchased North Korean missiles since the 1980s, and more recently, North Korea is thought to have supplied weapons to Iranian proxy groups, including Hezbollah and possibly Hamas. Pyongyang and Tehran have also bonded over a shared aversion to Washington: as a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, declared during a ten-day trip to Iran in 2017, the two countries “have a common enemy.”

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened the convergence among these four countries in ways that transcend their historical ties. Moscow has been among Tehran’s top suppliers of weapons over the past two decades and is now its largest source of foreign investment; Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent in the first ten months of 2022. Over the past two years, according to the White House, Russia has been sharing more intelligence with and providing more weapons to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, and Moscow has defended those proxies in debates at the UN Security Council. Last year, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of crude oil and trade between the two countries topped $240 billion, a record high. Moscow has also released millions of dollars in North Korean assets that previously sat frozen in Russian banks in compliance with Security Council sanctions. China, Iran, and Russia have held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman three years in a row, most recently in March 2024. Russia has also proposed trilateral naval drills with China and North Korea.

The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each country claims a sphere of influence: China’s “core interests,” which extend to Taiwan and the South China Sea; Iran’s “axis of resistance,” the set of proxy groups that give Tehran leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; North Korea’s claim to the entire Korean Peninsula; and Russia’s “near abroad,” which for the Kremlin includes, at a minimum, the countries that composed its historic empire. All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing these spheres of influence, and they want Washington’s presence in their respective regions reduced.

All reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West’s championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and foment domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define democracy for themselves. In the end, although they may make temporary accommodations with the United States, they do not believe that the West will accept their rise (or return) to power on the world stage. They oppose external meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances, the stationing of American nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of coercive sanctions.

Any positive vision for the future, however, is more elusive. Yet history shows that a positive agenda may not be necessary for a group of discontented powers to cause disruption. The 1940 Tripartite Pact uniting Germany, Italy, and Japan—the original “Axis”—pledged to “establish and maintain a new order of things” in which each country would claim “its own proper place.” They did not succeed, but World War II certainly brought global upheaval. The axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The countries’ shared opposition to the present order’s core tenets and their determination to bring about change form a powerful basis for collaborative action.

Fissures do exist among members of the axis. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia, for instance, while Iran and Russia compete for oil markets in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The four countries have complicated histories with each other, too. The Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941; Russia and China settled their long-standing border dispute only in 2004 and had both previously supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear programs and to isolate North Korea. Today, China may look askance at North Korea’s deepening relationship with Russia, worrying that an emboldened Kim Jong Un will aggravate tensions in Northeast Asia and draw in a larger U.S. military presence, which China does not want. Yet their differences are insufficient to dissolve the bonds forged by their common resistance to a Western-dominated world.

CATALYST IN THE KREMLIN

Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The invasion of Ukraine marked a point of no return in Putin’s long-standing crusade against the West. Putin has grown more committed to destroying not only Ukraine but also the global order. And he has doubled down on relationships with like-minded countries to accomplish his aims. Cut off from Western trade, investment, and technology since the start of the war, Moscow has had little choice but to rely on its partners to sustain its hostilities. The ammunition, drones, microchips, and other forms of aid that axis members have sent have been of great help to Russia. But the more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are taking advantage of their leverage over Moscow to expand their military capabilities and economic options.

Even before the Russian invasion, Moscow’s military assistance to Beijing was eroding the United States’ military advantage over China. Russia has provided ever more sophisticated weapons to China, and the two countries’ joint military exercises have grown in scope and frequency. Russian officers who have fought in Syria and in Ukraine’s Donbas region have shared valuable lessons with Chinese personnel, helping the People’s Liberation Army make up for its lack of operational experience—a notable weakness relative to more seasoned U.S. forces. China’s military modernization has reduced the urgency of deepening defense cooperation with Russia, but the two countries are likely to proceed with technology transfers and joint weapons development and production. In February, for instance, Russian officials confirmed that they were working with Chinese counterparts on military applications of artificial intelligence. Moscow retains an edge over Beijing in other key areas, including submarine technology, remote sensing satellites, and aircraft engines. If China can pressure a more dependent Russia to provide additional advanced technologies, the transfer could further undermine the United States’ advantages.

A similar dynamic is playing out in Russia’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Moscow and Tehran have forged what the Biden administration has called an “unprecedented defense partnership” that upgrades Iranian military capabilities. Russia has provided Iran with advanced aircraft, air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber-capabilities that would help Tehran resist a potential U.S. or Israeli military operation. And in return for North Korea’s ammunition and other military support to Russia, Pyongyang is reportedly seeking advanced space, missile, and submarine technology from Moscow. If Russia were to comply with those requests, North Korea would be able to improve the accuracy and survivability of its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and use Russian nuclear propulsion technology to expand the range and capability of its submarines. Already, Russia’s testing of North Korean weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has supplied Pyongyang with information it can use to refine its missile program, and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea launch a military spy satellite in November after two previous failures last year.

Strong relations among the four axis countries have emboldened leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran. Kim, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, indulged in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, and expressed a lack of any interest in talks with the United States. And although there does not appear to be a direct connection between their deepening partnership and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, growing support from Russia likely made Iran more willing to activate its regional proxies in the aftermath. The coordinated diplomacy and pressure from Russia and the West that brought Iran into the 2015 nuclear deal are now a distant memory. Today, Moscow and Beijing are helping Tehran resist Western coercion, making it easier for Iran to enrich uranium and reject Washington’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement.

AMERICA UNDERMINED

Collaboration among the axis members also reduces the potency of tools that Washington and its partners often use to confront them. In the most glaring example, since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has supplied Russia with semiconductors and other essential technologies that Russia previously imported from the West, undercutting the efficacy of Western export controls. All four countries are also working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar. The share of Russia’s imports invoiced in Chinese renminbi jumped from three percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2022. And in December 2023, Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct bilateral trade in their local currencies. By moving their economic transactions out of reach of U.S. enforcement measures, axis members undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions, as well as anticorruption and anti-money-laundering efforts.

Taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia can build trade and transportation networks safe from U.S. interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones and other weapons to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the United States has little power to stop transfers. If the United States were engaged in conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing could seek support from Moscow. Russia might increase its overland exports of oil and gas to its southern neighbor, reducing China’s dependence on maritime energy imports that U.S. forces could block during a conflict. Russia’s defense industrial base, now in overdrive to supply weapons for Russian troops in Ukraine, could later pivot to sustain a Chinese war effort. Such cooperation would increase the odds of China’s prevailing over the American military and help advance Russia’s goal of diminishing the United States’ geopolitical influence.

The axis is also hindering Washington’s ability to rally international coalitions that can stand against its members’ destabilizing actions. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, made it far easier for countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to do the same. And Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. Last year, they elevated Iran from observer to member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a predominantly Asian regional body, and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS—a group that China and Russia view as a counterweight to the West. Iran’s regional meddling and nuclear pursuits have made other countries wary of dealing with its government, but its participation in international forums enhances the regime’s legitimacy and presents it with opportunities to expand trade with fellow member states.

Parallel efforts by axis members in the information domain further weaken international support for U.S. positions. China, Iran, and North Korea either defended or avoided explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they all parroted the Kremlin in accusing NATO of inciting the war. Their response to Hamas’s attacks on Israel last October followed a similar pattern. Iran used the state media and social media accounts to express support for Hamas, vilify Israel, and denounce the United States for enabling Israel’s military response, while the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese media sharply criticized the United States’ enduring support for Israel. They used the war in Gaza to portray Washington as a destabilizing, domineering force in the world—a narrative that is particularly resonant in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even if axis members do not overtly coordinate their messages, they push the same themes, and the repetition makes them appear more credible and persuasive.

AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER?

Global orders magnify the strength of the powerful states that lead them. The United States, for instance, has invested in the liberal international order it helped create because this order reflects American preferences and extends U.S. influence. As long as an order remains sufficiently beneficial to most members, a core group of states will defend it. Dissenting countries, meanwhile, are bound by a collective action problem. If they were to defect en masse, they could succeed in creating an alternative order more to their liking. But without a core cluster of powerful states around which they can coalesce, the advantage remains with the existing order.

For decades, threats to the U.S.-led order were limited to a handful of rogue states with little power to upend it. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the restructuring of interstate relations it prompted have lifted the constraint on collective action. The axis of upheaval represents a new center of gravity, a group that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. The axis is ushering in an international system characterized by two orders that are becoming increasingly organized and competitive.

Historically, competing orders have invited conflict, especially at the geographical seams between them. Wars arise from specific conditions, such as a territorial dispute, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to the survival of a regime. But the likelihood that any of those conditions will lead to war increases in the presence of dueling orders. Some political science researchers have found that periods in which a single order prevailed—the balance-of-power system maintained by the Concert of Europe for much of the nineteenth century, for example, or the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War era—were less prone to conflicts than those characterized by more than one order, such as the multipolar period between the two world wars and the bipolar system of the Cold War.

The world has gotten a preview of the instability this new era of competing orders will bring, with potential aggressors empowered by the axis’s normalization of alternative rules and less afraid of being isolated if they act out. Already, Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens to engulf the wider Middle East in war. Last October, Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo in 2023, too, and Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana in December. Although internal conditions precipitated the coups in Myanmar and across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, the rising incidence of such revolts is connected to the new international arrangement. For many years, it seemed that coups were becoming less common, in large part because plotters faced significant costs for violating norms. Now, however, the calculations have changed. Overthrowing a government may still shatter relations with the West, but the new regimes can find support in Beijing and Moscow.

Further development of the axis would bring even greater tumult. So far, most collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has been bilateral. Trilateral and quadrilateral action could expand their capacity for disruption. Countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all of which chafe against the U.S.-led, Western-dominated system—could also begin working more closely with the axis. If the group grows in size and tightens its coordination, the United States and its allies will have a more difficult time defending the recognized order.

TAKING ON THE REVISIONISTS

For now, U.S. national security strategy ranks China as a higher priority than Iran, North Korea, or even Russia. That assessment is strategically sound when considering the threat that individual countries pose to the United States, but it does not fully account for the cooperation among them. U.S. policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should undercut the axis’s appeal by sharpening the attractions of the existing order.

If the United States is to counter an increasingly coordinated axis, it cannot treat each threat as an isolated phenomenon. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe, for example, in order to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. It is already clear that Russia’s success in Ukraine benefits a revisionist China by showing that it is possible, if costly, to thwart a united Western effort. Even as Washington rightly sees China as its top priority, addressing the challenge from Beijing will require competing with other members of the axis in other parts of the world. To be effective, the United States will need to devote additional resources to national security, engage in more vigorous diplomacy, develop new and stronger partnerships, and take a more activist role in the world than it has of late.

Driving wedges between members of the axis, on the other hand, will not work. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some strategists suggested that the United States align itself with Russia to balance China. After the war began, a few held out hope that the United States could join China in an anti-Russian coalition. But unlike President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s, which took advantage of a Sino-Soviet split to draw Beijing further away from Moscow, there is no equivalent ideological or geopolitical rivalry for Washington to exploit today. The price of trying would likely involve U.S. recognition of a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence in Europe and Asia—regions central to U.S. interests and ones that Washington should not allow a hostile foreign power to dominate. Breaking Iran or North Korea off from the rest of the axis would be even more difficult, given their governments’ revisionist, even revolutionary aims. Ultimately, the axis is a problem the United States must manage, not one it can solve with grand strategic gestures.

