First off, tremendous props to LoBrau, who saw Ukraine coming well in advance and started a record setting thread. May that record stand forever, because nothing would please us more than for there to no longer be anything to talk about.

What has become evident since February of 2022 is that there is a global reshuffling taking place, with three primary players behind most of the conflict in the world today. Discussion of current geopolitics cannot be constrained to one country or conflict.

What this thread is:
News and discussion related to political / military actions by Russia / Iran / China and their proxies, chief among those, North Korea.
News and discussion of the relationships between Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
News and discussion of responses to Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
Related Grey Zone / hybrid warfare / “competition short of war.”
Relevant or interesting technical discussion.
Relevant economic / social / historical discussion.
Reliable reporting from Russian / Iranian / Chinese sources.
Russian / Iranian / Chinese perspectives and factual evaluation thereof.
Political topics in the US and / or elsewhere which bear directly on these issues, including the politics of foreign aid.
Current focus is on the Russian war against and in Ukraine, however this could change if the Ukraine war cooled off and Taiwan heated up.  Related topics are always allowed.
Secondary but related topics like Wagner in Africa, uprising in Georgia, or a Third Chechen War.
Reasonable tangents.

What this thread is not:
US and / or foreign political issues which do not directly bear on these topics, including campaigning / advocating for one party or candidate.

General rules:
Discussion is expected to be conducted in good faith and assertions of fact should be substantiated.
In case of a question on whether a subtopic or line of discussion is relevant to this thread, the following members should be considered co-owners with decision making authority- AlmightyTallest, Capta, and SaltwaterHillbilly.

The Axis of Upheaval
How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order
By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine
May/June 2024
Published on April 23, 2024

In the early morning of January 2, Russian forces launched a massive missile attack on the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv that killed at least five civilians, injured more than 100, and damaged infrastructure. The incident was notable not just for the harm it caused but also because it showed that Russia was not alone in its fight. The Russian attack that day was carried out with weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran. Over the past two years, all three countries have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Moscow has deployed more than 3,700 Iranian-designed drones. Russia now produces at least 330 on its own each month and is collaborating with Iran on plans to build a new drone factory inside Russia that will boost these numbers. North Korea has sent Russia ballistic missiles and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, just as Ukrainian stockpiles have dwindled. China, for its part, has become Russia’s most important lifeline. Beijing has ramped up its purchase of Russian oil and gas, putting billions of dollars into Moscow’s coffers. Just as significantly, China provides vast amounts of warfighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar- and communications-jamming equipment and jet-fighter parts. Customs records show that despite Western trade sanctions, Russia’s imports of computer chips and chip components have been steadily rising toward prewar levels. More than half of these goods come from China.

The support from China, Iran, and North Korea has strengthened Russia’s position on the battlefield, undermined Western attempts to isolate Moscow, and harmed Ukraine. This collaboration, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Cooperation among the four countries was expanding before 2022, but the war has accelerated their deepening economic, military, political, and technological ties. The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval—a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape.

The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance. It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system. When these four countries cooperate, their actions have far greater effect than the sum of their individual efforts. Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to enforce global rules. Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States.

Too many Western observers have been quick to dismiss the implications of coordination among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The four countries have their differences, to be sure, and a history of distrust and contemporary fissures may limit how close their relationships will grow. Yet their shared aim of weakening the United States and its leadership role provides a strong adhesive. In places across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the ambitions of axis members have already proved to be destabilizing. Managing the disruptive effects of their further coordination and preventing the axis from upsetting the global system must now be central objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

THE ANTI-WESTERN CLUB

Collaboration among axis members is not new. China and Russia have been strengthening their partnership since the end of the Cold War—a trend that accelerated rapidly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. China’s share of Russian external trade doubled from ten to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021, and between 2018 and 2022 Russia supplied a combined total of 83 percent of China’s arms imports. Russian technology has helped the Chinese military enhance its air defense, antiship, and submarine capabilities, making China a more formidable force in a potential naval conflict. Beijing and Moscow have also expressed a shared vision. In early 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint manifesto pledging a “no limits” partnership between their two countries and calling for “international relations of a new type”—in other words, a multipolar system that is no longer dominated by the United States.

Iran has strengthened its ties with other axis members as well. Iran and Russia worked together to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power after the onset of civil war in 2011. Joining Russia’s efforts, which include major energy agreements with Iran to shield Tehran from the effects of U.S. sanctions, China has purchased large quantities of Iranian oil since 2020. North Korea, for its part, has counted China as its primary ally and trade partner for decades, and North Korea and Russia have maintained warm, if not particularly substantive, ties. Iran has purchased North Korean missiles since the 1980s, and more recently, North Korea is thought to have supplied weapons to Iranian proxy groups, including Hezbollah and possibly Hamas. Pyongyang and Tehran have also bonded over a shared aversion to Washington: as a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, declared during a ten-day trip to Iran in 2017, the two countries “have a common enemy.”

