First off, tremendous props to LoBrau, who saw Ukraine coming well in advance and started a record setting thread. May that record stand forever, because nothing would please us more than for there to no longer be anything to talk about.

What has become evident since February of 2022 is that there is a global reshuffling taking place, with three primary players behind most of the conflict in the world today. Discussion of current geopolitics cannot be constrained to one country or conflict.

What this thread is:
News and discussion related to political / military actions by Russia / Iran / China and their proxies, chief among those, North Korea.
News and discussion of the relationships between Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
News and discussion of responses to Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
Related Grey Zone / hybrid warfare / “competition short of war.”
Relevant or interesting technical discussion.
Relevant economic / social / historical discussion.
Reliable reporting from Russian / Iranian / Chinese sources.
Russian / Iranian / Chinese perspectives and factual evaluation thereof.
Political topics in the US and / or elsewhere which bear directly on these issues, including the politics of foreign aid.
Current focus is on the Russian war against and in Ukraine, however this could change if the Ukraine war cooled off and Taiwan heated up.  Related topics are always allowed.
Secondary but related topics like Wagner in Africa, uprising in Georgia, or a Third Chechen War.
Reasonable tangents.

What this thread is not:
US and / or foreign political issues which do not directly bear on these topics, including campaigning / advocating for one party or candidate.

General rules:
Discussion is expected to be conducted in good faith and assertions of fact should be substantiated.
In case of a question on whether a subtopic or line of discussion is relevant to this thread, the following members should be considered co-owners with decision making authority- AlmightyTallest, Capta, and SaltwaterHillbilly.

The Axis of Upheaval
How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order
By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine
May/June 2024
Published on April 23, 2024

In the early morning of January 2, Russian forces launched a massive missile attack on the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv that killed at least five civilians, injured more than 100, and damaged infrastructure. The incident was notable not just for the harm it caused but also because it showed that Russia was not alone in its fight. The Russian attack that day was carried out with weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran. Over the past two years, all three countries have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Moscow has deployed more than 3,700 Iranian-designed drones. Russia now produces at least 330 on its own each month and is collaborating with Iran on plans to build a new drone factory inside Russia that will boost these numbers. North Korea has sent Russia ballistic missiles and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, just as Ukrainian stockpiles have dwindled. China, for its part, has become Russia’s most important lifeline. Beijing has ramped up its purchase of Russian oil and gas, putting billions of dollars into Moscow’s coffers. Just as significantly, China provides vast amounts of warfighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar- and communications-jamming equipment and jet-fighter parts. Customs records show that despite Western trade sanctions, Russia’s imports of computer chips and chip components have been steadily rising toward prewar levels. More than half of these goods come from China.

The support from China, Iran, and North Korea has strengthened Russia’s position on the battlefield, undermined Western attempts to isolate Moscow, and harmed Ukraine. This collaboration, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Cooperation among the four countries was expanding before 2022, but the war has accelerated their deepening economic, military, political, and technological ties. The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval—a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape.

The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance. It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system. When these four countries cooperate, their actions have far greater effect than the sum of their individual efforts. Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to enforce global rules. Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States.

Too many Western observers have been quick to dismiss the implications of coordination among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The four countries have their differences, to be sure, and a history of distrust and contemporary fissures may limit how close their relationships will grow. Yet their shared aim of weakening the United States and its leadership role provides a strong adhesive. In places across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the ambitions of axis members have already proved to be destabilizing. Managing the disruptive effects of their further coordination and preventing the axis from upsetting the global system must now be central objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

THE ANTI-WESTERN CLUB

Collaboration among axis members is not new. China and Russia have been strengthening their partnership since the end of the Cold War—a trend that accelerated rapidly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. China’s share of Russian external trade doubled from ten to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021, and between 2018 and 2022 Russia supplied a combined total of 83 percent of China’s arms imports. Russian technology has helped the Chinese military enhance its air defense, antiship, and submarine capabilities, making China a more formidable force in a potential naval conflict. Beijing and Moscow have also expressed a shared vision. In early 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint manifesto pledging a “no limits” partnership between their two countries and calling for “international relations of a new type”—in other words, a multipolar system that is no longer dominated by the United States.

Iran has strengthened its ties with other axis members as well. Iran and Russia worked together to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power after the onset of civil war in 2011. Joining Russia’s efforts, which include major energy agreements with Iran to shield Tehran from the effects of U.S. sanctions, China has purchased large quantities of Iranian oil since 2020. North Korea, for its part, has counted China as its primary ally and trade partner for decades, and North Korea and Russia have maintained warm, if not particularly substantive, ties. Iran has purchased North Korean missiles since the 1980s, and more recently, North Korea is thought to have supplied weapons to Iranian proxy groups, including Hezbollah and possibly Hamas. Pyongyang and Tehran have also bonded over a shared aversion to Washington: as a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, declared during a ten-day trip to Iran in 2017, the two countries “have a common enemy.”

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened the convergence among these four countries in ways that transcend their historical ties. Moscow has been among Tehran’s top suppliers of weapons over the past two decades and is now its largest source of foreign investment; Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent in the first ten months of 2022. Over the past two years, according to the White House, Russia has been sharing more intelligence with and providing more weapons to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, and Moscow has defended those proxies in debates at the UN Security Council. Last year, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of crude oil and trade between the two countries topped $240 billion, a record high. Moscow has also released millions of dollars in North Korean assets that previously sat frozen in Russian banks in compliance with Security Council sanctions. China, Iran, and Russia have held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman three years in a row, most recently in March 2024. Russia has also proposed trilateral naval drills with China and North Korea.

The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each country claims a sphere of influence: China’s “core interests,” which extend to Taiwan and the South China Sea; Iran’s “axis of resistance,” the set of proxy groups that give Tehran leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; North Korea’s claim to the entire Korean Peninsula; and Russia’s “near abroad,” which for the Kremlin includes, at a minimum, the countries that composed its historic empire. All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing these spheres of influence, and they want Washington’s presence in their respective regions reduced.

All reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West’s championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and foment domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define democracy for themselves. In the end, although they may make temporary accommodations with the United States, they do not believe that the West will accept their rise (or return) to power on the world stage. They oppose external meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances, the stationing of American nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of coercive sanctions.