Neither the West nor the axis will become wholly distinct political, military, and economic blocs. Each coalition will compete for influence all over the world, trying to draw vital countries closer to its side. Six “global swing states” will be particularly important: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey are all middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order. These six countries—and others, too—can be expected to pursue economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ties with members of both orders. U.S. policymakers should make it a priority to deny advantages to the axis in these countries, encouraging their governments to choose policies that favor the prevailing order. In practice, that means using trade incentives, military engagement, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent swing states from hosting axis members’ military bases, giving axis members access to their technology infrastructure or military equipment, or helping them circumvent Western sanctions.

Although competition with the axis may be inevitable, the United States must try to avoid direct conflict with any of its members. To that end, Washington should reaffirm its security commitments to bolster deterrence in the western Pacific, in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States and its allies should also prepare for opportunistic aggression. If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompts U.S. military intervention, for instance, Russia may be tempted to move against another European country, and Iran or North Korea could escalate threats in their regions. Even if the axis members do not coordinate their aggression directly, concurrent conflicts could overwhelm the West. Washington will therefore need to press allies to invest in capabilities that the United States could not provide if it were already engaged in another military theater.

Confronting the axis will be expensive. A new strategy will require the United States to bolster its spending on defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic communications. Washington must direct aid to the frontlines of conflict between the axis and the West—including assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, all of which face encroachment by axis members. Revisionists are emboldened by the sense that political divisions at home or exhaustion with international engagement will keep the United States on the sidelines of this competition; a comprehensive, well-resourced U.S. strategy with bipartisan support would help counter that impression. The alternative—a reduction in the U.S. global presence—would leave the fate of crucial regions in the hands not of friendly local powers but of axis members seeking to impose their revisionist and illiberal preferences.

THE FOUR-POWER THREAT

There is a tendency to downplay the significance of growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. By turning to Beijing, this argument goes, Moscow merely signals its acceptance of the role of junior partner. Obtaining drones from Iran and munitions from North Korea demonstrates the desperation of a Russian war machine that incorrectly assumed that conquering Ukraine would be easy. China’s embrace of Russia shows only that Beijing could not achieve the positive relationship it originally sought with Europe and other Western powers. North Korea remains the world’s most isolated country, and Iran’s disruptive activities have backfired, strengthening regional cooperation among Israel, the United States, and Gulf countries.

Such analysis ignores the severity of the threat. Four powers, growing in strength and coordination, are united in their opposition to the prevailing world order and its U.S. leadership. Their combined economic and military capacity, together with their determination to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War, make for a dangerous mix. This is a group bent on upheaval, and the United States and its partners must treat the axis as the generational challenge it is. They must reinforce the foundations of the international order and push back against those who act most vigorously to undermine it. It is likely impossible to arrest the emergence of this new axis, but keeping it from upending the current system is an achievable goal.

The West has everything it needs to triumph in this contest. Its combined economy is far larger, its militaries are significantly more powerful, its geography is more advantageous, its values are more attractive, and its democratic system is more stable. The United States and its partners should be confident in their own strengths, even as they appreciate the scale of effort necessary to compete with this budding anti-Western coalition. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine

Economist article in archive (no paywall)
https://archive.is/em18H

CF shut down their operations in FL. I wonder if they found out that they could buy it cheaper than
their cost to produce. Others are still producing here

May 2nd updates on frontline developments from the Frontelligence Insight, including the information about a potential Russian offensive in the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts

Before proceeding, please like and share to aid with visibility, as sometimes we get less visibility

\uD83E\uDDF5Thread pic.twitter.com/feAVAAxf8W

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

2/ After successes in the Ocheretyne area, Russian forces now have slightly more than 10 kilometers of ground between them and the T0504 highway, which connects Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. However, another potential threat is emerging from the northward-leading road. pic.twitter.com/rZOHZdqcpV

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

3/ The Russian expansion into Arkhangel's'ke widens their range of possibilities and complicates Ukrainian efforts to establish a cohesive defensive system across such a broad area, particularly given the understaffing of many brigades.

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

4/ Frontelligence Insight analyzed imagery from April 22nd and May 1st to identify new scorch marks left by artillery or other projectiles. The results indicate Russian efforts concentrated in the western and northern directions, suggesting they may attempt to exploit this road. pic.twitter.com/tEzkzhvcMY

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

5/ As mentioned in our previous update, Russians launched multiple assaults in the Bilohorivka-Siversk area. The 6th separate MRB tried to assault Spirne, south of Bilohorivka, with 1 tank and 3 MTLBs carrying infantry. Only 1 MTLB survived and retreated. Photo: @4emberlen pic.twitter.com/EkyDsLe6lQ

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

6/ The Kharkiv-Sumy Area Offensive (?)

There is speculation about Russia's intentions to invade Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, requiring clarification of key details.

We previously identified Russian forces equivalent to two corps stationed along the border of Sumy and Kharkiv.

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

7/ Firstly, we have not observed the formation of a concentrated force capable of conducting a deep strike. Instead, we see scattered units that could potentially assemble into a striking force in the future, although this is not evident at present.

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

8/ Based on available to us information, these units are mainly infantry-based and have insufficient tanks and armored vehicles for deep maneuvers. Therefore, any operations against Ukrainian forces in Sumy and Kharkiv will differ from the large-scale invasion seen in 2022

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

9/ Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, suggests that Russia’s northern grouping, located across the border from Kharkiv, currently consists of 35,000 troops. https://t.co/FMCdSwXSJ3

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

10/ This aligns with our earlier estimates of the force approximately equivalent to 2 Russian corps in the area. Skibitsky anticipates that Russia's main offensive will commence "at the end of May or beginning of June." pic.twitter.com/A9eU7QgmSy

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

11/ While their increased presence poses some threat, the current force levels are insufficient for a significant deep maneuver into Ukrainian territory. Our team will continue to monitor the area to identify changes

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 2, 2024

(Thread w/o Politics)

As an Infantry Vet, you are most likely familiar with the acronym DIME

(except from Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 "Strategy" dated 25 April 2018)

"The Instruments of National Power

The ‘DIME’ acronym (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) has been used for many years to describe the instruments of national power.