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened the convergence among these four countries in ways that transcend their historical ties. Moscow has been among Tehran’s top suppliers of weapons over the past two decades and is now its largest source of foreign investment; Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent in the first ten months of 2022. Over the past two years, according to the White House, Russia has been sharing more intelligence with and providing more weapons to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, and Moscow has defended those proxies in debates at the UN Security Council. Last year, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of crude oil and trade between the two countries topped $240 billion, a record high. Moscow has also released millions of dollars in North Korean assets that previously sat frozen in Russian banks in compliance with Security Council sanctions. China, Iran, and Russia have held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman three years in a row, most recently in March 2024. Russia has also proposed trilateral naval drills with China and North Korea.

The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each country claims a sphere of influence: China’s “core interests,” which extend to Taiwan and the South China Sea; Iran’s “axis of resistance,” the set of proxy groups that give Tehran leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; North Korea’s claim to the entire Korean Peninsula; and Russia’s “near abroad,” which for the Kremlin includes, at a minimum, the countries that composed its historic empire. All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing these spheres of influence, and they want Washington’s presence in their respective regions reduced.

All reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West’s championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and foment domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define democracy for themselves. In the end, although they may make temporary accommodations with the United States, they do not believe that the West will accept their rise (or return) to power on the world stage. They oppose external meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances, the stationing of American nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of coercive sanctions.

Any positive vision for the future, however, is more elusive. Yet history shows that a positive agenda may not be necessary for a group of discontented powers to cause disruption. The 1940 Tripartite Pact uniting Germany, Italy, and Japan—the original “Axis”—pledged to “establish and maintain a new order of things” in which each country would claim “its own proper place.” They did not succeed, but World War II certainly brought global upheaval. The axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The countries’ shared opposition to the present order’s core tenets and their determination to bring about change form a powerful basis for collaborative action.

Fissures do exist among members of the axis. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia, for instance, while Iran and Russia compete for oil markets in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The four countries have complicated histories with each other, too. The Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941; Russia and China settled their long-standing border dispute only in 2004 and had both previously supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear programs and to isolate North Korea. Today, China may look askance at North Korea’s deepening relationship with Russia, worrying that an emboldened Kim Jong Un will aggravate tensions in Northeast Asia and draw in a larger U.S. military presence, which China does not want. Yet their differences are insufficient to dissolve the bonds forged by their common resistance to a Western-dominated world.

CATALYST IN THE KREMLIN

Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The invasion of Ukraine marked a point of no return in Putin’s long-standing crusade against the West. Putin has grown more committed to destroying not only Ukraine but also the global order. And he has doubled down on relationships with like-minded countries to accomplish his aims. Cut off from Western trade, investment, and technology since the start of the war, Moscow has had little choice but to rely on its partners to sustain its hostilities. The ammunition, drones, microchips, and other forms of aid that axis members have sent have been of great help to Russia. But the more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are taking advantage of their leverage over Moscow to expand their military capabilities and economic options.

Even before the Russian invasion, Moscow’s military assistance to Beijing was eroding the United States’ military advantage over China. Russia has provided ever more sophisticated weapons to China, and the two countries’ joint military exercises have grown in scope and frequency. Russian officers who have fought in Syria and in Ukraine’s Donbas region have shared valuable lessons with Chinese personnel, helping the People’s Liberation Army make up for its lack of operational experience—a notable weakness relative to more seasoned U.S. forces. China’s military modernization has reduced the urgency of deepening defense cooperation with Russia, but the two countries are likely to proceed with technology transfers and joint weapons development and production. In February, for instance, Russian officials confirmed that they were working with Chinese counterparts on military applications of artificial intelligence. Moscow retains an edge over Beijing in other key areas, including submarine technology, remote sensing satellites, and aircraft engines. If China can pressure a more dependent Russia to provide additional advanced technologies, the transfer could further undermine the United States’ advantages.

A similar dynamic is playing out in Russia’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Moscow and Tehran have forged what the Biden administration has called an “unprecedented defense partnership” that upgrades Iranian military capabilities. Russia has provided Iran with advanced aircraft, air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber-capabilities that would help Tehran resist a potential U.S. or Israeli military operation. And in return for North Korea’s ammunition and other military support to Russia, Pyongyang is reportedly seeking advanced space, missile, and submarine technology from Moscow. If Russia were to comply with those requests, North Korea would be able to improve the accuracy and survivability of its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and use Russian nuclear propulsion technology to expand the range and capability of its submarines. Already, Russia’s testing of North Korean weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has supplied Pyongyang with information it can use to refine its missile program, and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea launch a military spy satellite in November after two previous failures last year.

Strong relations among the four axis countries have emboldened leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran. Kim, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, indulged in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, and expressed a lack of any interest in talks with the United States. And although there does not appear to be a direct connection between their deepening partnership and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, growing support from Russia likely made Iran more willing to activate its regional proxies in the aftermath. The coordinated diplomacy and pressure from Russia and the West that brought Iran into the 2015 nuclear deal are now a distant memory. Today, Moscow and Beijing are helping Tehran resist Western coercion, making it easier for Iran to enrich uranium and reject Washington’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement.

