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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:13:57 PM EDT
[Last Edit: michigan66]
[#1]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Prime: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GMHEt6vWcAAe-o4?format=png&name=900x900 The Air Force commander for CENTCOM said the Houthi attacks slowed down dramatically because they were running out of missiles. Looks like the care package from Tehran has arrived. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:14:44 PM EDT
[#2]
        More from the Mad Ivan design departement. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:24:16 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#3]
 Russian online disinformation and propaganda - Pekka Kallioniemi at De Balie |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:29:57 PM EDT
[#4]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Prime:
Not a MG3 but dirty as fuck, it's barely working.  |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:32:11 PM EDT
[#5]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Prime: Not gonna argue any of that, I have no idea. But, interestingly... ...this just popped up.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GMG_BTWWcAA5EK2?format=jpg&name=900x900 If true, it suggests at least some level of plausibility to the idea that Surovikin just got exonerated. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Prime: Originally Posted By Capta: I’m calling this a disinfo op by the FSB to absolve themselves and Putin. Yes I’m sure that Shoigu and Ivanov were just as corrupt as stated, but IMO the rest is just grafted on. It is somewhat interesting because this source is directed at the west, not internally. First, the Ukrainians reported that Prigozhin’s claims of “shell hunger” were always a lie, and Wagner had several times the shell allotment of anyone else at the front. Second, I strongly doubt that Putin invaded Ukraine based on “information” that came from the Army. Putin has the SVR and the FSB for that, and they aren’t going to buy into a risky situation that could blow up in their faces, just to protect Shoigu’s grift. They would even have an incentive to undercut Shoigu on the basis of obviously untrue reporting. And I will categorically state that in 2021, LITERALLY NO ONE inside the Russian power structure would believe that NATO was about to intervene in East Ukraine. The whole idea is ludicrous. NATO was fat, dumb, happy, and asleep. Third, the Ukraine project obviously and provably extends back 20 years at least and comes directly from Putin, who is on record setting the trajectory of Ukraine’s “non-entity” status at least as far back as 2008. The whole arc of Russian actions and rhetoric against Ukraine points to the end goal of invasion. The 2014 war was intended to take the country or large parts of it then, but the Russian proxies lost and they had to pull in the Army just to stabilize the situation. Alleging that it all started from nowhere in 2021 to cover up an Army grift is just complete horse shit. Not gonna argue any of that, I have no idea. But, interestingly... ...this just popped up.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GMG_BTWWcAA5EK2?format=jpg&name=900x900 If true, it suggests at least some level of plausibility to the idea that Surovikin just got exonerated. It wouldn’t shock me if Surovikin is being rehabilitated because Putin is moving on Shoigu. Perhaps Putin has decided he can sort of trust Surovikin and needs someone competent in Shoigu’s job. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:34:09 PM EDT
[#6]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m: https://i.imgur.com/h2oJOJR.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/mIgFNy8.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/QSmpcYO.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/t6xvbv2.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/VXWUpL1.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/iXxZkEQ.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/AdcF8lq.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/H1Whlyq.jpeg More from the Mad Ivan design departement. LOL. Cope carts! |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:36:56 PM EDT
[#7]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m: Not a MG3 but dirty as fuck, it's barely working. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m: Originally Posted By Prime:
Not a MG3 but dirty as fuck, it's barely working. I certainly don't miss Kremina forest, and it is a place I will never forget. Those guys are in a hot area so pray for them. Soldiers, drones of all sorts, artillery, mortars, tanks, and aviation are all trying to kill you there. Yeah most of these guys can't clean a weapon worth a shit. Most of the issues I fix are related to dirty weapons and lost parts. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:44:33 PM EDT
[#8]
https://read.bradyafrick.com/p/russian-field-fortifications-in-ukraine |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:48:54 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#9]
This is after what has already been a busy night.
‼️✈️ Attention! There is information about the departure of a group of Tu-95ms strategic bombers from the "Olenya" airfield. If the flight is COMBAT, we are waiting for rocket launches: ~3:00 - 4:00. 🚀And missiles in the airspace of Ukraine: ~04:00 - 05:00. Don't ignore the anxiety at night/morning 🙏 https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87198 ⚠️ Takeoff of 5x Tu-95ms from "Olenya" AE, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation. South-Eastern course. Estimated approach to the starting lines: - Saratov region ~3 hours; - Ryazan region ~2 hours; - Caspian Sea ~4 hours. https://t.me/monitorwarr/20552 ⚠️Enemy EW also works. After all, it is impossible to immediately establish whether it is a real "Dagger" or a so-called "false target". Stay in shelters until the strike 🙏 https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87199 The Ukrainian Air Force reports missile attacks on Ukraine The Ukrainian Air Force reports that several Russian cruise missiles have been detected in the skies over Ukraine. An air raid alert has been declared throughout the country. According to the Ukrainian military, some missiles are flying in a western direction, towards the Vinnytsia, Khmelnytsky and Ternopil regions. According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian military also launched a Kinzhal missile through the Zhytomyr region in a southwestern direction. Monitoring channels also report on missiles and air defense operations in the Kyiv region. A group of Tu-95s was also recorded taking off from Olenya, monitoring channels report. https://t.me/uniannet/132236 📢 Countering the missile threat by region. https://t.me/kpszsu/13624
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Posted: 4/26/2024 4:59:29 PM EDT
[#10]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Easterner: I certainly don't miss Kremina forest, and it is a place I will never forget. Those guys are in a hot area so pray for them. Soldiers, drones of all sorts, artillery, mortars, tanks, and aviation are all trying to kill you there. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Easterner: I certainly don't miss Kremina forest, and it is a place I will never forget. Those guys are in a hot area so pray for them. Soldiers, drones of all sorts, artillery, mortars, tanks, and aviation are all trying to kill you there.  War is hell. Yeah most of these guys can't clean a weapon worth a shit. Most of the issues I fix are related to dirty weapons and lost parts. If the ROF goes down like in the video, that you can hear the single shots, it's time to act. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 5:10:48 PM EDT
[#11]
or via the Czech initiative. USAI funds have previously been used to procure artillery ammunition from Bulgaria. These 200,000 may be existing stocks being purchased off the shelf or orders for new production.
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Posted: 4/26/2024 5:29:32 PM EDT
[#13]
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Posted: 4/26/2024 5:37:53 PM EDT
[#14]
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Posted: 4/26/2024 5:47:43 PM EDT
[#15]
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Posted: 4/26/2024 5:59:06 PM EDT
[#17]
 
 
         
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:02:46 PM EDT
[#18]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Capta: Moving this set of links from my page 1 post to clear it for long-term reference links. So this group of links was originally posted on 4/23/24 and covers news immediately prior to that. Fantastic idea  |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:08:10 PM EDT
[#19]
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WI, USA
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:10:38 PM EDT
[#20]
Has this been posted? I'm behind on the thread.
Asia’s next war could be triggered by a rusting warship on a disputed reef MANILA — In the most hotly contested waterway in the world, the risk of Asia’s next war hinges increasingly on a ramshackle ship past her time, pockmarked with holes, streaked with rust and beached on a reef. To buttress its claims in the South China Sea, the Philippines in 1999 deliberately ran aground a World War II-era landing ship on a half-submerged shoal, establishing the vessel as an outpost of the Philippine navy. The BRP Sierra Madre, which has remained on Second Thomas Shoal ever since, has now become the epicenter of escalating tensions between the Philippines and China — and a singular trip wire that could draw the United States into an armed conflict in the Pacific, say officials and security analysts. I first read about the Sierra Madre years ago, so it's probably even more decrepit and inhospitable now. Philippines tries hard to hold onto sovereignty, but China pushes very hard. This is just one of the atolls & reefs disputed between Philippines & China (some are also claimed by Vietnam & Taiwan). I forget which one used to host gunnery practice by the USN when Philippines was a US territory. Philippine's government & the US ought to reach an agreement for the USN to resume gunnery practice in that location. 
