Arty are the only ones I have much knowledge about either.

The tempo in Astan near as I can tell was damn near every day for a year.

The Super-T is a pretty much solved problem, and you crew them with CWOs and that's your solution.  It's not a nightmare, the Army already has flying CWOs and the logistics to support something like the super-T are far less than required to support the A-10 or one of the flagship aircraft like the F-15 or the B1 that the USAF is using for CAS right now.

I view it as a failure of congress and the last two presidents.

Do you know how many UAVs we've purchased in the last 13 years?  We tripled our number of UAV orbits, built "manned UAV" MC-12s and fielded them, and did everything else asked of us as a service.  It's not like we had litening and sniper pods on our B-1s and B-52s a decade ago.  We have fielded new capabilities on our global hawks (BACN) and stop gapped that mission with manned aircraft too, we developed and deployed brand new sensors on the U-2 to help locate IEDs.  That's just a few of the things we've been doing.

We're using the U2 to hunt for IEDs. Huh.

That seems odd to me.

They've had tremendous success with that mission actually, enough that the AF wanted to put off their retirement.

That doesn't surprise me, that it's good at it. It's an amazing aircraft.

Couldn't that tech be stuck on a Global Hawk, though?

As much of a failure as being at war for 13 years.  Should we blame that on the grunts?



 

You keep referring to Army organizational dynamics as monolithic, which isn't true, nor do you seem particularly interested in the details.

There are points of failure within the Army generating force system that prevent meaningful change.

However factual these points may be, it doesn't change the facts that customers seem to think there is a problem, and the customer isn't tasked with providing the service.

All things that increased your fleet count. The LAAR and C-27J programs were asked, and USAF slow rolled them.

Umm... Your posting isn't grammatically perfect either, Nancy.  For as much as you're breaking this guy's balls over posting grammar errors, perhaps you should triple check your post before submitting it and looking like a hypocrite and a tard.

I don't care which rank you throw on them.

Fuck, make them enlisted pilots, doesn't change the facts.

Okay, I'll play this game.

If I can 100% prove to you that 6.8spc is a better all around round than 5.56 in every possible way, and smokes hadjis like Andrew Dice Clay at the Marlboro factory, why aren't we all switching to that round? I mean, isn't the spec ops community already using that round?

F22 has been around since the 90's and we are still trying to figure out all the quirks of that plane. Remember the oxygen issues?

F35 is a boondoggle. It's literally air power cancer that is costing ten times what it's supposed to and only doing half as much. It's like a bunch of fighter jocks sat around and said, "Hey, let's cram every possible ability into this one fighter!" Plainly, it's not going to work, and thus far isn't. If you want to make that argument, hey, jump in the backseat, I'm driving this bitch.

Now when it comes to CAS, you want, understandably, it to be there the moment you want it. Problem is that there no fewer than a thousand other guys in every other part of that shithole who want it too. So who gets it? Where does it come from? Those planes don't grow on trees, the maintenance guys that take care of them don't just pop out of magic land, and the logistical supply train can't all be contained in one ISU90...

You forgot a few things.

Do those CWO's grow on trees? Do they come with experience? Hell, why not just use enlisted pilots? Won't matter.

We would have to literally create an entire new supply system. Turcanos use a different engine than everything else we fly, and 99% of the other parts are unique too. Are you going to forward deploy maintenance, supply, and every other support they need?

I agree that using the F15/16 and B1 is nothing but shoehorning.

Why not?



 

Yea a lot of the shit for them is made here in the states.
 

No, the Army already has CWOs who fly fixed wing aircraft.  Give them the opportunity to "fleet up" to something with guns and bombs, and you wouldn't be able to open up enough slots -- they'd jump at the opportunity.  Then you train up new guys for the slots they vacate.  Or take from the Apache guys, since they already understand how to do CAS, or the Kiowa guys and retrain them.  Aviators are technicians, they are not gods who are magically chosen, they're simply people who are trained to fly, and we can train more of them if necessary.  Flying is cool and people want to do it, you'll have no lack of people who want to fly if you put the opportunity out there.  Hell, we throw out hundreds of them every year because there aren't enough jobs for them.  A few years ago they were dropping a bunch of them the day they graduated flight school -- here's your choice, go SWO or become a civilian...

You act as though nobody knows how to support aircraft deployed.  We (USN) do it all over the world for hundreds to thousands of sorties every day all day long.  It's not even hard.  It takes money and dedicated people to make it work.  The supply channels already exist, you just have to buy the parts and get them into the system.  If it's hard to figure it out, just fly the people who are going to build the program onboard a CVN for a couple of weeks and we'll teach them how to do it.  Logistics is not as hard as you make it out to be.