AMERICA UNDERMINED

Collaboration among the axis members also reduces the potency of tools that Washington and its partners often use to confront them. In the most glaring example, since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has supplied Russia with semiconductors and other essential technologies that Russia previously imported from the West, undercutting the efficacy of Western export controls. All four countries are also working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar. The share of Russia’s imports invoiced in Chinese renminbi jumped from three percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2022. And in December 2023, Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct bilateral trade in their local currencies. By moving their economic transactions out of reach of U.S. enforcement measures, axis members undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions, as well as anticorruption and anti-money-laundering efforts.

Taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia can build trade and transportation networks safe from U.S. interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones and other weapons to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the United States has little power to stop transfers. If the United States were engaged in conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing could seek support from Moscow. Russia might increase its overland exports of oil and gas to its southern neighbor, reducing China’s dependence on maritime energy imports that U.S. forces could block during a conflict. Russia’s defense industrial base, now in overdrive to supply weapons for Russian troops in Ukraine, could later pivot to sustain a Chinese war effort. Such cooperation would increase the odds of China’s prevailing over the American military and help advance Russia’s goal of diminishing the United States’ geopolitical influence.

The axis is also hindering Washington’s ability to rally international coalitions that can stand against its members’ destabilizing actions. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, made it far easier for countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to do the same. And Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. Last year, they elevated Iran from observer to member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a predominantly Asian regional body, and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS—a group that China and Russia view as a counterweight to the West. Iran’s regional meddling and nuclear pursuits have made other countries wary of dealing with its government, but its participation in international forums enhances the regime’s legitimacy and presents it with opportunities to expand trade with fellow member states.

Parallel efforts by axis members in the information domain further weaken international support for U.S. positions. China, Iran, and North Korea either defended or avoided explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they all parroted the Kremlin in accusing NATO of inciting the war. Their response to Hamas’s attacks on Israel last October followed a similar pattern. Iran used the state media and social media accounts to express support for Hamas, vilify Israel, and denounce the United States for enabling Israel’s military response, while the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese media sharply criticized the United States’ enduring support for Israel. They used the war in Gaza to portray Washington as a destabilizing, domineering force in the world—a narrative that is particularly resonant in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even if axis members do not overtly coordinate their messages, they push the same themes, and the repetition makes them appear more credible and persuasive.

AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER?

Global orders magnify the strength of the powerful states that lead them. The United States, for instance, has invested in the liberal international order it helped create because this order reflects American preferences and extends U.S. influence. As long as an order remains sufficiently beneficial to most members, a core group of states will defend it. Dissenting countries, meanwhile, are bound by a collective action problem. If they were to defect en masse, they could succeed in creating an alternative order more to their liking. But without a core cluster of powerful states around which they can coalesce, the advantage remains with the existing order.

For decades, threats to the U.S.-led order were limited to a handful of rogue states with little power to upend it. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the restructuring of interstate relations it prompted have lifted the constraint on collective action. The axis of upheaval represents a new center of gravity, a group that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. The axis is ushering in an international system characterized by two orders that are becoming increasingly organized and competitive.

Historically, competing orders have invited conflict, especially at the geographical seams between them. Wars arise from specific conditions, such as a territorial dispute, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to the survival of a regime. But the likelihood that any of those conditions will lead to war increases in the presence of dueling orders. Some political science researchers have found that periods in which a single order prevailed—the balance-of-power system maintained by the Concert of Europe for much of the nineteenth century, for example, or the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War era—were less prone to conflicts than those characterized by more than one order, such as the multipolar period between the two world wars and the bipolar system of the Cold War.

The world has gotten a preview of the instability this new era of competing orders will bring, with potential aggressors empowered by the axis’s normalization of alternative rules and less afraid of being isolated if they act out. Already, Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens to engulf the wider Middle East in war. Last October, Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo in 2023, too, and Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana in December. Although internal conditions precipitated the coups in Myanmar and across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, the rising incidence of such revolts is connected to the new international arrangement. For many years, it seemed that coups were becoming less common, in large part because plotters faced significant costs for violating norms. Now, however, the calculations have changed. Overthrowing a government may still shatter relations with the West, but the new regimes can find support in Beijing and Moscow.

Further development of the axis would bring even greater tumult. So far, most collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has been bilateral. Trilateral and quadrilateral action could expand their capacity for disruption. Countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all of which chafe against the U.S.-led, Western-dominated system—could also begin working more closely with the axis. If the group grows in size and tightens its coordination, the United States and its allies will have a more difficult time defending the recognized order.

TAKING ON THE REVISIONISTS

For now, U.S. national security strategy ranks China as a higher priority than Iran, North Korea, or even Russia. That assessment is strategically sound when considering the threat that individual countries pose to the United States, but it does not fully account for the cooperation among them. U.S. policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should undercut the axis’s appeal by sharpening the attractions of the existing order.

