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Posted: 4/15/2024 7:48:09 PM EDT
[#1]
Ghost
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Posted: 4/15/2024 9:16:44 PM EDT
[#2]
ISW assessment for April 15th.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2024 |
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Posted: 4/15/2024 9:51:34 PM EDT
[#3]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Saltwater-Hillbilly: Or, the guy was a newb who was on his first "meat wave" and the combination of the shock of the nearly-instantaneous wholesale violence/destruction to his buddies and abysmal levels of individual tactical training made him forget everything he was told about avoiding the drone threat. The fatalism inherent in the Russian character makes for great literature but also leads to "meat waves" and indifference to suffering (both your own and others). The dude many have seen the drone and, instead of getting under cover or running towards decent concealment, just figured "why bother". The Ruskies seem to have turned one of Patton's most famous dictums: "Your job is not to die for YOUR country; your job is to make the other poor dumb son-of-a-bitch die for HIS country" completely on it's head!  Very likely. |
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Posted: 4/15/2024 10:02:13 PM EDT
[#4]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By MFP_4073: not so sure i agree with that -- we have given Ukraine a lot -- and absolutely should give them more but Israel is 8,500 sq miles and near international waters -- Ukraine is over 230,000 sq miles and not adjacent to an easily accessible ocean so IMO it's a lot more complicated than just saying Israel is the 'favored' nation It IS an apples and oranges comparison. Israel had to fight a lot of wars to get where they are now and they have had the support of the USA for 50+ years. And they weren't disarmed and neutered by US politicians for 30 years. But to a Ukrainian hiding in a basement during a nightly attack and listening to the news about how a 300+ drone/missile attack was shut down like nothing should make them notice the difference between maximum effort for Israel and what they are getting. And I support Israel and am glad we are helping them as much as we are. I wish we would also let them fight their war like needed and likewise tell our domestic palestinians to STFU and go "home" to Jordan or Egypt to block streets and chant "death to America". |
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Posted: 4/15/2024 10:07:33 PM EDT
[#5]
Media: a marine drone made from American and Soviet parts found off the coast of Romania
Off the coast of Romania in the Black Sea, a search and rescue vessel discovered a mysterious unmanned boat assembled from both American and Soviet units. This was reported by the Naval News portal. According to the publication, the base for the vessel was the AM-800 boat with an aluminum hull produced by the American company Silver Ships. It was equipped with a warhead from the Soviet P-20 Termit anti-ship missile, filled with 500 kg of explosive. The American Starlink satellite communication system was used to remotely control the drone. It is not officially known who exactly this unmanned boat belonged to. However, Naval News revealed that Silver Ships supplied ships to Ukraine as part of American aid packages. In addition, Starlink is often used by Ukrainian militants to control drones. From this, the publication concludes that the boat was assembled by representatives of the Kyiv regime. After examination, the ship was destroyed at a Romanian military training ground. Earlier it became known that Russian experts had established the assembly site of Ukrainian Baba Yaga drones. https://crimea-news.com/society/2024/04/14/1347605.html |
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Posted: 4/15/2024 10:09:13 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#6]
Originally Posted By AlmightyTallest: 1 minute ago.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GLNLSQoXcAAtUzb?format=png&name=small High-ranking Russian officers were hit by a missile in occupied Crimea - sources On the afternoon of April 15, in the temporarily occupied Crimea, as a result of a missile attack by the Defense Forces of Ukraine, a command post in which high-ranking Russian officers were located was hit. Sources in the special services informed the Society about this. It is noted that the air alert in the occupied Crimea lasted almost two hours. In the bays of Sevastopol, the occupation forces used a smoke screen. Also, according to the Telegram channel "Krymskiy Veter", aircraft were raised in the air in occupied Sevastopol. Guerrillas of the military-patriotic movement "Atesh" noted that the operation of Russian air defense can be heard in Crimea. The underground also reported a possible hit to part of the 810th separate brigade of the Russian marines in Sevastopol. "The 810 brigade is all under cover. Minus the second floor," the message reads. The occupation authorities did not comment on this information. https://suspilne.media/crimea/725101-v-okupovanomu-krimu-pid-raketnij-udar-potrapili-visokopostavleni-rosijski-oficeri/ The Armed Forces hit the command post in Crimea, where high-ranking Russian officers - mass media - were Probably, the Defense Forces hit part of the 810th separate brigade of the Russian marines in Sevastopol On the afternoon of April 15, in the temporarily occupied Crimea, as a result of a missile attack by Ukraine, a command post where high-ranking Russian officers were stationed was hit. This was reported by "Suspilne" with reference to sources in the special services. The air alert in the occupied Crimea lasted almost two hours. In the bays of Sevastopol, the occupation forces used a smoke screen. Also, according to the Telegram channel "Krymskiy Veter", aircraft were launched into the air in occupied Sevastopol. Guerrillas of the "Atesh" movement noted that the work of Russian air defense could be heard in Crimea. In addition, they reported a possible hit to part of the 810th separate brigade of the Russian marines in Sevastopol. The occupation authorities have not yet commented on this information. We will remind you that today, April 15, an air alert was announced in the temporarily occupied Sevastopol, traffic for motor vehicles on the Crimean Bridge was temporarily blocked . It was previously reported that on the morning of April 15, explosions rang out in the center of temporarily occupied Sevastopol . It was also noted that a group of five helicopters flew through the Dzhankoy district in the direction of the Arabat arrow. Subsequently, two more pairs of Su-25 attack aircraft crossed the Dzhankoy district in the direction of the Arabat arrow. https://glavcom.ua/country/incidents/zsu-vluchili-v-komandnij-punkt-u-krimu-de-buli-visokopostavleni-rosijski-ofitseri-zmi-996183.html ⚡️⚡️⚡️Profile channels for the Air Force and Air Defense report that today Ukrainian military aviation lost three aircraft from tactical aviation. Presumably, these were the aircraft that unsuccessfully attacked Crimea and Sevastopol with Storm Shadow missiles today https://t.me/pravo_zn/13894 |
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Posted: 4/15/2024 10:23:28 PM EDT
[#7]
Mayor
