As a long-time armor model builder, its funny to see the Ukrainians are still using that weird Russian Green that all of the old Soviet gear was slathered with.  They probably found a massive storehouse full of that stuff.

This is huge - Zelenskyy says all the details about the US providing ATACMS to Ukraine have been agreed.

Ukraine’s 4 priorities are - defense of the sky, modern artillery, long-range weapons and that packages of American support arrive timely. pic.twitter.com/UDFTcwvLUK

Giorgi Revishvili  (@revishvilig) April 22, 2024

Did the GLSDBs make their appearance yet?

Yes.

This is the rear section of an sdb bomb.

Russians showed parts of the wreckage, as it looks like, of GLSDB.

Russians claim that this wreckage was found after strike on Russian targets on February 13 near Kreminna, Luhansk region. pic.twitter.com/FQvAeJcDNs

— Special Kherson Cat \uD83D\uDC08\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@bayraktar_1love) February 14, 2024

?\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83D\uDCAA\uD83D\uDCA5Wreckage of GLSDB in the Alchevsk area. The Russians write that we are actively using them. pic.twitter.com/OLbT7LPrXa

— \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 UkraineNewsLive\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@UkraineNewsLive) March 21, 2024

Attached File

Urozhaine
Possible friendly fire
Russian 14th Speznaz Brigade ATGM strikes against Tank and MT-LB with infantry.

47.745011, 36.837855 dmg./aband. Tank "V"
47.744755, 36.837969 destr. MT-LB@UAControlMap @GeoConfirmed
src: https://t.co/x00GFqPC9q (h/t @giK1893) pic.twitter.com/26JxUNW6pa

— imi (m) (@moklasen) April 22, 2024

*snort* lol.

Russia explicitly aims to devastate critical infrastructure of the city of 1,3 million. Would you imagine the levelling of the Milan TV tower? Destruction of a power generation station in Munich or entire heating system in Prague? Russia does that all to Kharkiv
Photo AFP via KI pic.twitter.com/PlCjxeJNub

Olena Halushka  (@OlenaHalushka) April 22, 2024

Kharkiv TV Tower \uD83D\uDE4F\uD83D\uDE14#RussiaIsATerroristState pic.twitter.com/31b6AL7DeT

— MAKS 23 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83D\uDC40 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) April 22, 2024

Video of collapse

Russia attacks TV tower in Kharkiv. Imagine you working in the office and seeing something like that outside of your window.

pic.twitter.com/00Mp0dC28D

— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated) April 22, 2024

Russian strike on Kharkiv's TV tower. The videos appeared in a lot of media already.

Thankfully, all the employees were in shelters. There are disruptions of the digital TV signal in the area - Kharkiv regional military administration. pic.twitter.com/BNCk2t072h

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) April 22, 2024

I watched the video and they called it the GOBLN with a picture of the Green Goblin in the logo. So maybe they are calling it Goblin.

Also, it's a magazine fed mortar, I think I might be in love.

Edit because morphine and spelling don't mix.

The Historical Roots of Russia’s Quest to Dominate Ukraine

According to Eugene Finkel, the Kenneth H. Keller Associate Professor of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University, Russia’s recurrent attacks against Ukraine can be traced to issues of identity and security.

Rachel Cody Owens


What has driven Russia’s violence in and against Ukraine from the 19th century to the contemporary era? In a recent Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) Seminar talk co-hosted by The Europe Center and CDDRL, Eugene Finkel, the Kenneth H. Keller Associate Professor of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University, argued that Russia’s recurrent attacks against Ukraine can be traced to issues of identity and security. Finkel draws on what he described as a two-hundred-year-long quest by Russia to dominate Ukraine, as detailed in his upcoming book Intent to Destroy (due for release in November 2024 by Basic Books).

Reflecting on the role of Russian identity in driving the country’s attempts to capture Ukraine, Finkel pointed out that many Russians think of Ukrainians as a subbranch of the Russian people.  These stark views on identity, he noted, are partly the product of the struggle between the Russian Empire and the Polish Independence movement. In an effort to avoid Polish influence, Russia began emphasizing unity between the Russian and Ukrainian people.

Security is another key driver of Russia’s aggression. There are large geographical features that block off Ukraine from the rest of Europe, but no such dividing features exist between Ukraine and Russia. As such, any force that enters Ukraine can easily invade Russia. Historical repetition of this route has made Ukraine seemingly imperative to Russian national security.

Regime security also plays an important role. Many of the democratic ideas reaching Russia were diffused through Ukraine. Abiding by the logic of Russians and Ukrainians as one people, if Ukraine can be democratic, so can Russia. Thus, an independent democratic Ukraine poses a serious ideological threat to the regime.

