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Posted: 4/23/2024 11:49:45 PM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime]
First off, tremendous props to LoBrau, who saw Ukraine coming well in advance and started a record setting thread. May that record stand forever, because nothing would please us more than for there to no longer be anything to talk about.

What has become evident since February of 2022 is that there is a global reshuffling taking place, with three primary players behind most of the conflict in the world today. Discussion of current geopolitics cannot be constrained to one country or conflict.

What this thread is:
News and discussion related to political / military actions by Russia / Iran / China and their proxies, chief among those, North Korea.
News and discussion of the relationships between Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
News and discussion of responses to Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
Related Grey Zone / hybrid warfare / “competition short of war.”
Relevant or interesting technical discussion.
Relevant economic / social / historical discussion.
Reliable reporting from Russian / Iranian / Chinese sources.
Russian / Iranian / Chinese perspectives and factual evaluation thereof.
Political topics in the US and / or elsewhere which bear directly on these issues, including the politics of foreign aid.
Current focus is on the Russian war against and in Ukraine, however this could change if the Ukraine war cooled off and Taiwan heated up.  Related topics are always allowed.
Secondary but related topics like Wagner in Africa, uprising in Georgia, or a Third Chechen War.
Reasonable tangents.

What this thread is not:
US and / or foreign political issues which do not directly bear on these topics, including campaigning / advocating for one party or candidate.

General rules:
Discussion is expected to be conducted in good faith and assertions of fact should be substantiated.
In case of a question on whether a subtopic or line of discussion is relevant to this thread, the following members should be considered co-owners with decision making authority- AlmightyTallest, Capta, and SaltwaterHillbilly.



The Axis of Upheaval
How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order
By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine
May/June 2024
Published on April 23, 2024






In the early morning of January 2, Russian forces launched a massive missile attack on the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv that killed at least five civilians, injured more than 100, and damaged infrastructure. The incident was notable not just for the harm it caused but also because it showed that Russia was not alone in its fight. The Russian attack that day was carried out with weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran. Over the past two years, all three countries have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Moscow has deployed more than 3,700 Iranian-designed drones. Russia now produces at least 330 on its own each month and is collaborating with Iran on plans to build a new drone factory inside Russia that will boost these numbers. North Korea has sent Russia ballistic missiles and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, just as Ukrainian stockpiles have dwindled. China, for its part, has become Russia’s most important lifeline. Beijing has ramped up its purchase of Russian oil and gas, putting billions of dollars into Moscow’s coffers. Just as significantly, China provides vast amounts of warfighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar- and communications-jamming equipment and jet-fighter parts. Customs records show that despite Western trade sanctions, Russia’s imports of computer chips and chip components have been steadily rising toward prewar levels. More than half of these goods come from China.

The support from China, Iran, and North Korea has strengthened Russia’s position on the battlefield, undermined Western attempts to isolate Moscow, and harmed Ukraine. This collaboration, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Cooperation among the four countries was expanding before 2022, but the war has accelerated their deepening economic, military, political, and technological ties. The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval—a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape.

The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance. It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system. When these four countries cooperate, their actions have far greater effect than the sum of their individual efforts. Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to enforce global rules. Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States.

Too many Western observers have been quick to dismiss the implications of coordination among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The four countries have their differences, to be sure, and a history of distrust and contemporary fissures may limit how close their relationships will grow. Yet their shared aim of weakening the United States and its leadership role provides a strong adhesive. In places across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the ambitions of axis members have already proved to be destabilizing. Managing the disruptive effects of their further coordination and preventing the axis from upsetting the global system must now be central objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

THE ANTI-WESTERN CLUB

Collaboration among axis members is not new. China and Russia have been strengthening their partnership since the end of the Cold War—a trend that accelerated rapidly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. China’s share of Russian external trade doubled from ten to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021, and between 2018 and 2022 Russia supplied a combined total of 83 percent of China’s arms imports. Russian technology has helped the Chinese military enhance its air defense, antiship, and submarine capabilities, making China a more formidable force in a potential naval conflict. Beijing and Moscow have also expressed a shared vision. In early 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint manifesto pledging a “no limits” partnership between their two countries and calling for “international relations of a new type”—in other words, a multipolar system that is no longer dominated by the United States.

Iran has strengthened its ties with other axis members as well. Iran and Russia worked together to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power after the onset of civil war in 2011. Joining Russia’s efforts, which include major energy agreements with Iran to shield Tehran from the effects of U.S. sanctions, China has purchased large quantities of Iranian oil since 2020. North Korea, for its part, has counted China as its primary ally and trade partner for decades, and North Korea and Russia have maintained warm, if not particularly substantive, ties. Iran has purchased North Korean missiles since the 1980s, and more recently, North Korea is thought to have supplied weapons to Iranian proxy groups, including Hezbollah and possibly Hamas. Pyongyang and Tehran have also bonded over a shared aversion to Washington: as a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, declared during a ten-day trip to Iran in 2017, the two countries “have a common enemy.”

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened the convergence among these four countries in ways that transcend their historical ties. Moscow has been among Tehran’s top suppliers of weapons over the past two decades and is now its largest source of foreign investment; Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent in the first ten months of 2022. Over the past two years, according to the White House, Russia has been sharing more intelligence with and providing more weapons to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, and Moscow has defended those proxies in debates at the UN Security Council. Last year, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of crude oil and trade between the two countries topped $240 billion, a record high. Moscow has also released millions of dollars in North Korean assets that previously sat frozen in Russian banks in compliance with Security Council sanctions. China, Iran, and Russia have held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman three years in a row, most recently in March 2024. Russia has also proposed trilateral naval drills with China and North Korea.