On the morning of April 15, due to an ice jam on the Selenga River in the Academy SNT, 35 household plots were flooded. On two of them the water rose above the floors. City rescuers helped raise all the belongings of local residents above the water level. At night, employees of the Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Security Committee and the administration of the Sovetsky district visited all areas and informed the residents of SNT. Rescuers continue to be on duty at the scene. Using the forces of sappers of the Eastern Military District and the Ministry of Emergency Situations in Selenga, we plan to carry out explosions to free the river bed I have the situation under control https://t.me/igorshutenkov/1573 In the Baikal region of Buryatia, 23 people were evacuated due to flooding Ministry of Emergency Situations: more than 400 household plots were flooded in the Pribaikalsky region of Buryatia ULAN-UDE, April 16 - RIA Novosti. In the Kolos gardening partnership in the Pribaikalsky district of Buryatia, 420 household plots were flooded and 23 people, including three children, were evacuated, reports the regional headquarters of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. According to the department, the message that several streets were flooded in the Kolos gardening partnership in the Pribaikalsky district of Buryatia was received at 00.50 (19.50 Moscow time). “As of 07.30 (2.30 Moscow time) on April 16, 2024, after a bypass during daylight hours, 420 household plots were flooded, 23 people were evacuated, including three children,” the message says. Water also came to the Mostovoy microdistrict of Ulan-Ude , one house was flooded, the mayor of the city, Igor Shutenkov, reported in his Telegram channel. On Monday morning, the head of the region, Alexey Tsydenov, reported that in the Ivolginsky district of Buryatia, the flood flooded more than 10 residential buildings, 22 people were evacuated, including six children, two people were placed in temporary accommodation centers. Also, in the SNT "Academy" in Ulan-Ude, 35 household plots were flooded, and in three houses the water rose above the floors. To free the Selenga River bed from ice jams, sappers from the Eastern Military District and the Ministry of Emergency Situations carried out blasting work on Monday evening. In the Ivolginsky and Pribaikalsky districts of the republic, as well as within the SNT "Academy" and the Mostovoy microdistrict in Ulan-Ude, a high alert regime has been introduced. https://ria.ru/20240416/buryatiya-1940292276.html |
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Posted: 4/15/2024 10:27:58 PM EDT
[#8]
In 32 cities of Ukraine, they are deploying "mini-CHP" — what is it and why is it needed
A network of small and medium-sized cogeneration will be deployed in 32 cities of Ukraine. This is necessary in order to ensure a stable heat supply for more than a million residents of multi-apartment buildings and about a thousand social facilities, regardless of planned or emergency power outages. This was reported by the Ministry of Community Development, Territories and Infrastructure of Ukraine on Monday, April 15. https://segodnya.novyny.live/u-32-mistakh-ukrayini-rozgortaiut-mini-tets-shcho-tse-i-navishcho-potribno-166505.html |
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Posted: 4/15/2024 10:31:53 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#9]
Exclusive: Russia restoring oil refining capacity knocked out by drones
By Reuters April 15, 20248:01 AM EDTUpdated 14 hours ago MOSCOW, April 15 (Reuters) - Russia has been able to swiftly repair some of key oil refineries hit by Ukrainian drones, reducing capacity idled by the attacks to about 10% from almost 14% at the end of March, Reuters calculations showed. Ukraine stepped up drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure since the start of the year, hitting some major oil refineries across the world's second largest oil exporter in attacks that sent up oil prices. Russia says the drone attacks amount to terrorism. Ukraine says its drone attacks on Russia are justified because it is fighting for survival as Russia has made "massive retaliatory" strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. There have been no reports of successful attacks on Russian large refineries since the Taneco plant was hit on April 2. Russia is repairing its refineries fast, despite difficulties in obtaining Western know-how. That includes Rosneft-owned Ryazan plant, which put back he CDU-4 and main CDU-6 primary oil refining units into operation, as well as Kuibyshev refinery repairing CDU-4 and Syzran's CDU-5 and previously idled for maintenance CDU-6. According to Reuters calculations, total Russian primary oil refining capacity, idled by drones, was reduced to 90,500 metric tons per day (660,000 barrels per day) from around 123,800 tons per day (907,000 bpd) previously. However, in total, Russia's cumulative primary oil refining capacity, put offline due to various outages and maintenances, is expected at 4.4 million tons in April, up from 4.1 million tons in March. The respite in Ukraine's strikes comes after criticism from the United States, the world's top energy consumer, where high fuel prices is high up on the agenda in the run up to presidential election on Nov. 5. Replying to Republican U.S. Senator Tom Cotton on why Joe Biden administration was discouraging Ukrainians from the attacks on Russia's "war-making capabilities", Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin told the Senate Armed Services committee last week that the attacks could harm global energy markets. "Certainly, those attacks could have a knock-on effect in terms of the global energy situation, and ... but quite frankly, I think Ukraine is better served by going after tactical and operational targets that can directly influence the current fight," he said. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-restoring-oil-refining-capacity-knocked-out-by-drones-2024-04-15/ 
— ChrisO_wiki (@ChrisO_wiki) April 15, 2024 https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1779951662955655460.html |
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Posted: 4/15/2024 10:57:01 PM EDT
[#10]
United Nations Security Council Update
15 Apr 2024 Rafael Mariano Grossi , Director General (As prepared for delivery) I thank the President of the Security Council for allowing me the opportunity to update you on the IAEA’s activities concerning nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. I also thank the Council for their continuing support of the IAEA’s efforts. It has been more than two years since the war began, the first ever to be fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme. The IAEA has been monitoring the situation closely and assisting Ukraine every day since the start of the war. IAEA staff are continuously present, monitoring the situation at all five of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, which remains under Russian operational control. Today my statement will focus on the recent grave violations of the five concrete principles that I first established in this very chamber on 30 May. These five concrete principles are there to prevent a nuclear accident and to maintain the integrity of the Zaporizhzhya NPP. Let me remind them what they are: There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel; ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant; Off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure off-site power remains available and secure at all times; All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage; No action should be taken that undermines these principles. On 30 May last year I said here that observing these principles was essential to avoid the danger of a catastrophic nuclear incident and that I had respectfully and solemnly asked both sides to commit to them. At our meeting last May distinguished Members of the Security Council and Ukraine clearly supported those principles. Nevertheless, Madame President, over the past ten days, the first of these principles has been violated repeatedly in what marks a step-change increase in risk to nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. On Sunday, 7 April, the International Support and Assistance Mission to ZNPP (ISAMZ) confirmed the first attacks since November 2022 to directly target ZNPP. The ISAMZ team was able to inspect the location of one direct strike at the apex of the containment dome of the Unit 6 reactor building. Whilst the damage to the structure is superficial, the attack sets a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment. The