Any positive vision for the future, however, is more elusive. Yet history shows that a positive agenda may not be necessary for a group of discontented powers to cause disruption. The 1940 Tripartite Pact uniting Germany, Italy, and Japan—the original “Axis”—pledged to “establish and maintain a new order of things” in which each country would claim “its own proper place.” They did not succeed, but World War II certainly brought global upheaval. The axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The countries’ shared opposition to the present order’s core tenets and their determination to bring about change form a powerful basis for collaborative action.

Fissures do exist among members of the axis. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia, for instance, while Iran and Russia compete for oil markets in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The four countries have complicated histories with each other, too. The Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941; Russia and China settled their long-standing border dispute only in 2004 and had both previously supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear programs and to isolate North Korea. Today, China may look askance at North Korea’s deepening relationship with Russia, worrying that an emboldened Kim Jong Un will aggravate tensions in Northeast Asia and draw in a larger U.S. military presence, which China does not want. Yet their differences are insufficient to dissolve the bonds forged by their common resistance to a Western-dominated world.

CATALYST IN THE KREMLIN

Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The invasion of Ukraine marked a point of no return in Putin’s long-standing crusade against the West. Putin has grown more committed to destroying not only Ukraine but also the global order. And he has doubled down on relationships with like-minded countries to accomplish his aims. Cut off from Western trade, investment, and technology since the start of the war, Moscow has had little choice but to rely on its partners to sustain its hostilities. The ammunition, drones, microchips, and other forms of aid that axis members have sent have been of great help to Russia. But the more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are taking advantage of their leverage over Moscow to expand their military capabilities and economic options.

Even before the Russian invasion, Moscow’s military assistance to Beijing was eroding the United States’ military advantage over China. Russia has provided ever more sophisticated weapons to China, and the two countries’ joint military exercises have grown in scope and frequency. Russian officers who have fought in Syria and in Ukraine’s Donbas region have shared valuable lessons with Chinese personnel, helping the People’s Liberation Army make up for its lack of operational experience—a notable weakness relative to more seasoned U.S. forces. China’s military modernization has reduced the urgency of deepening defense cooperation with Russia, but the two countries are likely to proceed with technology transfers and joint weapons development and production. In February, for instance, Russian officials confirmed that they were working with Chinese counterparts on military applications of artificial intelligence. Moscow retains an edge over Beijing in other key areas, including submarine technology, remote sensing satellites, and aircraft engines. If China can pressure a more dependent Russia to provide additional advanced technologies, the transfer could further undermine the United States’ advantages.

A similar dynamic is playing out in Russia’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Moscow and Tehran have forged what the Biden administration has called an “unprecedented defense partnership” that upgrades Iranian military capabilities. Russia has provided Iran with advanced aircraft, air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber-capabilities that would help Tehran resist a potential U.S. or Israeli military operation. And in return for North Korea’s ammunition and other military support to Russia, Pyongyang is reportedly seeking advanced space, missile, and submarine technology from Moscow. If Russia were to comply with those requests, North Korea would be able to improve the accuracy and survivability of its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and use Russian nuclear propulsion technology to expand the range and capability of its submarines. Already, Russia’s testing of North Korean weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has supplied Pyongyang with information it can use to refine its missile program, and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea launch a military spy satellite in November after two previous failures last year.

Strong relations among the four axis countries have emboldened leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran. Kim, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, indulged in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, and expressed a lack of any interest in talks with the United States. And although there does not appear to be a direct connection between their deepening partnership and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, growing support from Russia likely made Iran more willing to activate its regional proxies in the aftermath. The coordinated diplomacy and pressure from Russia and the West that brought Iran into the 2015 nuclear deal are now a distant memory. Today, Moscow and Beijing are helping Tehran resist Western coercion, making it easier for Iran to enrich uranium and reject Washington’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement.

AMERICA UNDERMINED

Collaboration among the axis members also reduces the potency of tools that Washington and its partners often use to confront them. In the most glaring example, since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has supplied Russia with semiconductors and other essential technologies that Russia previously imported from the West, undercutting the efficacy of Western export controls. All four countries are also working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar. The share of Russia’s imports invoiced in Chinese renminbi jumped from three percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2022. And in December 2023, Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct bilateral trade in their local currencies. By moving their economic transactions out of reach of U.S. enforcement measures, axis members undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions, as well as anticorruption and anti-money-laundering efforts.

Taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia can build trade and transportation networks safe from U.S. interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones and other weapons to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the United States has little power to stop transfers. If the United States were engaged in conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing could seek support from Moscow. Russia might increase its overland exports of oil and gas to its southern neighbor, reducing China’s dependence on maritime energy imports that U.S. forces could block during a conflict. Russia’s defense industrial base, now in overdrive to supply weapons for Russian troops in Ukraine, could later pivot to sustain a Chinese war effort. Such cooperation would increase the odds of China’s prevailing over the American military and help advance Russia’s goal of diminishing the United States’ geopolitical influence.

The axis is also hindering Washington’s ability to rally international coalitions that can stand against its members’ destabilizing actions. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, made it far easier for countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to do the same. And Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. Last year, they elevated Iran from observer to member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a predominantly Asian regional body, and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS—a group that China and Russia view as a counterweight to the West. Iran’s regional meddling and nuclear pursuits have made other countries wary of dealing with its government, but its participation in international forums enhances the regime’s legitimacy and presents it with opportunities to expand trade with fellow member states.

Parallel efforts by axis members in the information domain further weaken international support for U.S. positions. China, Iran, and North Korea either defended or avoided explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they all parroted the Kremlin in accusing NATO of inciting the war. Their response to Hamas’s attacks on Israel last October followed a similar pattern. Iran used the state media and social media accounts to express support for Hamas, vilify Israel, and denounce the United States for enabling Israel’s military response, while the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese media sharply criticized the United States’ enduring support for Israel. They used the war in Gaza to portray Washington as a destabilizing, domineering force in the world—a narrative that is particularly resonant in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even if axis members do not overtly coordinate their messages, they push the same themes, and the repetition makes them appear more credible and persuasive.

AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER?

Global orders magnify the strength of the powerful states that lead them. The United States, for instance, has invested in the liberal international order it helped create because this order reflects American preferences and extends U.S. influence. As long as an order remains sufficiently beneficial to most members, a core group of states will defend it. Dissenting countries, meanwhile, are bound by a collective action problem. If they were to defect en masse, they could succeed in creating an alternative order more to their liking. But without a core cluster of powerful states around which they can coalesce, the advantage remains with the existing order.