Finkel argues that identity and security have always been the driving factors of Russia’s aggression. To illustrate this continuity of this trend, he draws upon a case study from the early 20th century, namely the Russian occupation of Galicia and Bukovyna. As rising Ukrainian activism threatened the Russian empire, the regime responded with propaganda peddling the notion that Ukraine had been created to destroy Russia from within – a stark parallel to propaganda today. Russia also waged a war to “liberate” the Ukrainians, believing that annexing Galicia would allow Russia to reestablish its rightful boundaries.

The conflict resulted in violence and plunder against civilians, targeting of Ukrainian community leaders, banning Ukrainian publications, and switching the education system – actions closely mimicking those of Russia today.

In 2022, Russia’s “divide and repress” strategy failed. Ukraine witnessed the emergence of a nation – Ukrainian identity became more pronounced. Russia’s initial plan was to repress Ukraine’s elites, not conduct mass executions. But as the war progressed and Ukrainians turned from brother to traitor, the violence escalated.

This obsession begs the question – when will Russia’s quest to dominate Ukraine end? Or rather, how? Given the central role of identity in driving this quest, Finkel believes that the only realistic path for ending this longstanding trend is changing the education system – a path that Russia seems to be moving further away from.

https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/historical-roots-russias-quest-dominate-ukraine

Oh OK. Cool. But dont post anything sensitive. I'm just some goof spectating and cheering from the sidelines.

p.s. 400 would be a great start!

Russian FSB Counterintelligence Chief Gets 9 Years in Cybercrime Bribery Scheme

2024-04-22 21:04


The head of counterintelligence for a division of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was sentenced last week to nine years in a penal colony for accepting a USD $1.7 million bribe to ignore the activities of a prolific Russian cybercrime group that hacked thousands of e-commerce websites. The protection scheme was exposed in 2022 when Russian authorities arrested six members of the group, which sold millions of stolen payment cards at flashy online shops like Trump’s Dumps.

As reported by The Record, a Russian court last week sentenced former FSB officer Grigory Tsaregorodtsev for taking a $1.7 million bribe from a cybercriminal group that was seeking a “roof,” a well-placed, corrupt law enforcement official who could be counted on to both disregard their illegal hacking activities and run interference with authorities in the event of their arrest.

Tsaregorodtsev was head of the counterintelligence department for a division of the FSB based in Perm, Russia. In February 2022, Russian authorities arrested six men in the Perm region accused of selling stolen payment card data. They also seized multiple carding shops run by the gang, including Ferum Shop, Sky-Fraud, and Trump’s Dumps, a popular fraud store that invoked the 45th president’s likeness and promised to “make credit card fraud great again.”

All of the domains seized in that raid were registered by an IT consulting company in Perm called Get-net LLC, which was owned in part by Artem Zaitsev — one of the six men arrested. Zaitsev reportedly was a well-known programmer whose company supplied services and leasing to the local FSB field office.

Russian news sites report that Internal Affairs officials with the FSB grew suspicious when Tsaregorodtsev became a little too interested in the case following the hacking group’s arrests. The former FSB agent had reportedly assured the hackers he could have their case transferred and that they would soon be free.

But when that promised freedom didn’t materialize, four the of the defendants pulled the walls down on the scheme and brought down their own roof. The FSB arrested Tsaregorodtsev, and seized $154,000 in cash, 100 gold bars, real estate and expensive cars.

At Tsaregorodtsev’s trial, his lawyers argued that their client wasn’t guilty of bribery per se, but that he did admit to fraud because he was ultimately unable to fully perform the services for which he’d been hired.

The Russian news outlet Kommersant reports that all four of those who cooperated were released with probation or correctional labor. Zaitsev received a sentence of 3.5 years in prison, and defendant Alexander Kovalev got four years.

In 2017, KrebsOnSecurity profiled Trump’s Dumps, and found the contact address listed on the site was tied to an email address used to register more than a dozen domains that were made to look like legitimate Javascript calls many e-commerce sites routinely make to process transactions — such as “js-link[dot]su,” “js-stat[dot]su,” and “js-mod[dot]su.”

Searching on those malicious domains revealed a 2016 report from RiskIQ, which shows the domains featured prominently in a series of hacking campaigns against e-commerce websites. According to RiskIQ, the attacks targeted online stores running outdated and unpatched versions of shopping cart software from Magento, Powerfront and OpenCart.