other two attacks were in close proximity to the main reactor buildings and resulted in at least one casualty. Agency experts at the site have been informed by ZNPP of a drone strike against the site’s oxygen and nitrogen production facility; two attacks on the training centre located just outside the site perimeter and reports of a drone shot down above the turbine hall of Unit 6. These reckless attacks must cease immediately. Though, fortunately, they have not led to a radiological incident this time, they significantly increase the risk at Zaporizhzhya NPP, where nuclear safety is already compromised. I am not only concerned about the attacks themselves, but also the context in which they have occurred. For several months before these direct attacks there had already been an increase in isolated drone incursions in the vicinity of the facility and in the nearby town of Energodar. In other areas of nuclear safety degradation, the plant is currently relying on just two lines of external power. There have been at least four occasions in the past year when the plant has had only one line of external power supply, with the precarity lasting for periods of up to four months. Let me put it plainly. Two years of war are weighing heavily on nuclear safety at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Every one of the IAEA’s 7 pillars of nuclear safety and security have been compromised. We cannot sit by and watch as the final weight tips the finely balanced scale. Even though the plant’s six reactors are now in cold shutdown, with the final unit shifting into that status two days ago following the IAEA’s recommendation, the potential dangers of a major nuclear accident remain very real. The Agency will continue closely to follow the operational status of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and provide technically viable alternatives in a context of rapid changes and challenges. Our work at this facility remains essential. This has been recognized by all, irrespective of their side in this conflict. But to be effective, the IAEA teams need timely access to assess the condition of the plant and evaluate the cumulative impact that more than 26 months in a war zone have had on nuclear safety. Madame President, We are getting dangerously close to a nuclear accident. We must not allow complacency to let a role of the dice decide what happens tomorrow. We must do everything in our power today to minimize the risk of an accident. The five principles established in this very chamber one year ago must be adhered to. They are there to prevent a major nuclear accident with potentially significant radiological consequences. The latest attacks represent a flagrant violation of these crucial principles and must stop. I am asking this Council for its steadfast support for the five principles and the IAEA’s seven pillars of nuclear safety and security which they help to underpin. And I am asking for your continued support of the IAEA’s role monitoring the situation, in the service of the international community. Despite huge challenges, the IAEA has kept open the indispensable lines of communication and will continue doing so. The support of your nations and of the Council as a whole is a necessity. I thank the Council for inviting me today, thereby demonstrating your continuing commitment to this critical issue. The IAEA and myself remain at your disposal to assist this body in its mission to preserve international peace and security. Thank you, Madame President. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/united-nations-security-council-update Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine Rafael Mariano Grossi |
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Posted: 4/15/2024 11:14:13 PM EDT
[#11]
 ????????? TERRA: ???????? ????? ??? ?? ??????? ????? ??????. ????????? ??????.  ????? ? 4???????? ????????? ?'??? ???????-??? ??.?? ??.????????????? ??????? ? ??????? «???????????»  "? ????? ????, ? ? ????": ????????? "????". ???????? ????? ?????????? ?-2.  “???? ????? ???????? ? ?????? ?? ? ????? – ??????? ??? ??*????!”, – ??????? ??? 3 ???? ??? ????????? |
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USA
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Posted: 4/15/2024 11:22:29 PM EDT
[#12]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By ITCHY-FINGER: It IS an apples and oranges comparison. Israel had to fight a lot of wars to get where they are now and they have had the support of the USA for 50+ years. And they weren't disarmed and neutered by US politicians for 30 years. But to a Ukrainian hiding in a basement during a nightly attack and listening to the news about how a 300+ drone/missile attack was shut down like nothing should make them notice the difference between maximum effort for Israel and what they are getting. And I support Israel and am glad we are helping them as much as we are. I wish we would also let them fight their war like needed and likewise tell our domestic palestinians to STFU and go "home" to Jordan or Egypt to block streets and chant "death to America". Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By ITCHY-FINGER: Originally Posted By MFP_4073: not so sure i agree with that -- we have given Ukraine a lot -- and absolutely should give them more but Israel is 8,500 sq miles and near international waters -- Ukraine is over 230,000 sq miles and not adjacent to an easily accessible ocean so IMO it's a lot more complicated than just saying Israel is the 'favored' nation It IS an apples and oranges comparison. Israel had to fight a lot of wars to get where they are now and they have had the support of the USA for 50+ years. And they weren't disarmed and neutered by US politicians for 30 years. But to a Ukrainian hiding in a basement during a nightly attack and listening to the news about how a 300+ drone/missile attack was shut down like nothing should make them notice the difference between maximum effort for Israel and what they are getting. And I support Israel and am glad we are helping them as much as we are. I wish we would also let them fight their war like needed and likewise tell our domestic palestinians to STFU and go "home" to Jordan or Egypt to block streets and chant "death to America". IMO the most important difference is that one aggressor has nukes and the other doesn't. Unfortunately, I fear I'm not the only one to reach this conclusion. |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 1:22:03 AM EDT
[#13]
 
 
 
 
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Posted: 4/16/2024 1:33:58 AM EDT
[#14]
   
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Posted: 4/16/2024 4:04:11 AM EDT
[#15]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 4:07:05 AM EDT
[#16]
  Turtle Mk.3 |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 5:19:52 AM EDT
[#17]
    "Assault" URAL 4320 Zvezda-V At least they are lightly armored. 
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Posted: 4/16/2024 6:27:34 AM EDT
[#18]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 7:25:11 AM EDT
[#19]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m: https://i.imgur.com/XYpX1N3.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/usvgXPU.jpeg Turtle Mk.3 lol, these are so amusing, the first one we saw got away by sheer luck from getting hit by a DPICM round, and now all the Russians think Jawa Sandcrawlers are the way to go. 
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Posted: 4/16/2024 7:41:14 AM EDT
[#20]
U radar destroyed by the SBU--the first was located in Belgorod region of Russia. 
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Posted: 4/16/2024 8:05:11 AM EDT
[Last Edit: AlmightyTallest]
[#21]
of air and ground operations and suggest exploiting Ukrainian air defense weaknesses through tactics like reconnaissance and helicopter dismount landings for breaking through defenses. Overall, unfortunately, the situation with Russian air domination is only getting worse.   
