What I understood was a lack of supplies to include munitions was substantially hampering the Ukes ability to fight.  So you are saying the lack of artillery ammo such as 155 mm was not a substantial factor? Both sides were repeatedly saying it was.  Certainly that wasn't the only factor but it is/was a substantial one.    Two things can be going on at the same time such as there were substantial limits on available munitions to include 155 and there was IO to point that out as one of the reason why things were going poorly.  It's not one being absolute while the other does not exist at all.  It rarely works that way.

You selectively framing the conversation this way seems to be a reflection of a personal bias over objectivity.

I'd appreciate it if you stop being so obtuse.  

I don't watch every single video linked in this thread (or the original thread), but I also have never denied that Russian artillery is being destroyed- nor that there may be videos of it, in this thread...I merely stated that I. Haven't. Seen. Them.  Myself.

The story of the claims of a new Hezbollah drone and the Hezbollah attack on the blimp site are part of a much larger story about Hezbollah innovation and intelligence gathering and our-of-the-box thinking. Hezbollah will continue to surprise https://t.co/dORIwfDwNz

Seth Frantzman  (@sfrantzman) May 17, 2024

#Hezbollah has regularly fired missiles across the border with #Israel over the past seven months, but the one on Thursday appears to have been the first successful missile airstrike it has launched from within Israeli airspace.https://t.co/OzPEKVBIit

Jason Brodsky  (@JasonMBrodsky) May 17, 2024

Entire article mentioned in tweet.  Direct link.

You guys have the shortest memories. I remember the debate and how the lack of fires was the cause of the problem and if only they could increase the volume of fires, they would be winning.  The only solution was passing of the aid bill.

The cognitive dissident you guys show is amazing

Fake out the defenders for a few weeks until they don't rise to the bait and then attack for real. It's a tactic that has been used forever.

30 drones at 10 refineries

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/german-defence-industry-says-it-will-need-government-help-reduce-dependence-2024-05-17/

Attached File

But they all died; doesn’t seem like a very effective tactic.

You still have to be good at your job.

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/4465554

The title of the article is: "Zelensky: No reports of artillery shortages for first time in full-scale war"
The first three sentences are:
1.  For the first time since the launch of Russia's full-scale invasion, no Ukrainian brigades have reported a lack of artillery shells, President Volodymyr Zelensky told reporters on May 16.
2.  "And this has been happening for the past two months," he said, but added: "Everyone still has a lot of work to do."
3.  Over the winter months, Ukraine's Armed Forces suffered a critical shortage of artillery shells, in large part due to delays in U.S. military aid.

R0N, you seem to be taking the second sentence "and this has been happending for the past two months" to mean that there has not been an artillery shortage for 2 months.  That doesn't reconcile with "For the first time since the launch of Russia's full-scale invasion, no Ukrainian brigades have reported a lack of artillery shells".

Zelensky even points out that the critical shorage in the winter months was due in large part because of delays in US military aid.

You see the cognitive dissonance of the Ukraine supporters, and cite the fact that most here don't have access to more sensitive information.  I am open to other sources of information if you have some to suggest.

The individuals opposed to the aid had similar inconsistancies.  Current senior military leadership who should have access to the best informaiton available in the US were on record of how critical the aid was.  Mike Johnson switched his position and implored other members to attend briefings in the SCIF to understand the situation.  Those on this board saw that as the deep state having something over Johnson (or he's been bought off and that senior military leaders are crooked as well), versus a person examining the best information available and arriving to a different conclusion than they had previously without that information.

Thanks, tactic understood.   Exposing a defensive line to an expected armored attack and doing so with no drone support and inadequate artillery is what concerns me.

If based on what you have available, that is your interpretation you are free to have it.  

Based on what I have available to me, I see it the way I see it

Well, for one he should be able to reach a whole new set of Russian positions with the old “exploding-drone-on-a-pole” trick.

Do you have any proof at all?  Sources?  Or are you just “curating” information hoping we’ll take your word for it?

Didn’t you post the article from the Ukrainian aid station that discussed what was causing most of the wounds?

In that article, the doctor what said like 80% of wounds were from UAS?

Holy fuck, those Russians got what they deserved, good and hard!

My joy has increased already today.

Okay, thanks-  plenty to see there, with everything from cook-offs to immediate fireball conversions.  


I am flabbergasted that anyone would think that I'm trolling; either here or in the other thread.  It's not like I ever stated at any time that Ukraine wasn't successfully destroying lots of Russian artillery.

