Originally Posted By brahm:
has anyone heard more about the floating dock? that the U.S. was building for gaza.

Originally Posted By realwar:
US State Department official laughs at question about invading other countries

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xi5iX5fvUs4

Originally Posted By fike:
No idea on the legitimacy, but if true, there could be some internal struggles happening in Iran.

This is incredibly unusual…

Iranian media is reporting that the Swiss Ambassador to Iran was summoned so that she could be warned about the consequences of a potential Israeli military strike and US involvement in such a strike.

However, the ambassador was not summoned to the… pic.twitter.com/ombS0J3Fz4

— Yashar Ali \uD83D\uDC18 (@yashar) April 16, 2024

Originally Posted By BM1455:

Arab Officials have stated that Israel assured them and other Middle Eastern Countries today that their Retaliatory Strike against Iran for Saturday Night’s Attack wouldn’t Endanger Regional Security and would likely be Limited in Scope, with Israel stating that they would also… pic.twitter.com/ReH5bEFTRq

OSINTdefender  (@sentdefender) April 16, 2024

Originally Posted By realwar:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WSUdVu75M0Y



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JuT8lZ8Hdc



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b-fZCMPhBNo


The Dangers of Middle East Conflict

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K6QsiobWGv4

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip
Several local Palestinian sources reported that Israeli armored vehicles entered Beit Hanoun and areas east of Jabalia. The sources reported that Israeli forces ordered civilians in Beit Hanoun and areas east of Jabalia to leave.

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia on April 15.

The ability of Palestinian militias to continue to operate in the northern Gaza Strip is consistent with the infiltration of fighters into the area and Hamas’ efforts to reassert its governing authority following the drawdown of Israeli forces.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued operations near Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip.  Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters and destroyed military infrastructure. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting an Israeli command and control node in southwestern Gaza City.  

The Israeli defense minister said in February 2024 that the IDF has not defeated all four Hamas battalions in the central Gaza Strip and that it intends to dismantle the two remaining battalions.CTP-ISW previously wrote Palestinian militias, including Hamas, have likely used a rear area in the central Gaza Strip to conduct attacks since mid-December.

Palestinian militias have also likely been able to infiltrate from the central strip into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City. The IDF has conducted multiple raids in southern Gaza City since it decreased its force presence in the northern Gaza Strip in early 2024.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Hamas rejected the most recent ceasefire agreement because it thought the April 13 Iranian attack on Israel would lead to a regional conflict.

Palestinian fighters fired two rockets from the northern Gaza Strip

West Bank
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank.The IDF reported on April 16 that Israeli forces detained 23 wanted Palestinians during overnight operations in the West Bank.

Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters detonated an IED targeting Israeli forces in al Askar refugee camp. The militia separately targeted Israeli forces advancing into Nablus.  The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades shot at Israeli forces operating in Jenin.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
The IDF killed two Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon on April 16.  The IDF Air Force killed the commander of the Radwan Unit’s rocket and missile unit in Hezbollah’s Western Sector, Mohammed Hossein Metzafa Shouri.

The IDF added that Shouri oversaw the planning and execution of “many” rocket and missile attacks.

The IDF also killed a commander from Hezbollah’s “Coastal Sector,” Esmail Yousef Baz.  Baz held a rank equivalent to a brigadier general and served as a “senior” Hezbollah military official. Baz was responsible for directing rocket and anti-tank guided missile attacks into northern Israel.  Hezbollah acknowledged Baz’s death.

Lebanese Hezbollah launched one-way attack drones targeting an Iron Dome battery near Beit Hilal.  The IDF confirmed that two one-way attack drones entered Israeli airspace and exploded near Beit Hila.

Yemen
Houthi President Mahdi al Mashaat congratulated Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi for the April 13 Iranian attack targeting Israel during a phone call.

Houthi-controlled media claimed on April 16 that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Bajil District, Hudaydah Governorate, western Yemen.

Iraq
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani continued his official visit to Washington, DC.  US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin expressed support for transitioning to an “enduring bilateral security relationship” with Iraq.

Iran
The Washington Post reported that 17 Iranian officials visited a Russian air defense system factory in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in March 2023.

Senior Iranian officials emphasized that Iran would strike Israel again "faster and stronger" if Israel retaliates to Iran's April 13 missile and drone attack.

An anti-regime outlet posted a video of the Iranian military transporting drones, tanks, and other assorted military equipment in Tehran on April 16.  This is likely in preparation for the annual Artesh Day parade, which is held on April 18.

Political Negotiations
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Hamas rejected the most recent ceasefire agreement because it thought the April 13 Iranian attack on Israel would lead to a regional conflict.

Originally Posted By LoBrau:

And why the Swiss ambassador? Tradition of neutrality?

Originally Posted By realwar:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=japyf_7n1nA

Originally Posted By Banditman:


Did I see secondaries?

Originally Posted By realwar:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=japyf_7n1nA

Originally Posted By fike:


Vid is a month old.

Originally Posted By realwar:
*Edit vid is from last month.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=japyf_7n1nA

Rectangular stains mar the asphalt. Dozens of them are scattered on an Israeli highway near the Gaza Strip where cars became death traps on October 7. More than 250 Israelis were murdered on the roads.

Along the roads near Gaza there were at least 37 separate killing sites, a number derived from the research of Yuval Harpaz and Sagi Or. The list of sites includes Re'im Junction, 51 dead; the Mefalsim area, 42; Gama Junction, 29; and Sha'ar Hanegev Junction, 26. (None of this includes the access road to the Re'im parking lot, where many of the victims at the Nova music festival were killed.)

The police believe that Hamas planned to seize the intersections as part of its plan to control the highways and prevent the army and first responders from reacting. But preparation by Israeli security forces in the area, including training only a month earlier, prevented a far greater disaster.

Also, footage from highway cameras that was recently sent to the State Comptroller's Office shows that most people who left the Gaza border area by 7:30 A.M. were rescued. That was the hour of the flight from the rave at Re'im, but for many, the highway was the most dangerous place to be.

"About 50 percent of Nova participants who were murdered had scattered for kilometers beyond the site of the festival," Harpaz.

Shortly after the start of the attack, 22-year-old Inbar, a discharged medic from the Sayeret Golani commando unit, arrived on Moshav Mabu'im at the home of his girlfriend, Yuval. He had just finished a night shift as a security guard at a pipeline company. When he arrived he saw a message from his father on the family WhatsApp group – terrorists were on the kibbutz.

Inbar drove back onto the highway; he wanted to get back to work to pick up his gun and head for the kibbutz. Yuval asked him to stay with her. As his mother describes it, "She told me that he looked into her eyes and said, 'I can't just sit around.' He cried and she screamed; she begged him not to go."

It's not clear exactly when Inbar was killed at Sha'ar Hanegev Junction, though it's known that his phone, which was later found scorched, went silent at 7:34.

At about 7:30 at Sha'ar Hanegev Junction, Hamas terrorists massacred at least 28 people including four soldiers from the 551st Battalion and six members of the police's Yamam anti-terror unit. Members of Hamas' elite Nukhba force went from car to car and shot people at point-blank range. The battle at the intersection lasted at least two hours; the bodies of nine terrorists were later found. Later in the day, after more fighting there, Israel took the intersection back, a key development.

Adam and Shani fled the Nova festival long before everyone else. Already at 6:30 A.M., as the first rockets fell, they got into their car and drove east to Be'er Sheva, where they were supposed to meet a friend who had a room for them. At 7:30 they were already in the city, but the friend wasn't there; it turned out he had hid 10 hours in the bushes near the festival and survived.

Adam was in contact with his mother, Zoya, in Ashdod the entire time. "He told me, 'Mom, don't worry, I'm driving to Ashdod,'" she says. "Later I called again and he told me, 'Mom, this isn't a good time to talk, I'm near Sderot; there are soldiers here and I don't understand what's going on. I think there are terrorists.' Then he hung up on me."