If the United States is to counter an increasingly coordinated axis, it cannot treat each threat as an isolated phenomenon. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe, for example, in order to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. It is already clear that Russia’s success in Ukraine benefits a revisionist China by showing that it is possible, if costly, to thwart a united Western effort. Even as Washington rightly sees China as its top priority, addressing the challenge from Beijing will require competing with other members of the axis in other parts of the world. To be effective, the United States will need to devote additional resources to national security, engage in more vigorous diplomacy, develop new and stronger partnerships, and take a more activist role in the world than it has of late.

Driving wedges between members of the axis, on the other hand, will not work. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some strategists suggested that the United States align itself with Russia to balance China. After the war began, a few held out hope that the United States could join China in an anti-Russian coalition. But unlike President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s, which took advantage of a Sino-Soviet split to draw Beijing further away from Moscow, there is no equivalent ideological or geopolitical rivalry for Washington to exploit today. The price of trying would likely involve U.S. recognition of a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence in Europe and Asia—regions central to U.S. interests and ones that Washington should not allow a hostile foreign power to dominate. Breaking Iran or North Korea off from the rest of the axis would be even more difficult, given their governments’ revisionist, even revolutionary aims. Ultimately, the axis is a problem the United States must manage, not one it can solve with grand strategic gestures.

Neither the West nor the axis will become wholly distinct political, military, and economic blocs. Each coalition will compete for influence all over the world, trying to draw vital countries closer to its side. Six “global swing states” will be particularly important: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey are all middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order. These six countries—and others, too—can be expected to pursue economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ties with members of both orders. U.S. policymakers should make it a priority to deny advantages to the axis in these countries, encouraging their governments to choose policies that favor the prevailing order. In practice, that means using trade incentives, military engagement, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent swing states from hosting axis members’ military bases, giving axis members access to their technology infrastructure or military equipment, or helping them circumvent Western sanctions.

Although competition with the axis may be inevitable, the United States must try to avoid direct conflict with any of its members. To that end, Washington should reaffirm its security commitments to bolster deterrence in the western Pacific, in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States and its allies should also prepare for opportunistic aggression. If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompts U.S. military intervention, for instance, Russia may be tempted to move against another European country, and Iran or North Korea could escalate threats in their regions. Even if the axis members do not coordinate their aggression directly, concurrent conflicts could overwhelm the West. Washington will therefore need to press allies to invest in capabilities that the United States could not provide if it were already engaged in another military theater.

Confronting the axis will be expensive. A new strategy will require the United States to bolster its spending on defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic communications. Washington must direct aid to the frontlines of conflict between the axis and the West—including assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, all of which face encroachment by axis members. Revisionists are emboldened by the sense that political divisions at home or exhaustion with international engagement will keep the United States on the sidelines of this competition; a comprehensive, well-resourced U.S. strategy with bipartisan support would help counter that impression. The alternative—a reduction in the U.S. global presence—would leave the fate of crucial regions in the hands not of friendly local powers but of axis members seeking to impose their revisionist and illiberal preferences.

THE FOUR-POWER THREAT

There is a tendency to downplay the significance of growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. By turning to Beijing, this argument goes, Moscow merely signals its acceptance of the role of junior partner. Obtaining drones from Iran and munitions from North Korea demonstrates the desperation of a Russian war machine that incorrectly assumed that conquering Ukraine would be easy. China’s embrace of Russia shows only that Beijing could not achieve the positive relationship it originally sought with Europe and other Western powers. North Korea remains the world’s most isolated country, and Iran’s disruptive activities have backfired, strengthening regional cooperation among Israel, the United States, and Gulf countries.

Such analysis ignores the severity of the threat. Four powers, growing in strength and coordination, are united in their opposition to the prevailing world order and its U.S. leadership. Their combined economic and military capacity, together with their determination to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War, make for a dangerous mix. This is a group bent on upheaval, and the United States and its partners must treat the axis as the generational challenge it is. They must reinforce the foundations of the international order and push back against those who act most vigorously to undermine it. It is likely impossible to arrest the emergence of this new axis, but keeping it from upending the current system is an achievable goal.

The West has everything it needs to triumph in this contest. Its combined economy is far larger, its militaries are significantly more powerful, its geography is more advantageous, its values are more attractive, and its democratic system is more stable. The United States and its partners should be confident in their own strengths, even as they appreciate the scale of effort necessary to compete with this budding anti-Western coalition. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine

Another day over 1K.

Interview with Russian Duma member who left Russia in protest and joined the Ukrainian Army.  Talks about the war within the Russian elites.

Copetank

I did not state that I've heard Westerners decry the dissolution of the Soviet Union directly and unambiguously. (I have heard this sentiment in the Baltics from old Bolsheviks and Russians of all ages.)