The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each country claims a sphere of influence: China’s “core interests,” which extend to Taiwan and the South China Sea; Iran’s “axis of resistance,” the set of proxy groups that give Tehran leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; North Korea’s claim to the entire Korean Peninsula; and Russia’s “near abroad,” which for the Kremlin includes, at a minimum, the countries that composed its historic empire. All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing these spheres of influence, and they want Washington’s presence in their respective regions reduced.

All reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West’s championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and foment domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define democracy for themselves. In the end, although they may make temporary accommodations with the United States, they do not believe that the West will accept their rise (or return) to power on the world stage. They oppose external meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances, the stationing of American nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of coercive sanctions.

Any positive vision for the future, however, is more elusive. Yet history shows that a positive agenda may not be necessary for a group of discontented powers to cause disruption. The 1940 Tripartite Pact uniting Germany, Italy, and Japan—the original “Axis”—pledged to “establish and maintain a new order of things” in which each country would claim “its own proper place.” They did not succeed, but World War II certainly brought global upheaval. The axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The countries’ shared opposition to the present order’s core tenets and their determination to bring about change form a powerful basis for collaborative action.

Fissures do exist among members of the axis. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia, for instance, while Iran and Russia compete for oil markets in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The four countries have complicated histories with each other, too. The Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941; Russia and China settled their long-standing border dispute only in 2004 and had both previously supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear programs and to isolate North Korea. Today, China may look askance at North Korea’s deepening relationship with Russia, worrying that an emboldened Kim Jong Un will aggravate tensions in Northeast Asia and draw in a larger U.S. military presence, which China does not want. Yet their differences are insufficient to dissolve the bonds forged by their common resistance to a Western-dominated world.

CATALYST IN THE KREMLIN

Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The invasion of Ukraine marked a point of no return in Putin’s long-standing crusade against the West. Putin has grown more committed to destroying not only Ukraine but also the global order. And he has doubled down on relationships with like-minded countries to accomplish his aims. Cut off from Western trade, investment, and technology since the start of the war, Moscow has had little choice but to rely on its partners to sustain its hostilities. The ammunition, drones, microchips, and other forms of aid that axis members have sent have been of great help to Russia. But the more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are taking advantage of their leverage over Moscow to expand their military capabilities and economic options.

Even before the Russian invasion, Moscow’s military assistance to Beijing was eroding the United States’ military advantage over China. Russia has provided ever more sophisticated weapons to China, and the two countries’ joint military exercises have grown in scope and frequency. Russian officers who have fought in Syria and in Ukraine’s Donbas region have shared valuable lessons with Chinese personnel, helping the People’s Liberation Army make up for its lack of operational experience—a notable weakness relative to more seasoned U.S. forces. China’s military modernization has reduced the urgency of deepening defense cooperation with Russia, but the two countries are likely to proceed with technology transfers and joint weapons development and production. In February, for instance, Russian officials confirmed that they were working with Chinese counterparts on military applications of artificial intelligence. Moscow retains an edge over Beijing in other key areas, including submarine technology, remote sensing satellites, and aircraft engines. If China can pressure a more dependent Russia to provide additional advanced technologies, the transfer could further undermine the United States’ advantages.

A similar dynamic is playing out in Russia’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Moscow and Tehran have forged what the Biden administration has called an “unprecedented defense partnership” that upgrades Iranian military capabilities. Russia has provided Iran with advanced aircraft, air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber-capabilities that would help Tehran resist a potential U.S. or Israeli military operation. And in return for North Korea’s ammunition and other military support to Russia, Pyongyang is reportedly seeking advanced space, missile, and submarine technology from Moscow. If Russia were to comply with those requests, North Korea would be able to improve the accuracy and survivability of its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and use Russian nuclear propulsion technology to expand the range and capability of its submarines. Already, Russia’s testing of North Korean weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has supplied Pyongyang with information it can use to refine its missile program, and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea launch a military spy satellite in November after two previous failures last year.

Strong relations among the four axis countries have emboldened leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran. Kim, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, indulged in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, and expressed a lack of any interest in talks with the United States. And although there does not appear to be a direct connection between their deepening partnership and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, growing support from Russia likely made Iran more willing to activate its regional proxies in the aftermath. The coordinated diplomacy and pressure from Russia and the West that brought Iran into the 2015 nuclear deal are now a distant memory. Today, Moscow and Beijing are helping Tehran resist Western coercion, making it easier for Iran to enrich uranium and reject Washington’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement.

AMERICA UNDERMINED

Collaboration among the axis members also reduces the potency of tools that Washington and its partners often use to confront them. In the most glaring example, since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has supplied Russia with semiconductors and other essential technologies that Russia previously imported from the West, undercutting the efficacy of Western export controls. All four countries are also working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar. The share of Russia’s imports invoiced in Chinese renminbi jumped from three percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2022. And in December 2023, Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct bilateral trade in their local currencies. By moving their economic transactions out of reach of U.S. enforcement measures, axis members undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions, as well as anticorruption and anti-money-laundering efforts.

Taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia can build trade and transportation networks safe from U.S. interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones and other weapons to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the United States has little power to stop transfers. If the United States were engaged in conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing could seek support from Moscow. Russia might increase its overland exports of oil and gas to its southern neighbor, reducing China’s dependence on maritime energy imports that U.S. forces could block during a conflict. Russia’s defense industrial base, now in overdrive to supply weapons for Russian troops in Ukraine, could later pivot to sustain a Chinese war effort. Such cooperation would increase the odds of China’s prevailing over the American military and help advance Russia’s goal of diminishing the United States’ geopolitical influence.

The axis is also hindering Washington’s ability to rally international coalitions that can stand against its members’ destabilizing actions. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, made it far easier for countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to do the same. And Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. Last year, they elevated Iran from observer to member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a predominantly Asian regional body, and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS—a group that China and Russia view as a counterweight to the West. Iran’s regional meddling and nuclear pursuits have made other countries wary of dealing with its government, but its participation in international forums enhances the regime’s legitimacy and presents it with opportunities to expand trade with fellow member states.