Zoya was relieved. "When I heard that there were soldiers there a stone fell from my heart. I said that they would help them and save them." But the soldiers were actually Hamas terrorists.

Zoya called again but there was no answer. Five minutes later she called Shani. "I heard heavy breathing," she says. "Then I heard, 'Zoya, they're shooting at us, soldiers are shooting at us, save us.' Then she said, 'Open your eyes, open your eyes.' That was when they shot him."

For Israelis fleeing Hamas on October 7, highways turned into death traps

Rectangular stains mar the asphalt. Dozens of them are scattered on an Israeli highway near the Gaza Strip where cars became death traps on October 7. More than 250 Israelis were murdered on the roads.

Route 232 near the Gaza border is now a well-traveled highway again, but some drivers stop on the shoulder to look at the faces smiling back at them – photos of victims of October 7.

Along the roads near Gaza there were at least 37 separate killing sites, a number derived from the research of Yuval Harpaz and Sagi Or. The list of sites includes Re'im Junction, 51 dead; the Mefalsim area, 42; Gama Junction, 29; and Sha'ar Hanegev Junction, 26. (None of this includes the access road to the Re'im parking lot, where many of the victims at the Nova music festival were killed.)

The police believe that Hamas planned to seize the intersections as part of its plan to control the highways and prevent the army and first responders from reacting. But preparation by Israeli security forces in the area, including training only a month earlier, prevented a far greater disaster.

Also, footage from highway cameras that was recently sent to the State Comptroller's Office shows that most people who left the Gaza border area by 7:30 A.M. were rescued. That was the hour of the flight from the rave at Re'im, but for many, the highway was the most dangerous place to be.

"About 50 percent of Nova participants who were murdered had scattered for kilometers beyond the site of the festival," Harpaz says, adding that the site of the murder of 65 Nova revelers is still unknown, as is that of others who went out onto the highway.

The place where Inbar Buyum died is definitely known – there's a plaque at the side of the highway. His mother Ayelet goes there often; only at the end of last month could Inbar's younger brother Omer bear to visit.

Bereavement struck twice that Saturday for the Buyum family from Kibbutz Be'eri. The father Gil, a member of the kibbutz security squad, was killed fighting the Hamas terrorists.

Shortly after the start of the attack, 22-year-old Inbar, a discharged medic from the Sayeret Golani commando unit, arrived on Moshav Mabu'im at the home of his girlfriend, Yuval. He had just finished a night shift as a security guard at a pipeline company. When he arrived he saw a message from his father on the family WhatsApp group – terrorists were on the kibbutz.

Inbar drove back onto the highway; he wanted to get back to work to pick up his gun and head for the kibbutz. Yuval asked him to stay with her. As his mother describes it, "She told me that he looked into her eyes and said, 'I can't just sit around.' He cried and she screamed; she begged him not to go."

It's not clear exactly when Inbar was killed at Sha'ar Hanegev Junction, though it's known that his phone, which was later found scorched, went silent at 7:34. That was also around the time his father was killed.

Omer, 20, is now a soldier in a course for Engineering Corps officers, but three months passed until he returned to the army. His sister, Anog, is also in uniform; she joined the army in January and is now in a course for operations officers.

"I worried about Inbar for three years until he was discharged," says Ayelet, his mother. She always wears a gold necklace with a heart pendant bearing the names of her son and husband.

"We don't know much about what happened," she says, referring to Inbar. "We know that he reached the intersection at about 7:27. He saw that there were terrorists there, he tried to turn and get out of there, and apparently they hid there and shot him. We don't know, we're only guessing."

At about 7:30 at Sha'ar Hanegev Junction, Hamas terrorists massacred at least 28 people including four soldiers from the 551st Battalion and six members of the police's Yamam anti-terror unit. Members of Hamas' elite Nukhba force went from car to car and shot people at point-blank range. The battle at the intersection lasted at least two hours; the bodies of nine terrorists were later found. Later in the day, after more fighting there, Israel took the intersection back, a key development.

Anyone who drove west toward Sha'ar Hanegev Junction that morning encountered a line of cars that from a distance looked abandoned. But actually their passengers were lying on the ground or inside the car. Blood flowed along the highway alongside broken glass.

Behind one car lay two bodies. "Here Comes the Sun" read the fresh tattoo on the back of Shani Amin, 18. The hat of Adam Ilaev, 22, was stained with blood. His face was hidden by a yellow vest placed there by the invaders.

Adam and Shani fled the Nova festival long before everyone else. Already at 6:30 A.M., as the first rockets fell, they got into their car and drove east to Be'er Sheva, where they were supposed to meet a friend who had a room for them. At 7:30 they were already in the city, but the friend wasn't there; it turned out he had hid 10 hours in the bushes near the festival and survived.

Adam was in contact with his mother, Zoya, in Ashdod the entire time. "He told me, 'Mom, don't worry, I'm driving to Ashdod,'" she says. "Later I called again and he told me, 'Mom, this isn't a good time to talk, I'm near Sderot; there are soldiers here and I don't understand what's going on. I think there are terrorists.' Then he hung up on me."

Zoya was relieved. "When I heard that there were soldiers there a stone fell from my heart. I said that they would help them and save them." But the soldiers were actually Hamas terrorists.

Zoya called again but there was no answer. Five minutes later she called Shani. "I heard heavy breathing," she says. "Then I heard, 'Zoya, they're shooting at us, soldiers are shooting at us, save us.' Then she said, 'Open your eyes, open your eyes.' That was when they shot him."

The time was 8:24, and Shani was still alive, fully conscious. She phoned her grandfather, Ami Kalfon, to have a video conversation. "Her face was full of blood," he recalls. "She said to me, 'Grandpa, they're shooting at us. Adam is dead, Adam is dead, he isn't breathing.'"

Ami was the person closest to Shani when she was a teenager; he's also the one who cheered for her at her high school graduation last summer. "How I miss her," he says, tearing up. "Every Friday I light candles for her."

Ami often visits the "Nova section" at the Ashdod cemetery, where Shani is buried alongside Adam – and their pictures are together at the memorial site at the Re'im parking lot.

"She said to me, 'Grandpa, they're shooting at us. Adam is dead, Adam is dead, he isn't breathing.'"Credit: Ilan Assayag
Back on October 7 it was hard to flee that parking lot – also because the police placed barriers in a bid to block the terrorists. The police already had a scenario planned: The infiltration from Gaza of two squads each of 15 to 50 terrorists, along with an invasion by sea and air, and an attempt to break into two kibbutzim.

But 3,000 terrorists invaded Israel. So the police set up 16 ad hoc roadblocks and 12 patrols. At Yad Mordechai Junction just north of Gaza, four members of the Border Police were brought in, as well as four soldiers, two of them women. They prevented eight Hamas motorcyclists, and behind them vans with about 20 other armed men, from crossing the intersection and heading north.

"If we had arrived at the barrier 60 seconds later, 60 terrorists would have entered deep into Israel," a senior police officer says.

Still, some roadblocks turned into a death trap for the Israelis trying to flee. The story of Nitzan Rahoum and her boyfriend Lidor Levi – both 28 years old and from the center of the country – is the story of many partygoers who were trapped on the roads.

"They left the party at 6:50 A.M.," says Aderet Alali, Nitzan's cousin. "They left Re'im to the right, and police sent them back, to the mobile shelters."

The same was true for several dozen others fleeing the party. Nitzan called her mother at about 7 A.M. and told her that she was at the festival and being shot at.

"At 7:10, she called her mother to say that the police had let them off at a shelter, and that was the last conversation," says Aderet, the cousin.

About 40 minutes of terror would pass until the terrorists attacked the mobile shelter where Nitzan was hiding. They threw hand grenades inside. Twenty-two-year-old Aner Shapira managed to toss seven back outside, as documented by a camera in one of the cars abandoned on the highway.

But before the explosion that killed Aner, Lidor, who was standing at the entrance to the shelter, tried to flee and was shot dead. He was the first in the shelter to be murdered. Nitzan was inside the shelter. She was four months pregnant.