For decades, threats to the U.S.-led order were limited to a handful of rogue states with little power to upend it. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the restructuring of interstate relations it prompted have lifted the constraint on collective action. The axis of upheaval represents a new center of gravity, a group that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. The axis is ushering in an international system characterized by two orders that are becoming increasingly organized and competitive.

Historically, competing orders have invited conflict, especially at the geographical seams between them. Wars arise from specific conditions, such as a territorial dispute, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to the survival of a regime. But the likelihood that any of those conditions will lead to war increases in the presence of dueling orders. Some political science researchers have found that periods in which a single order prevailed—the balance-of-power system maintained by the Concert of Europe for much of the nineteenth century, for example, or the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War era—were less prone to conflicts than those characterized by more than one order, such as the multipolar period between the two world wars and the bipolar system of the Cold War.

The world has gotten a preview of the instability this new era of competing orders will bring, with potential aggressors empowered by the axis’s normalization of alternative rules and less afraid of being isolated if they act out. Already, Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens to engulf the wider Middle East in war. Last October, Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo in 2023, too, and Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana in December. Although internal conditions precipitated the coups in Myanmar and across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, the rising incidence of such revolts is connected to the new international arrangement. For many years, it seemed that coups were becoming less common, in large part because plotters faced significant costs for violating norms. Now, however, the calculations have changed. Overthrowing a government may still shatter relations with the West, but the new regimes can find support in Beijing and Moscow.

Further development of the axis would bring even greater tumult. So far, most collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has been bilateral. Trilateral and quadrilateral action could expand their capacity for disruption. Countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all of which chafe against the U.S.-led, Western-dominated system—could also begin working more closely with the axis. If the group grows in size and tightens its coordination, the United States and its allies will have a more difficult time defending the recognized order.

TAKING ON THE REVISIONISTS

For now, U.S. national security strategy ranks China as a higher priority than Iran, North Korea, or even Russia. That assessment is strategically sound when considering the threat that individual countries pose to the United States, but it does not fully account for the cooperation among them. U.S. policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should undercut the axis’s appeal by sharpening the attractions of the existing order.

If the United States is to counter an increasingly coordinated axis, it cannot treat each threat as an isolated phenomenon. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe, for example, in order to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. It is already clear that Russia’s success in Ukraine benefits a revisionist China by showing that it is possible, if costly, to thwart a united Western effort. Even as Washington rightly sees China as its top priority, addressing the challenge from Beijing will require competing with other members of the axis in other parts of the world. To be effective, the United States will need to devote additional resources to national security, engage in more vigorous diplomacy, develop new and stronger partnerships, and take a more activist role in the world than it has of late.

Driving wedges between members of the axis, on the other hand, will not work. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some strategists suggested that the United States align itself with Russia to balance China. After the war began, a few held out hope that the United States could join China in an anti-Russian coalition. But unlike President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s, which took advantage of a Sino-Soviet split to draw Beijing further away from Moscow, there is no equivalent ideological or geopolitical rivalry for Washington to exploit today. The price of trying would likely involve U.S. recognition of a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence in Europe and Asia—regions central to U.S. interests and ones that Washington should not allow a hostile foreign power to dominate. Breaking Iran or North Korea off from the rest of the axis would be even more difficult, given their governments’ revisionist, even revolutionary aims. Ultimately, the axis is a problem the United States must manage, not one it can solve with grand strategic gestures.

Neither the West nor the axis will become wholly distinct political, military, and economic blocs. Each coalition will compete for influence all over the world, trying to draw vital countries closer to its side. Six “global swing states” will be particularly important: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey are all middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order. These six countries—and others, too—can be expected to pursue economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ties with members of both orders. U.S. policymakers should make it a priority to deny advantages to the axis in these countries, encouraging their governments to choose policies that favor the prevailing order. In practice, that means using trade incentives, military engagement, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent swing states from hosting axis members’ military bases, giving axis members access to their technology infrastructure or military equipment, or helping them circumvent Western sanctions.

Although competition with the axis may be inevitable, the United States must try to avoid direct conflict with any of its members. To that end, Washington should reaffirm its security commitments to bolster deterrence in the western Pacific, in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States and its allies should also prepare for opportunistic aggression. If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompts U.S. military intervention, for instance, Russia may be tempted to move against another European country, and Iran or North Korea could escalate threats in their regions. Even if the axis members do not coordinate their aggression directly, concurrent conflicts could overwhelm the West. Washington will therefore need to press allies to invest in capabilities that the United States could not provide if it were already engaged in another military theater.

Confronting the axis will be expensive. A new strategy will require the United States to bolster its spending on defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic communications. Washington must direct aid to the frontlines of conflict between the axis and the West—including assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, all of which face encroachment by axis members. Revisionists are emboldened by the sense that political divisions at home or exhaustion with international engagement will keep the United States on the sidelines of this competition; a comprehensive, well-resourced U.S. strategy with bipartisan support would help counter that impression. The alternative—a reduction in the U.S. global presence—would leave the fate of crucial regions in the hands not of friendly local powers but of axis members seeking to impose their revisionist and illiberal preferences.

THE FOUR-POWER THREAT

There is a tendency to downplay the significance of growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. By turning to Beijing, this argument goes, Moscow merely signals its acceptance of the role of junior partner. Obtaining drones from Iran and munitions from North Korea demonstrates the desperation of a Russian war machine that incorrectly assumed that conquering Ukraine would be easy. China’s embrace of Russia shows only that Beijing could not achieve the positive relationship it originally sought with Europe and other Western powers. North Korea remains the world’s most isolated country, and Iran’s disruptive activities have backfired, strengthening regional cooperation among Israel, the United States, and Gulf countries.

Such analysis ignores the severity of the threat. Four powers, growing in strength and coordination, are united in their opposition to the prevailing world order and its U.S. leadership. Their combined economic and military capacity, together with their determination to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War, make for a dangerous mix. This is a group bent on upheaval, and the United States and its partners must treat the axis as the generational challenge it is. They must reinforce the foundations of the international order and push back against those who act most vigorously to undermine it. It is likely impossible to arrest the emergence of this new axis, but keeping it from upending the current system is an achievable goal.