LOL no shit.   He acts like it some ponderous thing to make airplanes fly.   Time+Money.  





We were flying Helo's and Harriers off FARP's in Iraq on the highway.   All they did was knock over the light standards and drive 5 tons up.  



A-10's were flying off a FOB in AFG.
 

Wouldn't be "make" so much as stand out of the way of the mad dash of 58 guys running to the flight line to play with their new toys.

You understand COIN the way I understand DCA.

In theory.

I don't like to risk my infantryman.

But, I guess 7000 KIAs later, I don't get much of a choice.

YOu know whats a real bitch?  war.

I am interested in the details.

What organization within the Army cares?  Not which Individual, but which organization  has taken such a position?

as usual.

I agree

and a lot of KIAs.

the frames aren't nearly as important as the doctrine and integration.

any fixed wing is more survivable than a rotary wing.

its war.  

and the last two we are losing.  primarily because we spend too much lives and treasure that don't give us the strategic patience OR the combat effects required for successful COI which our current system of CAS only exacerbates.

AF delivered CAS is currently a tactical and strategic liability in the wars we actually fight, and the wars its designed to fight, should never occur IF you actually believe in strategic airpower.

call me when they cancel the airshow circuit.

I have received X-CAS from rotary and fixed.

when you guys check in, its a huge difference.  rotary takes a load off my plate.  fixed wing adds to it.

you have been on one side of the equation, I have been on the other.  the key difference is you know your frame and how it works.  I have seen most frames and how they work in combat.

Plus, if rotary shits the bed for whatever reason, there is direct accountability.

I haven't had marine air, I hear that it splits the difference.  more flexible than af, but not as flexible as army.  they treat their aviation as a fires asset, we treat you as a maneuver asset.  I am sure RON will tone me up on where I am getting it wrong.

Kiowas are the frame of choice for conventional guys for a damned good reason.

that was one of my papers for the war college.
they killed it.

Here is an interesting quote from Carl Builder.  A RAND analyst.

When Air Power fails, the theory is not questioned, rather the war is.  American foreign policy is expected to bend to the capabilities of the AF, and not vice-versa

not that anyone cares about my opinion, but i like that idea

alot

Nothing Should Stop the Army Air Corps:  The United State Army’s Fixed Wing Future
With the decision to procure the Gray Eagle UAV (MQ-1C), the United States Army (Army) has embarked upon an enduring commitment to tactical, fixed wing aviation.  This decision, combined with recent and historical United States Air Force (USAF) decisions, must inspire the Army to fully embrace its fixed wing future.   The Army now finds itself in a convoluted situation.  It flies manned, unarmed, fixed wing aircraft.  It flies, manned, armed, rotary wing aircraft.  It flies unmanned, armed, fixed wing aircraft.  Yet, somehow, the Army cannot fly armed, manned, fixed wing aircraft regardless the effects they provide or the cost savings to the Nation.  This archaic and parochial position is untenable, unnecessary and foolish.  As the Army is committed to a fixed wing future, it should maximize the opportunities afforded.

This opportunity to focus on battlefield capabilities and not technical trivialities will save not only money but lives on the future battlefield.  The Army should divest itself of restrictions on which aircraft to procure in support of land operations.  The OH-58, a Vietnam legacy aircraft, should be replaced by a manned, fixed wing alternative designed specifically for light attack/armed reconnaissance and integrated to operate with current and future Army forces.  The USAF’s latest proposal to kill the A-10  is only the latest in a 70 year history of seeming ambivalence to their requirement to support the Army in close air support.  From Eisenhower to Odierno, the Army has often found itself the victim of a quick reversal of USAF promises to support the Army.  

The support of General Eisenhower was critical to the creation of the independent Air Force.  This support was obtained only by a commitment from General Spaatz to provide robust tactical air support in the form of the creation of the Tactical Air Command (TAC) .  Just one year later, Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Vandenburg demoted TAC making it subordinate to the Continental Air Command and eliminating all habitual relationships between air and ground units .  Spaatz, then retired, was furious at the betrayal of the Army and Eisenhower.  General Quesada, the father of US close air support (CAS) techniques in World War 2, later resigned in disgust due to Vandenburg’s decision .  The devolution of TAC happened only months after President Truman approved the Key West Agreement which severely curtailed US Army aviation based upon soon to be abandoned promises of support .  Vandenburg had divined that the inevitable conflict between the US and the USSR did not include ground forces .  