"She was like a sister to me," Aderet says in tears, adding that in the week or so before our interview, Nitzan would have given birth. "Nobody knew she was at that party; I saw her the previous Friday. For six days we knew nothing about her, we thought that maybe she had been kidnapped. We found out about her death on our own; to this day the government hasn't told us anything about how it happened."

The section of highway next to the site of the party at Re'im is the bloodiest. Fifty-one people were murdered in mobile shelters, 33 at or near Tel Gama Junction, including the commander of the police station in the city of Rahat, Jayar Davidov. Three were murdered on the road between the party area and the mobile shelters, and over 170 on the festival grounds. Seventeen police officers who protected the partygoers were killed.

Until October 7, Vitali Logvinchenko, 34, and his father-in-law Oleg Lifshitz, 60, considered themselves survivors. Vitali immigrated from the city of Kherson a moment before Russia invaded Ukraine. Oleg remained there to take care of his elderly parents but was arrested by the Russians, held for about a week and tortured.

He came to Israel only after the Ukrainian army liberated Kherson. Here the entire family reunited, including several members who aren't Jewish and joined as refugees.

For the Simhat Torah holiday, which began the evening of Friday October 6, Vitali and Oleg planned a weekend of fishing. Vitali's wife Lilya, a ballroom dancing teacher, had left for a competition in London, and on Thursday, Vitali drove their 5-year-old son from Ashkelon to Ashdod, where his parents and sister live.

On Saturday before dawn Vitali and Oleg were already on the banks of the reservoir next to Kibbutz Ein Hashlosha. As far as is known, the place isn't meant for fishing, but that never stopped Vitali, Oleg and a few of their friends. Vitali's sister Katya was with her little nephew camping at Ashkelon National Park.

When the rocket barrage began, Vitali phoned Katya and told her that he and Oleg were leaving to pick up her and their nephew at the park. At about 6:40, Katya says, Vitali sent a friend footage from the car; he and Oleg were driving down a dirt road.

"Let's get out of here, there's no reason to stand here," he tells Oleg in Russian to the sight and sound of rockets in the background. Later he sent the friend his location on Route 232 near where it meets Route 242, across from central Gaza. In one of Hamas' videos from that morning, Vitali's car is seen standing empty next to the intersection.

"At 7:05 I called him and there was no answer," Katya says. Four days later the family was informed that Oleg's body had been found. Vitali's body was identified a week later. To this day the family doesn't know where the bodies were found.

During all those days Vitali's young son stayed with relatives, and his mother couldn't return to Israel from abroad. "He really misses his father," Katya says. "But he doesn't cry because he doesn't understand."

It was around 5:30 A.M. when Tarafi Abu Rashad's wife woke him. She was in her ninth month of pregnancy and told him she was having labor pains. They got in the car and started driving toward Soroka Medical Center in Be'er Sheva. His brother, Bilal, remained in his tent on the grounds of the Re'im base.

"On the way, the missiles started, but I said I'll get my wife to Soroka and it will be safe there," Tarafi recalls.

But he soon realized that this wasn't an ordinary barrage. "I saw missiles from Zikim to Kerem Shalom," he said. "I told myself it can't be, the situation is dangerous. I realized that I had to go back and pick up my brother."

After that, they headed for Soroka once again. His wife was in the back seat, and his brother sat beside him.

At Magen Junction, Tarafi saw two vehicles, but didn't notice that around 10 terrorists were in the back. "I blinked my lights at the car," he said. "I saw that there was some kind of carpet in the truck, which was weird. Suddenly, one of them moved the carpet and I saw a machine gun. Suddenly, one of them began shooting at the car."

Tarafi stopped on the side of the road, convinced that they were about to die. But the two trucks kept driving. What a relief.

"Suddenly, my wife said to me, 'I'm bleeding from my stomach, a bullet hit me.' I heard this, I hit reverse and I don't know how the car drove, by God. There was a bullet in the back tire."

He raced toward Soroka, but along the way, near Patish Junction, he stopped to change the tire, which no longer had enough air. He also called an ambulance to take his wife. But then, more terrorists arrived. They shot at anything that moved, he said, and one bullet grazed Bilal's neck.

"Anyone who passed on the road was shot," he said. "I called for an ambulance, I said people were wounded. And they said, 'what is this, a Bedouin dispute?'"

Eventually, the ambulance did arrive and took the three to Soroka's maternity ward. "Some time later, the doctor told me that my wife was healthy, thank God, but not the girl. The bullets hit her; they entered through a leg."

The baby girl was born alive, and the doctors immediately began fighting to save her. But at around 10 P.M., she was pronounced dead. She lived long enough to be named Na'amna.

She was the youngest victim of October 7. Just 14 hours old when she died.

While preparing for this interview, I found an item from 2005 in which you explained the differences between the teeth of prisoners who are affiliated with Fatah and those who are members of Hamas.

The teeth of Fatah inmates are in poor condition, whereas Hamas prisoners maintain hygiene and purity. Theirs is a religious way of life. Ascetic. With rigid discipline. They pray five times a day, don't touch sweets, don't smoke. There's no such thing as smoking in Hamas. You see a 50-year-old prisoner who is entirely free of any signs of illness. No tooth decay. I'd say, "You're Hamas?" They would say, "Yes, how did you know?" "By the teeth," I replied. A very basic insight. Everything has meaning – it's the same with regard to their way of life, for example. At 9 P.M., there is a total lights-out in the prison's Hamas wings; in the Fatah wings they watch television all night.

...when I first started out at the service, thousands of prisoners had already been released as part of the Oslo Accords framework. Who was still incarcerated? Around 800 inmates. There was the really hard-core element of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and another 200 Fatah prisoners with "blood on their hands."

When I came to Nafha Prison ..the whole Hamas leadership was imprisoned there...behavior I saw at Nafha [among security prisoners] was very unusual.  The discipline there was at an insane level. There's a leadership, and they decide everything. There's no such thing as a prisoner who does whatever he pleases.

In the 1990s, there was still no separation in the prisons between Hamas and Fatah members.

Until 2007 the two organizations had a joint leadership, with an orderly distribution of tasks. I would look around and grasp that not only was this "business" being managed like a military organization in every respect – they had simply copied their models from the outside, with the same complex structure involved in electing the leaders, the same positions, only behind bars. There was the head of the Hamas political bureau – in prison.

Hamas-Gaza is very influenced by the extremist Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Hamas-West Bank is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. They're more pragmatic.They are people with political ambitions, with an ideological backbone.

The Fatah prisoners of that period were actually the founders of the organization; they had been incarcerated since the 1980s. They were people with a solid ideology. The same goes for the Hamas inmates: They were the ones who established Hamas, which in that period was already the Hamas responsible for suicide attacks.

Hamas, which was no longer the organization that dealt with issues of charity, widows and orphans.

It wasn't the socially oriented organization, as it were, that Israel aspired to cultivate in the 1980s as the entity that would pose a threat to Fatah. It was already a military organization then. The thing with Hamas is that they have always been a faction of the Muslim Brotherhood.

[Hamas] set themselves Islamist goals: to annihilate the State of Israel, to liberate sacred Muslim lands. The Israelis just didn't get it: For them, Hamas and Fatah were the same thing.

Fatah talked about the 1967 borders, about the occupation, about the Palestinian people...Hamas inmates would say, "There's neither 1967 nor 1948. There are no borders and there is nothing to talk about. You are on Waqf land, Muslim sacred ground, and you have no place here."

After Hamas' terrifying takeover of the Gaza Strip, after the Fatah people saw their people being thrown out of buildings.

Fatah people didn't grasp what was about to happen. From their perspective, Hamas were their brothers in the resistance. They thought they were confronting Israel together; they never imagined that Hamas was capable of massacring their people.

Until Hamas did just that – something we're familiar with.

We [Israelis] were taken by surprise by the horrific disaster of October 7. I'm certain that in Fatah they weren't surprised. They'd already seen it happening – they'd already seen how people were thrown off the roof, without a drop of mercy. How they [Hamas] tied Fatah activists, still alive, to cars and dragged them through the streets until they died.