(Break)

Evaluating Strategy

The preeminent metric for judging a strategy’s success is whether it achieves the desired political aim at an acceptable cost."

Unfortunately (especially for the Ukrainians), Russia is has defaulted to it's "Great Patriotic War" programing and has turned an ill-advised "quick" invasion into an existential war for their perceived survival.  Unfortunately for the Ruskies, this has become self-fulfilling because of the amount of resources they have thrown a Ukraine to date.  Since the Russians seem to be determined to fight to the death instead of cutting their their losses when they could still walk away with something and instead are "all in".   At this point Trump's potential actions/reactions as they relate to Ukraine are fixin' to become a factor. Global Economics may also become a major factor.  Having said that, analysis of potential Trump CoA's may be useful; "Orange Man Good" or "Orange Man Bad" with no analysis is not helpful.  Ukraine is in possession of information that could potentially destabilize a lot of Western leadership.  We can probably safely bet that Russia has similar "kompromat" information on a lot of western leadership. It WILL get out eventually as one side or the other sees it to their advantage.  European, US, and Russian Geopolitics is central to this war; so it will be almost impossible to assess Russian and Ukrainian actions without reading the tea leaves of the US election, since both the Russians and the Ukes are fixated on it and are already adjusting their strategies to influence it, since neither one believes the war will end before January 20th.  

russia, Iran, Hamas, China etc. are poking the US everywhere they can... and the lack of response encourages the enemies of the West to push further and further...

This is how deterrence fails. https://t.co/6jBvbPftcZ

Thomas C. Theiner  (@noclador) May 2, 2024

Russian troops have now entered a base in Niger that is housing U.S. troops as well, a senior U.S. official tells Reuters. While the Russian troops are in a hanger further down the airfield at Airbase 101, the official said the situation "is not great." W/@phildstewart

Idrees Ali  (@idreesali114) May 2, 2024

Recently 3 North Korean women have a similar talk in Texas, I’d have to dig up the video from last month


https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2024/04/30/3-north-korean-refugees-share-stories-of-terror-perseverance-in-us-tour-that-stops-at-smu/?outputType=amp


Attached File

You can say that again.  Now the Houthis are saying they're going to keep attacking ships until Israel is destroyed.  

From today's ISW Backgrounder Link

ISW assessment for May 2nd.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024

Somewhere, the ghost of Thomas Jefferson is furious!

I get the distinct impression that we're losing in the Red Sea.  We're intercepting most of their spitballs by flinging gold bars at them that we will struggle to replace while doing little or no damage in return.  What Is Going On With Shipping says traffic volume is down 50% and most of those who transit are shouting to everybody that they are certified Jew free, and usually also that they are doing business with China.  WIGOWS says even some kind of US military cargo turned back the other day.  

The Houthis, Iranians, and Chinese are accomplishing most of their goals at negligible cost and we are achieving very few of ours at high cost, while our ammo situation deteriorates.  I don't detect a plan B cooking in the Biden administration.  The protests have the Biden crew even more vapor locked than usual.

Plan B is going out for ice cream and never coming back.  Egypt was in the hurt locker before the Houthi attacks and is in worse shape now.  The only thing that keeps them afloat is $30 billion the UAE gave them to develop land along the Red Sea.  Egypt in chaos plays right into Iran's plans.  All the countries they fear and hate--Saudi, UAE, Israel, and the US busy dealing with Egypt means fewer resources available yo mess with Iran.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/How-China-s-ad-hoc-tech-pipeline-fuels-Russia-s-Ukraine-war-efforts

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🇷🇺🇺🇦 Chronicle of a special military operation
for May 1-2, 2024




Russian troops launched missile attacks on logistics infrastructure facilities and the headquarters of the operational command “South” in Odessa, as well as air defense systems and MLRS in the Kharkov region. The enemy, in turn, carried out another drone raid on Russian energy system facilities in the Kursk and Oryol regions.

In the Bakhmut direction, on the approaches to Chasov Yar, active clashes continue in the Novy microdistrict, as well as in the Stupki-Golubovskie-2 forest reserve, where Russian troops are advancing in the direction of the Seversky Donets - Donbass canal.

On the northern front of the Avdeevsky direction, Russian troops are clearing Keramik and Novokalinovo and have begun assault operations on the outskirts of Arkhangelsk, where the enemy is still unable to stabilize the front line. To the south, the Russian Armed Forces advanced a kilometer in the direction of Sokol from Solovyevo.

In the Vremyevsky direction, Russian troops, after several weeks of air and artillery strikes, went on the offensive in the Urozhaynoye area and gained a foothold on the southern outskirts of the village. Taking into account the geographical location, control over the taken positions in the future will make it possible to align the front along the Urozhaynoye - Novodonetskoye line.

https://t.me/rybar/59717



#Summary for the morning of May 3, 2024

▪️The situation in the Kherson direction remains unchanged. Krynki and the area near the Antonovsky Bridge remain points of tension; there are counter actions by both sides on the islands in the floodplain of the river. Dnieper. The enemy uses drones to strike and destroy communication towers. In the Cossack Camps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a civilian vehicle was fired upon, one person was killed, and one civilian was wounded by shrapnel. There are forest fires in the Golopristansky district due to enemy strikes.

▪️On the Zaporozhye front, there were oncoming battles in Rabotino. North-west of Verbovoy, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, after a massive artillery barrage, tried to move forward with two assault groups and take our positions, but in a shooting battle they were scattered and put to flight. Many night FPV drones and enemy UAV bombers of the “Baba Yaga” type continue to represent one of the main methods of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to strike our positions and mine the area.

▪️In the Vremevsky direction, the Russian Armed Forces storm Urozhaynoye, gaining a foothold in the southern part of the village. Enemy resources report 13 attacks by our units per day, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are trying to recapture occupied positions. Aviation of the Russian Army strikes at the enemy’s near rear, disrupting the rotation of enemy units and the approach of reinforcements.