The USAF has often tried to determine what a future war will look like.  For example, in response to many complaints about CAS during Korea, the USAF replied that the conventional fighting in Korea was atypical and would not be repeated in future conflicts .  In 1963 the Air Force predicted that the FB-111 would be the optimal CAS aircraft for Vietnam. . The procurement of the A-10 in the closing stages of Vietnam might be seen as a commitment to supporting the Army.  The main impetus for procuring the A-10, however, wasn’t to kill enemy ground forces; it was to kill the Army’s proposed follow on attack helicopter, the AH-56 Cheyenne .  
In a replay of the FB-111 prediction, the Air Force has determined that the supersonic, stealthy F35A is the best replacement for the A-10 .  The loiter, armament and armor which made the A-10 the premier conventional CAS aircraft all being abandoned for stealth and speed.  The GAU-8 30mm Gun with 1100 rounds of ammunition will be substituted by GAU 12 25mm gun with 180 rounds of ammunition providing only four seconds of total firing time .   The costs, too, will increase.  The $17,000 per flight hour cost of the A-10 is estimated to at least double for the F35A .  The 1970s vintage A-10s have been flown hard in their career and require an approximately $2.7 billion upgrade program  .  With network centric, high intensity conflict seen as the future challenges by the USAF, the A-10 has no place and is seen as an expensive albatross.  With the greatly increased operating cost and the many missions slated for the F35A few, if any, hours will be dedicated for training F35A pilots on CAS.  This situation, too, is not unprecedented.  In 1955 the Air Force identified the F100D as the USAF’s primary CAS platform.  Yet by 1959, no F100D pilots were trained to drop conventional munitions due to the USAFs preoccupation with the delivery of nuclear weapons by tactical aircraft .  

Light Attack, Armed Reconnaissance
The desire to replace the OH-58 with a more up to date airframe led to the RAH-66 Comanche program cancelled in 2004 .  The Comanche’s missions were “armed reconnaissance, light attack and air combat.”  The same terminology was used to describe the USAF’s Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) program in 2006.  The program originally envisioned 100 inexpensive, propeller driven aircraft to provide close air support in the counter insurgency environment . Unfortunately, the LAAR quickly devolved to the 20 airframe Light Air Support (LAS) program and only to be used to train allied air forces rather than in support of US ground units.  The USAF selected the Embraer A-29 “Super Tucano” for its LAAR/LAS program. .

The A-29 has features that should be attractive to a budget constrained military.    The per-unit cost for the A29 is approximately 22 million dollars.  This amount includes all training, maintenance and support requirements . With just the $2.7 billion pending for A-10 upgrades, 100 brand new A-29s could be procured.  The flight cost per hour is estimated at only $1000 .  It can fly well above 30,000 feet for up to 8 hours .  With hand held Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) being a primary threat to aircraft operating in a small war environment, only fixed wing  attack aircraft can operate effectively above these increasingly available missiles’ 15,000 foot range . The A-29 is one of many aircraft with similar capabilities and costs.  Veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan have asked for years for such a capability.  

The Army’s commitment to the Gray Eagle demonstrates the value of organic fixed wing assets to the Land Component.  But armed UAVs are a poor substitute for a manned aircraft in the close air support role .  Designed to perform Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, UAVs shine especially in the surveillance role.  The AH-64 helicopter will remain the premier Army attack platform in major combat operations (MCO).  Its remote field capability is irreplaceable in the rapid advances found during high intensity, short duration fights.  If this is the limit of the Army’s fighting future, then there is admittedly no need for a LAAR.  But, likewise, there would be no need for an Army independent UAV system.  These Desert Storm-esque battles are precisely the types of conflicts the Joint and USAF doctrine are designed to fight .  
The Future of Land Warfare
The Country gave a specific mission to the United States Army in 1947:
“In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army shall include land combat and services forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein.  It shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.”  

The past 30 years have seen the Army perform sustained missions in the Sinai Desert, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.  Farther back, large scale wars in Vietnam and Korea as well as smaller long term commitments in Central and South America have clearly predicted that sustained operations are most likely in the Army’s future.  Our Nation’s financial ability to fight long conflicts with expensive aviation optimized for short duration, high intensity conflict is increasingly in doubt.  The Army’s statutory mission is to fight both types of conflicts.  The law specifically includes authority for organic aviation as required to perform its mission. The Army should procure accordingly.