After these events, the penny dropped for Fatah. Their leaders in prison came to us [at the prison service] and said, "If you don't get them out of our cells – now – we will slaughter them all." Many inmates, whose families and friends had been massacred, wanted revenge. Fatah grasped that Hamas had a different agenda.

Islamist – not nationalist. That rift continues to this day. We also saw it in Fatah's behavior in the West Bank. They understood that they would not [be able to] crush Hamas there, that the same things would recur. They understood that their great enemy was Hamas, not Israel. They changed course. I'm telling you that when I spoke with significant Fatah leaders at that time, in prison, they told me, "Hamas will do to you what they did to us. You're cultivating Hamas, injecting money into Gaza, humiliating Fatah, but in the end they will do to you what they did to us."

The first encounter [with Sinwar] eas when I was still a dentist. By 2004, when the intelligence picture had become clearer to me, I already saw him differently. I saw his dominance as Hamas' leader in Gaza, and the bitter rivalry between Hamas-West Bank and Hamas-Gaza. Hamas-Gaza is very much influenced by the extremist Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Hamas-West Bank is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The latter live together with King Abdullah and [in the past with] King Hussein. They are more pragmatic.

What form did the differences between them take? How did you see them in real time?

Israel was ready to release only prisoners who had been arrested before the Al-Aqsa intifada – in other words, anyone taken into custody after 2000 was not included in the list of those who would be freed. But how does a Hamasnik from Gaza think, and not just Sinwar, by the way? "No. I want it all." There's no pragmatism. He wants the major Hamas prisoners to be freed – like Abdullah Barghouti, the explosives engineer behind the Sbarro, Café Hillel, Moment and Apropos bombings [restaurants and cafés in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv attacked by terrorists], who received 10 life sentences. Or Abbas al-Sayed, who was responsible for the terrorist attack in the Park Hotel [in Netanya, in 2002, in which 30 people were killed]

Sinwar himself was released in the Shalit deal: He had murdered Palestinians [suspected of collaborating with Israel], not Jews, so he did not technically have "blood on his hands."

That was a decision I could understand at the moral level – but when it came to the level of danger? It was a sign of total ignorance. He is 10 times as dangerous as anyone with "blood on his hands." Sinwar, Tawfiq Abu Naim, Rawhi Mushtaha – they don't have [Israeli] blood on their hands, and they are Hamas' leaders today.

We would like to think that a person who has been away from his turf for 22 years loses his influence. But it's simply not true. That's exactly the point we're missing. They don't disappear in prison. It's not like some criminal inmate who comes out after 20 years and has no one to talk to.

It's in the security facilities that those who want to be leaders shape their leadership. In prison they interact with the ranking figures, with those the organization views as people of stature.

Prison as a leadership institute.

Think of Sinwar, who leaves prison after orchestrating the arrangements for the [Shalit] deal, having established his status as leader, while others in the leadership, [Ismail] Haniyeh and [Mahmoud] al-Zahar, had never seen the inside of a prison.

Compared to them he's a hero...I was also against the release of [Saleh] Al-Arouri [a senior Hamas figure who was freed in 2007 and killed in an IDF drone attack in Lebanon last January]. I argued with the Shin Bet, I told them not to deport him, that he would not sit quietly. That he would send out octopus tentacles everywhere and operate the organization from afar. That is of course what happened and what he did – and with the help of the group he gathered around him in prison, to boot.

I saw a person whose authority was heeded by thousands of Hamas prisoners in jail, whose word was law. He had amazing abilities of persuasion. He didn't use force, just his personality. He could make a room go silent simply with a glance. He was so charismatic, far more charismatic than Sinwar.

Hebron prisoners are different from Nablus prisoners. We saw that also when we arranged encounters between them, deliberately. Things exploded. All-out wars broke out between them.

Tell me, what did you feel about them? You've described here calmly, how you manipulated them, played with their minds. What were they to you? Did you hate them?

People who engage in hatred are weak. Hatred is not a modus operandi.

And you hated them?

I was afraid of them.

Even when you sat with them, one on one? Was that frightening?

...there were were prisoners in whose eyes you could truly see burning hatred. In their gaze. I felt that I hated them too. Look, I also saw how the Hamas leaders abused other prisoners. Their faith is so strong that they say, "In the name of the faith, this is what we need to do. It doesn't matter if they have little children or a wife." It's crazy, because why is he in prison in the first place? He was arrested because he did something on their behalf.

There's no compassion, no feelings, no sentiments. Everyone is an object. There was a high-ranking Hamasnik in prison whom Sinwar suspected of collaboration. When he got out, they hanged that person in the city square and brought his 9-year-old son to watch.

Whole families in Nir Oz were erased. Slaughtered. Burned. It was a holocaust. To tell you I was surprised by the atrocities? Regrettably, no. I know this enemy. Personally. Sinwar could not surprise me. My only surprise was that the IDF, the security forces and the government of Israel allowed this holocaust to take place on Israeli soil.

...the prisoners who were supposed to be released were brought to Ketziot, and it was decided to have them sign a form in which they'd commit to not returning to terrorism.  Mushtaha and Sinwar said, "We're not signing, and no one else is signing." From that moment no one signed, but we released them all the same.

I was with the prisoners to be released ...They were happy. Euphoric. "We beat you," they said.

What did you tell them?

They think differently from us. I said to Sinwar, "Tell me, is it worth it for 10,000 innocent people to die, in order to free 100 prisoners?" The reply was, "Even 100,000 is worth it." Their notion of time is different, and the price in blood they are ready to pay in order to achieve their goal is different. Because each person who dies is a shahid [martyr]. It's warfare in the name of God.

I had a conversation with Abbas al-Sayed. I asked, "Why didn't you go on a suicide mission yourself? Why do you send others?" He said, "Everyone has a role. I am in charge."

Do you think Sinwar is willing to die?

He is. Definitely. That's the difference between him and the Hamas leaders who were released in the Shalit deal, and are living decadent lives in Turkey or Qatar. They forgot their people. Sinwar is not like that. He's an ascetic. Since establishing the shock committees in Gaza [the Al-Majad organization, whose aim was to liquidate collaborators and violators of religious law], he hasn't changed. Today he feels like Saladin, because he succeeded in doing what no Arab leader before him did. He sees himself as playing a central role in the realization of the Islamist ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood. He thinks he has entered the annals of history. And he really doesn't care if 200,000 people are killed and not a single house remains complete in Gaza. The main thing is the goal, the greater idea.

A Muslim theocracy under the aegis of Qatari money...We effectively allowed Qatar to finance the idea.

I know how [Sinwar] thinks. Look, when the first [hostage release] deal was implemented, I was invited to sit in the TV studios and accompany the broadcast of the release [as a commentator]. I refused to do that, because I didn't want to say on air what I really thought. Sinwar went for the first deal, because he had an interest in it. t

[Sinwar] was apprehensive of the pressure Qatar was wielding on him, under U.S. pressure – an insane steamroller to get him to release the women and children. The moment that interest was gone, the deal was over.

'I asked Sinwar, is it worth 10,000 Gazans dying? He said, even 100,000 is worth it'
As head of the Intelligence Division of the Israel Prison Service, Yuval Bitton knew Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar – whose organization murdered Bitton's nephew on Oct. 7 – up close

Please introduce yourself.

I'm the father of three and I give public lectures on Hamas. Two years ago I retired from the Israel Prison Service, where I started out in 1996, as a dentist.

And you finished there as head of the service's Intelligence Division.

I attended a course for intelligence officers and served as such at Ketziot Prison [southwest of Be'er Sheva] and then moved up the ladder until I reached the top of the pyramid.

While preparing for this interview, I found an item from 2005 in which you explained the differences between the teeth of prisoners who are affiliated with Fatah and those who are members of Hamas.