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:23:54 PM EDT
[#21]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m: https://i.imgur.com/h2oJOJR.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/mIgFNy8.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/QSmpcYO.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/t6xvbv2.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/VXWUpL1.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/iXxZkEQ.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/AdcF8lq.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/H1Whlyq.jpeg More from the Mad Ivan design departement. Hopefully that keeps all the gore inside post detonation and makes cleanup easier. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:25:47 PM EDT
[#22]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By 4xGM300m: Not a MG3 but dirty as fuck, it's barely working. What is it? An actual MG42? Seems to be running like a top. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:25:58 PM EDT
[#23]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Capta: I think a lot of the cake is already baked. As long as Ukraine can make it through the summer, Putin’s gambit of outlasting support has failed. The West isn’t going to fold, and every day that goes by, the West makes progress in shaking itself awake and towards dealing with Russia the way they need to be dealt with. With ATACMS now landing on valuable Russian shit with some regularity, the “escalation” taboo is fading. If there ever was a taboo. Westerners almost universally don’t understand how insular Russia is. They will project normality to the outside until the wheels come completely off, at which point nearly everyone in the West will be shocked. The post-World-War-Two order is finished, we just don’t know yet how bad things will get. My opinion is that it’s worst-case-scenario for Russia and that they don’t survive the next 25 years in their current form. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Capta: Originally Posted By Saltwater-Hillbilly: Originally Posted By Capta: Originally Posted By ThreadKiller: Originally Posted By Capta: First, while yes France was the former colonial power and their own legacy behavior wasn’t good either, there is also much info out there that the nations that let Wagner in already regret it. I read such an article but didn’t bother posting it. So whether the French would be seen as “oppressors” is already a very relative question. Once Russia is in they aren’t leaving. They will readily commit mass murder against the locals and call it “liberation from neo-colonialist western forces”, while using their info ops in the west to spread moral relativist propaganda. Like I said, and I mean it, I’m open to evaluating the situation as a naked power play. But that works both ways. If it’s OK for Wagner to execute a neocolonialist agenda while using anti-colonialist rhetoric, while also shooting all the locals who disagree, you can hardly fault the French for (hypothetically) doing some version of the same. And yes they are fully capable of it. Which gets back to the Perun video and French defense policy. Niger supplies something like 40% of French nuclear material. This affects not only their economy, but also their nuclear deterrent force. They’re going to act. The only question is how and when. Africa is already a de facto theater of the Third World War. Most tend to blow off the energy aspects of the West/Russia confrontation compared to shit blowing up in Ukraine, but this is a huge error. Russia’s poor play of their energy card against Europe was war in all but the shooting. The move into Niger has to be seen the same way. This is a dire and intentional threat to the economic livelihood of France and by extension Europe. And, very likely, this was the end goal of Wagner’s Africa operations all along. They aren’t after a pittance worth of gold and rare woods, they’re there to stand on the neck of France’s nuclear power industry and nuclear deterrent force. There is plenty of info out there to suggest that Russia (outside the Ukraine op itself) was positioning itself to hold Europe hostage using energy. Nordstream was one such vector, the French nuclear industry is another such vector. It’s not an accident. Well we will see what the French actually do. Normally this would be a job for their foreign legion. But they were already kicked out, they were beaten at their own game. And of course we are once again caught in the aftermath. And maybe the Russians will in fact overstay their welcome so to speak. Or maybe not. Particularly if they actually live up to their commitments. This has been a trend in many countries. Many countries have put their money not on the USA and it's allies, but the Chinese and theirs. No amount of intervention is going to change that trend IMHO. You seem to still think there is a win here, but in my mind it was lost some time ago, we just didn't realize it. France along with the whole west quite frankly has been operating with blinders on since the mid-90s. The Soviet threat was over, it was all going to be unicorns and skittles. Europe mostly disarmed, and Europe had its fantasy of what things should be like. France “lost” because they had been operating under 30 years of sloth and wishful thinking. Another aspect that Putin used effectively was France’s and the west’s focus on international legalisms that were meaningless to Russia. They portrayed Wagner as a non-state actor they had no control over or responsibility for. This let them get into places and do things that would’ve drawn a different response from a “state” entity. Eventually well into the Ukraine war, they acknowledged that Wagner was and had always been state sponsored. My opinion has always been that the “non-state” status let Wagner get dug in, and converting them to a “state” status lets Russia threaten escalation if there’s any response. However, since then they have also at times again denied it is state sponsored. Wagner can be one, the other, both, or neither so long as Putin believes it sows confusion and indecision in the west’s response. However, there are still ways around it. At the same time Russia (Putin) was making plans to conquer Europe. Paying off politicians, getting Europe hooked on Russian energy, playing both political sides against each other, trying to drive a wedge between the US and Europe. Based on hindsight, Putin’s direct actions in Europe started in the early 2000s if not before. A similar but not perfect analogy can be made with the start of the second world war. Japan and Germany had already made their minds up. We just didn’t believe it and found reasons not to. Japan had been effectively at war since the early 30s. So yeah, they made gains early but defeat was also baked in, because Japanese and German GDP was dwarfed by the Allies, just like Russia’s GDP is dwarfed by the west’s. Once we start getting even partly serious it’s over. And we are getting serious, but slowly. Russia is fully committed in Ukraine and their losses have been immense. They are not the USSR - they don’t have 20 divisions to drop into Africa on a whim. France, right now, is more than capable of dealing with Wagner. However, a more likely scenario is that they let Russia be ground to powder in Ukraine for another year or two. They can afford that delay. Then events start demanding the Russians pull forces for the front or for regime security - they can’t afford to be everywhere - then France uses some locals beefed up with some FFL and rolls Wagner up. Not only is it possible, I consider it certain. Russia is trying to project strength, but is actually desperately weak. There’s also the position held by some including myself that the west has been suckering Russia in, grinding them down, and that the end goal is their collapse and dismemberment. There is a lot on the table for the taking, with both the West and China positioning themselves to benefit. Think of Russia as a nice, big, juicy steak, with all its neighbors tying on napkins and sharpening knives. Various countries are selling influence to China because China has a lot of cash right now. However, it has yet to be explained what China can do if various countries take their money and then tell them to go pound sand when the chips are down. Russia, not so much. Sure, they have cash and there’s always someone for sale for cash. We also have a lot more cash. No one outside of Russia is taking bribes in roubles. Unfortunately for Russia, their best source of foreign revenue and influence outside of energy is now in the shitter and will stay there. Here’s another Perun video I highly recommend. It covers the collapse in Russian foreign military sales, and touches on all the knock-on effects that will have, since FMS were always the primary vector for Russian influence in the third world. I frankly was stunned at how bad it is.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wdap15tWnfIIt appears that, whether intentionally or not, Putin and his crew have triggered a slow-motion Russian "Gottdammerung". We can all see how this ends, with a Russia eclipsed on the world stage and facing massive internal and economic instability; the question becomes whom Russia takes out on the way down and how much the cake is already baked. Regardless, whether in 18 months or 18 years, Russia is in for some very hard times. Both the Chinese and the Russians seriously underestimated how much they were reliant on the global system they were trying to overturn. The system is now critically (if not terminally) damaged, and they are finding that they have a lot more vulnerability to the spiraling 2nd- and 3rd-Order Effects than they imagined. As their putative "allies" in western "leadership" (corporate, governmental, diplomatic, and academic) whom they seriously screwed over are now concentrating on fighting for survival of both their power and worldview (and skewering their credibility in the process), China and Russia cannot be anything but anxious about what comes next. The "great reset" that many International Bright (formerly young) Things advocated for is already spinning out of control, and they are falling back on narrative, ideology, and their inner fascist/communist to try to keep things going, and they are now willing to "cut sling" on China and Russia (as well as Venezuela, Cuba, and a lot of other places) in order to try to maintain control in the European/Anglophone world. Thing are fixin' to get quite sporty!  I think a lot of the cake is already baked. As long as Ukraine can make it through the summer, Putin’s gambit of outlasting support has failed. The West isn’t going to fold, and every day that goes by, the West makes progress in shaking itself awake and towards dealing with Russia the way they need to be dealt with. With ATACMS now landing on valuable Russian shit with some regularity, the “escalation” taboo is fading. If there ever was a taboo. Westerners almost universally don’t understand how insular Russia is. They will project normality to the outside until the wheels come completely off, at which point nearly everyone in the West will be shocked. The post-World-War-Two order is finished, we just don’t know yet how bad things will get. My opinion is that it’s worst-case-scenario for Russia and that they don’t survive the next 25 years in their current form. Concur. One of the few things Karl Marx ever wrote that I agree with is his statement to the effect that History repeats itself; the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. Just as I am convinced that America's actions in the GWOT were often influenced by the wave of WWII nostalgia, and much of the current campus unrest is driven by a combination of '60's nostalgia (on the part of being pro-terrorist) and "Selma Envy", a lot of the Russian actions were driven by a combination of "Great Patriotic War" envy combined with nostalgia for the Soviet era. Nostalgia, while often fun, can have serious consequences when divorced from historical fact and objective reality. I fear the bill is coming due for a lot of the "Good Times" that China, the US, Russia, and Western Europe have had at the expense of their respective middle classes/working classes and the respective leadership has no clue what to do except regurgitate the historical narratives they have been taught and attempt to ape the actions of leaders long dead. Both my 20-something kids often regurgitate some of the current leadership-class leftish corporate speak. I just smile and tell them that, when they experience what's fixin' to soon come, they are going to be far to the "right" of me when they are my age! |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:29:16 PM EDT
[#24]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Lieh-tzu: Has this been posted? I'm behind on the thread. Asia’s next war could be triggered by a rusting warship on a disputed reef I first read about the Sierra Madre years ago, so it's probably even more decrepit and inhospitable now. Philippines tries hard to hold onto sovereignty, but China pushes very hard. This is just one of the atolls & reefs disputed between Philippines & China (some are also claimed by Vietnam & Taiwan). I forget which one used to host gunnery practice by the USN when Philippines was a US territory. Philippine's government & the US ought to reach an agreement for the USN to resume gunnery practice in that location. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Lieh-tzu: Has this been posted? I'm behind on the thread. Asia’s next war could be triggered by a rusting warship on a disputed reef MANILA — In the most hotly contested waterway in the world, the risk of Asia’s next war hinges increasingly on a ramshackle ship past her time, pockmarked with holes, streaked with rust and beached on a reef. To buttress its claims in the South China Sea, the Philippines in 1999 deliberately ran aground a World War II-era landing ship on a half-submerged shoal, establishing the vessel as an outpost of the Philippine navy. The BRP Sierra Madre, which has remained on Second Thomas Shoal ever since, has now become the epicenter of escalating tensions between the Philippines and China — and a singular trip wire that could draw the United States into an armed conflict in the Pacific, say officials and security analysts. I first read about the Sierra Madre years ago, so it's probably even more decrepit and inhospitable now. Philippines tries hard to hold onto sovereignty, but China pushes very hard. This is just one of the atolls & reefs disputed between Philippines & China (some are also claimed by Vietnam & Taiwan). I forget which one used to host gunnery practice by the USN when Philippines was a US territory. Philippine's government & the US ought to reach an agreement for the USN to resume gunnery practice in that location. Interesting.