Via inference, it is not difficult to conclude that there are Western right and left wing elements who would prefer Russian dominance over E. Europe, whatever that would entail. There are numerous voices who state that Ukraine belongs to Russia via Russia's sphere of influence (and how dare the West interfere in any manner). And what other independent nations would fall to this "Realpolitik?" Moldava, Georgia? Notwithstanding NATO, perhaps Finland, The Baltics, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria? These were all in Russia's sphere of influence during the Soviet period.

OK. Thanks for the clarification and I think we are in agreement.

I'm sure there are some (probably many) in the US democrat party that cried when the USSR broke up. Likewise, I think today there may be some misguided conservatives who think Western Europe could benefit from Russian occupation. Replace the migrant invasion and lgbtqp obsession with Red Army mass rape, torture chambers, and deportations to gulags...I think some countries like Hungary feel caught in the middle of two malevolent forces.

We are well on our way towards building cost effective/easy to produce solutions to defeat relatively cheap Group 1-3 ISR or OWA drones. NGSRI & Stinger (traditional MANPADS) will very much be the upper end (cost) of this with plenty of capability sitting below. https://t.co/veylQMa9DS pic.twitter.com/YazqAmFi1u

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) April 28, 2024

I've been tweeting about this for years.\uD83E\uDDF5\uD83D\uDC47 captures some thoughts on the cost concerns that @RALee85 raises. With APKWS already facilitized to 20+K/yr & Army gearing up to order 6K Coyote II+'s + beginning to field CsUAS DEW, we're off to a good start.https://t.co/TgNTviTcPJ

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) April 28, 2024

This is a good summary. One thing to note about the Coyote Block 2+ is that its design is targeting a particular capability and not the absolute "cheapest" possible Group 2/3 defeat capability. That's reflected in its range, guidance, and other attributes. https://t.co/PWrSTxsJeD

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) December 21, 2023

As I've tweeted previously  \uD83E\uDDF5\uD83D\uDC47, there are a dozen or more US and European OEM's who can produce something like the Coyote and be collectively cranking out tens of thousands of these a year for a fraction of its current cost. If that was the objective.https://t.co/MMC8HTH9kE

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) December 21, 2023

The false comparison being drawn to "Western" air-defense capacity is also completely irrelevant to the discussion. The "Shahed" threat doesn't warrant those capabilities. It warrants equally scaled production of significantly cheaper, and simpler counter measures. pic.twitter.com/cTFuXX641P

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) May 28, 2023

So yeah, don't give me the BS of limited SM-6, or Aster missile production. It is irrelevant. What's relevant is the number of qualified, and technically capable OEM's in the west who can produce G-3 UAS optimized kinetic or DE interceptors like HPM, Coyote and several others. pic.twitter.com/dEyJPAUL7k

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) May 28, 2023

And \uD83D\uDC46 you have no shortage. Probably half a dozen- dozen in the US. As many in Europe & Asia. Now add EW, and HPM payloads to these effectors. And layer of DE (HEL & HPM) & factor in offensive capability against this sort of targeting.

Cheap solutions allow cheap CM's \uD83D\uDC47 pic.twitter.com/esNkpVigdZ

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) May 28, 2023

The current delivery of these Group 3 optimized CsUAS capability emphasizes mil fixed/semi-fixed site defense. But it isn't hard to imagine, that very similar solutions could also support Air-launched intercepts coming off of long loitering MALE RPA's allowing for SO ranges. pic.twitter.com/umUwXQ7Q5t

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) May 28, 2023

At the end of the day, what needs to be measured is the production capacity or barriers to scaling capacity of relatively simple, COTS based one-way attack drones like the Shahed, and equally simple to manufacture, C-sUAS solutions optimized specifically around G-3 systems. pic.twitter.com/0DSOdYSbOP

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) May 28, 2023

A $100K missile vs $50K target is cost-effective if your layered approach is aimed at using interceptor for 1 of 2-3 drones with majority being defeated by the DE,EW, or gun layers. Though designed for mil sites, small palletized solutions can easily be emplaced in urban areas. pic.twitter.com/dfxoyZfQX3

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) May 28, 2023

Plus much more at the links.

All 64 of Finland's future F35 fighters will be stored in underground shelters.

Simulators and other devices that contain sensitive information will also be stored in underground facilities.

The fighters will be spread over several different bases. pic.twitter.com/BvrpxplkPg

— Tomi \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDEB\uD83C\uDDEE (@TallbarFIN) April 28, 2024

These are the very cheat night vision drones using an IR light source for being able to see.

FPV drone of the 82nd Brigade sneaks up and attacks a Russian night assault group from behindhttps://t.co/912I82Q3iR pic.twitter.com/0bqeXRYPSd

— Special Kherson Cat \uD83D\uDC08\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@bayraktar_1love) April 28, 2024

AFU conducts ATACMS strike on Russian air defense targets in Crimea

Last night, the AFU struck Russian air defense units at Cape #Tarkhankut, Crimea, which is in Ukraine, with ATACMS missiles most likely carrying M39 Block 1 cluster warheads. There are no damage assessments… pic.twitter.com/iIAsM2SNwO

— OSINT (Uri) \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 \uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDE7 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEE\uD83C\uDDF1 (@UKikaski) April 28, 2024

So this is why the big thread hasn't had @Prime 's updates the last few days.  If it's not bad form, are you (and any other regular posters that see this) not planning on posting there any longer?