Understood.  The OSINT guys like warspotting/oryx numbers match up very well (basically 100%) with what gets posted here as “artillery”.  Just don’t expect the UA number to line up because they aren’t using the same definition.

Lego blowjob overhead perspective, proving that hilarity can come out of tragedy.

Just the nature of a forum,  or any text reading, sometimes we read things incorrectly or don't realize the other poster was joking or just mistook your meaning when you posted something.  It is good to clarify though and all is usually good and understood then.

Right, so it’s the old “I have super secret into that I can’t say but you should believe me.”
Frankly I don’t believe you.  Based on previous experiences, including with other SMEs who say otherwise, I believe you are presenting the issue in a way that serves your own anti-aid, anti-Ukraine bias.
You aren’t presenting information.  You’re presenting opinion, which is fine.  You can hold an opinion that’s different from mine.
I’ve yet to see you explain how and why the Russians would be interested in dovetailing their reporting about Ukraine’s ammo shortage with Ukraine’s reporting about their ammo shortage.

Other SMEs?  

Do you know there is actually a SME list that IC has for various things, are you saying that they are on that list?  If not what makes the a SME?  I noticed there are a few people that I would consider a SME on some subjects, since they have years of doing that job but they have been either banned or stopped posted because of the high amount of noise to signal they get on this subject because they don’t agree with the narratives.

Not that I remember, no.
I’ve seen various statements from both the Ukraine side and the Russian side.  Ones that come to mind that are pertinent:
85% of RUSSIAN armor losses are from FPVs.
The figure that I can personally remember posting was that 50% of RUSSIAN casualties are from FPV/drone drops.
The only thing I remember posting about Ukraine is that “the majority of losses are still from artillery.”
Another pretty strong refutation of your contention is the daily (claimed) Russian casualty numbers.  It ran at a consistent 1200+per day for a long while, then fell to a consistent 800, and now it has risen to a consistent 1200+ again.  Hard to explain the Ukrainians choosing not to kill Russians in order to maintain an IO op, but you could certainly opine that they were just lying about the numbers.

What I can (and do) believe and in fact said so 6 months ago, is that the real IO op was the whole question of “will or won’t Congress pass the aid bill at all?”
I absolutely believe we always knew it was going through but played the game to convince Russia they could still win if they just threw a little bit more at Ukraine for another 6 months.

I believe that some amount of aid was moving - to Poland, where it sat in depots.  This was also reported at the time.

I also said here in writing that we would delay the aid bill decision until after Putin was inaugurated, so that his path is set and there’s no going back.
This has resulted in another 180,000 dead Russians, another few thousand armored vehicles, 15% and increasing damage to their cash cow energy sector, mountains of gear they can’t replace, and their economy is bleeding cash.  I believe that disinfo op was highly successful.

I also tend to believe that Ukraine (with western cooperation) is feigning greater vulnerability than actually exists to induce Russia to throw another mass attack at them soon, which then gets chewed to pieces in a reverse play of last year’s Ukrainian offensive.  This is also a disinfo op.  But it doesn’t mean the Ukrainians were getting the aid over the last 6 months.

Mig-31s are a good get.

If they were K variants there's only 10 of those and that'll reduce the amount of Khinzal shots into Ukraine.

It also makes 7 Mig-31's lost since the invasion.


Also makes seven less interceptors Russia has against Global Strike Command.

Now if we can buy and scrap the Kazakhs Mig-31s or turn them into kamikaze drones and give them to Ukraine it would be funny.

I like the way you're thinking.

A Russian admits he was foolish to disassemble this Ukrainian TM-62M mine dropped by a Baba Yaga drone.
It has an electronic module with both an accelerometer to detect movement and a magnetic influence sensor to detect metal, but unfortunately it failed to initiate detonation. pic.twitter.com/a1oH2sbwFU

— Roy\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GrandpaRoy2) May 17, 2024

I just realized my thinking is a little flawed as the K variants are dedicated to the Khinzal role so wouldn't be interceptors.

There is some speculation based on the Mig-31's that have arrived at Belbek mostly aren't the Khinzal carrying variant, but the Interceptor BM or BSM variant.  But less Mig-31's helps either way.