The West has everything it needs to triumph in this contest. Its combined economy is far larger, its militaries are significantly more powerful, its geography is more advantageous, its values are more attractive, and its democratic system is more stable. The United States and its partners should be confident in their own strengths, even as they appreciate the scale of effort necessary to compete with this budding anti-Western coalition. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine

TIA!

Right now it is, but we are open to good info from the China-Taiwan (and Philippines, etc) and some of the stupidity lighting off in the Western Hemisphere and the middle east as well.  We're not picky!

During the demob after the Cold War, a LOT of stuff went missing.  It was chaotic, as we were demobing headquarters units in Europe at the same time we were standing down some combat units while sending others to the Balkans and the middle east.  We also were shipping stuff from prepo stocks with little oversight, as we sent equipment from storage sites that were closing through installations that were closing and arsenals that were closing were signing stuff to other commands that were also downsizing and/or closing.  I was in Germany 5-10 years after the initial drawdown and we were still seeing the impacts of this, as one of my first duties when I was a Battalion S4 was to clear the backlog of Reports of Survey for missing/lost equipment in my unit.  At a couple of points, I sat down with various investigators who were still looking for stuff that had gone missing years before.  I would like to say things were settling down at the turn of the century; however, I would be lying!  We continued to close down installations and turn in equipment to places like Pimasens that looked like they were 3/4 abandoned, and no one was tracking the piles of turned-in equipment that was more-or-less stacked in warehouses upon turn in until the local-national workforce (which had been seriously downsized) "got around to it" or the yards full of tanks, howitzers, APCs, etc that looked like they had been sitting around unattended for a long time. Once 9/11 happened, the tracking of turned-in equipment fell to the bottom of the "give a shit" list, as there were mountains of M923-series trucks, older HMMWVs, HF/AM radios, furniture, tentage, and you name it as heavy units were sent to the GWOT and redeployed to CONUS at the end of their tours. Any equipment they left in Europe was turned in.  In the early 2000's, the Russians were the "good guys" in the GWOT.  Fast Forward to 2012 when ISIS was running amok in Al Anbar and Iraqi Army units were walking away (or running away) from Motor Pools full of M1A1 (IQ) tanks.  I'm sure the Russians had at leas one example of an M1 or M1A1 before Ukraine.

it looks like the Russians took the treeline they were attacking. Is that right?

The Russians prepare to destroy a lot of artillery shells using DKRP-4 line charge, and many blocks of TNT.
I wonder what is wrong with them. pic.twitter.com/SakO1KrrXP

— Roy\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GrandpaRoy2) May 5, 2024

Here is a Russian FPV drone with a birch plywood and hardboard fuselage.
The operator says he is testing it using different frequencies, in response to new Ukrainian EW jammers. pic.twitter.com/JaaymgOzm0

— Roy\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GrandpaRoy2) May 6, 2024

The Russians claim their engineers blew up a downed Storm Shadow in the Zaporizhzhia region.
Whatever it was, the explosion was remarkable. pic.twitter.com/7AngreiOKF

— Roy\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GrandpaRoy2) May 6, 2024

What was that medieval movie? King says to his commander "Tell the archers to fire." Commander says "But sire, we will also hit our own men.?" King says "But we have reserves and they don't. Tell the archers to fire."
Freaking Russians. "Tell the tank to keep firing."

There are still Western military officers -- including most flag ranks -- watching videos like the one below and denying FPV and other cheap DJI drones have fundamentally changed the way wars on the ground are fought.

Drone War\uD83E\uDDF5
1/7 https://t.co/0I9QTYxIds

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 6, 2024

A year ago Ukraine had 10,000 drone operators, one per 100 troops

It has trained far more since then.  

In fact, the AFU has created a military drone branch co-equal to infantry and artillery branches.

2/7https://t.co/tjmH68LQVW

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 6, 2024

In some forward areas there are now as many Ukrainian drone operators as infantry because FPV drones have all but replaced crew served infantry weapons.https://t.co/tCxzc88klV
3/7

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 6, 2024

Ukrainian mortar teams, ATGM teams, recoilless rifle teams, and artillery forward observer teams have all been so heavily "supplemented" by drones it amounts to replacement.

4/7 pic.twitter.com/Ldpt9GJ4SD

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 6, 2024

Ukrainian infantry patrols have been all but replaced by quadcopter drone surveillance.

And since AFU drone operators have a much lower casualty rate than AFU infantry doing the same work.  

They are gaining more combat experience over time for less blood spent.

5/7 pic.twitter.com/COh487F5RR

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 6, 2024

If I were a small drone aware senior Western ground forces officer.

(Yes, I know few/none exist)

I'd be telling junior grade combat arms officers and senior NCO's to learn how to operate DJI  drones out of their own pocket.

Operating drones is the way modern wars are

6/7

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 6, 2024

... fought. Learning that skill is a survival issue for junior officers and enlisted ranks in Western armies with intellectually backward leadership.

And the lack of DJI drones on all US Army forward observer teams is exhibit A of that backwardness.

7/7 End pic.twitter.com/flsT81bJIj

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 6, 2024

Braveheart.
“Beg pardon Sire, won’t we hit our own troops?”
“Yes, but we’ll hit theirs as well.  We have reserves.  Attack!”

More Georgia background - what exactly is being proposed and protested?

From Human Rights Watch:
From Radio Free Europe
Russia does indeed abuse "foreign agent" designations, applying it to people who merely speak out against the government. But clearly labeling organizations that receive foreign funds is a valid requirement IMO. If a media outlet receives large amounts of funding from foreign sources, should you know about it? For instance, the Washington Times that we frequently cite for non-MSM stories is owned  under "a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity." Does that make it invalid? No. Is it good to know? Yes. Should non-profit organizations operating for social purposes be known and understood for who they are? Yes. For instance, don't you think it's worth knowing what the Open Society Foundations do with their $21B in annual spending? Heck yeah!

So while it's easy to look at what's going on in Tbilisi and support the people, the truth is more nuanced than the headlines would have you believe. IMO, the bill serves a legitimate public purpose, but is too broad and too vague. As such, it should be withdrawn and rewritten.

BTW, domestic politics in Georgia are... challenging. Post-Soviet states are a mixed bag, with some becoming very successful democracies (see Estonia) and some being repressive dictatorships (like Kazahkstan). An active electorate that takes to the street regularly is probably the best thing Georgia can have, even if instability serves Russian regional interests.