Building off the Gray Eagle, the Army’s standard Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) should include a fixed wing battalion.  Such a battalion would be comprised of LAAR aircraft, Gray Eagles, MC-12s as well as maintenance and ground support companies.  This battalion could also host a future fixed wing, intra-theater airlift element should the Army wish to relook this requirement following the cancellation of the C27J by the USAF.  The disestablishment of current OH-58 units would provide adequate manpower and funding.  AH-64s would provide rotary wing attack and reconnaissance requirements prior to Army airfields being established.  In peacetime, the fixed wing fleet could provide low cost border security, search and rescue, and command and control for natural disasters bypassing FAA limitations on UAV operations.  This fixed wing battalion would not be designed to operate en masse, but rather optimized to task organize into small detachments of mixed fleets crafted specifically to the requirements of the task force commander.  

The Army is rightfully committed to organic, fixed wing aviation in combat operations.  The current proposals for replacing our rotary wing fleet involve more expensive options which will entail either fewer available airframes or a higher overall cost with a strong possibility of both .  Procuring inexpensive, fixed wing options would give the Army better capabilities at a lower cost in anticipation of future reduced fleets.  Starting with the Gray Eagles and the LAAR, the Army would enjoy superior air support, sustainable for long periods, and at a savings to the taxpayer.  No one should say, “No” to that.

Who ever said that they were Gods... We'll except other pilots? And you're right, you'll have guys lined up around the block, but that's not going to magically make them awesome at their job and training them is going to take time. You can only do so many classes at the same time.

And if we have all the pilots in the world, and you fly them at the extreme ops tempo necessary to have a plane at the beck and call of every squad leader on the ground at any moment, you're going to burn them out in a hurry.



Supporting deployed aircraft is easy, and the Air Force already does it. The issue here is that how many more non combat guys are you going to drag to literally the front lines to support your Turcanos? Where are the guys going to come from that you want to have maintain your badass little gunships? On average you're going to need two guys for every six to eight aircraft in every job. We are going to assume we aren't doing depot level maintenance here or even major MX, so we'll just have Avionics, crew chiefs, hydro, engines/prop, and maybe a structures guy. Without at least that, planes are going to start getting maintenance cancelled when they inevitably break. Atop that you're going to need at least four pilots per aircraft so the zipper suits get a break. The maintenance guys are going to have to get up to speed on those aircraft.

Now keeping that in mind, for every squad leader getting their very own CAS assets, there's going to probably be two planes per sortie.

How many Army ops are going on at any given time? Don't answer that if you know. We will just say that there are fifty ground pounder groups wanting CAS assets nearby at any given time across that shithole country, and from what is getting said in this thread, they don't want it in a few minutes, they want it circling them at all times, and they want it RFN. That cuts down considerably on the "Zone Defense" idea.

Atop that, there is still the supply system that needs to be filled with enough spares of every possible system for those across the entire AOR to be effective. Otherwise there are shortfalls, which result in lost sorties, which results in guys not getting  the air support they need, which is unacceptable.

And we still haven't talked about survivability in regards to MANPAD equipped enemy shooting at a low ceiling, slow, lightly armored target.

a fixed wing laar is more survivable, more capable, requires less fuel and less maintenance than even the Kiowa.

never mind the amount of fuel an F15E flying from bagram requires.

Whats the in theater cost for Jet-A?

you think the army isn't capable of prioritizing?  The difference is with apportioned air its being prioritized by the men on the ground, not a 3 star in kabul.

fuck it.  bomber CAS for everyone.  if the cost is some dead ground pounders, really, who GAF, right?

1. Not by much unless they're high flying and fast, I.e. jets. Small turboprops like Turcanos are chip shots for modern MANPADs.

2. War, eh? Okay, how much experience are you willing to lose? I've been doing my job off and on for twenty years as of today. Went reserves, had other jobs, had to keep proficiency, now I do the civilian maintenance thing full time as a civilian. Maintenance guys don't get to proficient levels for two years and even then require significant supervision. Start losing maintenance NCO's because, "It's War" and you're losing irreplaceable experience, also known as "Fucking Stupid Idea." You'll start ending up with Maintenance that barely keeps aircraft in the air.

3. Lack of assets is lack of assets. Whether you buy ten thousand cool little bees a buzzing to pull constant CAS or not the result is going to be the same as it is now.

4. In my opinion we fight these wars wrong anyway. We should carpet bomb the entire country, wait a week for everyone to start crawling out, and hit them again. Problem solved, problem staying solved. Ain't no winning in Afghanistan. We proved it, the Russians before us, and how many others before them?