I’m not an SME and never claimed to be.  My background is Russian and East European studies and Russian language, so on the subject of this thread, I know more than your average bear.
I’ll give you an example of why I’m less than interested in just taking someone’s word.  The other person I’m talking about presented a list of assertions of fact which (allegedly) came from his own super-secret-squirrel info.  But, when I actually did the legwork to research them, I found that one major assertion came directly from a Russian propaganda site.  And I don’t mean a US-based occasionally Russia-friendly site, I mean an actual Russian propaganda source.  And most of the others could be sourced simply as versions of the most optimistic statements released by the Russian MOD regarding their own production numbers, not US super-secret-squirrel info.  So there are examples of either using one’s status to make claims that go way beyond their expertise, or to just flat pass off opinion as fact.
In this thread we look for assertions of fact to be sourced.  If your opinion is that the supply to Ukraine of everything, at scale, never stopped or decreased, great.  But it’s an opinion until you source it.  We talk about opinions all the time and we hold strong opinions on a lot of things, so that’s perfectly fine.

Still waiting for an explanation on why Russia would cooperate in this alleged IO.

Look.
I’ll illustrate the situation with a story.

I have a friend who got into an internet argument once. Friend had proprietary information about an AR manufacturer due to a job in the industry. Friend knew he was right about some vague qualitative statement and said so. Friend couldn’t prove he was right without WarThundering his way into a lawsuit.

I appreciate your presence here when you offer insights into your particular area of expertise, but you might need to just give up internet arguments. You’re not going to convince anyone with “I know and you don’t”, and people aren’t going to stop being interested in the subject matter.

The UK should not rule out sending troops to Ukraine – despite Putin’s nuclear threats
Backing down in the face of Russian threats is the worst option. The UK should join France in using strategic ambiguity.

PUBLISHED 10 MAY 2024 3 MINUTE READ


The Kremlin has responded with predictable theatre to comments from foreign secretary David Cameron, after he said Ukraine is free to use weapons supplied by Britain to launch strikes inside Russia.

That theatre was both diplomatic, with the British ambassador summoned to the foreign ministry in Russia on Monday to warn of retaliation, and nuclear: Moscow announced it would be holding exercises involving tactical nuclear weapons in the near future to remind the world yet again that it has them.

The UK position is a sharp contrast to that of the US, which has consistently forbidden Ukraine from using the weapons it supplies to hit targets in Russia. The US has even discouraged Kyiv from doing so using its own home-grown capabilities.

Deployments to Ukraine

Britain has repeatedly taken the lead in supplying weapons systems such as long-range missiles or main battle tanks to Ukraine. In the process it has shown that fears of ‘escalation’ in Washington and Berlin stem from a highly successful Russian con trick.

The Kremlin has responded with predictable theatre to comments from foreign secretary David Cameron, after he said Ukraine is free to use weapons supplied by Britain to launch strikes inside Russia.

That theatre was both diplomatic, with the British ambassador summoned to the foreign ministry in Russia on Monday to warn of retaliation, and nuclear: Moscow announced it would be holding exercises involving tactical nuclear weapons in the near future to remind the world yet again that it has them.

The UK position is a sharp contrast to that of the US, which has consistently forbidden Ukraine from using the weapons it supplies to hit targets in Russia. The US has even discouraged Kyiv from doing so using its own home-grown capabilities.

Deployments to Ukraine

Britain has repeatedly taken the lead in supplying weapons systems such as long-range missiles or main battle tanks to Ukraine. In the process it has shown that fears of ‘escalation’ in Washington and Berlin stem from a highly successful Russian con trick.

But the UK’s moral authority has been shaken over recent months by its reluctance to re-equip its own armed forces in the way it is urging other European states to do: grand announcements of defence investment have turned out on closer inspection to be inadequate.

Cameron has also suggested that Britain’s long-term commitment to supporting Ukraine would now be largely financial, since ‘we’ve just really emptied all we can in terms of giving equipment’.

And sadly, he immediately undermined the effect even of that commitment by once again ruling out the presence of Western troops in Ukraine.

French president Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly warned that European troops could be forced to intervene if Ukraine is unable to halt Russia’s aggression. It’s vital that Russia understands that, since the last thing Moscow wants is a direct military clash with NATO countries.

And yet, other European leaders have reacted with horror to the suggestion. ‘I don’t think it is right to have NATO soldiers killing Russian soldiers,’ Cameron said at the end of his visit to Ukraine. That may be true today, but as Russia’s ambitions have grown more apparent, it’s served as a reminder that the purpose of NATO should be to stop Russian soldiers being where they have no right to be.