BTW, if anybody here has been in Georgia or has contacts in Georgia that can add context to my background please add it!

We have such an investment in the idea of a gold-plated solution to everything, I think we probably aren’t learning as much as we could.
I also suspect that the solutions we think we have in hand aren’t going to be as effective as assumed, and contrary to both the Russians and Ukrainians, most Americans no longer have the technical savvy to find solutions themselves.

Africa always wins and after a bunch of this from the Chinese when they do get around to winning its going to be gruesome.

Agree but we need to help speed up the process.

Part of the issue is that higher ranking officers can't make the claim they're "managing" a multi-billion dollar program if they're managing the acquisition of 3,000 DJI Mavic type quadcopters. There's also still this mindset that these small UAS are "toys". Now they're finding out these "toys" can wreak havoc even on a "modern" battlefield. I gave up talking with senior DoD folks years ago trying to get them to understand the potential of the technology. Most of the working level folks "got it" pretty quickly. Management, not so much.

Today is Infantry Day. Congratulations Together we will win! Glory to Ukraine!

Video:
47 separate mechanized brigade
3 separate assault brigade
93rd OMBr Kholodny Yar
28 OMBr named after Knights of the Winter Campaign
and the Department of Public Relations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

???????? ???? ??????. ???????. ????? ??????????! ????? ???????!

?????:
47 ?????? ???????????? ???????
3 ?????? ???????? ???????
93-?? ???? ???????? ??
28 ???? ??. ??????? ???????? ??????
?? ?????????? ??'????? ? ????????????? ??? pic.twitter.com/UQwhQe6M7v

— ??????????? ???? ??? (@GeneralStaffUA) May 6, 2024

I have feared OTS commercial drones and FPV drones since about 2017 when I realized a spec ops squad camped out a a major airbase could take out parked jets and shutdown runway ops.. and that's before weapons were put on them. I have tried my best within the DoD to get senior leaders and even "Weapons School" patches to acknowledge that this is a serious threat and continue to get scoffed at so I've almost given up. The problem is a cultural one. Many senior GO/FO leaders grew up on "sexy" multi-million dollar weapon systems like fighter jets so drones are beneath them despite how low or high tech they might be.

AI-driven, networked weaponized drone swarms that can complete the ISR and Targeting process on their own are the future. I can envision them small enough to the point they can be delivered behind enemy lines onboard stealth cruise missiles and wreck havoc on fixed bases. Does that mean 5th and 6th gen jets are going away? Absolutely not but these swarms will complement traditional programs.

And therein lies the problem of why Western senior leaders avoid the drone discussion.. they see it as one or the other as opposed to one with the other.

Couldn't agree more with both of you. The sad part is we realize it's the young troop that is going to suffer by our senior leaders lack of forethought and vision. And we'll be once again racing (if not already) to find an adhoc solution. But I guess that's become something of the American way.. figure out as we go and hope it's faster than the bad guy can figure it out.

#Summary for the morning of May 6, 2024

▪️For the first time in a long time, there are reports of the enemy using MBEC near Crimea. Off the western coast of the peninsula, up to 5 unmanned boats of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were destroyed, the target of which was military boats in one of the bays in the area of ​​the settlement. Black Sea. There were no losses or casualties on our part.

▪️ In the Kherson direction, the Russian Armed Forces are increasingly using FABs with UMPC along the enemy shore, destroying concentrations of enemy forces. The enemy responds with artillery and many drones. There have been reports of two cases of the use of ammunition by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which cause severe burns in victims, after which the upper layers of the soft tissues of the victims are covered with a “wooden crust”. Military doctors argue about the nature of the burns; local fighters call the ammunition “napalm.” The enemy maintains the presence of small groups of infantry in Krynki.

▪️On the Zaporozhye front in Rabotino, assault operations by the Russian Armed Forces continue, reports of the dense work of enemy artillery. North-west of Verbovoy, the enemy tried to deliver an assault group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in an infantry fighting vehicle, but was covered by our fire. Several enemy attacks were repelled.

▪️On the Vremevsky ledge, battles in Urozhainy and near Staromayorsky report the advance of our troops east of Urozhainy 1 km to the north.

▪️In the South Donetsk direction, the Russian Armed Forces are fighting in Krasnogorovka near the industrial zone after installing a flag at a fireproof plant. Clashes in Georgievka and near the eastern outskirts of Paraskovievka.

▪️In the Pokrovsky direction (west of Avdeevka) there are battles in Netailovo. To the west of Berdychi, the Russian Armed Forces are conducting an offensive in the Novoprovsky area. After the success in Arkhangelskoye, the offensive of our troops towards Kalinovo develops.

▪️In the direction to Chasov Yar there are heavy battles on the eastern outskirts of the city. The battle continues for the flanks of the front sector: in the north - at Bogdanovka, in the south - at Ivanovsky (Red).

▪️In the Kharkov and Sumy directions, strikes are constantly being carried out on enemy positions; the X-51 Lancet UAV is increasingly being used to destroy armored vehicles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In the rear areas of these areas, enemy targets are also under constant attack.

▪️In the Belgorod region, Stary Khutor of the Valuysky urban district was shelled, Shebekino was hit by a UAV of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. From the Bryansk region they reported shelling in the area in the village of Lomakovka, Starodub district.

▪️The enemy used 75 different ammunition to attack the civilian population of the DPR, two civilians were wounded in the village. Nikolaevka as a result of bombs being dropped from an enemy drone.

▪️Summary compiled by: Two majors

https://t.me/dva_majors/41690

Interesting \uD83D\uDC40\uD83D\uDEA4\uD83D\uDCA5 pic.twitter.com/5IvxbV6o8B

— MAKS 23 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83D\uDC40 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) May 6, 2024

Ukrainian New Weapons: Drones, Robots, Radios, Mines Detection, AI. Brave1 Cluster - United24

Drones of various modifications attacking on land, in the sky, and in the water. Radios that cannot be jammed by electronic warfare means. A system that detects mines using artificial… pic.twitter.com/CjFEZq7G1t

TOGA  (@TOGAjano21) May 5, 2024

Ten years of Azov with Redis.

Ukraine War: 'If we go home, a lot of inexperienced soldiers will die'

1 hour ago

By James Waterhouse, BBC Ukraine correspondent, Donetsk region



Under the rich, leafy cover of the Ukrainian spring, an artillery unit awaits.