Fuck it, Strawmen for everybody!!! Or would you prefer a Strawman in every pot?

You're going to have to do better than that one.

Ah.
So are helicopters, more so even.  Guess we better ground those.  In fact, fuck it.  Lets surrender now.  War is only OK when risk free?  Thats a different way of looking at it.
So maintenance guys are going to quit if they have to turn wrenches?  Fuck, I wonder where AF gets the reputation it does.
So if we have more aircraft we won't have any more CAS.  Well, if we give them to the AF, you are probably right.
Airpower is awesome, we just fight the wrong wars.  Why have a president?  We should just take the F15C pilot with the most hours and put him in charge.  problem solved, problem staying solved.


your whole rant is, the AF doesn't like the wars we fight, so we shouldn't fight them.
brilliant.  and it does reflect the attitude of the AF.  Just sucks for the people who actually fight and die in these wars.

Have you ever seen Afghanistan?  "carpet bomb the whole country" would likely be at least a small improvement.

Well, to take it from the top, we're talking about replacing a 100 million dollar airframe with a bunch of really inexpensive airframes to radically increase the capability.

Creating pilots is not hard.  It takes a little bit of time.  Nobody ever said that we're simply going to cut a check and have this capability tomorrow.  A couple of years is easily doable, and gives plenty of time to address the logistics issues as well.

You're taking some ridiculous concept and pretending that's what I'm addressing.  No one ever said that every maneuver element on the ground is going to get full time CAS assets overhead 24/7.  That's never going to happen.  The idea we're discussing is radically increasing availability of CAS so the whole theater isn't at the mercy of a B-1B flying from ten thousand miles away and a couple of F-15s or A-10s flying from the other side of the country.

There are no MANPADS.  The discussion isn't even worth having, because they simply aren't there.

Your whole rant is based on the premise that no one will take an increase in capability if it doesn't assign two Super-Ts to every single squad 24/7.  That's absurd and not what's being discussed.  The rest of the rant falls completely apart without that ridiculous premise.

And you called it out far better than I did.  All good points.

Well you're little mister Lt.Col Strawman today, aren't you?

I guess I'll just respond to the ones where you're only deping slightly more than usual.

I'm not talking about maintenance people quitting because they have to turn wrenches, that's fucking stupid and you know it, and you're being intentionally dense throwing shit on the wall hoping for something to stick. I'm talking about them getting killed. In order for you to have those nifty little planes, you're going to have to have them in vulnerable places. Places where the people who keep them airworthy are likely to get shot or blowed up.

Now on your putting the F15 pilot in charge, isn't that what the Air Force already does? And I agree with you, pilots make shitty commanders, and have no business whatsoever in the echelons of command. That said, it is their Air Force, and as I've said to you before, you're the officer. You pushing for change is a lot more potent than my six stripes begging for it. They can tell me to embrace the suck while they dine on caviar and have interesting debates over 1996 Eisweine with people like you.

My post isn't really a rant, yours is, however. My "Rant" as you say, isn't official Air Force policy in regards to war fighting, just my opinion. And in my opinion we got into an un-winable war and started fighting it to the strengths of the enemy. THAT is what got our people killed more than any lack of CAS assets ever would, have, or did. We are an MMA champion trying to out box Mike Tyson instead of taking his silly ass to the ground and breaking his arms.

And your entire rant is one stupid fucking Strawman after another. If that's how you're going to act this time around, I'll just put you back on ignore and tell you to fuck off. Again.

Three times.

Touché.

Not too sure. But I did stay in a Holiday Inn Express recently.

 

There are MANPADS in Afghanistan, I've seen them. That said, it's a risk, a relatively low one at that. We are all in a risky business.

Logistically,

being Army fires,

I disagree....

there have been countless times where 4-4 ID requested Fixed wing support in operations during out deployment in Kunar provence, afghanistan and where denied by the AF. Only to end up having our embedded JTAC call up as we left mission for the same fixed wing support and it be there to drop rounds 6 hours later as we exfill during a TIC.

more often than not we gave up on having any support from the AF ( even to the point of sending the AF JTAC back to his unit, he didnt want to do guard.)

Personally I think the AF needs to get out of the business of air to ground support. WHEN they decide to do it its a day late and a dollar short. ( and for a branch with the kind of funds the AF has, its hard to buy " ohh all our shit is broke, we have no gas,we have no BBs")

turn it over entriely to each branch to support its own because thats really where we get results.

case in point Army kiowas spent more time on mission with my division than anything else and did an excellent job even with limited targeting ability ( in comparison) .. those guys with a box of smoke grenades marking enemy positions did more for soldiers on the ground than any fixed wing  could ever hope to.
sure theyre time on station and combat load is less. but they manage to be much more effective.

plus they bring snickers bars to FISTers and air drop them.