The teeth of Fatah inmates are in poor condition, whereas Hamas prisoners maintain hygiene and purity. Theirs is a religious way of life. Ascetic. With rigid discipline. They pray five times a day, don't touch sweets, don't smoke. There's no such thing as smoking in Hamas. You see a 50-year-old prisoner who is entirely free of any signs of illness. No tooth decay. I'd say, "You're Hamas?" They would say, "Yes, how did you know?" "By the teeth," I replied. A very basic insight. Everything has meaning – it's the same with regard to their way of life, for example. At 9 P.M., there is a total lights-out in the prison's Hamas wings; in the Fatah wings they watch television all night.

At that time you were an inquisitive dentist, with good diagnostic skills. How did you end up as an intelligence officer?

There was an intelligence officer I knew who hung out a lot in the clinic, which is a supposedly safe place for prisoners. They feel free to talk there, because their organizations aren't monitoring or eavesdropping on them. He saw that I was talking to them all the time, and I also talked with him about all kinds of insight that I had about them. He realized that I could be a platform for recruiting sources and suggested that I join the prisons service intelligence division.

You know, when I first started out at the service, thousands of prisoners had already been released as part of the Oslo Accords framework. Who was still incarcerated? Around 800 inmates. There was the really hard-core element of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and another 200 Fatah prisoners with "blood on their hands." When I came to Nafha Prison [in the Negev], as a dentist, the whole Hamas leadership was imprisoned there: [Yahya] Sinwar; his right-hand man Rawhi Mushtaha; Tawfiq Abu Naim, the head of the security branches; Ali al-Amoudi, Hamas' communications director and manager of Sinwar's office. And because I'd worked twice a week at a prison for criminals too, I understood that the behavior I saw at Nafha [among security prisoners] was very unusual.

In what way?

The discipline there was at an insane level. There's a leadership, and they decide everything. There's no such thing as a prisoner who does whatever he pleases.

In the 1990s, there was still no separation in the prisons between Hamas and Fatah members.

Until 2007 the two organizations had a joint leadership, with an orderly distribution of tasks. I would look around and grasp that not only was this "business" being managed like a military organization in every respect – they had simply copied their models from the outside, with the same complex structure involved in electing the leaders, the same positions, only behind bars. There was the head of the Hamas political bureau – in prison. I was fascinated.

A kind of microcosm of the organization in jail. A ship in a bottle. But there are hierarchies and organizations [among inmates] in all detention facilities.

True, but among criminal prisoners, I saw completely different behavior. Back then, there were no crime families with so-called soldiers and an economic infrastructure. There were prominent prisoners, like Herzl Avitan, for example, but there were no gangs per se. The inmates in a security prison are also a different breed. They are not rapists and thieves.

"Hamas-Gaza is very influenced by the extremist Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Hamas-West Bank is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. They're more pragmatic."

They are people with political ambitions, with an ideological backbone.

The Fatah prisoners of that period were actually the founders of the organization; they had been incarcerated since the 1980s. They were people with a solid ideology. The same goes for the Hamas inmates: They were the ones who established Hamas, which in that period was already the Hamas responsible for suicide attacks.

Hamas, which was no longer the organization that dealt with issues of charity, widows and orphans.

It wasn't the socially oriented organization, as it were, that Israel aspired to cultivate in the 1980s as the entity that would pose a threat to Fatah. It was already a military organization then. The thing with Hamas is that they have always been a faction of the Muslim Brotherhood. They set themselves Islamist goals: to annihilate the State of Israel, to liberate sacred Muslim lands. The Israelis just didn't get it: For them, Hamas and Fatah were the same thing.

I'd like for us to avoid the wisdom of hindsight, if possible. Do you stand behind what you are saying? That you, as a prison dentist, thought that Hamas was a danger to Israel's very existence as much as 30 years ago?

I stand behind that. So, yes, already back then. As a dentist. Fatah talked about the 1967 borders, about the occupation, about the Palestinian people. To me, the Hamas inmates would say, "There's neither 1967 nor 1948. There are no borders and there is nothing to talk about. You are on Waqf land, Muslim sacred ground, and you have no place here." When I became an intelligence officer, I made use of the insight about Hamas and Fatah being from two different worlds. That wasn't understood on the outside until 2007.

After Hamas' terrifying takeover of the Gaza Strip, after the Fatah people saw their people being thrown out of buildings.

Fatah people didn't grasp what was about to happen. From their perspective, Hamas were their brothers in the resistance. They thought they were confronting Israel together; they never imagined that Hamas was capable of massacring their people.

Until Hamas did just that – something we're familiar with.

We [Israelis] were taken by surprise by the horrific disaster of October 7. I'm certain that in Fatah they weren't surprised. They'd already seen it happening – they'd already seen how people were thrown off the roof, without a drop of mercy. How they [Hamas] tied Fatah activists, still alive, to cars and dragged them through the streets until they died. From Hamas' point of view, members of Fatah are not their brothers. So what if they are Muslims too? They are an obstacle on the road to achieving the goal: a sharia state.

After these events, the penny dropped for Fatah. Their leaders in prison came to us [at the prison service] and said, "If you don't get them out of our cells – now – we will slaughter them all." Many inmates, whose families and friends had been massacred, wanted revenge. Fatah grasped that Hamas had a different agenda.

An Islamist agenda.

Islamist – not nationalist. That rift continues to this day. We also saw it in Fatah's behavior in the West Bank. They understood that they would not [be able to] crush Hamas there, that the same things would recur. They understood that their great enemy was Hamas, not Israel. They changed course. I'm telling you that when I spoke with significant Fatah leaders at that time, in prison, they told me, "Hamas will do to you what they did to us. You're cultivating Hamas, injecting money into Gaza, humiliating Fatah, but in the end they will do to you what they did to us."

You spent many hours with Sinwar. Tell me about your relationship with him. When did you first meet him?

We spent many hours indeed. The first encounter was when I was still a dentist. By 2004, when the intelligence picture had become clearer to me, I already saw him differently. I saw his dominance as Hamas' leader in Gaza, and the bitter rivalry between Hamas-West Bank and Hamas-Gaza. Hamas-Gaza is very much influenced by the extremist Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Hamas-West Bank is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The latter live together with King Abdullah and [in the past with] King Hussein. They are more pragmatic.

What form did the differences between them take? How did you see them in real time?

For example, when I tried to help advance the Shalit deal [in 2011, for the return of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who was abducted by Hamas to Gaza in 2006, in exchange for 1,026 Palestinian prisoners] from inside the prison. Israel was ready to release only prisoners who had been arrested before the Al-Aqsa intifada – in other words, anyone taken into custody after 2000 was not included in the list of those who would be freed. But how does a Hamasnik from Gaza think, and not just Sinwar, by the way? "No. I want it all." There's no pragmatism. He wants the major Hamas prisoners to be freed – like Abdullah Barghouti, the explosives engineer behind the Sbarro, Café Hillel, Moment and Apropos bombings [restaurants and cafés in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv attacked by terrorists], who received 10 life sentences. Or Abbas al-Sayed, who was responsible for the terrorist attack in the Park Hotel [in Netanya, in 2002, in which 30 people were killed.

Sinwar himself was released in the Shalit deal: He had murdered Palestinians [suspected of collaborating with Israel], not Jews, so he did not technically have "blood on his hands."

That was a decision I could understand at the moral level – but when it came to the level of danger? It was a sign of total ignorance. He is 10 times as dangerous as anyone with "blood on his hands." Sinwar, Tawfiq Abu Naim, Rawhi Mushtaha – they don't have [Israeli] blood on their hands, and they are Hamas' leaders today.

At the time, did you object to Sinwar's release?

Of course.

What did you say, and to whom?

You have to understand: The Shin Bet [security service] didn't even ask the prison service; they didn't include the service. I was on the team of Haggai Hadas [the Shalit deal negotiating team], so I could make my views known there, but there was no discussion in which prison service representatives participated actively in deciding on the names [of those to be released]. I don't understand why. Sinwar had been held in Israel since 1988. Who knew what had happened and was still happening with him until his release, what he was up to? Only the prison service knew.