Those shopping cart flaws allowed the crooks to install “web skimmers,” malicious Javascript used to steal credit card details and other information from payment forms on the checkout pages of vulnerable e-commerce sites. The stolen customer payment card details were then sold on sites like Trump’s Dumps and Sky-Fraud.

https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/04/russian-fsb-counterintelligence-chief-gets-9-years-in-cybercrime-bribery-scheme/

As a result of the enemy's attack, residential buildings were damaged. At least 14 apartments were damaged, said the mayor of Odesa, Gennadiy Trukhanov.

"On the spot, the State Emergency Service, the Municipal Guard, other emergency services are helping to save people.
It is already known about seven victims. Previously, there were no casualties.
The Peresypsk district administration is deploying an operational headquarters on the spot to resettle and provide assistance to the victims of Odesa."

As a result of the enemy's attack, residential buildings were damaged. At least 14 apartments were damaged, said the mayor of Odesa, Gennadiy Trukhanov.

"On the spot, the State Emergency Service, the Municipal Guard, other emergency services are helping to save people.
It is… pic.twitter.com/NomWan5MOa

— Malinda \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDF5\uD83C\uDDF1\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDEE\uD83C\uDDF9\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDE7\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDF8\uD83C\uDDEA (@TreasChest) April 23, 2024

According to updated data, 34 people were rescued, including 3 children.
7 people were injured, including 2 children.

https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8546

I guess he did something that Putin didn't like, as this charge is sort of like writing speeding tickets on the track at the Daytona 500!

Russia has literally burned it's bridges in Ukraine.  Anything less than a complete conquest at this point of Ukraine on Russia's part will end up being a strategic defeat, as they are brewing Poland-levels of generational hate among the Ukes, and those folks are right up there with Appalachia in their ability to hold a grudge!

Unfortunately Russian culture seems to be based on "Let them hate us as long as they fear us."

Russian army less than 3km from main Ukrainian defensive line west of Avdiivka

After entering into Ocheretyne thanks to a failed Ukrainian relieving operation, they are now advancing westward.

\uD83E\uDDF5THREAD\uD83E\uDDF51/10 ?? pic.twitter.com/CfPiNzXE3D

— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) April 22, 2024

Has this dude been posted here yet? He's an active duty Ukrainian soldier who posts reviews of both NATO and Soviet equipment (rifles, grenades, flares, tourniquets, etc.). Recently, he posted an exclusive video to his Patreon that goes in-depth regarding drones. I'm not a paying member, but someone else on another forum did the leg work and summarized the key points. This is going to be a really long post, but it's very interesting, and I think it has validity to even SHTF scenarios here in the states. @planemaker should find this stuff really interesting.

FPV drone types (warheads):

. Explosive/Fragmentation - Straightforward, plastic explosive filler with fragmentation sleeve. Used for exposed personnel.

. HEAT - Most commonly RPG-7 Warheads

. Penetration Core - Here I think he was referring to an explosively formed penetrator (EFP). Opposed to HEAT, an EFP have a much thicker hemispherical copper lining with HE behind it. The benefit of an EFP is that the penetrator forms much further away (up to 20m) from the detonation, allowing penetration from a distance and through cope cages. Valgear states that these "Penetration Core" warheads are slowly replacing HEAT on the battlefield.

. Thermobaric - Mini fuel/air bombs which are used against dugouts and other entrenched positions

. Proximity Fuse - Valgear states that UA is slowly trying to replace contact fuses with proximity fuses with Claymore warheads, which detonate via a command from the drone operator. Valgear didn't say why, but I believe this is due to the rise of penetration core drones as well as better fragmentation zone.

FPV Drone Defensive Tactics - Interesting note, Valgear states that UA is basing its infantry drone defense tactics at least in part off of RU's reports and experience.

. First line of defense - Always listen for FPV drone motors. Always have a team member looking up and with active ear protection on max.

. Second line of defense - Speed. Of course, it's harder to hit a moving target.

. Third Line of defense - Smoke. Smoke is very effective at obscuring your position. If you are moving and obscured, you are much harder to hit. Russians are using massive smoke screens, kilometers wide to obscure movement of men and vehicles. It does clearly signal an attack, but with spotting drones so prevalent, it's better to obscure the attack than to attempt surprise.

. Forth line of defense - SHOOT! As soon as you see the drone, shoot at it. This was originally a Russian doctrine, but UAF is starting to adopt it as well. Reports are stating that this tactic is actually very effective. This is a pretty interesting example of selection bias in the footage we see. Russians and Ukrainians aren't posting videos of drones getting shot down, but it seems (at least based on this guy's reporting) this is actually a viable defense. Shooting at it may shoot down a drone, but it also forces the operator into evasive action and can result in poor targeting. This is also why proximity fuses are becoming more popular, because the operator can instantly detonate over the personnel as opposed to maneuvering for a good hit.