   
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:47:05 PM EDT
[#25]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By kpacman: With so many variables and unknowns here, it's difficult to game out how all of this will end. Putin craves power and wanted nothing more than to go down in Russian history as the greatest leader since Peter the Great. If his military had been half as competent and well equipped as he had been led to believe, he would have steamrolled to Kyiv and decapitated the leadership within a month or two, earning the praise and admiration from his people he anticipated. I doubt the West would have calculated conflict with Russia was worth restoring Ukraine at that point. Instead, he became the person who grossly miscalculated practically everything. Even if he wanted to end the conflict tomorrow, how would he? The "sunken cost" at this point almost forces him to push his chips all in. Reparations, war crime trials, etc. are all Russia can look forward to if they sue for peace. A modern day 1917 revolution or Putin's death is the only way I can see this end. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By kpacman: Originally Posted By Saltwater-Hillbilly: It appears that, whether intentionally or not, Putin and his crew have triggered a slow-motion Russian "Gottdammerung". We can all see how this ends, with a Russia eclipsed on the world stage and facing massive internal and economic instability; the question becomes whom Russia takes out on the way down and how much the cake is already baked. Regardless, whether in 18 months or 18 years, Russia is in for some very hard times. Both the Chinese and the Russians seriously underestimated how much they were reliant on the global system they were trying to overturn. The system is now critically (if not terminally) damaged, and they are finding that they have a lot more vulnerability to the spiraling 2nd- and 3rd-Order Effects than they imagined. As their putative "allies" in western "leadership" (corporate, governmental, diplomatic, and academic) whom they seriously screwed over are now concentrating on fighting for survival of both their power and worldview (and skewering their credibility in the process), China and Russia cannot be anything but anxious about what comes next. The "great reset" that many International Bright (formerly young) Things advocated for is already spinning out of control, and they are falling back on narrative, ideology, and their inner fascist/communist to try to keep things going, and they are now willing to "cut sling" on China and Russia (as well as Venezuela, Cuba, and a lot of other places) in order to try to maintain control in the European/Anglophone world. Thing are fixin' to get quite sporty! With so many variables and unknowns here, it's difficult to game out how all of this will end. Putin craves power and wanted nothing more than to go down in Russian history as the greatest leader since Peter the Great. If his military had been half as competent and well equipped as he had been led to believe, he would have steamrolled to Kyiv and decapitated the leadership within a month or two, earning the praise and admiration from his people he anticipated. I doubt the West would have calculated conflict with Russia was worth restoring Ukraine at that point. Instead, he became the person who grossly miscalculated practically everything. Even if he wanted to end the conflict tomorrow, how would he? The "sunken cost" at this point almost forces him to push his chips all in. Reparations, war crime trials, etc. are all Russia can look forward to if they sue for peace. A modern day 1917 revolution or Putin's death is the only way I can see this end. For Russia, the "sunk cost" is already more than the could afford, and due to the centralization of power Putin has run out of folks he can convincingly cast blame and is even running out of folks who share in the blame. If he somehow decided to deescalate the situation, the level of weakness he would have to demonstrate at this point would probably lead to his overthrow before the first diplomat could report back a positive response to his initiative; as in there would be so many knives out for him the Kremlin would look like a cutlery shop. There is currently no one in Russia with the stature to end this war on any sort of acceptable terms and survive. It will require a 1917-style break with the past, or an insurgency or other existential national threat so powerful that the average Ivan pretty much forgets about the war in Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia will continue to push forward, throwing the money for the mortgage, the kids college, and the power bill into the pot. While I've been wrong before, at this point I give Russia less than 20 or so years at best as a major world power in their current form and I think they can only sustain the war in Ukraine for, at most, another 2-3 years. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:53:09 PM EDT
[#26]
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USA
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Posted: 4/26/2024 6:59:00 PM EDT
[#27]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Saltwater-Hillbilly: Concur. One of the few things Karl Marx ever wrote that I agree with is his statement to the effect that History repeats itself; the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. Just as I am convinced that America's actions in the GWOT were often influenced by the wave of WWII nostalgia, and much of the current campus unrest is driven by a combination of '60's nostalgia (on the part of being pro-terrorist) and "Selma Envy", a lot of the Russian actions were driven by a combination of "Great Patriotic War" envy combined with nostalgia for the Soviet era. Nostalgia, while often fun, can have serious consequences when divorced from historical fact and objective reality. I fear the bill is coming due for a lot of the "Good Times" that China, the US, Russia, and Western Europe have had at the expense of their respective middle classes/working classes and the respective leadership has no clue what to do except regurgitate the historical narratives they have been taught and attempt to ape the actions of leaders long dead. Both my 20-something kids often regurgitate some of the current leadership-class leftish corporate speak. I just smile and tell them that, when they experience what's fixin' to soon come, they are going to be far to the "right" of me when they are my age! My longtime Russian teacher, said one time when we were talking, she thinks most of the leaders of the world's countries don't know what they're doing, and some of them are evil. Putin has for two decades if not longer made comments and given indications he thinks it is a "tragedy" that the Soviet Union collapsed, specifically, his words were "the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geo-political tragedy of the 20th century". It's not a problem if someone is nostalgic for the Soviet Union, but it is if its the leader/dictator of Russia, with the entire country, including its military, at his command, and he decides he is going to try and put it back together. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:05:53 PM EDT
[#28]
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:10:17 PM EDT
[#29]
‼️✈️ As of now, it is known about the takeoff of 8 TU-95MS strategic bombers.
Don't ignore future worries 🙏 https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87217 |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:14:42 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Capta]
[#30]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Saltwater-Hillbilly: For Russia, the "sunk cost" is already more than the could afford, and due to the centralization of power Putin has run out of folks he can convincingly cast blame and is even running out of folks who share in the blame. If he somehow decided to deescalate the situation, the level of weakness he would have to demonstrate at this point would probably lead to his overthrow before the first diplomat could report back a positive response to his initiative; as in there would be so many knives out for him the Kremlin would look like a cutlery shop. There is currently no one in Russia with the stature to end this war on any sort of acceptable terms and survive. It will require a 1917-style break with the past, or an insurgency or other existential national threat so powerful that the average Ivan pretty much forgets about the war in Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia will continue to push forward, throwing the money for the mortgage, the kids college, and the power bill into the pot. While I've been wrong before, at this point I give Russia less than 20 or so years at best as a major world power in their current form and I think they can only sustain the war in Ukraine for, at most, another 2-3 years. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Saltwater-Hillbilly: Originally Posted By kpacman: Originally Posted By Saltwater-Hillbilly: It appears that, whether intentionally or not, Putin and his crew have triggered a slow-motion Russian "Gottdammerung". We can all see how this ends, with a Russia eclipsed on the world stage and facing massive internal and economic instability; the question becomes whom Russia takes out on the way down and how much the cake is already baked. Regardless, whether in 18 months or 18 years, Russia is in for some very hard times. Both the Chinese and the Russians seriously underestimated how much they were reliant on the global system they were trying to overturn. The system is now critically (if not terminally) damaged, and they are finding that they have a lot more vulnerability to the spiraling 2nd- and 3rd-Order Effects than they imagined. As their putative "allies" in western "leadership" (corporate, governmental, diplomatic, and academic) whom they seriously screwed over are now concentrating on fighting for survival of both their power and worldview (and skewering their credibility in the process), China and Russia cannot be anything but anxious about what comes next. The "great reset" that many International Bright (formerly young) Things advocated for is already spinning out of control, and they are falling back on narrative, ideology, and their inner fascist/communist to try to keep things going, and they are now willing to "cut sling" on China and Russia (as well as Venezuela, Cuba, and a lot of other places) in order to try to maintain control in the European/Anglophone world. Thing are fixin' to get quite sporty! With so many variables and unknowns here, it's difficult to game out how all of this will end. Putin craves power and wanted nothing more than to go down in Russian history as the greatest leader since Peter the Great. If his military had been half as competent and well equipped as he had been led to believe, he would have steamrolled to Kyiv and decapitated the leadership within a month or two, earning the praise and admiration from his people he anticipated. I doubt the West would have calculated conflict with Russia was worth restoring Ukraine at that point. Instead, he became the person who grossly miscalculated practically everything. Even if he wanted to end the conflict tomorrow, how would he? The "sunken cost" at this point almost forces him to push his chips all in. Reparations, war crime trials, etc. are all Russia can look forward to if they sue for peace. A modern day 1917 revolution or Putin's death is the only way I can see this end. For Russia, the "sunk cost" is already more than the could afford, and due to the centralization of power Putin has run out of folks he can convincingly cast blame and is even running out of folks who share in the blame. If he somehow decided to deescalate the situation, the level of weakness he would have to demonstrate at this point would probably lead to his overthrow before the first diplomat could report back a positive response to his initiative; as in there would be so many knives out for him the Kremlin would look like a cutlery shop. There is currently no one in Russia with the stature to end this war on any sort of acceptable terms and survive. It will require a 1917-style break with the past, or an insurgency or other existential national threat so powerful that the average Ivan pretty much forgets about the war in Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia will continue to push forward, throwing the money for the mortgage, the kids college, and the power bill into the pot. While I've been wrong before, at this point I give Russia less than 20 or so years at best as a major world power in their current form and I think they can only sustain the war in Ukraine for, at most, another 2-3 years. Putin has internally unleashed and empowered rampant nationalism and xenophobia. He probably didn’t intend to, but it’s going to take on a life of its own. If Putin or his successor tries to back down, the hyper-nationalists/militarists will destroy him. It’s a situation that again IMO mirrors prewar Japan. The rhetoric has gone too far, too much blood and treasure have been spent. Domestically, Russia is desperately short of labor due to casualties and expatriation, and needs the migrant workers. At the same time the hyper-nationalists/ xenophobes are targeting and scapegoating the same migrant population. Either they’ll drive them out and lose the labor they need, or they’ll provoke a cycle of pogrom/terrorism/retaliation. Or both. Listening to the hyper-nationalist sources, they want the labor but they want them to “know their place.” That isn’t going to work like they think it will. Russian xenophobia and antisemitism have always been strong undercurrents in Russian culture. The worse their situation gets the more obvious it will be. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:22:39 PM EDT
[#31]
Going both ways, it seems.