Only a fraction of their job is firing rockets from their 50-year-old launcher. Most of their time is spent digging a new bunker into the hillside.

They're outgunned and outmanned by the Russian invaders, 5km (3 miles) away in the eastern Donetsk region, who are inching closer.

Incoming American ammunition is expected to help, but how the Ukrainian government is addressing its need to recruit is controversial.

A new mobilisation bill passed earlier in April was criticised for not including a limit on time served. A clause aimed at demobilising soldiers after three years was dropped at the army's request.

Now, war-weary troops have told the BBC the military needs to "rethink" how it recruits.

Despite Kyiv lowering the conscription age to find replacements, it's not just a numbers game.

Thousands of trained troops like Oleksandr, a radio operator in the 21st separate Mechanised Brigade, have been fighting for the best part of two years without a proper rest.

"If we go home," he says, "inexperienced soldiers might be able to hold the line against the Russians, but a lot of them will die."

He taps his handset in a bunker where he also sleeps with four other soldiers. The thickness of the air tells you it's well lived in.

Outside, the woodland provides an illusion of calm, periodically jarred by a whistling artillery shell overhead.

This time last year, the arrival of spring's hard soil brought a sense of optimism with an anticipated counter-offensive. The conditions make it easier to move men and machinery.

Today, it just makes these troops' job of digging new defences more difficult.

"My men have become professionals after fighting for so long," says their commander with the call sign "Chyzh", proudly.

He points to their mobile rocket launcher under camouflage netting.

"They know each vehicle is like a woman," he claims. "Each one is individual, with her own whims and characteristics."

Tucked away, their 1970s truck symbolises the current state of Ukraine's military. Old-fashioned in many ways yet modern in others - with a GPS guiding system - it lacks one key resource: rockets.

While Russia's army isn't a model of modern warfare, it is advancing on multiple parts of the eastern front line. It's why we're seeing new Ukrainian trenches being dug 30km (19 miles) back.

The invading forces have learnt tactical lessons and enjoy air superiority. Moscow has also drastically increased weapons production and is mobilising men at a faster rate than Ukraine can.

The sentiment in our wooded trench mirrors the Ukrainian government's mantra of "fighting for as long as it takes".

While the soldiers we meet might not have felt they could speak entirely freely, it's not an issue for Illia, whom I meet in the relative privacy of the main square of Kramatorsk, in eastern Ukraine.

Illia, a combat medic, thinks the military has been dishonest about what signing up means.

He argues that it would be more effective if recruiters told new soldiers that the first six months are "super hard" - but that they would then be trained for more specific roles.

"The infantry is the hardest job in the military," he says.

Tired as Illia is, the idea of fighting alongside a petrified conscript in a trench is not an appealing one. He also thinks a lack of transparency about the realities of the battlefield is further putting men off from registering to fight.

"What if this war lasts 10 years?"

Back in Kyiv, as we stroll down her normal jogging route, local MP Inna Sovsun explains to me why she abstained on the mobilisation bill vote. Her partner serves as a frontline medic.

"I spend countless nights worrying where he is," she explains. "It's the experience of millions of Ukrainians."

Ms Sovsun thinks there should be more of a focus on rotation, arguing Ukraine has enough men of a fighting age to swap with the 500,000 or so who are currently fighting.

"There are highly trained soldiers who can't be swapped, but what about the people in trenches?" she asks. "It takes time to train them, but what if this war lasts for 10 years?"

"We can't pretend to rely on the same people who started serving on day one."

Until now, Ukraine's army recruitment has been hampered by historical corruption claims and diminishing volunteers.

Now ministers are pursuing two key objectives: restoring trust in the system whilst increasing the pressure on men to fight.

Both made more difficult by the battlefield not going Ukraine's way.

Additional reporting by Hanna Chornous, Thanyarat Doksone, Anastasiia Levchenko and Hanna Tsyba.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68932127

The Cheka-OGPU learned that a monitoring and defibrillation system was purchased for the personal resuscitation of Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya; ventilator; device for cardiopulmonary resuscitation and a number of other equipment. We showed the list of equipment to the resuscitation doctor and this is how he commented:  “A set for one patient suffering from a serious illness, to provide him with urgent care on site, monitor vital functions, and also for the possibility of transporting him by plane or incubated car.”

As the Cheka-OGPU previously reported, after the “noise” with Ramzan Kadyrov’s hospitalization at the Central Clinical Hospital, all the equipment necessary to create a world-class intensive care unit in Chechnya was purchased. Now, if there is a sharp and urgent exacerbation of the disease in the head of Chechnya, it does not need to be urgently managed by the Central Clinical Hospital, but, on the contrary, specialists from the Central Clinical Hospital can urgently arrive in Chechnya.

https://t.me/vchkogpu/46315



The Cheka-OGPU became aware of official damage data after an allegedly reflected missile attack on Crimea. In total, according to the Russian Armed Forces, on the night of April 30, 12 MGM-140B ATACMS ballistic missiles were fired at two targets on the peninsula.

The first target was the military unit 61261 Air Defense of the Southern Military District of the Russian Defense Ministry. There was a large fire at the facility, which was extinguished only in the morning. 6 servicemen were hospitalized with varying degrees of injuries.

The second target was the military airfield in Dzhankoy, which was attacked twice over the past month. On the territory of military unit 46453, where the 39th Guards Helicopter Regiment of the 27th Mixed Aviation Division, 4 Aerospace Forces and Air Defense Commands of the Southern Military District of the Russian Defense Ministry are stationed, 5 servicemen were injured. Emergency services and police were not allowed into the facility: the fire was localized on their own.

https://t.me/vchkogpu/47927



Sources from the Cheka-OGPU report serious problems with intermediaries involved in processing migrants in Russia. Currently, all the main structures that were associated with the GUVM (Department for Migration Affairs) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation have frozen their activities. In Moscow, almost all intermediary structures that collected packages of documents for obtaining patents, invitations, visas, etc. were associated with the Agalarov clan. At one time, after fellow countryman Telman Ismailov fled from Russia, back in 2011, the Agalarovs took over the network of intermediary offices of the then FMS. Personal friendship with the director of the Federal Migration Service Romodanovsky allowed the Agalarov clan to do business with work permits and visas. From the FMS, the issue of interaction was personally supervised by the head of the internal security of the Russian Migration Service, Anatoly Faleev.