▪️In the Pokrovsky direction (west of Avdeevka), the Russian Army continues to build on its success from the Ocheretinsky ledge. Part of the village is occupied. Arkhangelskoye, there are reports of the flight of some units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the village. In battles, the Russian Armed Forces level the front line with flank attacks, which indicates the growing professionalism of our commanders in tactical-level battles in this direction. Attack operations are underway in the direction of Novoaleksandrovka.

▪️In the direction to Chasov Yar, the Russian Armed Forces are destroying enemy equipment and positions with air and artillery strikes. Deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine Skibitsky said that “the fall of the Yar Hours is a matter of time.” Videos are being circulated from the city showing the deplorable state of enemy personnel.

▪️A high pace of hostilities continues in Kislovka in the Kupyansky direction and east of Ternov in Krasnolimansky.

▪️In the Belgorod region yesterday, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that 8 enemy aircraft-type UAVs were shot down during the day. The village of Novostroevka-Vtoraya, Grayvoronsky urban district, was attacked by a drone of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

▪️In the Kursk region, the village of Gordeevka of the Korenevsky district, the villages of Guevo and Gornal of the Sudzhansky district, the village of Elizavetovka, the Zarya farm, the villages of Krasnooktyabrsky and Novy Put of the Glushkovsky district, the village of Iskra of the Khomutovsky district are located. Enemy drones were neutralized by electronic warfare equipment near the village. Begoshcha, Rylsky district, the villages of Vnezapnoye and the village of Gordeevka, Korenevsky district, the village of Gornal, Sudzhansky district, the village of Dronovka and the village of Novy Put, Glushkovsky district. An explosive device was dropped from an Ukrainian Armed Forces UAV in Tyotkino.

▪️An enemy UAV was also shot down over Crimea last night.

The summary was compiled by: Two majors

https://t.me/dva_majors/41461

I 100% agree.

The malcontents of the Russian 205th Motorized.

The first changes in key positions have begun.
You understand that Comrade Ivanov was not arrested because he stole.
A kind of preparation of a springboard for the start of an offensive.
New people must bring new goals. Instead of the old ones.
We are confidently moving towards victory.
More replacements will follow soon.

2️⃣0️⃣5️⃣
https://t.me/mototroopers_205/1248



Attacks on refineries significantly reduce activity. If the sufficiency of fuel supply is still ensured by reserves, then in the future there will be an acute shortage of fuel. And now the question will be: to cut at the expense of the economy or war?
The war will slowly and inevitably fade away.
Chemical plants will follow the refineries.
Aleksinsky for example.

2️⃣0️⃣5️⃣
https://t.me/mototroopers_205/1249



May 9 has nothing to do with the fall of the Crimean Bridge.
At least two more important events will happen, and it will definitely not be in May.
But.. Crimean Bridge yes.. We won’t save it.

2️⃣0️⃣5️⃣
https://t.me/mototroopers_205/1250



I would not be so happy about the next liberation of insignificant settlements on the map.
Looking objectively, you can easily see that advances occur over short distances as for the offensive in that period of time.
And from a military point of view, our resources are being depleted. First of all, in technology.
And we understand this.
But politics and ratings, the authorities overshadowed the mind.
The enemy’s defense is holding, we are squeezing out every 500 meters with thousands of lives and dozens of tanks.
This is exhaustion with an already visible end.

2️⃣0️⃣5️⃣
https://t.me/mototroopers_205/1252



Official data from 30.04 RF Ministry of Defense

📊 In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: ........, 15888 tanks......

Statistics on the number of tanks in the ranks of the spacecraft in 1941.
Designation VO - internal districts - equipment undergoing repair and restoration, YES - active army - equipment directly involved in hostilities.

12333 tanks and self-propelled guns according to the book: The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

20670 tanks and self-propelled guns, taking into account YES and VO: Campaigns and strategic operations in numbers. Volume II. - M.: United editorial office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, 2010.

21,700 tanks and self-propelled guns (Active Army) according to the book: Armored forces of the Soviet Army in the battles for the Motherland. Military historical essay. Part 2. P. 743. 1965

35,400 tanks and self-propelled guns (Total: active army and military units). Data from the book: The Great Patriotic War without the classification of secrecy. Book of losses. G. F. Krivosheev, V. M. Andronnikov, P. D. Burikov, V. V. Gurkin. M.: Veche, 2009. P. 339, 342

Major General L.G. Ivashov (VIZH No. 11'89) gives the figure 23,457 tanks, of which 30% are combat-ready.
The publication of the General Staff “The classification has been removed...” (M., 1993) determines their number at 22,600 units.

The length of the Soviet-German front exceeded 6 thousand km, and the total size of the territory covered by military operations in 1941–1945. amounted to about 3 million sq. km.

In 1941, the Wehrmacht army was 8 million 300 thousand against 5 million 700 thousand spacecraft.

During the heyday of the tank wars, during the period of 1943 and the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had 8.1 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns for an army of almost 10 million, experiencing a constant shortage.

... Destroyed!! 15888 tanks in two years... Almost 8 thousand a year.
Exactly this amount was in the active Red Army in 1943 along the entire length of the front.

2️⃣0️⃣5️⃣
https://t.me/mototroopers_205/1254



Several units from the Kherson direction will be redeployed to other sectors of the front.
Most likely the Kupyansk direction.
We expect the enemy to intensify actions along the entire left bank.

2️⃣0️⃣5️⃣
https://t.me/mototroopers_205/1255

Continuation of the Russian soldier’s POV narrative from a few days ago.  Says out of his platoon, two people are left, everyone else dead or wounded.  Talks about deserters/refuseniks being shot on the spot and calling them KIA.  GRIM picture.