Parallel efforts by axis members in the information domain further weaken international support for U.S. positions. China, Iran, and North Korea either defended or avoided explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they all parroted the Kremlin in accusing NATO of inciting the war. Their response to Hamas’s attacks on Israel last October followed a similar pattern. Iran used the state media and social media accounts to express support for Hamas, vilify Israel, and denounce the United States for enabling Israel’s military response, while the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese media sharply criticized the United States’ enduring support for Israel. They used the war in Gaza to portray Washington as a destabilizing, domineering force in the world—a narrative that is particularly resonant in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even if axis members do not overtly coordinate their messages, they push the same themes, and the repetition makes them appear more credible and persuasive.

AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER?

Global orders magnify the strength of the powerful states that lead them. The United States, for instance, has invested in the liberal international order it helped create because this order reflects American preferences and extends U.S. influence. As long as an order remains sufficiently beneficial to most members, a core group of states will defend it. Dissenting countries, meanwhile, are bound by a collective action problem. If they were to defect en masse, they could succeed in creating an alternative order more to their liking. But without a core cluster of powerful states around which they can coalesce, the advantage remains with the existing order.

For decades, threats to the U.S.-led order were limited to a handful of rogue states with little power to upend it. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the restructuring of interstate relations it prompted have lifted the constraint on collective action. The axis of upheaval represents a new center of gravity, a group that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. The axis is ushering in an international system characterized by two orders that are becoming increasingly organized and competitive.

Historically, competing orders have invited conflict, especially at the geographical seams between them. Wars arise from specific conditions, such as a territorial dispute, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to the survival of a regime. But the likelihood that any of those conditions will lead to war increases in the presence of dueling orders. Some political science researchers have found that periods in which a single order prevailed—the balance-of-power system maintained by the Concert of Europe for much of the nineteenth century, for example, or the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War era—were less prone to conflicts than those characterized by more than one order, such as the multipolar period between the two world wars and the bipolar system of the Cold War.

The world has gotten a preview of the instability this new era of competing orders will bring, with potential aggressors empowered by the axis’s normalization of alternative rules and less afraid of being isolated if they act out. Already, Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens to engulf the wider Middle East in war. Last October, Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo in 2023, too, and Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana in December. Although internal conditions precipitated the coups in Myanmar and across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, the rising incidence of such revolts is connected to the new international arrangement. For many years, it seemed that coups were becoming less common, in large part because plotters faced significant costs for violating norms. Now, however, the calculations have changed. Overthrowing a government may still shatter relations with the West, but the new regimes can find support in Beijing and Moscow.

Further development of the axis would bring even greater tumult. So far, most collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has been bilateral. Trilateral and quadrilateral action could expand their capacity for disruption. Countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all of which chafe against the U.S.-led, Western-dominated system—could also begin working more closely with the axis. If the group grows in size and tightens its coordination, the United States and its allies will have a more difficult time defending the recognized order.

TAKING ON THE REVISIONISTS

For now, U.S. national security strategy ranks China as a higher priority than Iran, North Korea, or even Russia. That assessment is strategically sound when considering the threat that individual countries pose to the United States, but it does not fully account for the cooperation among them. U.S. policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should undercut the axis’s appeal by sharpening the attractions of the existing order.

If the United States is to counter an increasingly coordinated axis, it cannot treat each threat as an isolated phenomenon. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe, for example, in order to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. It is already clear that Russia’s success in Ukraine benefits a revisionist China by showing that it is possible, if costly, to thwart a united Western effort. Even as Washington rightly sees China as its top priority, addressing the challenge from Beijing will require competing with other members of the axis in other parts of the world. To be effective, the United States will need to devote additional resources to national security, engage in more vigorous diplomacy, develop new and stronger partnerships, and take a more activist role in the world than it has of late.

Driving wedges between members of the axis, on the other hand, will not work. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some strategists suggested that the United States align itself with Russia to balance China. After the war began, a few held out hope that the United States could join China in an anti-Russian coalition. But unlike President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s, which took advantage of a Sino-Soviet split to draw Beijing further away from Moscow, there is no equivalent ideological or geopolitical rivalry for Washington to exploit today. The price of trying would likely involve U.S. recognition of a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence in Europe and Asia—regions central to U.S. interests and ones that Washington should not allow a hostile foreign power to dominate. Breaking Iran or North Korea off from the rest of the axis would be even more difficult, given their governments’ revisionist, even revolutionary aims. Ultimately, the axis is a problem the United States must manage, not one it can solve with grand strategic gestures.

Neither the West nor the axis will become wholly distinct political, military, and economic blocs. Each coalition will compete for influence all over the world, trying to draw vital countries closer to its side. Six “global swing states” will be particularly important: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey are all middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order. These six countries—and others, too—can be expected to pursue economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ties with members of both orders. U.S. policymakers should make it a priority to deny advantages to the axis in these countries, encouraging their governments to choose policies that favor the prevailing order. In practice, that means using trade incentives, military engagement, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent swing states from hosting axis members’ military bases, giving axis members access to their technology infrastructure or military equipment, or helping them circumvent Western sanctions.

Although competition with the axis may be inevitable, the United States must try to avoid direct conflict with any of its members. To that end, Washington should reaffirm its security commitments to bolster deterrence in the western Pacific, in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States and its allies should also prepare for opportunistic aggression. If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompts U.S. military intervention, for instance, Russia may be tempted to move against another European country, and Iran or North Korea could escalate threats in their regions. Even if the axis members do not coordinate their aggression directly, concurrent conflicts could overwhelm the West. Washington will therefore need to press allies to invest in capabilities that the United States could not provide if it were already engaged in another military theater.