Instead, more European leaders – and the UK – should follow Macron’s lead and preserve ‘strategic ambiguity’ (that is, not telling your adversary what you’re not going to do).

Russia stepping up aggression

Over the course of the last two weeks, Europe as a whole has woken up to the campaign of sabotage and disruption that Russia has been waging across the continent. There’s no doubt Russia could step this up still further. Moscow’s war on the West is now barely hidden, and for as long as the West does not respond, there are few downsides for Russia in waging it.

Using an extended network of proxies means the Kremlin’s intelligence chiefs won’t be too concerned if they are caught in the act. The crooks and patsies it recruits abroad will be considered even more disposable than its own personnel. And since Russia is already overtly acting as a rogue state, there’s no damage to reputation or relationships to be concerned about.

The West should expect proxy attacks against the UK and across Europe to continue. As well as hampering support to Ukraine, they have another useful purpose for Moscow. Whether or not they succeed, they’re useful for gathering information on a country’s will and capacity to prevent and respond to sabotage.

There’s one traditional way of hurting the West that Russia may not yet have employed. Throughout the Cold War and even in tsarist times, Moscow poured effort and resources into sponsoring terrorist groups to carry out attacks against European cities. That would be a more random campaign of violence than the targeting of European logistics and supporters of Ukraine that we see now. It would also have much greater impact.

Europe must not be just a passive victim. At the beginning of this year, I wrote about the West’s under-used ability to influence Russia’s choices.

The UK made its deliveries of Storm Shadow an explicit consequence of specific Russian actions. Now, it seems, the US has done the same with its long-awaited supply of longer-range ATACMs missiles.

To nobody’s surprise, except perhaps in the White House, the sky has not fallen.

Britain’s explicit endorsement of strikes into Russia could also have been presented as a consequence for Russia’s attacks against Europe, and with a promise that more would follow. What’s more, explicitly allowing Ukraine to strike Russia with British weapons as well as its own opens up other possibilities for targeting Russia’s ability to wage war.

Ukraine has already struck Russian locations where drones and missiles used to kill its innocent civilians are stored. It has also launched strikes at Russian energy infrastructure. These limited pinpoint strikes are in stark contrast to Russia’s lengthy campaign of indiscriminate bombardment of Ukrainian cities.

But further attacks could see Ukraine helping Europe, instead of the other way round. European countries can do little about Russian electronic warfare installations that have been sowing havoc with European air and maritime traffic. But for Ukraine, no holds should be barred and it’s in everybody’s interest that the jamming should be deterred or disrupted.

When considering how far the West should go in working with Kyiv, the fundamental question is still the same: whether Europe wishes to stop Russia in Ukraine, or allow Moscow’s war of reconquest to claim more victims further West.

Simple morality and practical common sense have always argued for the maximum possible support for Kyiv. Britain’s endorsement of Ukraine’s right to defend itself is a long overdue step in the right direction.

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/uk-should-not-rule-out-sending-troops-ukraine-despite-putins-nuclear-threats

Gazprom’s Declining Fortunes Spell Trouble for Moscow
The gas giant’s record loss should worry the Kremlin on several fronts.



At the end of 2022, Dmitry Medvedev—Russia’s former prime minister and the current deputy chairman of its Security Council—offered his predictions for the coming year. He warned that Europeans would suffer badly from Russia’s decision to curb natural gas exports to the European Union, suggesting that gas prices would jump to $5,000 per thousand cubic meters in 2023—around 50 times their prewar average. He probably assumed that that sky-high prices would translate into a windfall for Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, which was still supplying several European countries via pipeline, ramping up exports of liquefied natural gas, and eyeing new deals with China. Perhaps Medvedev also hoped that Europeans would beg the Kremlin to send the gas flowing again.

It turns out that Medvedev might want to polish his crystal ball: Last year, European gas prices averaged a mere one-tenth of his number. And just this month, Gazprom posted a massive $6.8 billion loss for 2023, the first since 1999.

Gazprom’s losses demonstrate the extent to which the Kremlin’s decision to turn off the gas tap to Europe in 2022 has backfired. In 2023, European Union imports of Russian gas were at their lowest level since the early 1970s, with Russian supplies making up only 8 percent of EU gas imports, down from 40 percent in 2021. This has translated into vertiginous losses for Gazprom, with the firm’s revenues from foreign sales plunging by two-thirds in 2023.