So, you just sat home and were silent? Didn't you try to raise a ruckus? To approach political decision makers?

I couldn't get to them – they do not engage with prison service personnel. I did what I could where I could, with Israel Defense Forces Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet. I was also a relatively junior figure then. That's what frustrates me most today. I'm certain that if I had been the head of the Intelligence Division then, I simply would not have allowed Sinwar's release to happen. I made my voice heard, but it simply had no effect. MI and the IDF do not monitor prisoners they took into custody 22 years earlier. That's not their job. They deal with what is happening on the ground. The thing is that releasing such prisoners affects the operations of MI and the Shin Bet on the ground.

And they don't know that? They must.

We would like to think that a person who has been away from his turf for 22 years loses his influence. But it's simply not true. That's exactly the point we're missing. They don't disappear in prison. It's not like some criminal inmate who comes out after 20 years and has no one to talk to. It's in the security facilities that those who want to be leaders shape their leadership. In prison they interact with the ranking figures, with those the organization views as people of stature.

Prison as a leadership institute.

Totally. And another critical matter that we, as Israelis, miss, is that from their point of view, those who paid the price of a prison term have added value.

And the longer the term, the higher the value.

Of course. Think of Sinwar, who leaves prison after orchestrating the arrangements for the [Shalit] deal, having established his status as leader, while others in the leadership, [Ismail] Haniyeh and [Mahmoud] al-Zahar, had never seen the inside of a prison. Compared to them he's a hero. By the way, I was also against the release of [Saleh] Al-Arouri [a senior Hamas figure who was freed in 2007 and killed in an IDF drone attack in Lebanon last January]. I argued with the Shin Bet, I told them not to deport him, that he would not sit quietly. That he would send out octopus tentacles everywhere and operate the organization from afar. That is of course what happened and what he did – and with the help of the group he gathered around him in prison, to boot. You really don't have to be especially smart to see this.

What did you see in Arouri?

I saw a person whose authority was heeded by thousands of Hamas prisoners in jail, whose word was law. He had amazing abilities of persuasion. He didn't use force, just his personality. He could make a room go silent simply with a glance. He was so charismatic, far more charismatic than Sinwar.

Look…

I'll rephrase. Did his charisma work on you as well?

No. Because I knew very well what lurked behind that charisma. Tenacity of idea. Of purpose. When I concluded my tenure as head of the Intelligence Division, they [the Hamas prisoners] were happy to see me go, they knew that I was a threat to them, simply because I knew them. I'll give you an example. In 2010, Sinwar wanted to get two inmates who had been placed in solitary confinement out. He decided that he would organize a hunger strike of 1,600 prisoners, along with terrorist attacks and he would set the entire West Bank ablaze. I set an ambush for him. I brought in two Hamas leaders from the West Bank – not part of his Gazan group. They told him, "No, for two prisoners we will not launch a war like that with the prison service. Who do you think you are? You don't decide things on your own." I created friction. A confrontation. Head-to-head.

In other words, you actually generated intelligence? Actively, I mean. You created a reality.

Prison intelligence is the only sort of intelligence that is preventive. That is, you are actually also shaping the intelligence picture, because you control them [the prisoners]. You decide where they will be and what they will do. They [Palestinians] are very tribal. For example, Fatah prisoners from Hebron will be loyal to a leader from Hebron. It's the same with Nablus, Ramallah, Tul Karm, etc. And among all these groups, there are also cultural and psychological differences.

Not only between Hamas and Fatah, but within the organizations themselves.

Yes. Hebron prisoners are different from Nablus prisoners. We saw that also when we arranged encounters between them, deliberately. Things exploded. All-out wars broke out between them. Power struggles like that are excellent for us. They help intelligence personnel, because each side wants you with on their side. We got to a situation where Fatah inmates themselves asked to be separated from the Hamas prisoners. I stood aside and was pleased. They lashed out at one another, but stopped attacking the warders. That was good for me. Let them mess with themselves and not with us. That's the power of divide and rule, but to do it, you need to know them in depth. I did the same with the famous hunger strike of Marwan Barghouti.

The so-called Tortit strike [the hunger strike launched by the Fatah leader in 2017, during which he was filmed eating a chocolate snack bar].

You know what he said when he launched that hunger strike? "I'm going to dismantle Bitton's kingdoms now."

What does "Bitton's kingdoms" mean?

The prisoners cooperated with me. When he declared the strike, he had an agreement that everyone would join in: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Popular Front. I made it very clear to those organizations what would happen if they joined. The Fatah prisoners had to be dismantled from within, so I spoke with their leaders. I told them that for 20 years Barghouti hadn't done a thing for the Palestinian people, and now too all he wanted was to put something over on them, to play at being Nelson Mandela. They also did not join the strike – [those from] Hebron, Nablus, Tul Karm, Jenin. He ended up with 600 prisoners, out of 3,600. He kept up the strike for 42 days, and all that time I worked from the inside, including with inmates who had gone on strike with him. The Tortit story is only one aspect of the mind games there. Why did I give him a Tortit bar, of all things?

Because of the color of its wrapping? Hamas green?

Correct.

Really?

Yes. When he ended the strike silently [in secret], the first time, he ate some sort of cake or bread, and had water. I later told my people to give him chocolate. He pretended to be on a hunger strike, those who were with him were almost dying, and he's eating chocolate. I wanted everyone to see that he was eating chocolate.

'Burning hatred'

Tell me, what did you feel about them? You've described here calmly, how you manipulated them, played with their minds. What were they to you? Did you hate them?

People who engage in hatred are weak. Hatred is not a modus operandi.

And you hated them?

I was afraid of them.

Even when you sat with them, one on one? Was that frightening?

In intelligence, you're supposed to put your emotions aside. But yes, there were prisoners in whose eyes you could truly see burning hatred. In their gaze. I felt that I hated them too. Look, I also saw how the Hamas leaders abused other prisoners. Their faith is so strong that they say, "In the name of the faith, this is what we need to do. It doesn't matter if they have little children or a wife." It's crazy, because why is he in prison in the first place? He was arrested because he did something on their behalf. For the movement.

It's a psychopathic viewpoint. There's no compassion, no feelings, no sentiments. Everyone is an object. A pawn.

Absolutely. There was a high-ranking Hamasnik in prison whom Sinwar suspected of collaboration. When he got out, they hanged that person in the city square and brought his 9-year-old son to watch. Is there anything crueler than that? Sinwar himself, too – after all, we saved him. After he collapsed in prison [he was suffering from a brain tumor], we took him to a hospital right away. Israeli physicians fought for his life. Was there a scrap of gratitude? No such thing.

You were present when he was freed?

Of course.

Do you remember that day?

It was pretty traumatic. All the prisoners who were supposed to be released were brought to Ketziot, and it was decided to have them sign a form in which they'd commit to not returning to terrorism. The junior-ranking prisoners signed – what did they care? But Mushtaha and Sinwar said, "We're not signing, and no one else is signing." From that moment no one signed, but we released them all the same. That amounted to caving in. So from that they understood that they could make Israel fold.

What difference would it have made? Would Sinwar say to himself, "No, that's it. I promised Israel. I'll become an accountant"?

Of course not. But then why give them a document to sign at all? If we're going to release him, you know, even if he doesn't sign. Why give him that power?

What else do you remember from that day? Where were you? What did you talk about?

I was with them, I walked around with them – they were on a high. Ketziot is an open-air facility. That particular wing is surrounded by a wall and there's netting above it but you see the sky. The prisoners who had arrived there to be freed hadn't seen the sky for 20 years. In the prisons they had come from, they'd spend the entire day in their cells, maybe going out for an hour or two. Suddenly they see the horizon. They're happy. Euphoric. "We beat you," they said.

What did you tell them?

I felt a twinge in my heart, because I knew the price was steep. And I said, "We are defeating you, not the opposite. Because we are more ethical than you. We are ready to pay this price for a single soldier. You would not have been willing to pay that price if the situation were reversed. We are willing to do it, because we have values and morality – but don't interpret that as weakness." By the way, I truly believe that.