Confronting the axis will be expensive. A new strategy will require the United States to bolster its spending on defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic communications. Washington must direct aid to the frontlines of conflict between the axis and the West—including assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, all of which face encroachment by axis members. Revisionists are emboldened by the sense that political divisions at home or exhaustion with international engagement will keep the United States on the sidelines of this competition; a comprehensive, well-resourced U.S. strategy with bipartisan support would help counter that impression. The alternative—a reduction in the U.S. global presence—would leave the fate of crucial regions in the hands not of friendly local powers but of axis members seeking to impose their revisionist and illiberal preferences.

THE FOUR-POWER THREAT

There is a tendency to downplay the significance of growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. By turning to Beijing, this argument goes, Moscow merely signals its acceptance of the role of junior partner. Obtaining drones from Iran and munitions from North Korea demonstrates the desperation of a Russian war machine that incorrectly assumed that conquering Ukraine would be easy. China’s embrace of Russia shows only that Beijing could not achieve the positive relationship it originally sought with Europe and other Western powers. North Korea remains the world’s most isolated country, and Iran’s disruptive activities have backfired, strengthening regional cooperation among Israel, the United States, and Gulf countries.

Such analysis ignores the severity of the threat. Four powers, growing in strength and coordination, are united in their opposition to the prevailing world order and its U.S. leadership. Their combined economic and military capacity, together with their determination to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War, make for a dangerous mix. This is a group bent on upheaval, and the United States and its partners must treat the axis as the generational challenge it is. They must reinforce the foundations of the international order and push back against those who act most vigorously to undermine it. It is likely impossible to arrest the emergence of this new axis, but keeping it from upending the current system is an achievable goal.

The West has everything it needs to triumph in this contest. Its combined economy is far larger, its militaries are significantly more powerful, its geography is more advantageous, its values are more attractive, and its democratic system is more stable. The United States and its partners should be confident in their own strengths, even as they appreciate the scale of effort necessary to compete with this budding anti-Western coalition. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 7:18:32 AM EDT
[#1]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By mcantu:
I wonder what would happen if Ukraine destroyed/damaged that ship, since it's a nuclear powered cruiser?
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Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By mcantu:
Originally Posted By AlmightyTallest:
That is a fat and juicy target in the area.



Images of other ships of that class before the modernization for reference.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/ARKR_Kalinin_bow_highlighted.jpg/1280px-ARKR_Kalinin_bow_highlighted.jpg
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2b/BCGN_Kalinin_1991.jpg/1280px-BCGN_Kalinin_1991.jpg


HI Sutton reference of this exact ship.
https://imageio.forbes.com/specials-images/imageserve/5f363983311f7c421e5597dd/Satellite-image-of-the-battle-cruiser-Admiral-Nakhimov-in-the-shipyard-at/0x0.jpg?format=jpg&crop=1528,859,x0,y28,safe&width=1440

https://cdn-media.tass.ru/width/1020_b9261fa1/tass/m2/en/uploads/i/20230530/1392957.jpg
https://cdn1.img.sputnikglobe.com/img/101964/57/1019645714_0:0:3011:2048_1440x900_80_0_1_1fcc6f32fafa38088e2b904eeef71714.jpg.webp?source-sid=rian_photo
I wonder what would happen if Ukraine destroyed/damaged that ship, since it's a nuclear powered cruiser?



Not much different than when the cruiser Moscow was sunk.  The Russians had dive teams go down to recover a few nuclear warheads that were supposedly on board.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 7:19:45 AM EDT
[#2]
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Originally Posted By BigGrumpyBear:


See! More proof the MIC is fucking over the American taxpayer!

We spend billions every year buying new stuff from them because they designed all of our bombs, explosives, missiles and shells to be one use items! Eisenhower warned us about this!

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Originally Posted By BigGrumpyBear:
Originally Posted By ITCHY-FINGER:
Originally Posted By Saltwater-Hillbilly:


Technically, they were destroyed when they detonated.  In 33 years, I never got to re-use a 155mm projectile, a STINGER missile, a LAW/AT-4, or a 2.75 rocket once I had fired it!

Same.
Although once dropping rounds down an 81mm mortar led to deafening silence. After kicking the side of the tube for a while we had the option of tipping the tube while a volunteer tries to grab the round or calling EOD. We called EOD. But I dont think anyone re-used that round nor was it "intercepted" in the Russian sense.


See! More proof the MIC is fucking over the American taxpayer!

We spend billions every year buying new stuff from them because they designed all of our bombs, explosives, missiles and shells to be one use items! Eisenhower warned us about this!



Well played sir lol.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 7:37:23 AM EDT
[#3]

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 7:43:20 AM EDT
[#4]










Link Posted: 5/7/2024 7:46:16 AM EDT
[Last Edit: AlmightyTallest] [#5]
the DPICM on a group of pinned down Russians, oof.


https://x.com/UKikaski/status/1787798032529957158
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 7:51:28 AM EDT
[Last Edit: Prime] [#6]

In previously unreported details of an investigation under way into the missiles, the office of Ukraine's top prosecutor, Andriy Kostin, also told Reuters that the failure rate of the North Korean weaponry appeared to be high.

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 7:53:35 AM EDT
[#7]
This is the one tank I fully expected to see Florks putting extra ERA on to help drone proof it.



Armiya TV report on the 🇺🇸M1A1SA Abrams 🇺🇦47 tank of the Separate Mechanized Brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction.

The on-board screens of this machine are equipped with ARAT-1 dynamic protection.
Among the advantages, the crew noted the accuracy of the gun and its stabilization, maneuverability (the crew of this tank accelerated to 72 km/h), the quality of the thermal imaging sights for the gun and the commander's machine gun installation. Among the disadvantages: lack of additional protection for the tower (we are talking about M32 ARAT-2 units), lack of high-explosive fragmentation shells.
In addition to fighting enemy infantry, the tank also works against armored vehicles.