🪂 Zaporozhye direction. North-west of the village of Verbovoe. The rain has stopped. Every night there is a large increase in flights of Baba Yaga-type drones. Now there are from 3 to 6 flying from north to south at the same time. Diary of a Paratrooper🇷🇺 https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10029 About 10 Bab-Yagas flew south. Everyone is ready ❗❗❗ https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10030 |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:31:36 PM EDT
[#32]
TLDR, but this looks like it shouldn’ve been the first post of this thread
The Axis of Upheaval How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine May/June 2024 Published on April 23, 2024 In the early morning of January 2, Russian forces launched a massive missile attack on the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv that killed at least five civilians, injured more than 100, and damaged infrastructure. The incident was notable not just for the harm it caused but also because it showed that Russia was not alone in its fight. The Russian attack that day was carried out with weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran. Over the past two years, all three countries have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine. Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Moscow has deployed more than 3,700 Iranian-designed drones. Russia now produces at least 330 on its own each month and is collaborating with Iran on plans to build a new drone factory inside Russia that will boost these numbers. North Korea has sent Russia ballistic missiles and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, just as Ukrainian stockpiles have dwindled. China, for its part, has become Russia’s most important lifeline. Beijing has ramped up its purchase of Russian oil and gas, putting billions of dollars into Moscow’s coffers. Just as significantly, China provides vast amounts of warfighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar- and communications-jamming equipment and jet-fighter parts. Customs records show that despite Western trade sanctions, Russia’s imports of computer chips and chip components have been steadily rising toward prewar levels. More than half of these goods come from China. The support from China, Iran, and North Korea has strengthened Russia’s position on the battlefield, undermined Western attempts to isolate Moscow, and harmed Ukraine. This collaboration, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Cooperation among the four countries was expanding before 2022, but the war has accelerated their deepening economic, military, political, and technological ties. The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval—a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape. The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance. It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system. When these four countries cooperate, their actions have far greater effect than the sum of their individual efforts. Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to enforce global rules. Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States. Too many Western observers have been quick to dismiss the implications of coordination among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The four countries have their differences, to be sure, and a history of distrust and contemporary fissures may limit how close their relationships will grow. Yet their shared aim of weakening the United States and its leadership role provides a strong adhesive. In places across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the ambitions of axis members have already proved to be destabilizing. Managing the disruptive effects of their further coordination and preventing the axis from upsetting the global system must now be central objectives of U.S. foreign policy. THE ANTI-WESTERN CLUB Collaboration among axis members is not new. China and Russia have been strengthening their partnership since the end of the Cold War—a trend that accelerated rapidly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. China’s share of Russian external trade doubled from ten to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021, and between 2018 and 2022 Russia supplied a combined total of 83 percent of China’s arms imports. Russian technology has helped the Chinese military enhance its air defense, antiship, and submarine capabilities, making China a more formidable force in a potential naval conflict. Beijing and Moscow have also expressed a shared vision. In early 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint manifesto pledging a “no limits” partnership between their two countries and calling for “international relations of a new type”—in other words, a multipolar system that is no longer dominated by the United States. Iran has strengthened its ties with other axis members as well. Iran and Russia worked together to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power after the onset of civil war in 2011. Joining Russia’s efforts, which include major energy agreements with Iran to shield Tehran from the effects of U.S. sanctions, China has purchased large quantities of Iranian oil since 2020. North Korea, for its part, has counted China as its primary ally and trade partner for decades, and North Korea and Russia have maintained warm, if not particularly substantive, ties. Iran has purchased North Korean missiles since the 1980s, and more recently, North Korea is thought to have supplied weapons to Iranian proxy groups, including Hezbollah and possibly Hamas. Pyongyang and Tehran have also bonded over a shared aversion to Washington: as a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, declared during a ten-day trip to Iran in 2017, the two countries “have a common enemy.” But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened the convergence among these four countries in ways that transcend their historical ties. Moscow has been among Tehran’s top suppliers of weapons over the past two decades and is now its largest source of foreign investment; Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent in the first ten months of 2022. Over the past two years, according to the White House, Russia has been sharing more intelligence with and providing more weapons to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, and Moscow has defended those proxies in debates at the UN Security Council. Last year, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of crude oil and trade between the two countries topped $240 billion, a record high. Moscow has also released millions of dollars in North Korean assets that previously sat frozen in Russian banks in compliance with Security Council sanctions. China, Iran, and Russia have held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman three years in a row, most recently in March 2024. Russia has also proposed trilateral naval drills with China and North Korea. The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each country claims a sphere of influence: China’s “core interests,” which extend to Taiwan and the South China Sea; Iran’s “axis of resistance,” the set of proxy groups that give Tehran leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; North Korea’s claim to the entire Korean Peninsula; and Russia’s “near abroad,” which for the Kremlin includes, at a minimum, the countries that composed its historic empire. All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing these spheres of influence, and they want Washington’s presence in their respective regions reduced. All reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West’s championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and foment domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define democracy for themselves. In the end, although they may make temporary accommodations with the United States, they do not believe that the West will accept their rise (or return) to power on the world stage. They oppose external meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances, the stationing of American nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of coercive sanctions. Any positive vision for the future, however, is more elusive. Yet history shows that a positive agenda may not be necessary for a group of discontented powers to cause disruption. The 1940 Tripartite Pact uniting Germany, Italy, and Japan—the original “Axis”—pledged to “establish and maintain a new order of things” in which each country would claim “its own proper place.” They did not succeed, but World War II certainly brought global upheaval. The axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The countries’ shared opposition to the present order’s core tenets and their determination to bring about change form a powerful basis for collaborative action. Fissures do exist among members of the axis. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia, for instance, while Iran and Russia compete for oil markets in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The four countries have complicated histories with each other, too. The Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941; Russia and China settled their long-standing border dispute only in 2004 and had both previously supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear programs and to isolate North Korea. Today, China may look askance at North Korea’s deepening relationship with Russia, worrying that an emboldened Kim Jong Un will aggravate tensions in Northeast Asia and draw in a larger U.S. military presence, which China does not want. Yet their differences are insufficient to dissolve the bonds forged by their common resistance to a Western-dominated world. CATALYST IN THE KREMLIN Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The invasion of Ukraine marked a point of no return in Putin’s long-standing crusade against the West. Putin has grown more committed to destroying not only Ukraine but also the global order. And he has doubled down on relationships with like-minded countries to accomplish his aims. Cut off from Western trade, investment, and technology since the start of the war, Moscow has had little choice but to rely on its partners to sustain its hostilities. The ammunition, drones, microchips, and other forms of aid that axis members have sent have been of great help to Russia. But the more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are taking advantage of their leverage over Moscow to expand their military capabilities and economic options. Even before the Russian invasion, Moscow’s military assistance to Beijing was eroding the United States’ military advantage over China. Russia has provided ever more sophisticated weapons to China, and the two countries’ joint military exercises have grown in scope and frequency. Russian officers who have fought in Syria and in Ukraine’s Donbas region have shared valuable lessons with Chinese personnel, helping the People’s Liberation Army make up for its lack of operational experience—a notable weakness relative to more seasoned U.S. forces. China’s military modernization has reduced the urgency of deepening defense cooperation with Russia, but the two countries are likely to proceed with technology transfers and joint weapons development and production. In February, for instance, Russian officials confirmed that they were working with Chinese counterparts on military applications of artificial intelligence. Moscow retains an edge over Beijing in other key areas, including submarine technology, remote sensing satellites, and aircraft engines. If China can pressure a more dependent Russia to provide additional advanced technologies, the transfer could further undermine the United States’ advantages. A similar dynamic is playing out in Russia’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Moscow and Tehran have forged what the Biden administration has called an “unprecedented defense partnership” that upgrades Iranian military capabilities. Russia has provided Iran with advanced aircraft, air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber-capabilities that would help Tehran resist a potential U.S. or Israeli military operation. And in return for North Korea’s ammunition and other military support to Russia, Pyongyang is reportedly seeking advanced space, missile, and submarine technology from Moscow. If Russia were to comply with those requests, North Korea would be able to improve the accuracy and survivability of its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and use Russian nuclear propulsion technology to expand the range and capability of its submarines. Already, Russia’s testing of North Korean weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has supplied Pyongyang with information it can use to refine its missile program, and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea launch a military spy satellite in November after two previous failures last year. Strong relations among the four axis countries have emboldened leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran. Kim, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, indulged in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, and expressed a lack of any interest in talks with the United States. And although there does not appear to be a direct connection between their deepening partnership and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, growing support from Russia likely made Iran more willing to activate its regional proxies in the aftermath. The coordinated diplomacy and pressure from Russia and the West that brought Iran into the 2015 nuclear deal are now a distant memory. Today, Moscow and Beijing are helping Tehran resist Western coercion, making it easier for Iran to enrich uranium and reject Washington’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement. AMERICA UNDERMINED Collaboration among the axis members also reduces the potency of tools that Washington and its partners often use to confront them. In the most glaring example, since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has supplied Russia with semiconductors and other essential technologies that Russia previously imported from the West, undercutting the efficacy of Western export controls. All four countries are also working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar. The share of Russia’s imports invoiced in Chinese renminbi jumped from three percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2022. And in December 2023, Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct bilateral trade in their local currencies. By moving their economic transactions out of reach of U.S. enforcement measures, axis members undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions, as well as anticorruption and anti-money-laundering efforts. Taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia can build trade and transportation networks safe from U.S. interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones and other weapons to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the United States has little power to stop transfers. If the United States were engaged in conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing could seek support from Moscow. Russia might increase its overland exports of oil and gas to its southern neighbor, reducing China’s dependence on maritime energy imports that U.S. forces could block during a conflict. Russia’s defense industrial base, now in overdrive to supply weapons for Russian troops in Ukraine, could later pivot to sustain a Chinese war effort. Such cooperation would increase the odds of China’s prevailing over the American military and help advance Russia’s goal of diminishing the United States’ geopolitical influence. The axis is also hindering Washington’s ability to rally international coalitions that can stand against its members’ destabilizing actions. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, made it far easier for countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to do the same. And Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. Last year, they elevated Iran from observer to member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a predominantly Asian regional body, and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS—a group that China and Russia view as a counterweight to the West. Iran’s regional meddling and nuclear pursuits have made other countries wary of dealing with its government, but its participation in international forums enhances the regime’s legitimacy and presents it with opportunities to expand trade with fellow member states. Parallel efforts by axis members in the information domain further weaken international support for U.S. positions. China, Iran, and North Korea either defended or avoided explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they all parroted the Kremlin in accusing NATO of inciting the war. Their response to Hamas’s attacks on Israel last October followed a similar pattern. Iran used the state media and social media accounts to express support for Hamas, vilify Israel, and denounce the United States for enabling Israel’s military response, while the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese media sharply criticized the United States’ enduring support for Israel. They used the war in Gaza to portray Washington as a destabilizing, domineering force in the world—a narrative that is particularly resonant in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even if axis members do not overtly coordinate their messages, they push the same themes, and the repetition makes them appear more credible and persuasive. AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER? Global orders magnify the strength of the powerful states that lead them. The United States, for instance, has invested in the liberal international order it helped create because this order reflects American preferences and extends U.S. influence. As long as an order remains sufficiently beneficial to most members, a core group of states will defend it. Dissenting countries, meanwhile, are bound by a collective action problem. If they were to defect en masse, they could succeed in creating an alternative order more to their liking. But without a core cluster of powerful states around which they can coalesce, the advantage remains with the existing order. For decades, threats to the U.S.-led order were limited to a handful of rogue states with little power to upend it. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the restructuring of interstate relations it prompted have lifted the constraint on collective action. The axis of upheaval represents a new center of gravity, a group that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. The axis is ushering in an international system characterized by two orders that are becoming increasingly organized and competitive. Historically, competing orders have invited conflict, especially at the geographical seams between them. Wars arise from specific conditions, such as a territorial dispute, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to the survival of a regime. But the likelihood that any of those conditions will lead to war increases in the presence of dueling orders. Some political science researchers have found that periods in which a single order prevailed—the balance-of-power system maintained by the Concert of Europe for much of the nineteenth century, for example, or the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War era—were less prone to conflicts than those characterized by more than one order, such as the multipolar period between the two world wars and the bipolar system of the Cold War. The world has gotten a preview of the instability this new era of competing orders will bring, with potential aggressors empowered by the axis’s normalization of alternative rules and less afraid of being isolated if they act out. Already, Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens to engulf the wider Middle East in war. Last October, Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo in 2023, too, and Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana in December. Although internal conditions precipitated the coups in Myanmar and across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, the rising incidence of such revolts is connected to the new international arrangement. For many years, it seemed that coups were becoming less common, in large part because plotters faced significant costs for violating norms. Now, however, the calculations have changed. Overthrowing a government may still shatter relations with the West, but the new regimes can find support in Beijing and Moscow. Further development of the axis would bring even greater tumult. So far, most collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has been bilateral. Trilateral and quadrilateral action could expand their capacity for disruption. Countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all of which chafe against the U.S.-led, Western-dominated system—could also begin working more closely with the axis. If the group grows in size and tightens its coordination, the United States and its allies will have a more difficult time defending the recognized order. TAKING ON THE REVISIONISTS For now, U.S. national security strategy ranks China as a higher priority than Iran, North Korea, or even Russia. That assessment is strategically sound when considering the threat that individual countries pose to the United States, but it does not fully account for the cooperation among them. U.S. policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should undercut the axis’s appeal by sharpening the attractions of the existing order. If the United States is to counter an increasingly coordinated axis, it cannot treat each threat as an isolated phenomenon. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe, for example, in order to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. It is already clear that Russia’s success in Ukraine benefits a revisionist China by showing that it is possible, if costly, to thwart a united Western effort. Even as Washington rightly sees China as its top priority, addressing the challenge from Beijing will require competing with other members of the axis in other parts of the world. To be effective, the United States will need to devote additional resources to national security, engage in more vigorous diplomacy, develop new and stronger partnerships, and take a more activist role in the world than it has of late. Driving wedges between members of the axis, on the other hand, will not work. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some strategists suggested that the United States align itself with Russia to balance China. After the war began, a few held out hope that the United States could join China in an anti-Russian coalition. But unlike President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s, which took advantage of a Sino-Soviet split to draw Beijing further away from Moscow, there is no equivalent ideological or geopolitical rivalry for Washington to exploit today. The price of trying would likely involve U.S. recognition of a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence in Europe and Asia—regions central to U.S. interests and ones that Washington should not allow a hostile foreign power to dominate. Breaking Iran or North Korea off from the rest of the axis would be even more difficult, given their governments’ revisionist, even revolutionary aims. Ultimately, the axis is a problem the United States must manage, not one it can solve with grand strategic gestures. Neither the West nor the axis will become wholly distinct political, military, and economic blocs. Each coalition will compete for influence all over the world, trying to draw vital countries closer to its side. Six “global swing states” will be particularly important: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey are all middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order. These six countries—and others, too—can be expected to pursue economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ties with members of both orders. U.S. policymakers should make it a priority to deny advantages to the axis in these countries, encouraging their governments to choose policies that favor the prevailing order. In practice, that means using trade incentives, military engagement, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent swing states from hosting axis members’ military bases, giving axis members access to their technology infrastructure or military equipment, or helping them circumvent Western sanctions. Although competition with the axis may be inevitable, the United States must try to avoid direct conflict with any of its members. To that end, Washington should reaffirm its security commitments to bolster deterrence in the western Pacific, in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States and its allies should also prepare for opportunistic aggression. If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompts U.S. military intervention, for instance, Russia may be tempted to move against another European country, and Iran or North Korea could escalate threats in their regions. Even if the axis members do not coordinate their aggression directly, concurrent conflicts could overwhelm the West. Washington will therefore need to press allies to invest in capabilities that the United States could not provide if it were already engaged in another military theater. Confronting the axis will be expensive. A new strategy will require the United States to bolster its spending on defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic communications. Washington must direct aid to the frontlines of conflict between the axis and the West—including assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, all of which face encroachment by axis members. Revisionists are emboldened by the sense that political divisions at home or exhaustion with international engagement will keep the United States on the sidelines of this competition; a comprehensive, well-resourced U.S. strategy with bipartisan support would help counter that impression. The alternative—a reduction in the U.S. global presence—would leave the fate of crucial regions in the hands not of friendly local powers but of axis members seeking to impose their revisionist and illiberal preferences. THE FOUR-POWER THREAT There is a tendency to downplay the significance of growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. By turning to Beijing, this argument goes, Moscow merely signals its acceptance of the role of junior partner. Obtaining drones from Iran and munitions from North Korea demonstrates the desperation of a Russian war machine that incorrectly assumed that conquering Ukraine would be easy. China’s embrace of Russia shows only that Beijing could not achieve the positive relationship it originally sought with Europe and other Western powers. North Korea remains the world’s most isolated country, and Iran’s disruptive activities have backfired, strengthening regional cooperation among Israel, the United States, and Gulf countries. Such analysis ignores the severity of the threat. Four powers, growing in strength and coordination, are united in their opposition to the prevailing world order and its U.S. leadership. Their combined economic and military capacity, together with their determination to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War, make for a dangerous mix. This is a group bent on upheaval, and the United States and its partners must treat the axis as the generational challenge it is. They must reinforce the foundations of the international order and push back against those who act most vigorously to undermine it. It is likely impossible to arrest the emergence of this new axis, but keeping it from upending the current system is an achievable goal. The West has everything it needs to triumph in this contest. Its combined economy is far larger, its militaries are significantly more powerful, its geography is more advantageous, its values are more attractive, and its democratic system is more stable. The United States and its partners should be confident in their own strengths, even as they appreciate the scale of effort necessary to compete with this budding anti-Western coalition. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:43:10 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Capta]
[#33]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Prime: Not my favorite source, but the info is what it is. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GMAsDo0XwAE9oEG?format=jpg&name=large
True, but in that case how would the remaining Russian armored vehicle fleet and another 500,000 men make it to the front to be destroyed? Think about it. 😀 
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:46:21 PM EDT
[#34]
Georgia.