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Posted: 4/16/2024 8:24:58 AM EDT
[Last Edit: AlmightyTallest]
[#22]
List of countries producing Patriot missiles 🇺🇸Raytheon - ongoing 🇯🇵MHI - ongoing 🇩🇪MBDA - starting soon 🇷🇴Electromecanica - starting soon |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 8:27:38 AM EDT
[#23]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 8:46:16 AM EDT
[#24]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 10:01:22 AM EDT
[#25]
 Ka-52 radar |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 10:27:15 AM EDT
[#26]
Quote HistoryNo phased array AESA radar there - it looks like something from 1970. I guess they lose them so fast that they don't want to bother with complex electronics. |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 10:28:36 AM EDT
[#27]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 12:38:14 PM EDT
[#28]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m: https://i.imgur.com/ButCfWA.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/29w5Ab1.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/WUjw1yn.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/wF0w0ag.jpeg "Assault" URAL 4320 Zvezda-V At least they are lightly armored. Emphasis on "light". That armour is next to useless against anything but a pure frag. |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 12:45:54 PM EDT
[#29]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m: https://i.imgur.com/ButCfWA.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/29w5Ab1.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/WUjw1yn.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/wF0w0ag.jpeg "Assault" URAL 4320 Zvezda-V At least they are lightly armored.  |
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WY, USA
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Posted: 4/16/2024 1:21:42 PM EDT
[#30]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m: https://i.imgur.com/XYpX1N3.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/usvgXPU.jpeg Turtle Mk.3 I can't wait to see one of those launch a turret
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Posted: 4/16/2024 1:50:00 PM EDT
[#31]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 1:59:42 PM EDT
[#32]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 3:12:38 PM EDT
[#33]
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AL, USA
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Posted: 4/16/2024 3:16:43 PM EDT
[#34]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 3Florks: I can't wait to see one of those launch a turret And then lazily glide to the ground like Mary Poppins |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 3:47:49 PM EDT
[#35]
 Here we have the first sighting of a German-delivered HLR 338 (Pro) precision rifle at a Ukrainian shooting range. In total, Germany has delivered 65 HLR 338 to #Ukraine, with another 385 being pledged. This precision rifle is specially designed for long-range shooting. |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 3:50:01 PM EDT
[Last Edit: 4xGM300m]
[#36]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 5:05:25 PM EDT
[#37]
The Talks That Could Have Ended the War in Ukraine
A Hidden History of Diplomacy That Came Up Short—but Holds Lessons for Future Negotiations By Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko April 16, 2024 In the early hours of February 24, 2022, the Russian air force struck targets across Ukraine. At the same time, Moscow’s infantry and armor poured into the country from the north, east, and south. In the days that followed, the Russians attempted to encircle Kyiv. These were the first days and weeks of an invasion that could well have resulted in Ukraine’s defeat and subjugation by Russia. In retrospect, it seems almost miraculous that it did not. What happened on the battlefield is relatively well understood. What is less understood is the simultaneous intense diplomacy involving Moscow, Kyiv, and a host of other actors, which could have resulted in a settlement just weeks after the war began. By the end of March 2022, a series of in-person meetings in Belarus and Turkey and virtual engagements over video conference had produced the so-called Istanbul Communiqué, which described a framework for a settlement. Ukrainian and Russian negotiators then began working on the text of a treaty, making substantial progress toward an agreement. But in May, the talks broke off. The war raged on and has since cost tens of thousands of lives on both sides. What happened? How close were the parties to ending the war? And why did they never finalize a deal? To shed light on this often overlooked but critical episode in the war, we have examined draft agreements exchanged between the two sides, some details of which have not been reported previously. We have also conducted interviews with several participants in the talks as well as with officials serving at the time in key Western governments, to whom we have granted anonymity in order to discuss sensitive matters. And we have reviewed numerous contemporaneous and more recent interviews with and statements by Ukrainian and Russian officials who were serving at the time of the talks. Most of these are available on YouTube but are not in English and thus not widely known in the West. Finally, we scrutinized the timeline of events from the start of the invasion through the end of May, when talks broke down. When we put all these pieces together, what we found is surprising—and could have significant implications for future diplomatic efforts to end the war. Some observers and officials (including, most prominently, Russian President Vladimir Putin) have claimed that there was a deal on the table that would have ended the war but that the Ukrainians walked away from it because of a combination of pressure from their Western patrons and Kyiv’s own hubristic assumptions about Russian military weakness. Others have dismissed the significance of the talks entirely, claiming that the parties were merely going through the motions and buying time for battlefield realignments or that the draft agreements were unserious. Although those interpretations contain kernels of truth, they obscure more than they illuminate. There was no single smoking gun; this story defies simple explanations. Further, such monocausal accounts elide completely a fact that, in retrospect, seems extraordinary: in the midst of Moscow’s unprecedented aggression, the Russians and the Ukrainians almost finalized an agreement that would have ended the war and provided Ukraine with multilateral security guarantees, paving the way to its permanent neutrality and, down the road, its membership in the EU. A final agreement proved elusive, however, for a number of reasons. Kyiv’s Western partners were reluctant to be drawn into a negotiation with Russia, particularly one that would have created new commitments for them to ensure Ukraine’s security. The public mood in Ukraine hardened with the discovery of Russian atrocities at Irpin and Bucha. And with the failure of Russia’s encirclement of Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelensky became more confident that, with sufficient Western support, he could win the war on the battlefield. Finally, although the parties’ attempt to resolve long-standing disputes over the security architecture offered the prospect of a lasting resolution to the war and enduring regional stability, they aimed too high, too soon. They tried to deliver an overarching settlement even as a basic cease-fire proved out of reach. Today, when the prospects for negotiations appear dim and relations between the parties are nearly nonexistent, the history of the spring 2022 talks might seem like a distraction with little insight directly applicable to present circumstances. But Putin and Zelensky surprised everyone with their mutual willingness to consider far-reaching concessions to end the war. They might well surprise everyone again in the future. ASSURANCE OR GUARANTEE? What did the Russians want to accomplish by invading Ukraine? On February 24, 2022, Putin gave a speech in which he justified the invasion by mentioning the vague goal of “denazification” of the country. The most reasonable interpretation of “denazification” was that Putin sought to topple the government in Kyiv, possibly killing or capturing Zelensky in the process. Yet days after the invasion began, Moscow began probing to find grounds for a compromise. A war Putin expected to be a cakewalk was already proving anything but, and this early openness to talking suggests he appears to have already abandoned the idea of outright regime change. Zelensky, as he had before the war, voiced an immediate interest in a personal meeting with Putin. Though he refused to talk directly with Zelensky, Putin did appoint a negotiating team. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko played the part of mediator. The talks began on February 28 at one of Lukashenko’s spacious countryside residences near the village of Liaskavichy, about 30 miles from the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. The Ukrainian delegation was headed by Davyd Arakhamia, the parliamentary leader of Zelensky’s political party, and included Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov, presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak, and other senior officials. The Russian delegation was led by Vladimir Medinsky, a senior adviser to the Russian president who had earlier served as culture minister. It also included deputy ministers of defense and foreign affairs, among others. At the first meeting, the Russians presented a set of harsh conditions, effectively demanding Ukraine’s capitulation. This was a nonstarter. But as Moscow’s position on the battlefield continued to deteriorate, its positions at the negotiating table became less demanding. So on March 3 and March 7, the parties held a second and third round of talks, this time in Kamyanyuki, Belarus, just across the border from Poland. The Ukrainian delegation presented demands of their own: an immediate cease-fire and the establishment of humanitarian corridors that would allow civilians to safely leave the war zone. It was during the third round of talks that the Russians and the Ukrainians appear to have examined drafts for the first time. According to Medinsky, these were Russian drafts, which Medinsky’s delegation brought from Moscow and which probably reflected Moscow’s insistence on Ukraine’s neutral status. At this point, in-person meetings broke up for nearly three weeks, although the delegations continued to meet via Zoom. In those exchanges, the Ukrainians began to focus on the issue that would become central to their vision of the endgame for the war: security guarantees that would oblige other states to come to Ukraine’s defense if Russia attacked again in the future. It is not entirely clear when Kyiv first raised this issue in conversations with the Russians or Western countries. But on March 10, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, then in Antalya, Turkey, for a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, spoke of a “systematic, sustainable solution” for Ukraine, adding that the Ukrainians were “ready to discuss” guarantees it hoped to receive from NATO member states and Russia. What Kuleba seemed to have in mind was a multilateral security guarantee, an arrangement whereby competing powers commit to the security of a third state, usually on the condition that it will remain unaligned with any of the guarantors. Such agreements had mostly fallen out of favor after the Cold War. Whereas alliances such as NATO intend to maintain collective defense against a common enemy, multilateral security guarantees are designed to prevent conflict among the guarantors over the alignment of the guaranteed state, and by extension to ensure that state’s security. Ukraine had a bitter experience with a less ironclad version of this sort of agreement: a multilateral security assurance, as opposed to a guarantee. In 1994, it signed on to the so-called Budapest Memorandum, joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear weapons state and agreeing to give up what was then the world’s third-largest arsenal. In return, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States promised that they would not attack Ukraine. Yet contrary to a widespread misconception, in the event of aggression against Ukraine, the agreement required the signatories only to call a UN Security Council meeting, not to come to the country’s defense. Russia’s full-scale invasion—and the cold reality that Ukraine was fighting an existential war on its own—drove Kyiv to find a way to both end the aggression and ensure it never happened again. On March 14, just as the two delegations were meeting via Zoom, Zelensky posted a message on his Telegram channel calling for “normal, effective security guarantees” that would not be “like the Budapest ones.” In an interview with Ukrainian journalists two days later, his adviser Podolyak explained that what Kyiv sought were “absolute security guarantees” that would require that “the signatories . . . do not stand aside in the event of an attack on Ukraine, as is the case now. Instead, they [would] take an active part in defending Ukraine in a conflict.” Ukraine’s demand not to be left to fend for itself again is completely understandable. Kyiv wanted (and still wants) to have a more reliable mechanism than Russia’s goodwill for its future security. But getting a guarantee would be difficult. Naftali Bennett was the Israeli prime minister at the time the talks were happening and was actively mediating between the two sides. In an interview with journalist Hanoch Daum posted online in February 2023, he recalled that he attempted to dissuade Zelensky from getting stuck on the question of security guarantees. “There is this joke about a guy trying to sell the Brooklyn Bridge to a passerby,” Bennett explained. “I said: ‘America will give you guarantees? It will commit that in several years if Russia violates something, it will send soldiers? After leaving Afghanistan and all that?’ I said: ‘Volodymyr, it won’t happen.’” To put a finer point on it: if the United States and its allies were unwilling to provide Ukraine such guarantees (for example, in the form of NATO membership) before the war, why would they do so after Russia had so vividly demonstrated its willingness to attack Ukraine? The Ukrainian negotiators developed an answer to this question, but in the end, it didn’t persuade their risk-averse Western colleagues. Kyiv’s position was that, as the emerging guarantees concept implied, Russia would be a guarantor, too, which would mean Moscow essentially agreed that the other guarantors would be obliged to intervene if it attacked again. In other words, if Moscow accepted that any future aggression against Ukraine would mean a war between Russia and the United States, it would be no more inclined to attack Ukraine again than it would be to attack a NATO ally. A BREAKTHROUGH Throughout March, heavy fighting continued on all fronts. The Russians attempted to take Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy but failed spectacularly, although all three cities sustained heavy damage. By mid-March, the Russian army’s thrust toward Kyiv had stalled, and it was taking heavy casualties. The two delegations kept up talks over videoconference but returned to meeting in person on March 29, this time in Istanbul, Turkey. There, they appeared to have achieved a breakthrough. After the meeting, the sides announced they had agreed to a joint communiqué. The terms were broadly described during the two sides’ press statements in Istanbul. But we have obtained a copy of the full text of the draft communiqué, titled “Key Provisions of the Treaty on Ukraine’s Security Guarantees.” According to participants we interviewed, the Ukrainians had largely drafted the communiqué and the Russians provisionally accepted the idea of using it as the framework for a treaty. The treaty envisioned in the communiqué would proclaim Ukraine as a permanently neutral, nonnuclear state. Ukraine would renounce any intention to join military alliances or allow foreign military bases or troops on its soil. The communiqué listed as possible guarantors the permanent members of the UN Security Council (including Russia) along with Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, and Turkey. The communiqué also said that if Ukraine came under attack and requested assistance, all guarantor states would be obliged, following consultations with Ukraine and among themselves, to provide assistance to Ukraine to restore its security. Remarkably, these obligations were spelled out with much greater precision than NATO’s Article 5: imposing a no-fly zone, supplying weapons, or directly intervening with the guarantor state’s own military force. Although Ukraine would be permanently neutral under the proposed framework, Kyiv’s path to EU membership would be left open, and the guarantor states (including Russia) would explicitly “confirm their intention to facilitate Ukraine’s membership in the European Union.” This was nothing short of extraordinary: in 2013, Putin had put intense pressure on Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to back out of a mere association agreement with the