It is worth noting that most of the inscriptions on the interfaces of the instrument panels have been translated into Ukrainian. Also, in the last photo, you can see the consequences of an indirect hit by an enemy kamikaze UAV "Lancet".
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Link Posted: 5/7/2024 7:55:04 AM EDT
[#8]
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Originally Posted By Prime:

In previously unreported details of an investigation under way into the missiles, the office of Ukraine's top prosecutor, Andriy Kostin, also told Reuters that the failure rate of the North Korean weaponry appeared to be high.

View Quote



lol, I am seeing a pattern here, but I just can't place my finger on it.  Perhaps dictator state sponsored ballistic missiles made from commercial components have a high failure rate?
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 7:57:36 AM EDT
[#9]










Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:00:13 AM EDT
[#10]

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:02:06 AM EDT
[#11]
🇾🇪🇺🇸 According to rumors circulating online, the Americans have reportedly offered the Houthis an agreement that would allow ships to enter ports under Ansar Allah's control, in exchange for the Houthis ceasing their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.

It's not that the Houthis are heavily dependent on the coalition's permission. Ships and boats have been plying the established routes to the Yemeni coast anyway. Yes, they were sometimes intercepted, but most of them reached their destination.



Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:05:44 AM EDT
[Last Edit: AlmightyTallest] [#12]
Again, this turret top and side need the ERA or ARAT treatment.  It hit the ammo blowout panels.


under FPV attack.
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Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:15:48 AM EDT
[#13]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By AlmightyTallest:
the DPICM on a group of pinned down Russians, oof.


https://x.com/UKikaski/status/1787798032529957158
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What band and song?
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:19:18 AM EDT
[#14]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By doc540:

What band and song?
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The Offspring - The Kids Aren't Alright (Official Music Video)
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:26:53 AM EDT
[#15]



The Russian resource ASTRA wrote on April 30:
The air defense unit of the South Military District of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was attacked by missiles last night in the village of Donskoe in the Simferopol district of the annexed Crimea, ASTRA found out. As a result of the attack, a fire broke out on the territory of the military unit, and it took more than one and a half hours to extinguish it. Wounded servicemen of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the exact number of wounded is unknown.

Analyzing the pictures from May 2, you can see two places that were hit during the attack on April 30.

As a result, the hangar was destroyed and 1 hit hit the field. Unfortunately, we cannot say whether there was something in the field at the place of the impact due to the lack of pictures before the attack. It is not known what exactly was in the hangar, but judging by the amount of equipment and tanks around, it can be definitely noted that the part is working and actively used by the enemy.


https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8095

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:28:13 AM EDT
[#16]
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Originally Posted By Prime:
Originally Posted By doc540:

What band and song?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7iNbnineUCI

Thanks.  Sounded familiar.  Daughter used to crank up "Hit That".  Hated the groove.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:32:06 AM EDT
[#17]
Remember when reading anything from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, that if they are unhappy or fearful of what the U.S. is doing then we are doing something right.

https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-05/united-states-nuclear-weapons-2024/#post-heading

The United States contends that Russia’s “suspension” of New START implementation is “legally invalid” (US State Department 2023c). In response, the United States adopted four countermeasures in 2023 that it claimed were fully consistent with international law 1) no longer providing biannual data updates to Russia; 2) withholding from Russia notifications regarding treaty-accountable items (i.e. missiles and launchers) required under the treaty; 3) refraining from facilitating inspection activities on US territory; and 4) not providing Russia with telemetric information on US ICBM and SLBM launches (US State Department 2023c).
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46 B-52 bombers are currently equipped with the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile and both the B-52 and the new B-21 bombers will receive the new AGM-181 Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), which will have very similar capabilities to the sea-launched cruise missile proposed by the 2018 NPR.
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The current strategic nuclear war plan—OPLAN 8010–12—consists of “a family of plans” directed against four identified adversaries: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Known as “Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment,” OPLAN 8010–12 first entered into effect in July 2012 in response to operational order Global Citadel. The plan is flexible enough to absorb normal changes to the posture as they emerge, including those flowing from the NPR. Several updates have been made since 2012, but more substantial updates will trigger the publication of what is formally considered a “change.” The April 2019 change refocused the plan toward “great power competition,” incorporated a new cyber plan, and reportedly blurred the line between nuclear and conventional attacks by “fully incorporat[ing] non-nuclear weapons as an equal player” (Arkin and Ambinder 2022a, 2022b).
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The 400 deployed Minuteman IIIs carry one warhead each, either a 300-kiloton W87/Mk21 or a 335-kiloton W78/Mk12A. ICBMs equipped with the W78/Mk12A, however, could technically be uploaded to carry two or three independently targetable warheads each, for a total of 800 warheads available for the ICBM force. The USAF occasionally test-launches Minuteman III missiles with unarmed multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to maintain and signal the capability to reequip the Minuteman III missiles with additional reentry vehicles, if desired. The most recent such test occurred on September 6, 2023, when a Minuteman III equipped with three test reentry vehicles was launched from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California and flew approximately 4,200 miles to the US ICBM testing ground at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands (US Air Force 2023e).

Although the Minuteman III was initially deployed in 1970, it has been modernized several times, including in 2015, when the missiles completed a multibillion-dollar, decade-long modernization program to extend their service life until 2030. The modernized Minuteman III missiles were referred to by Air Force personnel as “basically new missiles except for the shell” (Pampe 2012).
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lol, smart fuzes to make sure each warhead is delivering over 10,000 psi pressure on the most hardened Russian missile silos.