Gazprom’s woes are very likely setting off alarm bells in Moscow: With no good options for the company to revive flagging gas sales, its losses could weigh on Russia’s ability to finance the war in Ukraine. This is especially ironic given the fact that EU sanctions do not target Russian gas exports; the damage to the Kremlin and its war effort is entirely self-inflicted.

The most immediate impact of Gazprom’s losses will be on Russian government revenues, a crucial metric to gauge Moscow’s ability to sustain its war against Ukraine. Poring over Gazprom’s latest financials paints a striking picture. Excluding dividends, Gazprom transferred at least $40 billion into Russian state coffers in 2022, either to the general government budget or the National Welfare Fund (NWF), Moscow’s sovereign wealth fund

This is no small feat. Until last year, Gazprom alone provided about 10 percent of Russian federal budget revenues (emphasis added, holy shit) through customs and excise duties as well as profit taxes. (Oil receipts usually account for an additional 30 percent of budget revenues.) This flood of money now looks like distant history. In 2023, the company’s contribution to state coffers through customs and excise duties was slashed by four-fifths, and like many money-losing firms, it is due a tax refund from the Russian treasury.

For Moscow, this is bad news on several fronts. Because of rising military expenses, the country’s fiscal balance swung into deficit when Moscow invaded Ukraine. To help plug the gap, the Kremlin ordered Gazprom to pay a $500 million monthly levy to the state until 2025. Now that the company is posting losses, it is unclear how it will be able to afford this transfer. In addition, Gazprom’s contribution to the NWF will probably have to shrink. For the Kremlin, this could not come at a worst time: The NWF’s liquid holdings have already dropped by nearly $60 billion, around half of its prewar total, as Moscow drains its rainy-day fund to finance the war. Finally, Gazprom’s woes could prompt the firm to shrink its planned investments in gas fields and pipelines—a decision that would, in turn, hit Russian GDP growth.

As if this was not enough, a closer look at Gazprom’s newly released financials suggests that the worst may be yet to come, with three telltale signs that 2024 could be even more difficult than 2023.

First, Gazprom’s accounts receivable—a measure of money due to be paid by customers—are in free fall, suggesting that the firm’s revenue inflow is drying up. Second, accounts payable shot up by around 50 percent in 2023, hinting that Gazprom is struggling to pay its own bills to various suppliers. Finally, short-term borrowing nearly doubled last year as Russian state-owned banks were enlisted to support the former gas giant.

Whereas these figures come from Gazprom’s English-language financials, the company’s latest Russian-language update yields two additional surprises—both of which show that the firm’s situation has worsened even further since the beginning of the year.

First, short-term borrowing during the first three months of 2024 roughly doubled compared to the previous quarter. If Russian state-owned banks continue to cover Gazprom’s losses, the Russian financial sector could soon find itself in trouble. This begs a tricky question: With the NWF’s reserves dwindling and Moscow’s access to international capital markets shut down, who would pay a bailout bill? Second, Gazprom’s losses were almost five times greater in the first quarter of 2024 than in the same period of 2023, hinting that the firm may post an even bigger loss this year than it did in 2023.

Looking ahead, 2025 will be an especially tough year for Gazprom. The transit deal for gas shipments through Ukraine via pipeline to Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia will probably expire at the end of this year, further curbing what’s left of Gazprom’s exports to Europe. A quick glance at a map makes it clear that China is now the only remaining option for Russian pipeline gas.

Yet Beijing is not that interested: Last year, it bought just 23 billion cubic meters of Russian gas, a mere fraction of the 180 billion cubic meters that Moscow used to ship to Europe. Negotiations to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which would boost gas shipments to China, have stalled. And in truth, China is not a like-for-like replacement for Gazprom’s lost European consumers. Beijing pays 20 percent less for Russian gas than the remaining EU customers, and the gap is predicted to widen to 28 percent through 2027.

Without pipelines, raising exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is the only remaining option for Moscow. However, Western policies make this easier said than done. Western export controls curb Russia’s access to the complex machinery needed to develop LNG terminals, such as equipment to chill the gas to negative160 degrees Celsius so that it can be shipped on specialized vessels. And Washington has recently imposed sanctions on a Singapore-based firm and two ships working on a Russian LNG project, signaling that it will similarly designate any entity willing to work in the sector. Finally, U.S. sanctions make it much harder for Russian firms to finance the development of new liquefaction facilities and the gas field designed to supply them. In December, Japanese firm Mitsui announced that it was pulling staff and reviewing options for its participation to Russia’s flagship Arctic LNG 2 project. As a result, the Russian operator announced last month that it was suspending operations of the project, which was originally slated to launch LNG shipments early this year.