The workhorse who directly led the production process was Yuri Sudalin, the former head of the department for issuing work permits in Moscow. At one time, he was fired from the Federal Migration Service due to abuses related to the issuance of work permits. After Romodanovsky’s resignation, the network of offices, together with the work team, smoothly passed under the roof of the new boss, Valentina Kazanova, who, as the Cheka-OGPU wrote last year, celebrated her daughter’s wedding in Crocus on a grand scale. After the terrorist attack in Crocus, the Agalarovs were forced to go into the shadows and their mediation business will apparently be completely squeezed out. According to a source from the Cheka-OGPU, the likelihood that Kazakova’s resignation will take place after May 8 is extremely high. Therefore, the main shadow designer Yuri Sudalin on May 6 irrevocably moves with his entire family for permanent residence in Germany.

https://t.me/vchkogpu/47954

Statement issued by the Islamic Resistance:



In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
“Permission is given to those who fight because they have been wronged, and indeed, God is Able to grant them victory.”
Believe God Almighty

In support of our steadfast Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and in support of their valiant and honorable resistance, and in response to the enemy attack that targeted the Bekaa region, the bombing of the Mujahideen of the Islamic Resistance at 09:00 on Monday 05/06/2024, the headquarters of the Golan Division (210) At Nafah base with dozens of Katyusha rockets

“And victory is only from Allah, the Mighty, the Wise.”
Monday 05-06-2024 AD
27 Shawwal 1445 AH

https://t.me/C_Military1/49822

\uD83D\uDCA5  A few days ago, we reported massive fires in occupied Crimea, suspecting munition stockpiles. Now we know: The Ukrainian ATACMS strikes destroyed multiple Russian Iskander ballistic missile systems along with their missile stockpiles. https://t.co/mDX4jMjReH pic.twitter.com/nb63qBzhw2

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 6, 2024

\uD83D\uDD25 Massive fires in occupied Crimea. Might be Russian munitions stockpiles given the scale. Fires began 6 hours ago.
Russian MoD claims to have shot down 4 ATACMS missiles this night. Recently the US government stated that not a single ATACMS missile has been shot down by Russia. pic.twitter.com/Lg6esvqe2g

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 4, 2024

I might've missed this in Capta's Reddit Roundup^TM yesterday, but this is a dude being blown into tiny pieces.

Is it just me or are these drones on Steroids now? Holy cow it not only blew him apart,t it sent him up through a tree , It's a bird, It's a Plane, No it's just Ivan learning to fly pic.twitter.com/ZFNTnOZ4bA

— \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDFF4???Sgt. HIMARS\uD83C\uDFF4???\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6(Fella) (@SgtHIMARS2) May 5, 2024

Putin instructed the Ministry of Defense to conduct exercises to test the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The exercises are aimed, among other things, at unconditionally ensuring the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in response to provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials against Russia.

https://t.me/RIAKremlinpool/12930

Truly brutal.

I think it was originally posted a few days ago.

Cope cages on submarines...

SSBN K-114 Tula project 667BDRM - DELTA-IV
SSN K-157 Vepr Project 971 Akula II
\uD83D\uDDFA?Gadzhievo (Murmansk region)
\uD83D\uDCF9"Vesti" (March  2024) pic.twitter.com/u8HGOXvd6H

Massimo Frantarelli  (@MrFrantarelli) March 19, 2024

Here are losses I could identify for yesterday. https://t.co/6ZeZYh0yAV pic.twitter.com/JZGD2RKQH8

Andrew Perpetua  (@AndrewPerpetua) May 6, 2024

I can't wait until they try this shit in Afghanistan.   I hope their is video of the results.

\uD83D\uDD25\uD83D\uDD25\uD83D\uDD25

The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence has released a video showing the destruction of a \uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFARussian high-speed boat by surface attack drones in the Vuzka Bay area, in the south of Crimea. pic.twitter.com/s0rsRihuFW

— Cloooud |\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GloOouD) May 6, 2024

https://twitter.com/DI_Ukraine/status/1787384782923469294

\uD83D\uDC40 A Russian Ka-29 destroys a kamikaze surface drone that took part in the morning attack on the Vuzka Bay, Crimea.

??The drone probably was equipped with R-60/R-73 air-to-air missiles and even managed to launch one at another Mi-8 helicopter, unfortunately unsuccessfully. pic.twitter.com/SG9p54kIO5

— MAKS 23 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83D\uDC40 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) May 6, 2024

1/2 Guerre d'Ukraine | 05/05/24

Secteurs :
\uD83C\uDF10 Kupiansk-Kyslivka\uD83D\uDD39U240505-1013
\uD83C\uDF10 Avdiivka-Ocheretyne\uD83D\uDD39U240505-0958
\uD83C\uDF10 Pervomaiske-Krasnohorivka\uD83D\uDD39U240505-1000
\uD83C\uDF10 Velyka novosilka-Urozhaine\uD83D\uDD39U240505-1004#UkraineRussianWar #GuerreEnUkraine pic.twitter.com/NuwS2oUs3F

Poulet volant  (@Pouletvolant3) May 6, 2024

\uD83E\uDDF5 The tragic story of Yuriy Galushko who killed 6 Russian officers in his division in occupied Donetsk:
Born in Kharkiv (Ukraine) to a WW2 veteran who passed away in 2011, he moved to Belgorod (Russia) to marry Natalia in 2013 and became a Russian citizen. They divorced since. https://t.co/Cd1bBwYt4t

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 6, 2024

His ex-wife Natalia describes him as highly intellectual with a deep love for reading books. Galushko was going blind and to pay for the needed surgery he joined the Russian army. His mother remains in Kharkiv with whom Galushko has always been close.

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 6, 2024

Galushko killed 6  Russian commanders in his artillery division with a silenced AK-12 machine gun and successfully disappeared in the dead of night upon learning that his elderly mother suffered a broken arm and had a stroke as a result of Russia's daily shelling of Kharkiv.

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 6, 2024

A native of Ukraine recruited into the Russian army allegedly fatally destroyed six Russian servicemen and escaped. His motivation was the Russian strike on Kharkiv, which led to his elderly mother having a stroke.

Now they are trying to find him in the “DPR”, but apparently he fled to the territory of Ukraine.