. When in a forest, hug a tree. When in a building, close all doors and windows, use curtains if glass is shattered (curtains can detonate fuse).

In general, if you get spotted, be active and aggressive with your defense. Cowering in place will only result in certain death.

EW (Electronic Warfare)

. Any EW is better than none. Even if operating on the wrong frequencies, EW can interfere with an operator at short ranges. Note: Another Ukrainian soldier on the forum I'm copying and pasting this from disagreed, stating, "Completely wrong. If you do not match the operating range of the signal, the effectiveness of your EW emitter is zero (0). Short range interference is due to radio blocking of the signal when losing line of sight."

. UA has some EW capabilities (vehicle mounts and backpack EW).

. Russians have gotten much better at EW in quantity and quality. They now have EW repeaters that create a frequency umbrella around their trenches.

. "Radio Horizon" - This is essentially the range of EW and FPV frequencies in consideration of Earth curvature and obstacles. Place antennas high on trees and buildings. The UAF is now placing repeaters on heavy drones.

Drone Drop Munitions

. Usually use DJI Mavic series drones.

. Up to Baba Yaga - Heavy drone that drops mines, apparently it’s a repurposed agricultural drone.

. Valgear states that drone drops are an even greater threat than FPV. They have better resolution, and can acquire targets better. They have higher munition capacity. Due to the altitudes they are operating in, they are very difficult to hear and see.

. RU is using drone drop attacks at a similar frequency to UA.

. Autell Drones are more dangerous than DJI, because they are more resistant to EW than DJI and can operate at night.

Drone Drop Defensive Tactics

. Basically the same as FPV with a few differences. When digging a trench and dugout, dig the trench deeper than the dugout. This way a drone drop grenade will not roll into the dugout.

Drone Surveillance

. American doctrine states that when you encounter indirect fire, you should push in the direction of that fire (note: this isn't the case, according to people on the original forum). In the context of Ukraine, and drone surveillance, this is a completely outdated tactic. On the modern battlefield, artillery zeros in within minutes.

. If you encounter indirect fire, take cover immediately.

. You will get one to three accurate shots on your position, but if your cover is good, chances are you will survive.

. After you have taken fire, wait in cover for 30min to an hour (longer the better) for the spotting drone to run out of battery and return to base.

. "Don’t fuck around with artillery under any condition, ever!"

. Artillery is the number one killer in Ukraine.

. Russians will double tap you if you do not wait long enough.

Fixed Wing Drones

. Orlan - 10- Surveillance drone and designator. Typically designates for guided cluster munitions, less often Lancets.

. Zala - Another surveillance drone and designator. Typically designates for Lancets (Zala and Lancet are built by the same company).

. Lancets (First Generation) - Used a general penetration warhead, similar to an upscaled DPCIM submunition.

. Lancets (Second Generation) - Uses a penetration core (EFP) to penetrate past netting and cover.

. These fixed wing drones are used almost entirely to identify and eliminate high value targets: artillery, tanks, etc. Infantry generally doesn't have to worry about them.

Budanov did a long interview with BBC Ukraine.

Summary:

. There's no reason to believe in Ukraine's strategic defeat. There are problems at the front, but these problems didn't appear today, nor a month ago, nor even three months ago.

. There's systemic problems within the UAF. At the same time, we must remember that Ukraine still exists. The Russians did have real success at Avdiivka, though. It can't be denied; it's a fact that has to be acknowledged. It's too early to talk about success in other directions.

. Russia has effectively circumvented sanctions, acquiring components for its military production.

. China has neither transferred nor plans to transfer any ready-made weapons. Beijing provided dual-use goods to Russia - parts, microchips, and machines.  

. Ukraine will have a challenging time in the near future, but not catastrophic. Armageddon will not happen, as many are now beginning to say. However, there will be problems from mid-May to early June.

. Russia improved the equipment issued to its infantry, but the quality of other equipment fell. Russia uses repaired, restored equipment from warehouses for long-term storage of weapons.

. The quality of their military personnel also deteriorated. Initially, they employed troops who were somewhat professional, with years in uniform and often combat experience. At this point, there are almost none of them left. Russia is essentially fighting with mobilized forces.

. They had a morale boost after capturing Avdiivka. However, their morale has not substantially changed. The Russian mentality also plays an important role here. "Go forward," as they say, and the Russian man goes. He does not particularly think about what will happen to him there. To say he tries hard is also not true, however.