Part of the ongoing ICBM modernization program involves upgrades to the Mk21 reentry vehicles’ arming, fuzing, and firing system at a total cost of nearly $1 billion (US Department of Defense 2023c, 32). The publicly stated purpose of this refurbishment is to extend the vehicles’ service lives, but the effort appears to also involve adding a “burst height compensation” to enhance the targeting effectiveness of the warheads (Postol 2014). A total of 743 fuze replacements—including all necessary units for the development, qualification, certification, fielding, aging, and replenishment of the fuzes—are planned to be delivered for deployment on the Minuteman IIIs as well as their replacement missile—LGM-35 Sentinel—by the end of FY26 (US Department of Defense 2023a). A cost-projection overrun of the fuze integration program unit cost triggered a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act in September 2020 but is expected to begin full-rate production in FY 2024 (Reilly 2021; US Department of Defense 2023c). As part of the Mk21A program, Lockheed Martin was awarded a sole source contract in October 2023 amounting to just under $1 billion for the engineering and manufacturing of the new reentry vehicle (US Department of Defense 2023b). These modernization efforts complement a similar fuze upgrade underway to the Navy’s W76–1/Mk4A warhead.
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But because operational submarines undergo minor repairs at times, the actual number at sea at any given time is usually closer to eight or 10. Four or five of those are thought to be on “hard alert” in their designated patrol areas, while another four or five boats could be brought to full alert status in hours or days.

Each submarine can carry up to 20 Trident II D5 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), a number reduced from 24 to meet the limits of New START. The 14 SSBNs could potentially carry up to 280 such missiles but the United States has stated that it will not deploy more than 240. Since 2017, the Navy has been replacing the original Trident II D5 with a life-extended and upgraded version known as Trident II D5LE (LE stands for “life-extended”). The upgrade is expected to be completed in 2024. The D5LE, which has a range of more than 12,000 km, is equipped with the new Mk6 guidance system designed to “provide flexibility to support new missions” and make the missile “more accurate,” according to the Navy and Draper Laboratory (Draper Laboratory 2006; Naval Surface Warfare Center 2008). According to FY24 budget documents, the D5LE has also added a hard-target kill capability and increased its payload “to the level permitted by the size of the TRIDENT submarine launch tube, thereby allowing mission capability to be achieved with fewer submarines” (US Department of Defense 2023d). This is to compensate for the fact that the United States will deploy fewer Columbia-class submarines than Ohio-class submarines and each submarine will only carry 16 missiles. (See later paragraphs in this section for more details).
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Each Trident SLBM can carry up to eight nuclear warheads, but they normally carry an average of four or five warheads, for an average load-out of approximately 90 warheads per submarine. The payloads of the different missiles on a submarine are thought to vary significantly to provide maximum targeting flexibility, but all deployed submarines are thought to carry the same combination. Normally, around 950 warheads are deployed on the operational SSBNs, although the number can be lower due to maintenance of individual submarines. Overall, SSBN-based warheads account for approximately 70 percent of all warheads attributed to the United States’ deployed strategic launchers under New START.
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The LRSO will arm both the 46 nuclear-capable B-52Hs and the new B-21, the first time a US stealth bomber will carry a nuclear cruise missile. A $250 million contract was awarded to Boeing in March 2019 for the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction phase and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (phase to integrate the future LRSO onto the B-52Hs, a process that is expected to be completed by the beginning of 2025 (Hughes 2019).
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The LRSO missile itself is expected to be entirely new, with significantly improved military capabilities compared with the ALCM, including longer range, greater accuracy, and enhanced stealth (Young 2016). Supporters of the LRSO argue that a nuclear cruise missile is needed to enable bombers to strike targets from well outside the range of current and future air-defense systems of potential adversaries. Proponents also argue that these missiles are needed to provide US leaders with flexible strike options in limited regional scenarios. However, critics argue that conventional cruise missiles, such as the extended-range version of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, can currently provide standoff strike capability, and that other nuclear weapons would be sufficient to hold the targets at risk. In fact, the conventional Extended-Range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile is now an integral part of US Strategic Command’s strategic war plan. (Standoff weapons engage targets from a distance where attacking personnel are standing off outside the range of defensive weapons).
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Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:32:13 AM EDT
[#18]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By Capta:


AFAIK, all the daytime footage of drones prior to this was at the beginning of their use, and it’s possibly they weren’t equipped with suitable thermal cameras then.
There’s a lot we don’t know about their deployment.  Launching them from the Odesa area is the most straightforward option but launching from boats can’t be completely ruled out.
We don’t really have enough context to evaluate the helicopter drone kill.  When and where was it?  If the drone’s intended target was at the far northwestern edge of Crimea, it should be possible to launch near dusk at Odesa, transit at night and attack before dawn.  If the intended target of the destroyed drone was on the east side of Crimea or the eastern Black Sea, some daylight transit would be likely, unless it was covertly launched from a boat somewhere in the Black Sea.  I doubt it was an intentional daylight attack.
If a night attack was intended, then perhaps they launched on bad intel, or they had to deal with a delay en route like a storm, or the Russians got wind of it, or the Russians just deviated from expectations.
It’s also hard to say what Ukraine’s practice is with bringing back an unused drone from an aborted or fouled up mission.
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Its also possible the drones arrive at night but have to wait for booms and anti-drone netting to open for morning traffic or for some other conditions to be favorable. It's also possible that the whole Op was a "SAM trap" for the responding helos but it didnt go off...Whatever the reason, I doubt it's the Ukrainians being stupid or careless.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:44:01 AM EDT
[#19]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By Saltwater-Hillbilly:


I agree.  Moldova has too much chance of a backfire for Russia, as even if some sort of overthrow temporarily "succeeds", it would be weak and the Russians not only would not be able to reinforce against the inevitable insurgency, the Moldavian military, or what portion of it would be loyal to the new government, is definitely NOT up to the task.  Not to mention that Moldavian is very close to Romanian, and it is inconceivable that Romania would just stand by and let the Russians take over Moldova, and I can assure you based on personal observation under combat conditions that the Romanian military would make short work of anything the Moldovan military (or whatever portion that chooses loyalty to the new government) or the "Russian Brigade" in Transnistria can throw at them.  IF Russian Black Sea fleet had managed to remain relevant in the western Black Sea, it might be doable.  Right now, the only outcome of a Russian amphib attack along that part of the Black Sea would be to create a future world-class diving destination.  Ultimately, moving on Moldova would undermine the Russian position there as well as the probable eventual loss of Transnistria.
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With Georgia starting to look like Maidan 2014, Russia may not need to trouble themselves with clumsy false-flag Op's. They may start playing whack-a-mole for real all over. I think everybody (who is sane) wants Moldova to stay quiet since everybody has bigger fish to fry.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 8:59:47 AM EDT
[#20]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By Capta:
See, I disagree.  I feel certain that Putin demanded Belarusian involvement starting in early March of 2022.
The fact that they didn’t get involved from 2/22 until Russian mobilization and stabilization of the front in the winter of 2022-2023 demonstrates that Lukashenko was willing and able to defy Putin.
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Or that Putin is willing to give Lukashenka a bit of leeway against a more restive population. He can't risk losing Belarus, whatever happens in Ukraine, or his strategic loss is unrecoverable. The 'union state' MUST proceed.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:05:24 AM EDT
[#21]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By BigGrumpyBear:


See! More proof the MIC is fucking over the American taxpayer!

We spend billions every year buying new stuff from them because they designed all of our bombs, explosives, missiles and shells to be one use items! Eisenhower warned us about this!

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Well my mortar adventure was in the mid 90's and we were dropping rounds from the Vietnam era 60's manufacture. Inside the packaging there was some leaflet or DOD "info card" signed by McNamara. Aside from the dud/stuck round (possibly from dirty tubes since we'd been firing all day), we had numerous airbursts over our heads. I'd drop a round...boom..then kaboom about a second later. Probably 500-1000 feet above us. Adolescent and stupid Itchy thought it was cool. I was told it was probably moisture intrusion into the prox. fuse. It was all a good time.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:09:12 AM EDT
[#22]
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:13:34 AM EDT
[#23]
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:17:23 AM EDT
[#24]
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:17:30 AM EDT
[#25]
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:20:12 AM EDT
[#26]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By Prime:

In previously unreported details of an investigation under way into the missiles, the office of Ukraine's top prosecutor, Andriy Kostin, also told Reuters that the failure rate of the North Korean weaponry appeared to be high.

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This give any indication of how it would go in a North Vs. South Korea dust-up again or are these just old as shit and not taken care of munitions?
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:26:31 AM EDT
[#27]
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:28:25 AM EDT
[#28]

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:28:29 AM EDT
[#29]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By Capta:
Cunning, technical competence, and astute understanding of the West.  The Arabs don’t get us any more than we get them.  The Russians understand us but we have forgotten and are having to re-learn how to understand them.
To be clear I think a Moldovan adventure would be reactionary (to Georgia) from their perspective, but also in their perspective a completely fair “tit-for-tat”.  Until it happens, it’s leverage.  I also hope (and in my person opinion this is the case) that the Romanian secret service is already balls deep in Moldova.  Romania is not a country you’d want to mess with, those guys will kill you.
Reason I think Georgia is the most likely target comes down to their new naval base.  They’ve been mostly driven out of Sevastopol, and Novorossisk isn’t a great alternative.  As of now they have good reason to expect further losses to the BSF as “escalation lines” cease to be effective and Ukraine gets better stuff and more experience.  They also have good reason to expect that they won’t be able to operate freely from Sevastopol for a long time.  From their perspective, they cannot accept being reduced to naval irrelevance in the Black Sea.  Of course, the sane thing would’ve been to never start the war and coexist peacefully and profitably, but the Russians have taken that idea, run it through a blender, set it on fire, then pissed on the ashes.  They are pursuing and will pursue a policy of naked force to accomplish Imperialist goals, a major one of which is hegemony over Black Sea trade.  No naval base, no Black Sea hegemony.  They may be willing to accept losses along the way but the idea of not having a safe base for their fleet will be intolerable.
A litmus test for Russian intentions will be how far they push the Georgian Dream party to pass these unpopular measures.  If Georgia Dream backs off like they did last year, it indicates Russia isn’t yet willing to cause themselves more problems and they will accept status quo for now.  If Georgia Dream tries to ram it through then this indicates Russia is determined on solidifying their grip on Georgia now, making a Georgian Maidan more likely and also indicating the Russians (who would have to know this was a likely outcome) will attempt to intervene somehow.
Objectively, losing a friendly regime in Georgia doesn’t mean losing their base.  Even in the case of a complete overthrow, which is possible but unlikely, Russia could just say “we’re keeping Abkhazia and there’s nothing you can do about it.”  With Abkhazia being contiguous with Russia, there’s no geographic obstacle to this.
But…this does not fit the Russian modus operandi, which is to control their neighbors by political means if possible but force if necessary.  With increasing paranoia, dysfunction, losses, and economic pressure, this kind of response will become MORE imperative to Russia, not less.  IMO.
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IMO Abkhazia is not going back to Georgia, no matter how nice Georgia tries to be. Keep in mind, the conflict between Abkhazia & Georgia is far from modern, there was conflict during the Russian civil war era, and there was tension in the 1980s even before the USSR broke up. Moscow didn't do any better at grouping its colonies than Italians or French in Africa did, and the Georgia SSR was never a cohesive whole. Even the political opposition in Abkhazia doesn't want to be part of Georgia, and with the ethnic cleansing that has occurred from wars in 1991-92 and 1998, many ethnic Georgians have abandoned Abkhazia. That conflict is nearly intractable, and the common practice of Russians means it will remain completely intractable.

I think Russia says "we're keeping Abkhazia" no matter what happens in Georgia, and Abkhazia seems to be okay with that.

I've never been there and don't know anybody from there, so I'd love to hear from anybody with direct knowledge as opposed to just me reading articles.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:29:51 AM EDT
[#30]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By Prime:

In previously unreported details of an investigation under way into the missiles, the office of Ukraine's top prosecutor, Andriy Kostin, also told Reuters that the failure rate of the North Korean weaponry appeared to be high.