According to sources in the Russian media, a certain Yuri Galushko, 60, destroyed six servicemen and finished them off with control shots, after which he managed to escape with a weapon. The "DPR" announced a hunt for him, but they were not able to catch him.

He was called up from the penal colony by occupational formations on February 28, 2024, and carried out this act on 4 May.

A native of Ukraine recruited into the Russian army allegedly fatally destroyed six Russian servicemen and escaped. His motivation was the Russian strike on Kharkiv, which led to his elderly mother having a stroke.

Now they are trying to find him in the “DPR”, but apparently he… pic.twitter.com/Fch9k42VYr

— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated) May 6, 2024

US shared intel with UK showing 'high likelihood' of COVID-19 lab leak: report

The Ghost of John Boyd

Well said, each has their place and both types of systems can be made to work together to compliment each other.

Same reason many Thud pilots reupped  knowing the Washington suits were feeding them into the maw.

US EW system.

"Pulsar is a family of software-defined Electromagnetic Warfare #EW systems that leverages AI at the edge to rapidly adapt to emerging threats. Pulsar’s modular form factor can be adapted & integrated onto vehicles or aircrafts to support multiple EW mission sets" ~ Anduril pic.twitter.com/vMZtymgszP

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) May 6, 2024

“At a high level, we’re in production of these systems, so we’re pumping them out and they are being used,” said Sam El-Akkad with Anduril Industries. https://t.co/ao93AhaT4F

— Defense News (@defense_news) May 6, 2024

GeoConfirmed UKR.

Did Ukraine target an Iskander site using ATACMS on May 4th as suggested?

We have confirmation through satellite imagery that at the selected site, -what seems to be- Iskander launchers and other vehicles were present in significant numbers (over 10) a few… https://t.co/XpreXkdwwo pic.twitter.com/BSIl6ZsZ1K

GeoConfirmed  (@GeoConfirmed) May 6, 2024

First image which supposedly shows a Ukrainian naval drone carrying a R-73 heat seeking air-to-air missile. The fact that it shows one empty slot, could mean it has fired one of the two. https://t.co/UDjHTL4tX8 pic.twitter.com/WW5THkRTWB

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) May 6, 2024

Russian channel Fighterbomber claims that Ukrainian naval drones are now equipped with R-60/73 air-to-air missiles.

"There were no launches yet, but Ukrainians were able to somehow connect the rocket with the USV telecontrol systems. So far to no avail," he adds. pic.twitter.com/5H6eUhWzw8

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) May 6, 2024

Next up, try putting some with anti aircraft missiles, and some with Harpoon anti ship missiles.

??Hit by a guided air bomb \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6AASM-250 "Hammer" on the place of deployment of \uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFARussian drone operators in the village of Novoprokopivka, Zaporizhzhia region pic.twitter.com/9C7Ut5q5jY

— \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukrainian Front (@front_ukrainian) May 6, 2024

After the first hit, look toward the right hand side of the image as the tank continues to move forward, looks like two more Ukrainian drones setting up to strike it again in coordination.

A Russian T-90M "No Analogue" tank in the #Avdiivka area taken out by drones from the 47th Mechanized Brigade.#OSINT #UkraineRussiaWar #UkraineWar #UkraineKrieg #Ukraine #Russia

Re-Tweet Appreciated pic.twitter.com/O22WWsQq28

— OSINT (Uri) \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 \uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDE7 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEE\uD83C\uDDF1 (@UKikaski) May 6, 2024

Russian field camp for the production of decoys. https://t.co/MSNR3sIViO pic.twitter.com/Ol9rAS9e32

— Special Kherson Cat \uD83D\uDC08\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@bayraktar_1love) May 6, 2024

Fewer and fewer IFVs in the Russian army

This is why the golf karts pic.twitter.com/jqoZ4Fj8nf

PS01  (@PStyle0ne1) May 6, 2024

Tick tock...

First relatively intact Kh-69? Unfortunately, without the seeker section... https://t.co/TU31ht9Uh7 pic.twitter.com/aePKPEAXHb

— LotA (@LotA_IL) May 6, 2024

Russian Navy May Be Driven Out Of Baltic Seahttps://t.co/3oqsZZyLFY

Estonia has proposed a plan.

Estonia, Poland, Finland and Sweden have possibilities to completely block the Baltic Sea for the Russian fleet.

This was stated by the commander of the Estonian Defence Forces,… pic.twitter.com/zSwDFrQkKQ

— Lew Anno Suport#Israel #Ukraine 24/2-22 (@anno1540) May 6, 2024

The number of ships you have doesn't always matter if I can swarm them all with anti-ship cruise missiles and airpower.

lol, they had to get this close to destroy it in daylight.  Set up some cheaper Stinger missiles on a rotating remote control mount like they use for their camera system and fire away.

Footage from a Russian Ka-29 helicopter, firing at the Ukrainian naval drone carrying a R-73 air-to-air missile. Eventually it is destroyed. https://t.co/r1LwNiRLmN pic.twitter.com/6qBPHwrqTX

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) May 6, 2024

U.S. Missile defense.

Two videos showing separating RVs carried on top of the Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicles (ARAV) getting intercepted by SM-3's KKV. https://t.co/Ts2leM3aQb pic.twitter.com/yA416GW1Da

Zach  (@ThrustWR) May 6, 2024

Last one for today: a separating Re-enttry Vehicle (RV) for the Navy/MDA Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicles (ARAV). More specifically, ARAV-B and a few other variants. These are made up of Surface to Air Missile booster sections and emulate ballistic missiles for ships. pic.twitter.com/XzteyWB34V

Zach  (@ThrustWR) April 23, 2024

Kratos is the provider of these target systems. You can see here that there are about 3-4 distinct front-end RVs. pic.twitter.com/aJ3RsMaj0j

Zach  (@ThrustWR) April 23, 2024

Photo of leaflets being dropped on Rafah, Gaza, advising residents to relocate to the humanitarian zone in Mawashi.

Flyer 1:

Urgent warning!

To all the residents and displaced people in the Al-Shouka municipality area and in the neighborhoods of Al-Salam, Al-Geneina, Tabet… pic.twitter.com/SEYhTSJioC

— OSINT (Uri) \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 \uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDE7 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEE\uD83C\uDDF1 (@UKikaski) May 6, 2024