Russian tank, possibly abandoned but running, hit by “package dropper” quads.  Tank gets brewed up by one down the driver’s hatch, you can see a drone drop another one behind the tank when it lurches forward.  The FPV video should be amazing.

M T L B R E K T

Long FPV of a Ukrainian trench assault in the Kremmina area.  Enemy not visible.

Russian BMP-1 with a dead driver in the hatch hit by kamikaze, eventually KABOOMs

Still pics, three damaged/abandoned Russian tanks, all with big cages.  Interestingly, looks like at least 2 (if not all 3) are T62s.

Russian 152mm SPAG with new copeshed-over-log-cabin armor.

Somewhat amusing POW video about a Russian certain he’s a liberator but also that Russia invaded and “annexed” Ukrainian territory.

Gazprom goes into the red for the first time in decades.

Russian drone drops a CS/chloropicrin grenade into a UA dugout.

BRUTAL kamikaze hit on three Russians.  One KIA, two badly wounded.  NSFW.

Several pics of Maxim guns being used in training, probably anti-Shahed.

Pile of Russian AT mines deflagrates over 6 minutes.

Surveillance and shelling of the Russian-held slagheap near Avdiivka

Series of brutal kamikaze hits on Russians trying to assault UA positions.  With spotting.

Kamikaze cleanup of damaged/abandoned Russian tank and APCs from a failed small assault.  Several Russian dead visible.  Good footage.

Series of drone drops on Russian troops.

Two drone drops badly wound or kill a lone Russian

Series of drone drops, mostly notable for the amusing intro

Edited down series of drone hits on Russians.

Drone drop OBLITERATES an abandoned Russian BMP-2, kamikaze burns down abandoned T-series tank.

ATACMS strike on training ground kills over 100, wounds many more.

Unknown Russian APC drops off infantry then blows up on a mine.  Thermal view.

UA drone takeoff accident.  That’s why you have a dugout close by!

Small Russian unit eats a DPICM.

Series of drone drops on Russians.  One brutal.

EXTREMELY NSFW.  UA kamikaze hits an unaware Russian, takes his legs and head off.  If you aren’t paying attention, you get about 1 second of warning.

Damaged/abandoned Russian T-series tank brews up, cause unknown.

Lone Russian soldier direct hit, likely by a kamikaze and likely killed.  Spotter view off a monitor only.

Another snippet of a Russian copeshed tank

Thermal video showing Russian tank with full copeshed, jammer, and mineroller, being used to carry assault infantry.  Title says they are increasingly using tanks more than APCs now.

EXTREEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEMELY NSFW.  Kamikaze finishes off a wounded Russian by hitting him in the face.  A bad one.

Russian POV tour of his dugout

Direct links between Russian Red Cross, Putin, and the Russian Army.  Head of RRC is member of the “All Russia People’s Front” which supplies military gear and other things.  Worth a read.

Aftermath of a failed Russian assault.  3-4 MTLBs destroyed, 1-2 T-series tanks.

Overview of destruction in Chasiv Yar

Kamikaze attack on CGC.  Results unknown.

At least 15 Ukrainian POWs executed on camera since December.

Series of kamikaze strikes on Russian transport and a BTR

Mine clearing training in Ukraine

Macron again refuses to rule out intervention if Ukrainians can’t hold the line.

Ukrainian tank working over Russian positions

Ukrainian program to train civilians in military and resistance tactics.

Russian POV, aftermath of a Russian BTR destroyed by Baba Yaga.  Blown to hell.

The Ukrainian civilian logistics/support system

UA claims Russia dropped over 3000 glide bombs in April.

Satellite view - S300/400 battery likely hit in Dzankoy airfield attack.

Kamikaze strikes on Russian positions, and a large pie of mines blown up.

Reported as survey of 42 destroyed Russian armored vehicles in one are of the Donetsk front.

Thermal drone drops on Russians.  One direct hit, VERY NSFW.

Russian BUK SAM destroyed by long-range fixed-wing kamikaze.  Great footage!

Good look at the organization and dynamics Ukrainians trying to deal with Russia for their POWs.  Interesting details, like Russians directly contacting relatives to recruit them as assets with an “or else” offer.

US to send M2E4A1 Bradleys to replace all models.

LONG interview with ISW contributor regarding the progress of the war and the results of the long delay in US military aid.  Excellent interview, worth the time if you have it.

Before/after satellite photos show destroyed oil storage tanks in Smolensk Russia

US starting to sanction China over military DIB supplies to Russia

Still pic, Russian MSTA-S SPAG wrecked by Baba Yaga

One Bradley tows another out of a mud pit.

Meduza report that Russian governmental apparatchiks promised career advancement for taking administrative jobs in Ukraine are not seeing the benefits they anticipated and also now perceive non-trivial risks.

Russian infantry hiding in, around, and under a disabled BMP-1 receive a series of explosive gifts.

Russian repair depot somewhere in Donetsk showing a yard full of wrecked armored vehicles.

Series of kamikaze and drop attacks on Russian vehicles and troops, day and night

2:45 of Magyar carnage

6:28 video of the ATACMS hit on Russian training formation

Lol right.

A big thanks to @SGL_Shooter !!!

I received your care package of socks, med supplies, foot powder, and a Ukrainian flag.
Attached File


The guys are already grabbing what they need, and we will get this flag signed and sent back to you. Thank you so much!

More contextual video of the javelined tank from yesterday.