EU. Now, Russia was agreeing to “facilitate” Ukraine’s full accession to the EU. Although Ukraine’s interest in obtaining these security guarantees is clear, it is not obvious why Russia would agree to any of this. Just weeks earlier, Putin had attempted to seize Ukraine’s capital, oust its government, and impose a puppet regime. It seems far-fetched that he suddenly decided to accept that Ukraine—which was now more hostile to Russia than ever, thanks to Putin’s own actions—would become a member of the EU and have its independence and security guaranteed by the United States (among others). And yet the communiqué suggests that was precisely what Putin was willing to accept. We can only conjecture as to why. Putin’s blitzkrieg had failed; that was clear by early March. Perhaps he was now willing to cut his losses if he got his longest-standing demand: that Ukraine renounce its NATO aspirations and never host NATO forces on its territory. If he could not control the entire country, at least he could ensure his most basic security interests, stem the hemorrhaging of Russia’s economy, and restore the country’s international reputation. The communiqué also includes another provision that is stunning, in retrospect: it calls for the two sides to seek to peacefully resolve their dispute over Crimea during the next ten to 15 years. Since Russia annexed the peninsula in 2014, Moscow has never agreed to discuss its status, claiming that it was a region of Russia no different than any other. By offering to negotiate over its status, the Kremlin had tacitly admitted that was not the case. FIGHTING AND TALKING In remarks he made on March 29, immediately after the conclusion of the talks, Medinsky, the head of the Russian delegation, sounded decidedly upbeat, explaining that the discussions of the treaty on Ukraine’s neutrality were entering the practical phase and that—allowing for all the complexities presented by the treaty’s having many potential guarantors—it was possible that Putin and Zelensky would sign it at a summit in the foreseeable future. The next day, he told reporters, “Yesterday, the Ukrainian side, for the first time fixed in a written form its readiness to carry out a series of most important conditions for the building of future normal and good-neighborly relations with Russia.” He continued, “They handed to us the principles of a potential future settlement, fixed in writing.” Meanwhile, Russia had abandoned its efforts to take Kyiv and was pulling back its forces from the entire northern front. Alexander Fomin, Russia’s deputy minister of defense, had announced the decision in Istanbul on March 29, calling it an effort “to build mutual trust.” In fact, the withdrawal was a forced retreat. The Russians had overestimated their capabilities and underestimated the Ukrainian resistance and were now spinning their failure as a gracious diplomatic measure to facilitate peace talks. The withdrawal had far-reaching consequences. It stiffened Zelensky’s resolve, removing an immediate threat to his government, and demonstrated that Putin’s vaunted military machine could be pushed back, if not defeated, on the battlefield. It also enabled large-scale Western military assistance to Ukraine by freeing up the lines of communication leading to Kyiv. Finally, the retreat set the stage for the gruesome discovery of atrocities that Russian forces had committed in the Kyiv suburbs of Bucha and Irpin, where they had raped, mutilated, and murdered civilians. Reports from Bucha began to make headlines in early April. On April 4, Zelensky visited the town. The next day, he spoke to the UN Security Council via video and accused Russia of perpetrating war crimes in Bucha, comparing Russian forces to the Islamic State terrorist group (also known as ISIS). Zelensky called for the UN Security Council to expel Russia, a permanent member. Remarkably, however, the two sides continued to work around the clock on a treaty that Putin and Zelensky were supposed to sign during a summit to be held in the not-too-distant future. The sides were actively exchanging drafts with each other and, it appears, beginning to share them with other parties. (In his February 2023 interview, Bennett reported seeing 17 or 18 working drafts of the agreement; Lukashenko also reported seeing at least one.) We have closely scrutinized two of these drafts, one that is dated April 12 and another dated April 15, which participants in the talks told us was the last one exchanged between the parties. They are broadly similar but contain important differences—and both show that the communiqué had not resolved some key issues. First, whereas the communiqué and the April 12 draft made clear that guarantor states would decide independently whether to come to Kyiv’s aid in the event of an attack on Ukraine, in the April 15 draft, the Russians attempted to subvert this crucial article by insisting that such action would occur only “on the basis of a decision agreed to by all guarantor states”—giving the likely invader, Russia, a veto. According to a notation on the text, the Ukrainians rejected that amendment, insisting on the original formula, under which all the guarantors had an individual obligation to act and would not have to reach consensus before doing so. Second, the drafts contain several articles that were added to the treaty at Russia’s insistence but were not part of the communiqué and related to matters that Ukraine refused to discuss. These require Ukraine to ban “fascism, Nazism, neo-Nazism, and aggressive nationalism”—and, to that end, to repeal six Ukrainian laws (fully or in part) that dealt, broadly, with contentious aspects of Soviet-era history, in particular the role of Ukrainian nationalists during World War II. It is easy to see why Ukraine would resist letting Russia determine its policies on historical memory, particularly in the context of a treaty on security guarantees. And the Russians knew these provisions would make it more difficult for the Ukrainians to accept the rest of the treaty. They might, therefore, be seen as poison pills. It is also possible, however, that the provisions were intended to allow Putin to save face. For example, by forcing Ukraine to repeal statutes that condemned the Soviet past and cast the Ukrainian nationalists who fought the Red Army during World War II as freedom fighters, the Kremlin could argue that it had achieved its stated goal of “denazification,” even though the original meaning of that phrase may well have been the replacement of Zelensky’s government. In the end, it remains unclear whether these provisions would have been a deal-breaker. The lead Ukrainian negotiator, Arakhamia, later downplayed their importance. As he put it in a November 2023 interview on a Ukrainian television news program, Russia had “hoped until the last moment that they [could] squeeze us to sign such an agreement, that we [would] adopt neutrality. This was the biggest thing for them. They were ready to finish the war if we, like Finland [during the Cold War], adopted neutrality and undertook not to join NATO.” The size and the structure of the Ukrainian military was also the subject of intense negotiation. As of April 15, the two sides remained quite far apart on the matter. The Ukrainians wanted a peacetime army of 250,000 people; the Russians insisted on a maximum of 85,000, considerably smaller than the standing army Ukraine had before the invasion in 2022. The Ukrainians wanted 800 tanks; the Russians would allow only 342. The difference between the range of missiles was even starker: 280 kilometers, or about 174 miles, (the Ukrainian position), and a mere 40 kilometers, or about 25 miles, (the Russian position). The talks had deliberately skirted the question of borders and territory. Evidently, the idea was for Putin and Zelensky to decide on those issues at the planned summit. It is easy to imagine that Putin would have insisted on holding all the territory that his forces had already occupied. The question is whether Zelensky could have been convinced to agree to this land grab. Despite these substantial disagreements, the April 15 draft suggests that the treaty would be signed within two weeks. Granted, that date might have shifted, but it shows that the two teams planned to move fast. “We were very close in mid-April 2022 to finalizing the war with a peace settlement,” one of the Ukrainian negotiators, Oleksandr Chalyi, recounted at a public appearance in December 2023. “[A] week after Putin started his aggression, he concluded he had made a huge mistake and tried to do everything possible to conclude an agreement with Ukraine.” WHAT HAPPENED? So why did the talks break off? Putin has claimed