What happened as they left? Did they sing? Applaud?

They didn't dare. They knew that as along as they were still being held by the Shin Bet, they couldn't do that. Only when they had been driven a distance away, I saw them opening windows and making the victory sign. Look, during all those years they would tell me, "We will be freed," and I would say, "There's no way," in order to suppress their motivation. And yet now they were finally being freed, as they had believed. They think differently from us. When Gilad Shalit was abducted, Israel entered the Gaza Strip, eliminated a few hundred terrorists and destroyed buildings; of course, another few thousand civilians paid the price.

I said to Sinwar, "Tell me, is it worth it for 10,000 innocent people to die, in order to free 100 prisoners?" The reply was, "Even 100,000 is worth it." Their notion of time is different, and the price in blood they are ready to pay in order to achieve their goal is different. Because each person who dies is a shahid [martyr]. It's warfare in the name of God.

Are they themselves willing to die?

Not all of them. For example, I had a conversation with Abbas al-Sayed. I asked, "Why didn't you go on a suicide mission yourself? Why do you send others?" He said, "Everyone has a role. I am in charge."

Do you think Sinwar is willing to die?

He is. Definitely. That's the difference between him and the Hamas leaders who were released in the Shalit deal, and are living decadent lives in Turkey or Qatar. They forgot their people. Sinwar is not like that. He's an ascetic. Since establishing the shock committees in Gaza [the Al-Majad organization, whose aim was to liquidate collaborators and violators of religious law], he hasn't changed. Today he feels like Saladin, because he succeeded in doing what no Arab leader before him did. He sees himself as playing a central role in the realization of the Islamist ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood. He thinks he has entered the annals of history. And he really doesn't care if 200,000 people are killed and not a single house remains complete in Gaza. The main thing is the goal, the greater idea.

A Muslim theocracy under the aegis of Qatari money.

Yes. Qatar is the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar is the great idea. We effectively allowed Qatar to finance the idea.

Not "we." I didn't transfer suitcases of cash to Hamas, and I assume you didn't either.

Then whoever did the transfer, and whoever thought up the concept of allowing the Qataris to enter Gaza and pay Hamas and prop it up. I can tell you that one of the top figures in the Hamas leadership, whose name I will not mention, told me, "How is that you're letting Qatar underwrite Hamas? Underwrite Gaza? Why don't you go to Egypt or even Turkey or the United Arab Emirates? Qatar, of all countries? You don't have a clue."

The events of October 7 also hit you personally. Your nephew Tamir Adar was abducted and then found to have been murdered by Hamas.

Tamir, my sister's son, who was 38, grew up and was educated on [Kibbutz] Nir Oz to love the country. In his heroism, Tamir went out to defend his family, his community and the country. He didn't hesitate. He, and his four comrades in the emergency defense squad, fought alone against hundreds of terrorists, and prevented a far larger disaster. [Tamir's grandmother, Yaffa Adar, was among the hostages released in November.] Whole families in Nir Oz were erased. Slaughtered. Burned. It was a holocaust. To tell you I was surprised by the atrocities? Regrettably, no. I know this enemy. Personally. Sinwar could not surprise me. My only surprise was that the IDF, the security forces and the government of Israel allowed this holocaust to take place on Israeli soil.

Sinwar couldn't surprise you?

I don't think so. I know how he thinks. Look, when the first [hostage release] deal was implemented, I was invited to sit in the TV studios and accompany the broadcast of the release [as a commentator]. I refused to do that, because I didn't want to say on air what I really thought. Sinwar went for the first deal, because he had an interest in it. He was apprehensive of the pressure Qatar was wielding on him, under U.S. pressure – an insane steamroller to get him to release the women and children. The moment that interest was gone, the deal was over.

My sister viewed that deal as a preface to future deals, she was euphoric, she thought it was only the beginning. That she would quickly get her son back. I was sure that it was the first and last deal, that her son would not return. But I couldn't say that. I couldn't look my sister in the eye.

During the period when Tamir was considered a hostage, until you learned that he had been murdered [in January], did you try to exploit your acquaintanceship with people in Hamas? To convey messages?

I didn't try. There's no point. It's impossible to speak to the heart of people like them. I'm certain that Sinwar knows that Tamir was my nephew. One-hundred percent. Well, so what? I have no expectations of him. He owes me nothing. Those responsible for bringing back Tamir and the other hostages are the government of Israel and the person who heads it.

I have done some research on the true numbers in Gaza.

Originally, the Hamas run Gaza Health Ministry published that 32,000 Gazan Palestinians had been killed by Israeli forces. Of these, they claimed that 78% were women and children, and none were combatants or members of Hamas. Israel countered that 12,000 Palestinians they killed were combatants and/or members of Hamas. That leaves 20,000 Gazan Palestinian non-combatants as having been killed by Israel.

A little over a week ago, Hamas announced that over 11,000 people originally reported killed by Israeli forces couldn’t be accounted for – meaning, and this is the consensus in the global community, they were never killed. This means that 21,000 Palestinians were killed, 12,000 of whom were terrorists. That leaves 9,000 Gazan Palestinian non-combatants as having been killed by Israel.

Here’s an odd fact no one seems to be reporting. In the normal course of life, 4,000 people would’ve died over the past six months in Gaza. Hamas reports ALL deaths in Gaza as war related and killed by Israel, even those of natural means. That leaves 5,000 Gazan Palestinian non-combatants as having been killed by Israel.

Another factor not being counted is the number of Gazan Palestinians killed by Hamas rockets falling short and killing their own people. It’ll be impossible to ever calculate how many people were killed in this way, but it won’t be a small number of victims.

It is my conclusion that less than 5,000 Palestinian Gazans have been killed by force in this war; some by Israeli forces, and some by Hamas forces.

Originally Posted By tparker241:

Netanyahu stated response would be "unprecedented",  now we get this quote. Who to believe? I smell biden stink and payoff to one or both. Probably will never know.

The IDF's 91st "Galilee" Regional Division has wrapped up a "large-scale" drill in northern Israel, simulating attack and defense scenarios, the military says.

The army says the drill is part of "accelerating the IDF's readiness for defense and a strong attack in the northern arena."

The scenarios included "dealing with complex terrain, difficult weather conditions and mass casualty incidents," the military says.

The drill also involved the Israeli Air Force, Israel Police, and rescue authorities.

The exercise comes amid daily attacks by the Hezbollah terror group on northern Israel amid the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip.

Israel has warned it can no longer tolerate Hezbollah's presence along its border following the October 7 atrocities, and has warned that should a diplomatic solution not be reached, it will turn to military action to push Hezbollah northward.

The Israeli military says it has wrapped up a pinpoint operation against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in northern Gaza's Beit Hanoun, aimed at detaining members of the terror groups.

In a statement, the IDF says troops, led by the Gaza Divison's Northern Brigade, raided two school buildings in Beit Hanoun, following intelligence that Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives were gathered there and were "using the civilians sheltering there as a human shield."

Before the troops entered the buildings they called on the civilians to evacuate, the IDF says.

"The troops arrested a number of terrorists from the terrorist organizations in a targeted and precise manner while avoiding harming the civilian population," the statement says.

Several "terrorists who tried to harm the forces" were killed amid the raid, the IDF adds.

Participating in the raid were the Paratroopers Brigade's 890th Battlion, the Kfir Brigade's Netzah Yehuda Battalion, combat engineers, tank forces, the Air Force's elite Shaldag unit, the Military Intelligence Directorate's Unit 504, and the Shin Bet security agency.

The IDF says 14 soldiers were wounded in the Hezbollah drone and missile attack on Arab al-Aramshe earlier today.

Six troops were seriously wounded, two are listed in moderate condition, and another six are lightly hurt, the military says.

In all, 18 people were taken to Galilee Medical Center in Nahariya for treatment.

Fighter jets also hit buildings used by Hezbollah and other infrastructure in Naqoura and Yarine, the army adds.