https://jam-news.net/georgian-ngos-against-foreign-agents-law/ |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:52:04 PM EDT
[#35]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Prime: TLDR, but this looks like it shouldn’ve been the first post of this thread The Axis of Upheaval How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine May/June 2024 Published on April 23, 2024 In the early morning of January 2, Russian forces launched a massive missile attack on the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv that killed at least five civilians, injured more than 100, and damaged infrastructure. The incident was notable not just for the harm it caused but also because it showed that Russia was not alone in its fight. The Russian attack that day was carried out with weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran. Over the past two years, all three countries have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine. Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Moscow has deployed more than 3,700 Iranian-designed drones. Russia now produces at least 330 on its own each month and is collaborating with Iran on plans to build a new drone factory inside Russia that will boost these numbers. North Korea has sent Russia ballistic missiles and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, just as Ukrainian stockpiles have dwindled. China, for its part, has become Russia’s most important lifeline. Beijing has ramped up its purchase of Russian oil and gas, putting billions of dollars into Moscow’s coffers. Just as significantly, China provides vast amounts of warfighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar- and communications-jamming equipment and jet-fighter parts. Customs records show that despite Western trade sanctions, Russia’s imports of computer chips and chip components have been steadily rising toward prewar levels. More than half of these goods come from China. The support from China, Iran, and North Korea has strengthened Russia’s position on the battlefield, undermined Western attempts to isolate Moscow, and harmed Ukraine. This collaboration, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Cooperation among the four countries was expanding before 2022, but the war has accelerated their deepening economic, military, political, and technological ties. The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval—a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape. The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance. It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system. When these four countries cooperate, their actions have far greater effect than the sum of their individual efforts. Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to enforce global rules. Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States. Too many Western observers have been quick to dismiss the implications of coordination among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The four countries have their differences, to be sure, and a history of distrust and contemporary fissures may limit how close their relationships will grow. Yet their shared aim of weakening the United States and its leadership role provides a strong adhesive. In places across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the ambitions of axis members have already proved to be destabilizing. Managing the disruptive effects of their further coordination and preventing the axis from upsetting the global system must now be central objectives of U.S. foreign policy. THE ANTI-WESTERN CLUB Collaboration among axis members is not new. China and Russia have been strengthening their partnership since the end of the Cold War—a trend that accelerated rapidly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. China’s share of Russian external trade doubled from ten to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021, and between 2018 and 2022 Russia supplied a combined total of 83 percent of China’s arms imports. Russian technology has helped the Chinese military enhance its air defense, antiship, and submarine capabilities, making China a more formidable force in a potential naval conflict. Beijing and Moscow have also expressed a shared vision. In early 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint manifesto pledging a “no limits” partnership between their two countries and calling for “international relations of a new type”—in other words, a multipolar system that is no longer dominated by the United States. Iran has strengthened its ties with other axis members as well. Iran and Russia worked together to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power after the onset of civil war in 2011. Joining Russia’s efforts, which include major energy agreements with Iran to shield Tehran from the effects of U.S. sanctions, China has purchased large quantities of Iranian oil since 2020. North Korea, for its part, has counted China as its primary ally and trade partner for decades, and North Korea and Russia have maintained warm, if not particularly substantive, ties. Iran has purchased North Korean missiles since the 1980s, and more recently, North Korea is thought to have supplied weapons to Iranian proxy groups, including Hezbollah and possibly Hamas. Pyongyang and Tehran have also bonded over a shared aversion to Washington: as a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, declared during a ten-day trip to Iran in 2017, the two countries “have a common enemy.” But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened the convergence among these four countries in ways that transcend their historical ties. Moscow has been among Tehran’s top suppliers of weapons over the past two decades and is now its largest source of foreign investment; Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent in the first ten months of 2022. Over the past two years, according to the White House, Russia has been sharing more intelligence with and providing more weapons to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, and Moscow has defended those proxies in debates at the UN Security Council. Last year, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of crude oil and trade between the two countries topped $240 billion, a record high. Moscow has also released millions of dollars in North Korean assets that previously sat frozen in Russian banks in compliance with Security Council sanctions. China, Iran, and Russia have held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman three years in a row, most recently in March 2024. Russia has also proposed trilateral naval drills with China and North Korea. The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each country claims a sphere of influence: China’s “core interests,” which extend to Taiwan and the South China Sea; Iran’s “axis of resistance,” the set of proxy groups that give Tehran leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; North Korea’s claim to the entire Korean Peninsula; and Russia’s “near abroad,” which for the Kremlin includes, at a minimum, the countries that composed its historic empire. All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing these spheres of influence, and they want Washington’s presence in their respective regions reduced. All reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West’s championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and foment domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define democracy for themselves. In the end, although they may make temporary accommodations with the United States, they do not believe that the West will accept their rise (or return) to power on the world stage. They oppose external meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances, the stationing of American nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of coercive sanctions. Any positive vision for the future, however, is more elusive. Yet history shows that a positive agenda may not be necessary for a group of discontented powers to cause disruption. The 1940 Tripartite Pact uniting Germany, Italy, and Japan—the original “Axis”—pledged to “establish and maintain a new order of things” in which each country would claim “its own proper place.” They did not succeed, but World War II certainly brought global upheaval. The axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The countries’ shared opposition to the present order’s core tenets and their determination to bring about change form a powerful basis for collaborative action. Fissures do exist among members of the axis. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia, for instance, while Iran and Russia compete for oil markets in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The four countries have complicated histories with each other, too. The Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941; Russia and China settled their long-standing border dispute only in 2004 and had both previously supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear programs and to isolate North Korea. Today, China may look askance at North Korea’s deepening relationship with Russia, worrying that an emboldened Kim Jong Un will aggravate tensions in Northeast Asia and draw in a larger U.S. military presence, which China does not want. Yet their differences are insufficient to dissolve the bonds forged by their common resistance to a Western-dominated world. CATALYST IN THE KREMLIN Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The invasion of Ukraine marked a point of no return in Putin’s long-standing crusade against the West. Putin has grown more committed to destroying not only Ukraine but also the global order. And he has doubled down on relationships with like-minded countries to accomplish his aims. Cut off from Western trade, investment, and technology since the start of the war, Moscow has had little choice but to rely on its partners to sustain its hostilities. The ammunition, drones, microchips, and other forms of aid that axis members have sent have been of great help to Russia. But the more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are taking advantage of their leverage over Moscow to expand their military capabilities and economic options. Even before the Russian invasion, Moscow’s military assistance to Beijing was eroding the United States’ military advantage over China. Russia has provided ever more sophisticated weapons to China, and the two countries’ joint military exercises have grown in scope and frequency. Russian officers who have fought in Syria and in Ukraine’s Donbas region have shared valuable lessons with Chinese personnel, helping the People’s Liberation Army make up for its lack of operational experience—a notable weakness relative to more seasoned U.S. forces. China’s military modernization has reduced the urgency of deepening defense cooperation with Russia, but the two countries are likely to proceed with technology transfers and joint weapons development and production. In February, for instance, Russian officials confirmed that they were working with Chinese counterparts on military applications of artificial intelligence. Moscow retains an edge over Beijing in other key areas, including submarine technology, remote sensing satellites, and aircraft engines. If China can pressure a more dependent Russia to provide additional advanced technologies, the transfer could further undermine the United States’ advantages. A similar dynamic is playing out in Russia’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Moscow and Tehran have forged what the Biden administration has called an “unprecedented defense partnership” that upgrades Iranian military capabilities. Russia has provided Iran with advanced aircraft, air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber-capabilities that would help Tehran resist a potential U.S. or Israeli military operation. And in return for North Korea’s ammunition and other military support to Russia, Pyongyang is reportedly seeking advanced space, missile, and submarine technology from Moscow. If Russia were to comply with those requests, North Korea would be able to improve the accuracy and survivability of its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and use Russian nuclear propulsion technology to expand the range and capability of its submarines. Already, Russia’s testing of North Korean weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has supplied Pyongyang with information it can use to refine its missile program, and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea launch a military spy satellite in November after two previous failures last year. Strong relations among the four axis countries have emboldened leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran. Kim, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, indulged in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, and expressed a lack of any interest in talks with the United States. And although there does not appear to be a direct connection between their deepening partnership and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, growing support from Russia likely made Iran more willing to activate its regional proxies in the aftermath. The coordinated diplomacy and pressure from Russia and the West that brought Iran into the 2015 nuclear deal are now a distant memory. Today, Moscow and Beijing are helping Tehran resist Western coercion, making it easier for Iran to enrich uranium and reject Washington’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement. AMERICA UNDERMINED Collaboration among the axis members also reduces the potency of tools that Washington and its partners often use to confront them. In the most glaring example, since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has supplied Russia with semiconductors and other essential technologies that Russia previously imported from the West, undercutting the efficacy of Western export controls. All four countries are also working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar. The share of Russia’s imports invoiced in Chinese renminbi jumped from three percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2022. And in December 2023, Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct bilateral trade in their local currencies. By moving their economic transactions out of reach of U.S. enforcement measures, axis members undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions, as well as anticorruption and anti-money-laundering efforts. Taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia can build trade and transportation networks safe from U.S. interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones and other weapons to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the United States has little power to stop transfers. If the United States were engaged in conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing could seek support from Moscow. Russia might increase its overland exports of oil and gas to its southern neighbor, reducing China’s dependence on maritime energy imports that U.S. forces could block during a conflict. Russia’s defense industrial base, now in overdrive to supply weapons for Russian troops in Ukraine, could later pivot to sustain a Chinese war effort. Such cooperation would increase the odds of China’s prevailing over the American military and help advance Russia’s goal of diminishing the United States’ geopolitical influence. The axis is also hindering Washington’s ability to rally international coalitions that can stand against its members’ destabilizing actions. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, made it far easier for countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to do the same. And Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. Last year, they elevated Iran from observer to member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a predominantly Asian regional body, and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS—a group that China and Russia view as a counterweight to the West. Iran’s regional meddling and nuclear pursuits have made other countries wary of dealing with its government, but its participation in international forums enhances the regime’s legitimacy and presents it with opportunities to expand trade with fellow member states. Parallel efforts by axis members in the information domain further weaken international support for U.S. positions. China, Iran, and North Korea either defended or avoided explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they all parroted the Kremlin in accusing NATO of inciting the war. Their response to Hamas’s attacks on Israel last October followed a similar pattern. Iran used the state media and social media accounts to express support for Hamas, vilify Israel, and denounce the United States for enabling Israel’s military response, while the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese media sharply criticized the United States’ enduring support for Israel. They used the war in Gaza to portray Washington as a destabilizing, domineering force in the world—a narrative that is particularly resonant in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even if axis members do not overtly coordinate their messages, they push the same themes, and the repetition makes them appear more credible and persuasive. AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER? Global orders magnify the strength of the powerful states that lead them. The United States, for instance, has invested in the liberal international order it helped create because this order reflects American preferences and extends U.S. influence. As long as an order remains sufficiently beneficial to most members, a core group of states will defend it. Dissenting countries, meanwhile, are bound by a collective action problem. If they were to defect en masse, they could succeed in creating an alternative order more to their liking. But without a core cluster of powerful states around which they can coalesce, the advantage remains with the existing order. For decades, threats to the U.S.-led order were limited to a handful of rogue states with little power to upend it. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the restructuring of interstate relations it prompted have lifted the constraint on collective action. The axis of upheaval represents a new center of gravity, a group that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. The axis is ushering in an international system characterized by two orders that are becoming increasingly organized and competitive. Historically, competing orders have invited conflict, especially at the geographical seams between them. Wars arise from specific conditions, such as a territorial dispute, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to the survival of a regime. But the likelihood that any of those conditions will lead to war increases in the presence of dueling orders. Some political science researchers have found that periods in which a single order prevailed—the balance-of-power system maintained by the Concert of Europe for much of the nineteenth century, for example, or the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War era—were less prone to conflicts than those characterized by more than one order, such as the multipolar period between the two world wars and the bipolar system of the Cold War. The world has gotten a preview of the instability this new era of competing orders will bring, with potential aggressors empowered by the axis’s normalization of alternative rules and less afraid of being isolated if they act out. Already, Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens to engulf the wider Middle East in war. Last October, Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo in 2023, too, and Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana in December. Although internal conditions precipitated the coups in Myanmar and across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, the rising incidence of such revolts is connected to the new international arrangement. For many years, it seemed that coups were becoming less common, in large part because plotters faced significant costs for violating norms. Now, however, the calculations have changed. Overthrowing a government may still shatter relations with the West, but the new regimes can find support in Beijing and Moscow. Further development of the axis would bring even greater tumult. So far, most collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has been bilateral. Trilateral and quadrilateral action could expand their capacity for disruption. Countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all of which chafe against the U.S.-led, Western-dominated system—could also begin working more closely with the axis. If the group grows in size and tightens its coordination, the United States and its allies will have a more difficult time defending the recognized order. TAKING ON THE REVISIONISTS For now, U.S. national security strategy ranks China as a higher priority than Iran, North Korea, or even Russia. That assessment is strategically sound when considering the threat that individual countries pose to the United States, but it does not fully account for the cooperation among them. U.S. policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should undercut the axis’s appeal by sharpening the attractions of the existing order. If the United States is to counter an increasingly coordinated axis, it cannot treat each threat as an isolated phenomenon. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe, for example, in order to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. It is already clear that Russia’s success in Ukraine benefits a revisionist China by showing that it is possible, if costly, to thwart a united Western effort. Even as Washington rightly sees China as its top priority, addressing the challenge from Beijing will require competing with other members of the axis in other parts of the world. To be effective, the United States will need to devote additional resources to national security, engage in more vigorous diplomacy, develop new and stronger partnerships, and take a more activist role in the world than it has of late. Driving wedges between members of the axis, on the other hand, will not work. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some strategists suggested that the United States align itself with Russia to balance China. After the war began, a few held out hope that the United States could join China in an anti-Russian coalition. But unlike President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s, which took advantage of a Sino-Soviet split to draw Beijing further away from Moscow, there is no equivalent ideological or geopolitical rivalry for Washington to exploit today. The price of trying would likely involve U.S. recognition of a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence in Europe and Asia—regions central to U.S. interests and ones that Washington should not allow a hostile foreign power to dominate. Breaking Iran or North Korea off from the rest of the axis would be even more difficult, given their governments’ revisionist, even revolutionary aims. Ultimately, the axis is a problem the United States must manage, not one it can solve with grand strategic gestures. Neither the West nor the axis will become wholly distinct political, military, and economic blocs. Each coalition will compete for influence all over the world, trying to draw vital countries closer to its side. Six “global swing states” will be particularly important: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey are all middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order. These six countries—and others, too—can be expected to pursue economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ties with members of both orders. U.S. policymakers should make it a priority to deny advantages to the axis in these countries, encouraging their governments to choose policies that favor the prevailing order. In practice, that means using trade incentives, military engagement, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent swing states from hosting axis members’ military bases, giving axis members access to their technology infrastructure or military equipment, or helping them circumvent Western sanctions. Although competition with the axis may be inevitable, the United States must try to avoid direct conflict with any of its members. To that end, Washington should reaffirm its security commitments to bolster deterrence in the western Pacific, in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States and its allies should also prepare for opportunistic aggression. If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompts U.S. military intervention, for instance, Russia may be tempted to move against another European country, and Iran or North Korea could escalate threats in their regions. Even if the axis members do not coordinate their aggression directly, concurrent conflicts could overwhelm the West. Washington will therefore need to press allies to invest in capabilities that the United States could not provide if it were already engaged in another military theater. Confronting the axis will be expensive. A new strategy will require the United States to bolster its spending on defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic communications. Washington must direct aid to the frontlines of conflict between the axis and the West—including assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, all of which face encroachment by axis members. Revisionists are emboldened by the sense that political divisions at home or exhaustion with international engagement will keep the United States on the sidelines of this competition; a comprehensive, well-resourced U.S. strategy with bipartisan support would help counter that impression. The alternative—a reduction in the U.S. global presence—would leave the fate of crucial regions in the hands not of friendly local powers but of axis members seeking to impose their revisionist and illiberal preferences. THE FOUR-POWER THREAT There is a tendency to downplay the significance of growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. By turning to Beijing, this argument goes, Moscow merely signals its acceptance of the role of junior partner. Obtaining drones from Iran and munitions from North Korea demonstrates the desperation of a Russian war machine that incorrectly assumed that conquering Ukraine would be easy. China’s embrace of Russia shows only that Beijing could not achieve the positive relationship it originally sought with Europe and other Western powers. North Korea remains the world’s most isolated country, and Iran’s disruptive activities have backfired, strengthening regional cooperation among Israel, the United States, and Gulf countries. Such analysis ignores the severity of the threat. Four powers, growing in strength and coordination, are united in their opposition to the prevailing world order and its U.S. leadership. Their combined economic and military capacity, together with their determination to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War, make for a dangerous mix. This is a group bent on upheaval, and the United States and its partners must treat the axis as the generational challenge it is. They must reinforce the foundations of the international order and push back against those who act most vigorously to undermine it. It is likely impossible to arrest the emergence of this new axis, but keeping it from upending the current system is an achievable goal. The West has everything it needs to triumph in this contest. Its combined economy is far larger, its militaries are significantly more powerful, its geography is more advantageous, its values are more attractive, and its democratic system is more stable. The United States and its partners should be confident in their own strengths, even as they appreciate the scale of effort necessary to compete with this budding anti-Western coalition. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine It can be. Leave the OP, move your second post to the current page, and drop it in there. Or tack it on to the end of the OP. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:56:59 PM EDT
[#36]
 Ukrainian-made 155 howitzer Bohdana Hit Russian Weapons Depots, Infantry Positions, and Mortar Crews |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 7:59:18 PM EDT
[#37]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Prime: Georgia. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GMG69diWgAAkcMt?format=jpg&name=large
https://pbs.twimg.com/card_img/1783773850766876672/N2Nny_ce?format=jpg&name=small
https://jam-news.net/georgian-ngos-against-foreign-agents-law/ Getting time for the Georgian Legion to head home with some parting gifts. 
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Posted: 4/26/2024 8:11:53 PM EDT
[Last Edit: 4xGM300m]
[#38]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By ITCHY-FINGER: What is it? An actual MG42? Seems to be running like a top. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By ITCHY-FINGER: Originally Posted By 4xGM300m: Not a MG3 but dirty as fuck, it's barely working. What is it? An actual MG42? Seems to be running like a top. Likely an ex Italian MG42/59. ROF is slow, you can hear the single shots instead of a ripping sound. When this happens, it wont take long until it's starts jamming. ETA: But too fast for the italian heavy bolt assembly. With this bolt assembly it would sound like a M-60. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 8:24:42 PM EDT
[#39]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By ITCHY-FINGER: Hopefully that keeps all the gore inside post detonation and makes cleanup easier. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By ITCHY-FINGER: Originally Posted By 4xGM300m: https://i.imgur.com/h2oJOJR.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/mIgFNy8.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/QSmpcYO.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/t6xvbv2.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/VXWUpL1.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/iXxZkEQ.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/AdcF8lq.jpeg https://i.imgur.com/H1Whlyq.jpeg More from the Mad Ivan design departement. Hopefully that keeps all the gore inside post detonation and makes cleanup easier. Yeah I was going to say, equal parts drone catcher and giblet catcher. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 8:33:33 PM EDT
[#40]
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Posted: 4/26/2024 8:38:48 PM EDT
[#41]
ISW assessment for April 26th.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2024 |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 9:04:32 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#42]
‼️🚀Preliminarily, the launches of X-101/555 missiles from Stratavia (Tu-95ms) took place.