Gazprom’s cheesy corporate slogan—“Dreams come true!”—does not ring so true anymore as Moscow’s former cash cow becomes a loss-making drain. Data from the International Energy Agency confirms the extent of the Kremlin’s miscalculation when it turned off the gas tap to Europe: The agency predicts that Russia’s share of global gas exports will fall to 15 percent by 2030—down from 30 percent before Moscow’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine.

This was probably predictable. It is hard to imagine how a gas exporter configured to serve European customers and reliant on Western technology could thrive after refusing to serve its main client—signaling to every other potential customer, including China, that it is an unreliable supplier. Corporate empires tend to rise and fall, and it looks like Gazprom will be no exception to the rule.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/15/gazprom-2023-results-budget-war-economy-russia-putin-europe-china/

Looking forward to the first impacts of Storm Shadow on valuable and painful targets inside Russia.

\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFABSF: NOVOROSSIYSK\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFA
0.5m\uD83D\uDCF7 from 17 May 2024 (02:25 UTC). No apparent signs of damage. Boom is closed and there is a crane there (can't tell if its stationary or working).

Most interesting observation, no subs in the pen. Major surface vessels are in port. pic.twitter.com/Tu3cQEreU4

— MT Anderson (@MT_Anderson) May 17, 2024

h/t @charly0153 for pointing out the potential of 2 KILO class subs, submerged with only the top of the sail showing. Not definitive but a very interesting hypothesis pic.twitter.com/nNdsiHS2QL

— MT Anderson (@MT_Anderson) May 17, 2024

Missed this two weeks ago.

OSINT researcher M.T. Anderson has discovered from satellite imagery that the Russians have moved their new Karakurt-class small missile ship Tucha from Novorossiysk to the Caspian Sea. The ships of this project are so small that they can be moved along the waterway through the Don, Volga and Volgodonsk Canal. Previously, it was assumed that the Russians would replenish their Black Sea Fleet this way, but the reality turned out to be the opposite - they are trying to save them from Ukrainian attacks by withdrawing them to the Caspian Sea. Previously, the Air Force of the Ukrainian Armed Forces had already struck one of the ships of this type, the Askold, which was being completed at a dock in occupied Kerch. Despite their small size, Karakurt-class ships are dangerous, as they could potentially carry Kalibr cruise missiles on board.

https://t.me/yigal_levin/66209

\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFACASPIAN SEA FLOTILLA\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFA
0.5m\uD83D\uDCF7 from 2 May 2024. It would indeed appear that the Tucha (Karakurt Class) made her way from Novorossiysk to the Caspian Sea Flotilla via the inland waterway. https://t.co/RYKaAkleIg pic.twitter.com/Z8bM2N0TpD

— MT Anderson (@MT_Anderson) May 4, 2024

How not to de-mine.

I wonder if they could spare the drones for targeting the assets of, say, top-10 Russian oligarchs.

NOW I HAVE A MACHINE-GUN TOO

What may be the first combat use of machine-gun armed Baba Yaga!

Isn't this mostly an artillery war? Largely supplanted by drones due to the lack of conventional artillery. I would think the supply of arty ammo would be important. I believe the UA came close to parity with Russia sometime last year when the most supplies were still arriving but that has change bigly. Unless you are arguing that arty and the supply of ammo is irrelevant since the UA would just blast away at nothing, wasting the ammo, and have no impact on the course of the war?

Yeah. Especially if the UA took 90% casualties to stop that attack?  and what about the next one?...

Went looking for an article and found this sad thing from back in April.
The trolls just ain’t what they used to be, money must be drying up.

\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 The first confirmed defeat of the new Canadian Senator MRAP armored vehicle, transferred to Ukrainian forces as military assistance.#Canadian #TaxPayers poof! pic.twitter.com/4SD2t4qdhq

T  (@Krommsan) April 21, 2024

Senator MRAP saves Ukrainian Soldiers from mine blast




The Ukrainian military has reported a remarkable incident in which a Canadian-made Senator vehicle, in its Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) configuration, saved the lives of several soldiers after striking an anti-tank mine.