The epic destruction of a Russian tank near the village of Urozhaine, Donetsk region
Video from soldiers of the 58th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade

?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ? ?????? ???? ????????, ?????????
????? ??? ?????? 58-? ??????? ???????????? ??????? pic.twitter.com/ViE35GNreo

— ????????? ?? ?????? (@small10space) May 3, 2024

Scranton Army Ammunition Plant (SCAAP) already achieved the 2027 target of increased production of 155mm shells, producing 36,000 shells per month, up from just 7,000 before Russia invaded Ukraine.
- Doug Bush, Asst Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology pic.twitter.com/8HA8fjYdpq

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 3, 2024

155mm production in Scranton and Wilkes-Barre last month ramped up to more than 36,000 shells, their highest in decades, Army's Doug Bush tells reporters.#UkraineWar #USModernization

Carla Babb  (@CarlaBabbVOA) May 2, 2024

❗️The katsaps have a new destructive weapon "Dragon" - Welt

In recent weeks, a prototype of the new TOS-3 flamethrower system has appeared for the first time. Each Dragon launcher is capable of launching missiles with thermobaric warheads of high destructive power. TOS-3 is a breakthrough weapon that even bunkers and city blocks cannot withstand. The publication writes that one volley can turn several blocks of the city "into ruins."

The new missile launcher can fire missiles at a distance of up to 15 km, and therefore (unlike TOS-1 and TOS-2) cannot be successfully attacked by Ukrainian FPVs

https://t.me/Tsaplienko/53040

⚡️ Over the past night, attempts by the Kyiv regime to carry out terrorist attacks using aircraft-type UAVs against targets on the territory of the Russian Federation were stopped.

Air defense systems on duty destroyed and intercepted five Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles over the territory of the Belgorod region and one UAV was destroyed over the territory of the Crimean Peninsula.

🔹 Russian Ministry of Defense

https://t.me/mod_russia/38198

Ukrainian trench assault with drone spotting and possibly fire support.  Pretty awesome video, several prisoners taken.

UA kamikazes burn down Russian fuel truck

Kamikaze threads the needle to take out a lone Russian

Russian dumbass decides to throw down with a drone when he didn’t have to.  Mistake!

Kamikaze strikes on Russian positions and towed arty

Series of drone drops on Russians by the Dodo unit

Series of kamikaze strikes on Russian positions and transport.  No spotter.

Kamikaze brews up concealed Russian BMD

Drone drops wound three Russians at a position.  Two likely badly wounded or killed.

Lone Russian carrying a load direct hit by kamikaze.  Likely killed.

Russian surveillance cameras on a TV tower destroyed.

Kamikaze attacks on a small-scale Russian armored assault.  One part you can see the whole top of a BMP sparkling with rifle fire from the infantry shooting at the drone.

Series of kamikaze attacks on Russian troops.  No spotter.

PART 1 Flying Skull kamikaze attacks on Russian troops.  BRUTAL HITS.  Possibly a couple of Flying Claymores (TM).

PART 2 Flying Skull kamikaze attacks on Russian troops and vehicles.

A few divebomber/package dropper attacks on Russian positions.

Thermal drone drop on two Russians.

Russian decides to flip off a UA drone operator, receives an explosive response.

Well lookie there.  It’s the FPV video from the above strike.

Large series of kamikaze attacks on Russian transport, and some armored vehicles.  Night and day.

Russian soldier lucks out with when teh first drop doesn’t detonate, but his luck runs out about 3 seconds later when the second drop direct-hits him AND detonates the first drop.

Baba Yaga working on the east bank of Kherson

Kamikaze direct-hits reasonably well-concealed Russian.  Likely fatal.  EXTREMELY NSFW.

UA incendiary munitions test

Series of drone drops on Russian positions and troops.  One BRUTAL drop blows a wounded Russian 10 yards into the river.  NSFW.

Series of kamikaze strikes on Russian armored vehicles.  Some but not all spotted.  Also hits on Russians hiding in and under destroyed armor.

Russian takes a brutal drone drop to the leg.  Also shows that one can’t assume a thermal view is actually a night operation.  NSFW.

Drone drop hits Russian in a shell crater

Series of kamikaze strikes on Russian troops and positions

Kamikaze attacks Russian truck with some hangers-on

LR fixed-wing kamikaze strikes on two Russian BUKs

Drone drops on Russian night assault group

Series of LR fixed-wing kamikaze attacks on Russian checkpoint and vehicles in Kherson area

CANDYGRAM FOR MONGO.  Plus various strikes on Russians in the open.

Series of kamikaze attacks on a small-scale Russian assault across a wheat field.  No spotters but kamikaze view indicates several damaged/abandoned.

Series of night drops on Russian infantry near Novomikhailivka

Possibly a Flying Claymore (TM) attack

Kamikaze hit to the engine deck damages Russian tank

UA kamikazes destroy two BMPs and a T-72, plus some troops and vehicles.  Jammers seen on the armored vehicles.

Kamikaze finishes off a likely wounded Russian

Series of kamikaze hits on Russians, no spotter

1/2 Guerre d'Ukraine | 02/05/24

\uD83C\uDF10 Synthèse mouvements\uD83D\uDD39U240502-1004

Secteurs :
\uD83C\uDF10 Kupiansk-Kyslivka\uD83D\uDD39U240502-0952
\uD83C\uDF10 Avdiivka-Ocheretyne\uD83D\uDD39U240502-1001
\uD83C\uDF10 Velyka novosilka-Urozhaine\uD83D\uDD39U240502-0957#UkraineRussianWar #GuerreEnUkraine pic.twitter.com/CNfxWBg0pr

Poulet volant  (@Pouletvolant3) May 3, 2024

Occupation Governor



Kyiv terrorists dealt another blow to a five-story residential building in Tokmak.
According to preliminary data, there may be people under the rubble. Rescuers are working on the spot.

https://t.me/BalitskyEV/3121



💥💥💥 Byak-smyak! Meet Tokmak!

Katsapnia, did you like it?

Can we help with anything else?

https://t.me/gnilayachereha/15648

About the only way they know hiw to take a town/city.

\uD83D\uDD25\uD83D\uDD25\uD83D\uDD25

\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFARussian 9K330 «Tor» surface-to-air missile system was destroyed by M142 «Himars» MLRS in the Zaporizhzhia region.

The \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukrainian-made PD-2 UAV, which was purchased by the Come Back Alive Foundation, found and adjusted the work of Himars. pic.twitter.com/XOR0PW8xV3

— Cloooud |\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GloOouD) May 3, 2024

Radar was operating at some point while the drone watched.