Snipped for reading clarity:



Your attribution of USAF preoccupations with nuclear warfare are slightly off.  TAC had the preoccupation with nuke delivery from tactical aircraft.  Every Service and every branch at some level in the 1950's was preoccupied with nuclear warfare.  Why?  It's where the funding was.  Army artillery branch was developing/fielding Honest John and nuclear artillery.  Combined arms units were playing with the Davy Crockett.  The Army itself was reorganizing into the Pentomic structure to survive on the nuclear battlefield.  The Navy was trying to launch Regulus's off everything and building the Forrestall class capable of Skywarrior ops.  The AF of course had SAC, and the only way TAC was to get funds was to go nuke, just like everyone else.

I too have read Schlight's book and know where you've gotten your information on the initial plans for the F-111.  The FB-111 was a separate development envisioned as a B-58 stopgap replacement.  The FB-111 was a completely different aircraft to the standard F-111, having larger wings and different avionics.  Not having Schlight's book in front of me, I would like to know how the F-111 was to be the optimal CAS a/c in Vietnam considering America was not fully engaged there at the time (1963).  The AF may have said that the F-111 was optimal for CAS, but just like today, their hand was forced.  The F-111 was MacNamara's monster, a DoD nightmare that was supposed to do everything just because his Whiz Kids piled every requirement on it.  In the early 1960's it was the only new a/c in the development pipeline.  The Century series was nearing the end of their production run, the F-4 was ramping up and being modded (F-4E), but there was nothing in the pipeline for either the USN or USAF (due to DoD insistence) except the F-111.  Once the Vietnam War started in earnest, the A-7 came about, and USN & USAF flight testing determined that the F-111 was indeed not a cure-all.  Macnamras departure allowed the services to go their own ways (USAF - F-15/16 and USN F-14 and eventually F-18).  The F-111 development wasn't a AF problem, it was a DoD one that the AF was forced to embrace.  

As to the F-35 replacing the A-10 I  don't know.  I have not worked F-35 procurement.

With regards to losing experienced people in wartime...
... it's not like the AF has ever operated out of airfields in shitty locations (small, austere, or otherwise) where Airmen had to deal with the occasional sniping, mortar attacks and sometimes even enemy troops inside the wire.  Ever hear of a little place called Vietnam?  The AF lost people in some of those attacks, and lost aircrew and aircraft getting the goods to the Army, or evacuating wounded, or evacuating entire bases being over-run.  Tac Airlift, the CAS guys, the fighter guys, the rescue guys, etc... all did what they were tasked to do back then.  People were injured, killed, and some spent time in garden spots like the Hanoi Hilton.
Those guys had valuable experience, and it took time to train and season them.  Just as it does maintainers.  Just like the aircrew that have been lost since 2001.  Just like the Army helo drivers.  And I'm fairly certain infantry aren't turned out in a matter of a few weeks either - it takes time to train and season them as well.  Same with our brothers and sisters in the Navy and Marines.
Do we need to throw away lives, experience, assets?  No.  But there are risks associated with preparing for, and actually engaging in hostilities.
The AF has become more risk averse over the years.  From my perspective, it was becoming apparent in the 1980's, and was quite noticeable in the 1990's.
Maybe the VN guys who were in our leadership positions during my early career saw it occurring even earlier?
As for the CAS issue as a whole...
...there is absolutely no reason the issue cannot be made to work better, other than a lack of interest from senior leadership on both sides of the equation.  No reason why the Army and the AF cannot sit down and try to figure out how to make the existing force work better, for the current war-fighting.  No reason why the Army and AF cannot do exchange programs, where the relevant positions work on the other end of the stick to get real-life experience on the ball of wax in its entirety.  Then take that experience, and build a CAS force that is more responsive to user need in future war-fighting.  And possibly even make the force joint - put Army guys in the command/ control/ scheduling, maintenance and crew mix.  Or make changes to the agreements and just give the primary CAS role to the Army if they want it.
This inter-service rivalry we used to enjoy sure seems more of an actual "hate" thing these days.  That attitude making its way to the upper levels of leadership are going to compound problems in the future, if it isn't already "there".
Just the opinion of a cranky dinosaur.  IMHO, YMMV, yada yada yada