Three days ago, a Roshel Senator MRAP encountered an 8kg anti-tank mine. Despite the powerful explosion, all Ukrainian soldiers on board survived without injuries.

This incident marks the first documented instance where a commercial-based armored vehicle has successfully withstood such an attack, highlighting its robust protective capabilities.

The Senator MRAP is built on the heavy-duty commercial platform of the Ford F-550, making it a preferred choice for combat teams due to its ease of serviceability and maintenance. Leveraging the widespread and established service network of Ford vehicles, the Senator MRAP ensures efficient and accessible maintenance support worldwide. The vehicle’s high ground clearance, four-wheel drive, and 6.7L turbo diesel engine provide effective off-road capabilities across various terrains.

A crucial feature of the Senator MRAP is its V-shaped body design, which enhances survivability during explosive attacks, particularly from landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This design incorporates a pronounced V-shape that deflects the force of an explosion away from the vehicle’s cabin, minimizing the impact and reducing the risk of severe injury or death to the occupants. The V-shaped hull helps absorb and dissipate the explosive energy, further enhancing the vehicle’s blast resistance.

The recent incident demonstrated results identical to the STANAG blast test, with the vehicle’s capsule remaining intact. In 2023, the Senator MRAP successfully passed the stringent STANAG 4569 AEP-55 Level 3a blast test and exceeded Levels 2a, 2b, and 2c, withstanding a side blast of 25 kg of TNT.

Roshel already had delivered more than 1,000 Senator vehicles to Ukraine. The company has since become one of the largest armored vehicle manufacturers in Canada, producing Senator vehicles in various configurations, including the Senator APC, ERV, MRAP, and Senator Pickup, designed for cargo transport, counter-UAV systems, mortar installations, and other equipment.

Moreover, the company is currently working on a new 8×8 project.

https://defence-blog.com/senator-mrap-saves-ukrainian-soldiers-from-mine-blast/

Impressive tech.

Even if they did, they still have 10% more than the attacking force.

My original comment alluded to: Why would you even mount an attack without enough of a reserve to exploit a potential breakthrough?

It’s retarded, they(Russians) are using up that which they have plenty of, lives.

Ha! That probably applies to me and my China threads

Russian POV - Drone hits on Tuapse oil refinery

Russian POV - Another drone hits Tuapse refinery

Russian POV - tank crew abandons and records their tank go KABOOM!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Russian infantry assault group caught in the open and fucked up by drones.  Also likely accurate machine-gun fire seen at the end, so maybe we have drones spotting for LR machine-gun fire now.

Russian throws down with a kamikaze; it doesn’t work out.

Russians approaching Vovchansk hit by small arms fire at a canal.

Ukrainian MTLB runs the gauntlet of artillery fire

Tuapse refinery shut down.

Snippet of interview with the President of Finland

NATO considering sending trainers to help the Ukrainian army

Youtube series.  If you have the time, I strongly recommend Ukraine the Latest and Silicon Curtain

Twitter version of Captas post above.

Detonation of the Russian tank somewhere at the front. Filmed by Russians.https://t.co/zCuuHOAw4s pic.twitter.com/d8YeEj59t8

— Special Kherson Cat \uD83D\uDC08\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@bayraktar_1love) May 17, 2024

Posting articles about artillery shell shortages is different than stating in here that if only Ukraine had artillery shells they could win the war are two different things.
I have read many articles about artillery shells with varying opinions on what the consequences are for a shortage, and varying degrees of supply.
I'm going to need a direct quote of anyone saying that supplying artillery shells to Ukraine will win the war for them. Until then just take his snark wit a grain of salt.

Have the same issue; even though I have been "read-off" of a lot of information, and a lot has evolved since I retired from the Army and started teaching college history, I still try to "talk around" a lot of information I was privy to in a previous life.  At this point, when talking about some of this stuff I feel like my dad must have felt when, as a new Private in the 1980's, I took him to the Fort Eustis museum when we got the AH56 "Cheyenne" exhibit.  Dad's first reaction (he had ETS'd from the Army as a mid-level NCO in 1972) was "They have this out in the open? Isn't it Secret?"  at which point the teenage smartass me replied with "Dad, we're in a Museum"!

I mean, it applies to almost anyone. You can quote sources, but some people are unfairly burdened by their professions with a "trust me bro" penalty when arguing on the internet 🤷‍♂️