1/2 Guerre d'Ukraine | 27/04/24

Secteurs :
\uD83C\uDF10 Kupiansk-Kyslivka\uD83D\uDD39U240427-0846
\uD83C\uDF10 Avdiivka-Ocheretyne\uD83D\uDD39U240427-0857
\uD83C\uDF10 Ocheretyne-Semenivka\uD83D\uDD39U240427-0919
\uD83C\uDF10 Pervomaiske\uD83D\uDD39U240427-0913#UkraineRussianWar #GuerreEnUkraine pic.twitter.com/14jdyNB44W

Poulet volant  (@Pouletvolant3) April 28, 2024

Looks like Netailove is lost https://t.co/sFO5UQSzAn

Ukraine Control Map  (@UAControlMap) April 28, 2024

To be honest, I think a lot of us felt too constrained on the subjects that could be discussed.  For weeks we couldn't provide news or links about what Congress was doing because those posts were deleted in that thread.  Numerous other readers to the thread complained so it was proposed to start a new thread that would encompass what was allowed before in the old thread.

I know my posting time is limited, so I can only really put attention to 1 or 2 threads, and I may be unable to contribute soon because of a new job.

I still follow and read the big Ukraine thread, and I'm happy to see the other guys stepping up to provide info I don't have time to post.

It turns out that the Ukrainian M1A1SA's tanks have specially designed composite armor that is recognized by serial number with code UKR and it is a completely different armor from those used by the US Army M1A1's and M1A2's with U or M armor code letters. pic.twitter.com/TwoZr2OIRf

Junsupreme  (@RyszardJonski) April 28, 2024

Seriously, that is downgraded armor compared to what US forces have in their M1's.

Not bad form at all.
We could’ve communicated what we were doing a little better, but we weren’t sure how it was going to turn out, honestly.

Yeah, it's been almost sarcastically over moderated.  Hopefully the new job still leaves you time to post some.  With your knowledge base Ii'd be a shame if you weren't able to anymore.

Thank you for the kind words, I will certainly try to check in each day and try to contribute as well when I can.

The job is from another U.S. defense company and it is very vital work for our nations defense.

There are a lot of people like you that help make a thread great, I'm really glad we have such a good team of people to put the information together in one place.  The odd lurker that jumps in to provide excellent info and personal experience is great to see as well.

Chronology of deliveries of CAESAR guns to Ukraine :

? 18 in 2022;
? 31 or 37 in 2023;
? 72 or 75 between 2024 and 2025;

After 2025, @KNDS_France should be able to produce 144 CAESARs per year. https://t.co/hhpr5kKxEj pic.twitter.com/s25bfCf1hV

— French Aid to Ukraine \uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDF5\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@aidefranceukr) April 28, 2024

It’s all good, the time and effort you put into this is greatly appreciated.

The sign behind her head that says "Socialism and Liberalism" while at an anti Israeli protest says it all really.

"What are we protesting?"

Teaching your children the process of critical thinking is one way to avoid seeing them later on, like this clueless specimen, in a meme.
#HamasAttack #Israel #Yemen #Hamas #Hezbollah #Palestine #Iran #Syria #OSINT

Re-Tweet Appreciated

Re-Tweet… pic.twitter.com/gAI3eyQDiC

— OSINT (Uri) \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 \uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDE7 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEE\uD83C\uDDF1 (@UKikaski) April 28, 2024

FPV hit group of Orcs riding on Chinese all-terrain vehicle pic.twitter.com/Xmle8jHaKV

Getty  (@gettylegion) April 28, 2024

"A strange trend in recent days, a lot of military equipment is going towards Poland," Russians in Europe are taking videos and worrying. https://t.co/Hbgdj4HL9O pic.twitter.com/LYpGsfCsmf

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) April 28, 2024

If they couldn’t hear that, those were some deaf MFs.

Russia Soldiers position on the left bank of Kherson region was hit with long range drone. https://t.co/tcQYS9ASdo pic.twitter.com/z63BgHSw5a

Getty  (@gettylegion) April 28, 2024

I personally feel that the third component is a feeling of being sick and tired, of being sick and tired of carrying the load defense wise for Europe, while they sneer down their noses and laugh at us for being poor uneducated, unsophisticated bumpkins who just don't understand how things work.

They've navel gazed and tried to build their socialist utopias's while flipping us the bird and not spending the agreed upon 2% GDP. So when this war started they sat on their collective hands waiting for us to do it, because well... we've always done it. They were all prepared to tut-tut, laugh and stage whisper with each other about how stupid we are and superior they are.