HIMARS strike on Russian TOR air defence system, Zaporizhzhia front. https://t.co/z9RA3jss3I pic.twitter.com/FRkYYaYL9w

— Special Kherson Cat \uD83D\uDC08\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@bayraktar_1love) May 3, 2024

A significant amount of work is being carried out to adapt AASM Hammer bombs to F-16 jets that will be delivered to Ukraine. https://t.co/edxMxBNfcA pic.twitter.com/BaYKSgpYTK

— French Aid to Ukraine \uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDF5\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@aidefranceukr) May 3, 2024

Germany has started delivery of AMPS self-protection systems to Ukraine, with one delivered in April.

AMPS is a highly modular system that can detect incoming missile threats and deploy various countermeasures. Ukrainian attack helicopters will most likely receive the upgrade. pic.twitter.com/im6RUqXq5C

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) May 2, 2024

USN major surface combatants & VLS count changes between 2027 - 2035.

->Impressive number of newly commissioned with 2496 cells added
->Final 2 Tico & Flight-I AB retirement negates 50% of the above growth
->In the span of 9 years, USN may see a 1082 VLS net increase pic.twitter.com/7qHMnzQ0Nw

SomePLAOSINT  (@someplaosint) May 3, 2024

When considering changes in hulls and VLS counts between 2023 - 2026 with a negative growth of -790. USN may only see a meager 292 VLS count growth from 2023 - 2035.https://t.co/AxqNaElwhM

SomePLAOSINT  (@someplaosint) May 3, 2024

A Simple way of eliminating Orcs pic.twitter.com/NNn0734j6y

Getty  (@gettylegion) May 3, 2024

Italy is planning to supply Ukraine with a highly capable Samp-T SAM system, per la Repubblica.

The system, able to provide ballistic missile and long-range air defense coverage, will reportedly be included in an aid package announced before the Apulia G7 Summit in June. pic.twitter.com/PZdzPa4Hqi

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) May 3, 2024

??Before the G7 summit, \uD83C\uDDEE\uD83C\uDDF9Italy intends to hand over the 9th package of military aid to \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukraine, which will include a battery of SAMP-T air defense systems, as well as artillery shells - La Repubblica

It was previously reported that Italy is recalling the SAMP-T system from… pic.twitter.com/J0y06WTeYF

— \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukrainian Front (@front_ukrainian) May 3, 2024

Britain confirms plans to double rocket artillery fleet - The Ministry of Defence has confirmed plans to upgrade and expand its Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fleet to 85 vehicles from around 40. Click the image to read more.https://t.co/D4Zpo9CbqX

UK Defence Journal  (@UKDefJournal) May 3, 2024

This could be an accident, but I would have suspicions given the circumstances.

#Fck

Diehl Defense (Hersteller IRIS-T) in Berlin  \uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDEA brennt \uD83D\uDD25 lichterloh.

pic.twitter.com/Th4clQAQZg

— @BrennpunktUA \uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@BrennpunktUA) May 3, 2024

There are different branches of Diehl, the burning factory is Diehl Metall not Diehl Defence. They produce products mostly for automotive industry...

Graue Suppe  (@Kiezinitiative) May 3, 2024

https://www.twz.com/air/israel-is-shooting-down-a-lot-of-its-own-drones

Deconfliction is a big job.












U.S. Marine LAV-M with Hero 120 drones.

Secretive Long Range Attack Missile For Marine AH-1s Is Now Being Flight Tested

The Long Range Attack Missile, based on an unknown Air Force weapon, will help ensure Marine AH-1Zs stay relevant in future high-end fights.

Story: https://t.co/gmLNhdWpFn

The War Zone  (@thewarzonewire) May 3, 2024

Who's up for some Russian turret toss competition? \uD83D\uDD25?#ArmUkraineNow
I'm starting to upload things to this telegram, need to clean out space for more, Russia is just to flammable \uD83E\uDD0C https://t.co/b04g3o8Z0T pic.twitter.com/X6HiTVVAAT

— Kvist.P \uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDF0\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@kvistp) May 2, 2024

??The Armed Forces of \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukraine will receive advanced attack drones with firearms on board, - Defense Industry Europe

The \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8American company Feloni Aero announced the launch of a new line of UAVs designed to "strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities."

These are the Felon 1.0 c… pic.twitter.com/O3pi0SogLa

— \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukrainian Front (@front_ukrainian) May 3, 2024

You had me at Spike missile.

https://defence-industry.eu/feloni-aero-introduces-weaponized-drones-to-strengthen-defence-efforts-in-ukraine/







Mini Spike test footage in the U.S.  the missile costs $5,000.



https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2016/05/10/china-lake-spike-the-5000-missile/



This could get interesting.

They are making parts for the Diehl Defence Group, lots of parts.

Thanks for that info, dang.

Super late since I'm so far behind this thread, but this is the seminal quote for my entire stand in UA/RUS conflict.  

Right on Capta!  Love it!

Movie: more than 20 days in Mariupol

I'm surprised that domestic commies dont protest and shut down those "Nork stories from hell" type tours. After all it must be counter productive to the revolution...

But that would’ve attacking women of color!

Eventually, someone (most likely US) will have to deal with those assholes but only after they have been thoroughly emboldened and strengthened by years of coddling.

It's typical for German companies, (offically) non of them are making anything for military because of the politically hyper correct libtards. No civilian company would list Rheinmetall or Diehl Defense as customer or partner.  

The leftists are compiling and publishing lists with companies who clandistinely working for the defense sector.

I read about one instance from a company that made screws for H&K, the libtards even protested for days in front of the entrance. They lost lots of customers, because working with such companies is branded unethical in Germany.

Groups like Diehl are having dozens of subcompanies located all over the world, offically strictly separated between civilian and defense, not only to avoid taxes.

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