that Western powers intervened and spiked the deal because they were more interested in weakening Russia than in ending the war. He alleged that Boris Johnson, who was then the British prime minister, had delivered the message to the Ukrainians, on behalf of “the Anglo-Saxon world,” that they must “fight Russia until victory is achieved and Russia suffers a strategic defeat.” The Western response to these negotiations, while a far cry from Putin’s caricature, was certainly lukewarm. Washington and its allies were deeply skeptical about the prospects for the diplomatic track emerging from Istanbul; after all, the communiqué sidestepped the question of territory and borders, and the parties remained far apart on other crucial issues. It did not seem to them like a negotiation that was going to succeed. Moreover, a former U.S. official who worked on Ukraine policy at the time told us that the Ukrainians did not consult with Washington until after the communiqué had been issued, even though the treaty it described would have created new legal commitments for the United States—including an obligation to go to war with Russia if it invaded Ukraine again. That stipulation alone would have made the treaty a nonstarter for Washington. So instead of embracing the Istanbul communiqué and the subsequent diplomatic process, the West ramped up military aid to Kyiv and increased the pressure on Russia, including through an ever-tightening sanctions regime. The United Kingdom took the lead. Already on March 30, Johnson seemed disinclined toward diplomacy, stating that instead “we should continue to intensify sanctions with a rolling program until every single one of [Putin’s] troops is out of Ukraine.” On April 9, Johnson turned up in Kyiv —the first foreign leader to visit after the Russian withdrawal from the capital. He reportedly told Zelensky that he thought that “any deal with Putin was going to be pretty sordid.” Any deal, he recalled saying, “would be some victory for him: if you give him anything, he’ll just keep it, bank it, and then prepare for his next assault.” In the 2023 interview, Arakhamia ruffled some feathers by seeming to hold Johnson responsible for the outcome. “When we returned from Istanbul,” he said, “Boris Johnson came to Kyiv and said that we won’t sign anything at all with [the Russians]—and let’s just keep fighting.” Since then, Putin has repeatedly used Arakhamia’s remarks to blame the West for the collapse of the talks and demonstrate Ukraine’s subordination to its supporters. Notwithstanding Putin’s manipulative spin, Arakhamia was pointing to a real problem: the communiqué described a multilateral framework that would require Western willingness to engage diplomatically with Russia and consider a genuine security guarantee for Ukraine. Neither was a priority for the United States and its allies at the time. In their public remarks, the Americans were never quite so dismissive of diplomacy as Johnson had been. But they did not appear to consider it central to their response to Russia’s invasion. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin visited Kyiv two weeks after Johnson, mostly to coordinate greater military support. As Blinken put it at a press conference afterward, “The strategy that we’ve put in place—massive support for Ukraine, massive pressure against Russia, solidarity with more than 30 countries engaged in these efforts—is having real results.” Still, the claim that the West forced Ukraine to back out of the talks with Russia is baseless. It suggests that Kyiv had no say in the matter. True, the West’s offers of support must have strengthened Zelensky’s resolve, and the lack of Western enthusiasm does seem to have dampened his interest in diplomacy. Ultimately, however, in his discussions with Western leaders, Zelensky did not prioritize the pursuit of diplomacy with Russia to end the war. Neither the United States nor its allies perceived a strong demand from him for them to engage on the diplomatic track. At the time, given the outpouring of public sympathy in the West, such a push could well have affected Western policy. Zelensky was also unquestionably outraged by the Russian atrocities at Bucha and Irpin, and he probably understood that what he began to refer to as Russia’s “genocide” in Ukraine would make diplomacy with Moscow even more politically fraught. Still, the behind-the-scenes work on the draft treaty continued and even intensified in the days and weeks after the discovery of Russia’s war crimes, suggesting that the atrocities at Bucha and Irpin were a secondary factor in Kyiv’s decision-making. The Ukrainians’ newfound confidence that they could win the war also clearly played a role. The Russian retreat from Kyiv and other major cities in the northeast and the prospect of more weapons from the West (with roads into Kyiv now under Ukrainian control) changed the military balance. Optimism about possible gains on the battlefield often reduces a belligerent’s interest in making compromises at the negotiating table. Indeed, by late April, Ukraine had hardened its position, demanding a Russian withdrawal from the Donbas as a precondition to any treaty. As Oleksii Danilov, the chair of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council, put it on May 2: “A treaty with Russia is impossible—only capitulation can be accepted.” And then there is the Russian side of the story, which is difficult to assess. Was the whole negotiation a well-orchestrated charade, or was Moscow seriously interested in a settlement? Did Putin get cold feet when he understood that the West would not sign on to the accords or that the Ukrainian position had hardened? Even if Russia and Ukraine had overcome their disagreements, the framework they negotiated in Istanbul would have required buy-in from the United States and its allies. And those Western powers would have needed to take a political risk by engaging in negotiations with Russia and Ukraine and to put their credibility on the line by guaranteeing Ukraine’s security. At the time, and in the intervening two years, the willingness either to undertake high-stakes diplomacy or to truly commit to come to Ukraine’s defense in the future has been notably absent in Washington and European capitals. A final reason the talks failed is that the negotiators put the cart of a postwar security order before the horse of ending the war. The two sides skipped over essential matters of conflict management and mitigation (the creation of humanitarian corridors, a cease-fire, troop withdrawals) and instead tried to craft something like a long-term peace treaty that would resolve security disputes that had been the source of geopolitical tensions for decades. It was an admirably ambitious effort—but it proved too ambitious. To be fair, Russia, Ukraine, and the West had tried it the other way around—and also failed miserably. The Minsk agreements signed in 2014 and 2015 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas covered minutiae such as the date and time of the cessation of hostilities and which weapons system should be withdrawn by what distance. Both sides’ core security concerns were addressed indirectly, if at all. This history suggests that future talks should move forward on parallel tracks, with the practicalities of ending the war being addressed on one track while broader issues are covered in another. KEEP IT IN MIND On April 11, 2024, Lukashenko, the early middleman of the Russian-Ukrainian peace talks, called for a return to the draft treaty from spring 2022. “It’s a reasonable position,” he said in a conversation with Putin in the Kremlin. “It was an acceptable position for Ukraine, too. They agreed to this position.” Putin chimed in. “They agreed, of course,” he said. In reality, however, the Russians and the Ukrainians never arrived at a final compromise text. But they went further in that direction than has been previously understood, reaching an overarching framework for a possible agreement. After the past two years of carnage, all this may be so much water under the bridge. But it is a reminder that Putin and Zelensky were willing to consider extraordinary compromises to end the war. So if and when Kyiv and Moscow return to the negotiating table, they’ll find it littered with ideas that could yet prove useful in building a durable peace. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-could-have-ended-war-ukraine |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 5:34:09 PM EDT
[#38]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By DonKey153: https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/105982/1000025944_jpg-3189396.JPG Wait! Let me show you my AN/AWG-10B...