And then the U.S. did little to nothing, leaving Europe exposed. Their chickens have come home to roost and they didn't realize the world changed on them while they were refilling their beer mug.

When asked to help the cupboards were mostly bare. Remember back when this started Germany saying they didn't have the supplies to keep an infantry company in the field for more that a few weeks?

A year or so in they came to the conclusion that maybe, just maybe, the U.S. wasn't gonna do the heavy lifting for them anymore so maybe, just maybe they need to look at doing... something.

Now, another year in, they've got plans to do several somethings that will take anywhere between 1 and 5 years to do because of their 40 year navel gazing socialist utopia building kumbaya Russian dick sucking lifestyles.

We stopped talking to most of the European branch of our family over this war. The last of my civility died with their "Good Vibes from Washington" and "Zelensky just needs to talk to Putin to settle their differences like adults" conversation. The level of disconnect between reality and their perceived reality was too great to bridge.

Personally, I'm surprised Western Europe has stepped up and sent anything more than butt plugs and ball gags, two things which they seem to have in abundance.

\uD83D\uDE4F "We are monitoring the increase in the number and regrouping of the enemy's troops in the Kharkiv direction", - Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi.

The most difficult situation is in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions. The enemy deployed up to four brigades, is trying to develop… pic.twitter.com/U6KmejOAHy

The Ukrainian Review  (@UkrReview) April 28, 2024

... an offensive west of Avdiivka and Mariinka.

AFU, saving their lives, moved to new frontiers west of Berdychiv, Semenivka and Novomykhailivka. Heavy fighting continued across the front line this week.  The situation escalated.

As mentioned above, it is good to see there is a realization that these countries need to step it up for their own safety.  I think once they actually realise that making your own defense systems can be a real benefit, especially if the product is good enough that other countries will pay you for it as well.

Britain developing homegrown hypersonic missile - It has been reported that the United Kingdom intends to design and deploy its own hypersonic cruise missile by the year 2030. Click the image to read more.https://t.co/mc69zEMvTD

UK Defence Journal  (@UKDefJournal) April 28, 2024

Not the greatest quality at 3 m resolution, but there are some notable changes that are worth following up on at Kushchyovskaya Airbase.

PlanetScope-SuperDove imagery from April 22 and today (April 27) showing at least 2 locations on the apron that may have been damaged in the… pic.twitter.com/IjBWM6v78Q

Evergreen Intel  (@vcdgf555) April 28, 2024

This is the Russian Kushchyovskaya airbase.  Much better image below.

Damage from a Ukrainian strike on Russia’s Kushchyovskaya air base is visible in new high resolution satellite imagery.

This site is more than 200 kilometers from the front line in Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/HXNaB7ClGp

Brady Africk  (@bradyafr) April 28, 2024

Upon the conclusion of WWII historians, using information from our former enemies, learned that submarine commanders and aircraft pilots often grossly inflated the number or tonnage of destroyed ships and aircraft. Even if these casualty figures are off by similar numbers, I don't know how any nation can continue suffering these kinds of casualties without serious consequential political consequences.
At some point, the citizens of Russia will have a hard time dealing with the number of funerals and watching the military cemeteries fill up. Hard to tell where the breaking point will be, but it will come at some point.

I'm subscribing here. A post on the other thread, where I thought I was always careful, was zeroed out and I have no idea what un-good thoughts I had written.

The other thread was analogous to having an HOA president who loved flexing authority to the point where all the condo members have decided to sell their condos and move into another complex.

Most of us got our pee pee slapped for reasons not understood or positions that probably conflicted slightly with his political position.

Hopefully this thread will allow reasonable discussion and slightly wider guard rails.

I tend to believe the trackers because they are using a cautious methodology. Will casualties halt the war? The Russians are a greedy and hateful people, so they really don't care if all the neighbors kids die in a war. They may not even care about their own kids dying, unless it costs them money.

The Russians have the simplist solution to this. They leave them on the field.

I think there is a lot of disinfo going around; my current take is that this whole op was a Putin-directs SVR/FSB operation gone bad.  Since all of the scapegoat searching seems to be directed at the various logistic and support commands as well as combatant commanders, I am led to assume the GRU had better intel leading up to this and tried to put the brakes on this whole op and has enough receipts squirrelled away to protect themselves against some pretty high ups in the Kremlin/SVR/FSB groups that seem to be dominating Russian decision-making currently.

Japan has been facing off Russian naval and air space incursions in addition to North Korean missle threats and China territorial dispute near Taiwan

https://amp.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3260692/chinese-coastguard-face-japanese-politicians-near-disputed-east-china-sea-islands

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I got banned for posting Congressional bills news articles the mod claimed there was prior warnings not to include any Presidential or Congressional news which if there was I may have missed as it’s hard to keep up.