Missiles are expected near the borders of Ukraine: ~04:40 - 05:20. https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87221 🔴 03:43 Air alarm in Chernihiv region 🔴 03:43 Air alarm in Sumy region 🔴 03:44 Air alarm in m. Kyiv 🔴 03:44 Air alarm in Poltava 🔴 03:44 Air alarm in Zaporizhzhia region 🔴 03:44 Air alarm in Kirovohrad region 🔴 03:45 Air alarm in Kyiv region 🔴 03:45 Air alarm in Dnipropetrovsk region 🔴 03:45 Air alarm in Cherkasy region 🔴 03:45 Air alarm in Zhytomyr region 🔴 03:45 Air alarm in Vinnytsia region 🔴 03:45 Air alarm in Kharkiv region 🔴 03:45 Air alarm in Donetsk region https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87222 Х-59/69🚀→Chernihiv https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87226 More X-59/69🚀→Sumi/region https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87227 ⚠️🚀Current trajectory of rockets: 1. Sumshchyna → Chernihiv region. 2. Chernihiv region→Kyiv region. https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87228 🔴 03:57 Air alarm in Ivano-Frankivsk region 🔴 03:58 Air alarm in Transcarpathian region 🔴 03:58 Air alarm in Ternopil region 🔴 03:58 Air alarm in Chernivtsi region 🔴 03:58 Air alarm in Khmelnytskyi region 🔴 03:58 Air alarm in Rivne region 🔴 03:58 Air alarm in Lviv region 🔴 03:58 Air alarm in Volyn region https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87229 Rocket in the north of Kyiv region in the western direction. https://t.me/kpszsu/13631 📡The first rocket that flew over half of Ukraine - entered the Mykolaiv region. A group of missiles (probably X-59) in Dnipropetrovsk region. And a few more new groups in Sumy Oblast heading for Chernihiv. https://t.me/eRadarrua/16167 ‼️✈️3 Tu-22M3 in the Black Sea. Threat of launch of "X-22" missiles. https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87239 ‼️✈️+Tactical aviation in the south. The threat of launching the "X-59" 🚀 https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87241 ⚠️🚀Current trajectory of rockets: 1. Kyiv region→Zhytomyr region. 2. Dnipropetrovsk → Dnipro. 3. Mykolaiv region → Kryvyi Rih. 4. Kherson region→Kryvyi Rih. https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87263 💥Dnipro/district - explosions again https://t.me/povitryanatrivogaaa/87264 Cruise missiles in Zhytomyr Oblast, heading south-west. https://t.me/kpszsu/13648 ❗️killers during the massive missile attack were used: ▪️ Kh-101 cruise missiles launched by Tu-95; ▪️ Kh-47M2 "Dagger" aeroballistic hypersonic missiles. S-300 ballistic missiles. ▪️ guided air missiles of various types (X-59). ▪️ Kalibr cruise missiles. The vast majority of attacks took place on critical infrastructure facilities. Thanks to the air defense forces. https://t.me/zsuwar/45301 ❗️A large-scale air alert has been declared throughout Ukraine. Strategic aviation strikes enemy targets with cruise missiles. Caliber missiles were fired from the Black Sea. Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 carry out attacks with Kh-101/555 and Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, respectively, and Mig-31K uses Daggers. At night, explosions were heard in the Ivano-Frankivsk region. The enemy claims that Kinzhal missiles attacked the city of Burshtyn, where the thermal power plant of the same name is located. The Krivoy Rog thermal power plant and other facilities were also attacked. Explosions were recorded in Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoy Rog, in the Zhytomyr and Ternopil regions, as well as in the Stryisky district. Military Informant https://t.me/milinfolive/121148 |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 9:11:58 PM EDT
[#43]
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Posted: 4/26/2024 9:30:09 PM EDT
[#44]
Ferries for Crimea, a company in Hong Kong, a pocket German denomination and 2 billion “in the interests of the state” for Timur Ivanov
Part 1 Deputy Minister of Defense Timur Ivanov could have gone to jail many times over a long time ago. As the Cheka-OGPU found out, in the archives of the Investigative Committee there are cases where there are testimonies against him and all the evidence. Today we will talk about one such very interesting criminal case that has gathered dust in the Investigative Committee, from which high-ranking patrons in the person of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Deputy Minister Ruslan Tsalikov got Timur Ivanov off. According to the materials we have, the persons involved in the investigation into the theft of money from Interkommerts Bank gave direct testimony against the then general director of Oboronstroy JSC Timur Ivanov. It was established that the future deputy minister was in cahoots with the fugitive chairman of the bank’s board, Alexander Bugaevsky. They acted under the pretext that they were circumventing international sanctions “in the interests of the country,” and then withdrew almost 2 billion rubles from the bank, dissolving them through Timur Ivanov’s companies. The events begin in 2014 - the first half of 2015, when international sanctions fell on the Russian Federation. As a result, the Ministry of Defense was unable to purchase the necessary ships for crossing the Kerch Strait. Timur Ivanov was assigned to resolve the issue. Since no one gave money in advance for the project, the general director of Oboronstroy JSC applied for a loan to the chairman of the board of Interkommerts Bank, Alexander Bugaevsky. Timur Ivanov arrived personally for negotiations with the bank’s management in the company of his deputy Larisa Levina. Even then, Alexander Bugaevsky introduced the guest to his colleagues as a high-ranking official who could not be refused, since most of the subsidiaries of Oboronstroy, which acted in the interests of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, are under his control and keep large sums on deposits and accounts in the bank. And most importantly, based on the testimony, this was also voiced publicly; the request to assist in the purchase of ships came from Deputy Minister of Defense Ruslan Tsalikov, whose confidant is Timur Ivanov. At the direction of Timur Ivanov, the general director joined the already listed officials and bankers and was appointed executive Oboronlogistics LLC Anton Filatov. The purchase, delivery and operation of ferries under the flag of the Russian Federation (at the Kerch ferry) was on it. The diagram looked like this. Alexander Bugaevsky found among the clients of Interkommerts a company whose management, in exchange for future victories in tenders of the Ministry of Defense, agreed to participate in a deal to purchase ships. The company was provided with a targeted loan for the purchase of goods in the interests of JSC “1470 Logistics and Technical Support Department”. The general director of the latter company was Anton Filatov, who subsequently organized the tender and ensured the victory of the participating company. Alexander Bugaevsky organized the acquisition of a “clean” company registered in Hong Kong - “Tourinvest Services Limited”. The transaction amount was 800 million rubles, and all obstacles (questions from the Central Bank, the Federal Tax Service) were cleared out of the way by a call from Ruslan Tsalikov. To be continued https://t.me/vchkogpu/47835 Ships for Crimea, a company in Hong Kong, a pocket German denomination and 2 billion “in the interests of the state” for Timur Ivanov Part 2 As a result, the company found by Alexander Bugaevsky received a loan from Interkommerts. The money was transferred through two payment companies: one in Kaliningrad, the other abroad, and the latter “poured” funds into the Turinvest account. Both “gaskets” were controlled by the then chairman of the board of directors, Andrei Maysyuk. As a result, in the summer of 2015, the deal took place and two ships, Lavrentios and Maria, were delivered to the Black Sea and were subsequently transferred to the ownership of Oboronlogistics. Full payment (including the loan) was made in December 2015. Everyone was happy with the successful deal - “Lavrenty” and “Maria” are still sailing. Timur Ivanov completed the responsible task. But for some reason the then head of Oboronstroy did not even think about sending the exposed companies to scrap. Data about Turinvest was even available in the Rosmorrechflot register - for those same two ferries, a foreign company was issued permission to transport goods and passengers between the seaports of Kavkaz and Kerch. Even despite such “exposure”, the company replaced one denomination with another. An interesting detail: later, during the investigation, the new director explained that he was paid 20 thousand rubles for these frauds, but in fact the company’s activities were managed by Anton Filatov. The same head of Oboronlogistics, who only carried out the orders of Timur Ivanov, and later became one of the scapegoats in this case. Thus, Turinvest remained in the hands of Timur Ivanov, and, as it turned out, not in vain. A few days before Interkommerts’ license was revoked in January 2016, the recent partners in the purchase of ships played a farewell chord. Under the guise of buying and selling foreign currency, the bank transferred more than 25 million euros to Turinvest, which at that time was equivalent to approximately 2 billion rubles. Turinvest's obligations to Interkommerts Bank were not secured by anything. The money sank into oblivion and was split between the “partners.” In total, Alexander Bugaevsky, who managed to leave the country without waiting for arrest, transferred about 25 million euros in those days under fictitious agreements. More than half of which were received by a company purchased on the instructions and headed by a person controlled by Timur Ivanov. https://t.me/vchkogpu/47836 |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 9:38:09 PM EDT
[#45]
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LA, USA
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Posted: 4/26/2024 9:48:31 PM EDT
[#46]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By AlmightyTallest: NSFW.
The really need to adopt the tactic to let one survive to spread the story and infect fear in the ranks. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 9:59:44 PM EDT
[#47]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Kuhndog: The really need to adopt the tactic to let one survive to spread the story and infect fear in the ranks. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Kuhndog: Originally Posted By AlmightyTallest: NSFW.
The really need to adopt the tactic to let one survive to spread the story and infect fear in the ranks. They usually just walk into the area later and film all their own dead, you would think that would be enough. |
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LA, USA
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Posted: 4/26/2024 10:44:57 PM EDT
[#48]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By AlmightyTallest: They usually just walk into the area later and film all their own dead, you would think that would be enough. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By AlmightyTallest: Originally Posted By Kuhndog: Originally Posted By AlmightyTallest: NSFW.
The really need to adopt the tactic to let one survive to spread the story and infect fear in the ranks. They usually just walk into the area later and film all their own dead, you would think that would be enough. True. The video is frightening for anyone thinking of being near the theater of operations |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 10:45:10 PM EDT
[#49]
 Taras Kuzio - Russia’s Orthodox Church is Complicit in Crimes of Genocide, Abduction and Persecution “Battle Lines” podcast by The Telegraph covers non-Ukraine conflicts, primarily Israel/Gaza but the second half of this one covers the growing protests in Georgia.  Could protests in Georgia turn violent? I Battle Lines, Podcast Link for Central Asia and South Caucasus Bulletin News Blog. Added to Page 1 sources. |
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Posted: 4/26/2024 11:26:24 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
[#50]
The distillation column on the territory of the plant in Slavyansk-on-Kuban was damaged due to a UAV attack, the fire was extinguished, there were no casualties, local authorities report
https://t.me/rian_ru/243160 Residents of the Krasnodar region report the sounds of explosions. According to preliminary data, at about four in the morning, 9 drones were shot down over Slavyansk-on-Kuban. After the drone attack, a fire started in the area of the bitumen plant. There is no official information yet. UPD. The head of the Krasnodar region, Veniamin Kondratyev, said that more than 10 drones were suppressed in the region in the Slavyansky, Seversky and Kushchevsky districts. Drones tried to attack oil refineries and infrastructure. There were no casualties or serious damage. Operational services are extinguishing fires caused by a UAV crash. https://t.me/bazabazon/27362 Krasnodar Governor Tonight, the Kiev regime attempted a large-scale terrorist attack on targets in the Krasnodar region using unmanned aerial vehicles. I am grateful to our armed forces for repelling the attack and destroying the UAV. According to information at the moment, more than 10 drones have been suppressed in the Slavyansky, Seversky and Kushchevsky districts. They tried to attack oil refineries and infrastructure facilities. As reported from the field, there were no casualties or serious damage. Operational services are extinguishing fires caused by a UAV crash. https://t.me/kondratyevvi/7088 In the Seversky district of the Krasnodar Territory, the Ilsky oil refinery plant was attacked, local residents report to ASTRA. After the UAV attack, a fire broke out at the plant; it is almost extinguished, residents say. https://t.me/astrapress/54149 During the night drone attack on the Krasnodar Territory, strikes were made on the Slayavnsk-EKO oil refinery, a bitumen plant, the Ilsky oil refinery and a number of other facilities. https://t.me/vchkogpu/47850 |
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