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported Israeli forces led by the Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) conducted raids targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) sites in Beit Hanoun.  Targets were identified during intelligence during interrogation of Palestinian fighters,

Palestinian militias conducted attacks in the northern Gaza Strip.  The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that its fighters conducted 14 mortar and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks in Beit Hanoun.  

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.  The 401st and Nahal brigades (162nd Division) are operating near Wadi Gaza.  The Air Force struck a Palestinian fighter in the central Gaza Strip.  The 215th Artillery Brigade and IDF Air Force cooperated to destroy several rocket launchers.

The IDF Air Force struck over 40 targets in the Gaza Strip, including explosively rigged buildings, observation posts, and underground military infrastructure.

Palestinian sources claimed. Israeli forces are in eastern Deir al Balah.  Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed separate RPG and anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting Israeli forces.

Palestinian fighters fired a single rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip.

West Bank
Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank.

Three Palestinian militias—PIJ, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and Jundullah—claimed separate attacks targeting Israeli forces around Tubas.  The PIJ detonated an IED targeting an IDF bulldozer.  Jundallah has claimed two previous attacks in Tubas since the Israel-Hamas war began.

Israeli forces detained six wanted Palestinians during overnight operations. bIsraeli police separately detained a Palestinian man in Jerusalem on suspicion of planning to conduct a stabbing attack.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon.  One of these attacks was a complex drone and anti-tank guided missile attack that injured 18 Israelis, including 14 IDF soldiers, in Arab al Aramsha along the Israel-Lebanon border.

The drone Hezbollah used bears visual similarities to an Iranian-made Adabil-2.  The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah air defense sites near Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, in retaliation for the Hezbollah drone strike in Arab al Aramsha.

Yemen
CENTOM reported that it destroyed two drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen.  Houthi-controlled media claimed the United States and United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Bajil District.

Iran
A small demonstration occurred outside the Jordanian embassy in Tehran, protesting the Jordanian support in intercepting the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance have adopted a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan in recent months.

Senior Iranian political and military officials reiterated their threats that Iran would respond “severely” if Israel retaliates for the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel

Syria
The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran ordered IRGC personnel to evacuate military sites across Syria in anticipation of possible Israeli strikes.

Iraq
An adviser to the Iraqi prime minister, Subhan al Mullah Jiyad, claimed that the US-Iraqi Higher Military Commission has “set a schedule” for the withdrawal of the US-led international coalition from Iraq.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah issued a statement criticizing Saudi Arabia amid rising tensions between the Axis of Resistance and the kingdom.  Kataib Hezbollah accused Saudi Arabia of supporting the US agenda in the Middle East.

Originally Posted By BM1455:

A Senior U.S. Official has now told ABC News what Israeli Journalist for Axios, Barak Ravid said earlier today which is that Israel is unlikely to launch a Retaliatory Strike against Iran until after Passover which Ends on April 30th; the Official also stated that despite this,… pic.twitter.com/AzWBOcu8LD

OSINTdefender  (@sentdefender) April 18, 2024

Originally Posted By Charging_Handle:
Just curious, but is anyone noticing any unusual military activity in the Middle East or elsewhere tonight? The reason I ask, there's 3 E-6B Mercury airborne command posts airborne over the U.S. right now on ADSB and HF radio is going nuts with tons of EAMs. The volume of radio traffic is highly unusual. It is just one message after another going out. I have a feeling something is up somewhere in the world.

Originally Posted By Charging_Handle:
Just curious, but is anyone noticing any unusual military activity in the Middle East or elsewhere tonight? The reason I ask, there's 3 E-6B Mercury airborne command posts airborne over the U.S. right now on ADSB and HF radio is going nuts with tons of EAMs. The volume of radio traffic is highly unusual. It is just one message after another going out. I have a feeling something is up somewhere in the world.

Border Police officers detained a Palestinian man allegedly affiliated with the Islamic State jihadist movement, who planned to carry out a terror attack in "the immediate time-frame."

The suspect was nabbed in the West Bank town of Beitunia, close to Ramallah, following intelligence provided by the Shin Bet, police say.

Police say the suspect attempted to flee when they reached his home, and was arrested as he tried to grab the gun of one of the officers.

He was handed over to the Shin Bet for further interrogation.

The head of interrogations in Hamas's internal security in northern Gaza's Beit Hanoun was killed in an airstrike this week, the military and Shin Bet announce.

Yousef Sabat also served as an officer in the intelligence division of Hamas's military wing, in its Beit Hanoun Battalion, according the IDF.

"This elimination significantly damages the organization's investigations department," the joint statement says.

In a separate recent incident, the IDF says it carried out an airstrike on a vehicle with at least 10 gunmen in it, killing them. It says the strike followed "accurate intelligence" on the operatives.

Overnight, fighter jets struck a mortar launcher in Gaza City's Rimal neighborhood, used to launch projectiles at troops operating in the Gaza Strip, the IDF says.

Also over the past day, the Air Force struck dozens more targets across Gaza. The military says the sites included observation posts, buildings used by Hamas, operatives, and other infrastructure.

The IDF reported that a reservist is in critical condition and four others are seriously wounded by the anti-tank missiles and drones launched toward the village of Arab al-Aramshe, in northern Israel. 18 people were wounded in total, including 13 reservists, two security squad members and three civilians. The army is investigating why the launches were not intercepted.

Internal Israeli documents obtained by the New York Times reveal that the assassination of top Iranian general Mohammad Reza Zahedi (also known as Hassan Mahadawi) in Damascus had been planned for about two months.

The Times reported that according to American and Israeli officials, Israel had miscalculated the strength of Iran's response, expecting only small scale attacks by proxies or Iran itself.

The Israeli war cabinet approved the operation to carry out the Damascus strike on March 22, a week before, according to documents viewed by The Times. The U.S. was only updated on Israel's plans "mere moments" before.

The U.S. secretary of defense, Lloyd Austin, spoke directly with Israel's defense minister Yoav Gallant on April 3, American officials told The Times. He reportedly complained that the attack had put U.S. troops in danger, and that the lack of warning from Israel gave them no time to prepare.

A satellite image taken on Sunday morning shows the damage caused by a ballistic missile that hit a strategic air base in Israel's south after Iran launched its first-ever direct assault on the country, which also included drones and cruise missiles.

The photo, taken by Planet Labs hours after Iran's attack against Israel, shows damage to a taxiway in the southern part of the Nevatim Air Base, near the transport squadron and its C-130s.

"There were a total of four hits," IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari said, "One landed near a runway, two in open areas and one near a building that is still under construction, causing minor damage to it. The base functioned throughout the attack," he added.

An Egyptian source told London-based Qatari newspaper Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that the U.S. agreed to the Israeli plan for a military operation in Rafah in exchange for a limited response against Iran.

Israel is unlikely to carry out a strike on Iran until after Passover, a senior U.S. official told ABC News, although that could always change.

The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other leadership are still on a high state of alert, with some in safe houses and underground facilities, the official said.

Three Israeli sources also told ABC News that Israel prepared for and then aborted retaliatory strikes on at least two nights this week. According to them, the war cabinet has been present with a number of different options, including attacking Iranian proxies not on Iranian soil, or a potential cyberattack.

The killing of Mohammad Srour, 57, who was sanctioned by the U.S., was like something out of an international spy thriller. Pistols equipped with silencers and gloves were found in a bucket of water and chemicals at the scene, apparently intended to remove fingerprints and other evidence, Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi said in an interview with The Associated Press. Thousand of dollars in cash were left scattered around Srour's body, as if to dispel any speculation that robbery was the motive.

"Lebanese security agencies have suspicion or accusations that Mossad was behind this operation," Mawlawi said, referring to the Israeli spy agency. "The way the crime was carried out led to this suspicion."

He provided no specific evidence for his allegations. Mawlawi said the investigation is still ongoing and once it's over the results will be made public and referred to judicial authorities.

The Israeli prime minister's office, which oversees Mossad, did not immediately respond to a request for comment