I’m way behind on emails and my inbox so I’m sure people are also frustrated trying to contact me but not getting any reply.

https://www.upi.com/amp/Top_News/World-News/2024/04/27/kazakhstan-Russian-Chinese-defense-ministers-tout-close-bilateral-ties-during-meeting/8771714225305/

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Speaking of ISW who used my Islamic state info in a Fox News interview a decade ago


https://www.foxnews.com/video/6351801113112

February 2024 article about Japan’s territorial dispute with Russia

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2024/02/13/japan/japans-northern-territories/

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https://www.newsweek.com/china-navy-ships-sea-japan-east-sea-russia-1880641

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From Iran state news https://en.mehrnews.com/amp/214393/

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Russia’s missile attack on 26-27 April visualised:

\uD83D\uDD34 - cruise missiles
\uD83D\uDFE3 (dark) - ballistic missiles
\uD83D\uDFE3 (light) - Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and fast-moving targets \uD83D\uDDFA???

The primary target of the latest mass attack was once again the gas storage facility near Stryi, in… pic.twitter.com/yZfqQCFMvs

— TEXTY.org.ua in Eng (@Textyorgua_Eng) April 28, 2024

US Army has already integrated new DE components to its Fixed and Mobile LIDS system and its associated C2 to augment the Coyote interceptors and EW layers. The Army is now moving ahead and funding full FAAD C2 integration of the @anduriltech #RoadRunner & @BAESystemsInc APKWS. https://t.co/TVAx125oJQ pic.twitter.com/j4SJHNV21v

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) April 28, 2024

USAF Chief Scientist Victoria Coleman later noted ARRW was "the most mature weapon that we have" Disclosed prev. unreported successful Tactical Boost Glide flight test on Dec 8, 2020, over the Pacific, "an amazing day." Was coy on whether ARRW was fully zeroed out https://t.co/MN904fXIQW pic.twitter.com/15FJdLZzpd

— Masao Dahlgren (@masao_dahlgren) April 28, 2024

Progress continuing on HACM, Congress and Global Strike Command apparently "huge fans and can't wait" for it to be in inventory. flight test next year will happen in Australia. This is why AUKUS matters. pic.twitter.com/iLO3lxdeAd

— Masao Dahlgren (@masao_dahlgren) April 28, 2024

Here's the top-level portfolio from Dr. Weber on current hypersonic acquisition programs. pic.twitter.com/ya7OmNDWUo

— Masao Dahlgren (@masao_dahlgren) April 28, 2024

Europe has been preaching integration, internationalism and multiculturalism as well for years.  Unfortunately for them, they are now realizing what that looks like and how well it actually works in practice; right at the same time that they realize that Europe is not the US's only priority, and is probably not even the main priority.  One of the reason they feared Trump in the past is that he was willing to say what a lot of Americans have been thinking since the IFOR/SFOR/KFOR missions of the late 1990's that was kind of papered over post 9-11.  They HATE Biden's Administration because they now realize that existential European security concerns are no longer a US priority and will be secondary to US domestic politics.  As much as we love to rightfully point at the ten or so Republican clowns who used Ukraine to create drama, the Euros also understand that Biden could have made the whole issue go away nearly instantaneously by adding a rider for $1 Billion or so for a border wall.   Also, even though the Euros are fashionably anti-Semitic in their rhetoric they didn't really believe a lot of the crap they talked regarding the Israelis and were comforted by the idea that they could criticize Israel all they wanted and vote for all kinds of unrealistic resolutions secure in the conventional wisdom that the US would come through and stop the stupidity allowing them to virtue signal.  When the Biden administration showed themselves perfectly willing to throw a long-time ally like Israel under the bus for the sake of a few voters in states that many Europeans would have a hard time accurately identifying on a map (and may actually confuse, since they are both in the Midwest and unhelpfully both start with the letter "M"), the Euros took a hard look at their position and realized that the same criticisms of "Colonialism" dubiously directed at the Israelis are in reality a double-barreled shotgun pointed right at much of the basis for the underlying fraternal relationship between Europe and the United States.  IF the basis for the view that United States is both illegitimate and absolutely evil due to it's "white supremacy" and horrible record of "colonialism", who actually has a better/more humane record in Europe?  France, Britain, Holland, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and even Belgium have far bloodier records of colonialism and conquest than the United States.  They are also terrified by the fecklessness of the American "elites" when faced with even a minor amount of criticism from their putative "allies", and the terrifying inability of their peers in American "leadership" to actually lead.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68916317.amp

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https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kyivs-top-general-says-fighting-east-ukraine-worsens-troops-fall-back-2024-04-28/

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Here are losses I could Identify for yesterday.https://t.co/6ZeZYh00Ln pic.twitter.com/RJ3xw1nSzh

Andrew Perpetua  (@AndrewPerpetua) April 28, 2024

I believe Germany intends to provide another Patriot but please share any air defense - worldwide not just European theater


https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68901820.amp

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New Perun video on the US aid package:

Canada has increased its commitment to supply Skyranger R70 small reconnaissance drones to Ukraine.
The first batch of  450 will start arriving next month, with another 450 to follow. pic.twitter.com/CrdGaYV4uF

— Roy\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GrandpaRoy2) April 28, 2024