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Posted: 4/16/2024 6:49:38 PM EDT
[#39]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 7:49:29 PM EDT
[#40]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 8:55:14 PM EDT
[Last Edit: j_hooker]
[#41]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m:
I have to admit, it works…. in a Russian sort of way |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 9:48:38 PM EDT
[#42]
ISW assessment for April 16th.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2024 |
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Posted: 4/16/2024 10:24:31 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#43]
More footage of the fire in the area of the military airfield in Dzhankoy after the explosions
According to Radio Liberty, “Dzhankoy” is an operating state airfield in Crimea, where the 39th helicopter regiment of the 27th mixed aviation division of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Command of the Southern Military District and three aviation squadrons are stationed. https://t.me/astrapress/53445 Residents of Dzhankoy report new explosions, the fire in the area of the military airfield continues, there is no official information https://t.me/astrapress/53446 Residents of the Crimean Dzhankoy report powerful explosions in the sky above the city. Previously, the air defense system is working. As local residents told SHOT, several loud bangs were heard at around 4 a.m., the first at about 3:40. After this, according to eyewitnesses, a fire started in a field near the local airfield; its cause is unknown. There has been no official information yet. https://t.me/shot_shot/65080 Twitter video
Additional video OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) April 17, 2024 OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) April 17, 2024
March  
Public reports report night arrivals at the military airfield in Dzhankoy Russian telegram channels report that the strike could have been double - ballistics (ATACMS) and Storm Shadow air missiles. There are no official comments yet. https://t.me/chp_simferopol/21048 For what it's worth. The enemy has minus air defense batteries, helicopters and more: the attack on Dzhankoy was an operation of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Main Intelligence Directorate, they were hit with modernized weapons – sources The strikes on the military airfield in Dzhankoi in the temporarily occupied Crimea were probably a joint operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. After the attack, there were two waves of detonation, the consequences of damage by modernized weapons are currently being clarified. It is preliminarily known that three air defense batteries, several helicopters, a ammunition depot and other "fat" targets were destroyed at the airport. That's what OBOZ. UA learned from its own sources. According to our sources, the strike on the airfield in Dzhankoy was carried out with modernized Soviet weapons. This came as a surprise to the Russian occupiers, so the consequences and scale of the damage, according to preliminary data, became significant. Sources note that it is highly likely that three air defense batteries located on the territory of the Dzhankoi airfield were destroyed as a result of the strike. The invaders could also lose several helicopters, a fuel tank, an ammunition depot, two radar stations, one electronic warfare/rec station and a launcher of the Bastion coastal missile system. On the night of April 17, explosions rang out in Dzhankoy: locals began to report that a powerful fire broke out in the area of the military airfield. Meanwhile, Russian propagandists began to write that "grass is burning in the field." As you know, the 39th Helicopter Regiment of the 27th Mixed Aviation Division of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Command of the Southern Military District of the Russian Federation, three aviation squadrons on Mi-8, Mi-35M, Mi-28, Ka-52 are stationed at the military air base near Dzhankoi. Helicopters of the Border Guard Service of the FSB of the Russian Federation are also stationed there. https://war.obozrevatel.com/ukr/u-voroga-minus-batarei-ppo-vertoloti-i-ne-tilki-udar-po-dzhankoyu-buv-operatsieyu-sbu-i-gur-bili-modernizovanoyu-zbroeyu-dzherela.htm ❗️🇷🇺🇺🇦 Regarding the missile strike on Dzhankoi Last night, the AFU launched an attack on the airfield in Dzhankoi. Around 12 ATACMS operational-tactical missiles were utilized for the strike, likely originating from the Kherson region. ▪️ The assault was executed in two phases. The initial strike involved seven missiles, seemingly equipped with cluster warheads, while the second wave deployed at least five. Some equipment at the airfield sustained damage, along with one of the buildings. ▪️ The attack could have employed both MGM-140A with a range of up to 165 km and MGM-140B with a combat radius of 300 km. By launching from the outskirts of Kherson, the AFU can easily reach Dzhankoi, even with the initial versions of ATACMS. ❗️Similar to previous strikes, an American RQ-4B drone freely patrolled the airspace south of Crimea, overseeing the operation. However, even in its absence, the adversary obtained the necessary information. Clear footage of the attacks is available on the Internet, thanks to the actions of pro-Ukrainian residents of the city, as well as some minors. The question remains as to why residents of Russian Crimea are seemingly untroubled by the repercussions of such actions. The lack of concrete punitive measures hampers the apprehension and prosecution of such individuals, thereby endangering our military personnel. 🔻Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are actively preparing for larger-scale assaults on the peninsula. A few days ago, there was an unsuccessful attempt to target the control point in Berdiansk, followed by today's attack on the airfield. The objective is clear. Disrupt the coordination of our units by neutralizing command posts and causing significant damage to air defense forces. Achieving these dual aims, particularly with the fleet already weakened, is crucial for the AFU before targeting the Crimean Bridge. 
To my knowledge, far from confirmed. But this was an early rumor. 
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Posted: 4/16/2024 11:10:09 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#44]
 
 
      
 
⚔️ The enemy advanced in Ocheretin. Fighting continues in Berdychy, Krasnohorivka and south of Urozhany.
   
❗️🇷🇺🇺🇦 Donetsk direction Russian forces are advancing in Krasnohorivka on the southern and eastern outskirts of the city. According to the latest information, about half of the private sector south of the railroad has come back under the control of the Russian Armed Forces, and assault groups managed to reach the train station some time ago. This is partly confirmed by footage of enemy strikes on various buildings in the south of the village. The Russian Armed Forces, on the other hand, are striking with FABs from the UMPK on the territory of the Krasnogorovsk refractoryplant and the ruins of the industrial zone to the south. There is also an advance north of the railroad in the private sector and the vicinity of Vatutina Street. However, there have been no attempts to advance from Staromikhailovka, as this section has been well shelled by the enemy, as well as fortifications dating back to the Minsk Agreements. To the north, in the Nevelskoye-Pervomayskoye section, the Russian Armed Forces began eliminating the "pocket" near Domakha beam some time ago. Russian units occupied the territory of the gardens at least up to the outskirts of the beam. 
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IA, USA
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Posted: 4/16/2024 11:10:24 PM EDT
[#45]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 11:15:09 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#46]
16.04 18:00
A fire broke out in the workshop of the Avangard plant in the north of Moscow Tags: Ministry of Emergency Situations, Factories, SAO, Voykovsky, Fire, Ignition, Fire The fire with an area of 50 square meters occurred in the workshop of the Moscow machine-building plant "Avangard" in the capital's Voikovsky district, by now the fire has been localized. This was reported to the Moscow City News Agency by an informed source. "In workshop No. 12 of the Avangard plant on Klara Zetkin Street, a fire broke out on an area of 50 square meters. By now, the fire has been localized," the agency's interlocutor explained. Details of the incident are being established. https://www.mskagency.ru/materials/3377245  There is a fire at the Avangard military plant in Moscow, media reports According to sources from 360 and the Moscow City News Agency, the fire was 50 square meters in size. m. occurred in workshop No. 12 of the Avangard machine-building plant. To date, the fire has not been extinguished. The plant produces missiles for air defense systems. Open sources say that this is the main supplier of missiles for the S-300 and S-400 complexes. https://t.me/astrapress/53414 Even pro-Russian Twitter seems impressed.
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Posted: 4/16/2024 11:28:03 PM EDT
[#47]
Monster explosion.
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Posted: 4/16/2024 11:34:04 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#48]
The Tobol River's water level keeps increasing, with a massive volume of water heading towards Kurgan. Within two hours, the level surged by 26 cm to reach 8.3 meters. The government of Russia's Kurgan region has declared a state of emergency. Residents of the Belozersky district, in the path of the advancing water, have been strongly urged by authorities to evacuate. Local officials have shared video footage illustrating the aftermath of the flooding, with many houses now submerged to the extent that their roofs are no longer visible.
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Posted: 4/16/2024 11:34:24 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#49]
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Posted: 4/16/2024 11:39:36 PM EDT
[#50]
Witch backstory.
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