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It would be funny if Ukes snuck someone into NK to take out Kim lol.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:35:06 AM EDT
[#31]
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:45:27 AM EDT
[#32]

The 229-meter vessel Alexis ran aground in the Bosphorus and ship traffic is temporarily suspended in both directions, the Turkish Coast Guard said. According to the Vessel Finder service, Alexis left the Yuzhny port near Odessa and is heading to Port Said, Egypt.

The Bosphorus Strait is the only sea route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Presumably, the cause of the emergency was engine failure. Coast Guard tugboats headed towards the cargo ship.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:53:14 AM EDT
[#33]
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:56:10 AM EDT
[#34]
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:56:57 AM EDT
[#35]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By lorazepam:
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Sow the wind, reap the whirlwind. That video should get a lot of shares over there. Karma for you, cyka.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 9:57:31 AM EDT
[#36]

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:00:54 AM EDT
[#37]

https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-constantly-inventing-new-ways-to-sink-russian-ships-says-military-intelligence/
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:03:25 AM EDT
[#38]

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:11:43 AM EDT
[#39]

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:13:11 AM EDT
[#40]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By BigGrumpyBear:


See! More proof the MIC is fucking over the American taxpayer!

We spend billions every year buying new stuff from them because they designed all of our bombs, explosives, missiles and shells to be one use items! Eisenhower warned us about this!

View Quote


Really? The MIC, or if you prefer the arsenal of democracy, has created the finest weapons ever known to man, produced them in quantity, employed millions of Americans, improved our balance of trade and made our enemies jealous and fearful.

I don't like paying taxes, but every dollar spent in the nation's defense makes me smile. In fact, it's one of the only legitimate use of tax dollars according to our Constitution.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:14:25 AM EDT
[Last Edit: Lieh-tzu] [#41]
Washington Post had a couple articles about how Putin is militarizing Russia, openly restoring the Cold War rivalry with the US & the West.
Archive link. WaPo link.
Over six months, The Post examined the changes sweeping Russia as Putin has used his war in Ukraine to cement his grip on power.

Vladimir Putin is positioning Russia as America’s most dangerous and aggressive enemy, and transforming his country in ways that stand to make it a bitter adversary of the West for decades to come.

Over more than six months, The Washington Post examined the profound changes sweeping Russia as Putin has used his war in Ukraine to cement his authoritarian grip on power.

The Russian leader is militarizing his society and infusing it with patriotic fervor, reshaping the education system, condemning scientists as traitors, promoting a new Orthodox religiosity and retrograde roles for women, and conditioning a new generation of youth to view the West as a mortal enemy in a fight for Russia’s very survival.

For this series — “Russia, Remastered” — our journalists reported extensively in Russia, especially Moscow and St. Petersburg, and central and western parts of the country. They also met with or spoke to Russians living in exile around the world, including officials, analysts, experts and civilians.

Our reporting also relied on government documents, including presidential decrees, transcripts of Putin’s speeches and remarks at public events, national and local Russian news reports and television broadcasts, social media posts, blogs and Telegram channels.

Some people interviewed for this series in Russia have since been imprisoned or have fled.
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One of the feature articles. Do give this a read. WaPo link.

next in the series - Russia reforms its higher education to support Putin's authoritarian system.  Archive link
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:16:34 AM EDT
[#42]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By lorazepam:

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Birds are not real! #TMFINR!
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:21:17 AM EDT
[#43]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By klinc:


This give any indication of how it would go in a North Vs. South Korea dust-up again or are these just old as shit and not taken care of munitions?
View Quote View All Quotes
View All Quotes
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By klinc:
Originally Posted By Prime:

In previously unreported details of an investigation under way into the missiles, the office of Ukraine's top prosecutor, Andriy Kostin, also told Reuters that the failure rate of the North Korean weaponry appeared to be high.



This give any indication of how it would go in a North Vs. South Korea dust-up again or are these just old as shit and not taken care of munitions?



It is in line with the recent modern Iranian IRBM launches that ended up being reported to be failing 50% of the time.  The Nork KN-23 was first displayed in 2018, so a recent weapon and not an old one.
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:23:10 AM EDT
[#44]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By Prime:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GM92tiJWkAAlrVt?format=jpg&name=large



https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GM92TpNWkAA3NR9?format=jpg&name=large
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GM92TpFXgAAGXa7?format=jpg&name=large



https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GM-FMbIXEAINz9n?format=png&name=900x900
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A German private target practice Learjet........what in the Volkswagen.......I don't understand
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:26:58 AM EDT
[#45]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By doc540:

What band and song?
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The Offspring has some amazing songs!
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:29:18 AM EDT
[#46]
10,000 psi
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:37:34 AM EDT
[#47]
Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:37:45 AM EDT
[#48]
Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Originally Posted By ITCHY-FINGER:

With Georgia starting to look like Maidan 2014, Russia may not need to trouble themselves with clumsy false-flag Op's. They may start playing whack-a-mole for real all over. I think everybody (who is sane) wants Moldova to stay quiet since everybody has bigger fish to fry.
View Quote


My sanity is always in question, but I think Ukraine capturing Transnistria is a legitimate goal as far as supplies are concerned. It eliminates a Russian enclave at their rear, helps their neighbor Moldova and the rest of the EU/NATO alliance, gives Russia the middle finger and puts Kaliningrad on notice that we aren't above taking back territory.

Escalation is a red herring, Russia hasn't any qualms about escalating in theory or in practice. The west needs to start putting our collective boot in their ass. We are at war. The sooner our politicians wake up to that fact and the full consequences and responsibilities that are implied, the better.

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:53:48 AM EDT
[#49]

Link Posted: 5/7/2024 10:56:00 AM EDT
[#50]
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