. The Maidan-3 operation is still active and it is progressing. Russia clearly understands that purely pro-Russian forces will not be able to function now. Therefore, Russia camouflages it under various kinds of activities, under various issues of social tension.

Having sound amplification so you can hear drone motors is a pretty good idea if (a) the sound amp can pick up and amplify the motor frequencies of interest and (b) you know what to listen for. This might also be a thing for a Pi with a good mic input to do - scan for known drone sounds. We built one multicopter that made a heck of a lot of noise but the noise was coming from the ESCs, not the props. Changing the switching frequency of the ESCs got rid of most of that noise.

The comment on EW I'm assuming is a translation issue. If you have a jammer that is wide enough to cover the frequencies the bad guys are using (whether it's using one transmitter or multiple transmitters to cover those frequencies), then it becomes a matter of signal-to-noise. If you have 40W, you'll be a much stronger signal than his controller unless the bad guys have much, much higher power. (R-squared works regardless of whether it's you to the drone or him to the drone.) LOS doesn't really play into it until you get really close to the ground (hence the reason a lot of videos start getting really static-y close to the ground).

I'm still of the opinion that fixed-wing units dropping munitions could be employed to good effect. The equations for when to drop the munition given a fixed target are pretty straightforward. In theory, you could set up an FPV fixed-wing where the HUD back on the ground control station shows you where the munition would hit if you dropped it right now. Then just fly the box to the target you want to hit and push button, receive bacon.

There's lots of lessons to be learned related to drones in this conflict. Hopefully we learn them.

Attached File


Interesting Russian soldier... Two things immediately come to mind. One, that guy's kit is all sorts of fucked up. Two, a Sieg Heil, a Totenkopf, and a Hammer and Sickle are all being spotted by the same guy... That's a lot to unpack.

IN MARIUPOL, THERE WAS A "HIT" ON THE BARRACKS, BUT THE RUSSIANS ARE TALKING ABOUT A "REED FIRE" – ANDRIUSHCHENKO

23 April, 2024, 04:52


On the evening of April 22, a fire broke out in the temporarily occupied Mariupol, Donetsk region. According to preliminary data, the "arrival" was based on the location of Russian servicemen and equipment.

The fire is burning in the left-bank part of the city, Reported adviser to the mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko.

Later, he added that the Russians announced a "fire of reeds".

"They haven't come up with anything better. However, there are no reeds, rivers, or even a puddle with a frog at the site of the fire," Andriushchenko said.

The adviser to the mayor also showed a map showing the approximate places of "arrivals" and emphasized that this is where the military barracks are located.



On the morning of April 19, explosions rang out in the area of the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol. Pre It was possible to hit the command post of the Russians.

Earlier, partisans recorded their arrival in Mariupol a large number of Russian servicemen. Presumably, these soldiers can be sent to the front to reinforce the troops of the Russian Federation, as they need to constantly replace people due to heavy losses.

https://zn.ua/ukr/war/u-mariupoli-buv-prilit-po-kazarmam-ale-rosijani-kazhut-pro-pozhezhu-ocheretu-andrjushchenko.html

🐷 Katsaps continue to advance in Ocheretino

📷 Available footage shows that the enemy occupied the central part of the village and most of it. Fighting continues on the outskirts. Only the district of "Hydrobudivelniki" in the north-eastern part of the settlement remains in question.

🏚 The situation with Ocheretin worsens.

📍

\uD83D\uDC37?????? ??????????? ??????????? ? ???????????

\uD83D\uDCF7?????? ????? ????????, ?? ????? ?????? ?????????? ??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ???? ???????. ??? ???????? ?? ????????. ??? ???????? ??????????? ???? ????? "??????????????????" ? ????????-??????? ??????? ?????????? ??????.

\uD83C\uDFDA????????… pic.twitter.com/QNkSZyby9D

— DeepState UA (@Deepstate_UA) April 22, 2024

Russian troops in the center of Ocheretyne. The settlement is mostly Russian controlled now, while they continue to advance north and west.

Tonight’s SitRep I will elaborate a bit more why Russians were able to advance so quickly into the town. pic.twitter.com/kjEEmlNXoW

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) April 22, 2024

SitRep - 22/04/24 - A big US aid package is prepared & Russians broke into Ocheretyne.. \uD83D\uDE44

An overview of the daily events in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russia broke into Ocheretyne, while Ukraine is desperately waiting for new US aid. Hurry up!

RT=appreciated

1/X pic.twitter.com/grUXAy2mGn

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) April 22, 2024