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First shot was an under-power load. I guess the powder meter needed to be calibrated. ;) See below.
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It's actually more than 1550 warheads that are allowed in New START. It's not simple numerical listing in the treaty, so verification is the only way to ensure conformance regarding the final number allowed. This is for both countries. There not a separate calculation for the Russians that favor them. Some bloggers seem to think so.
Also, it does not become enforced until next year, but then will expire in 3 years after that. There are quite a lot of information on the web about it. Limiting armament favors Russia because of the greater geographical area of their country. Something like just under 2x the amount. It was often said by analysts in the cold war years that we have the edge on delivery and accuracy over the Soviets. I don't read about that much anymore so it's likely some gap closure has been made. Russia, on the other hand, says the New START favors the USA because we don't have nuclear powers that are a close threat as they do. There might be some basis for that argument. Close threats would seem to be ideal for the intermediate range nuclear weaponry that the treaty bans. Somebody much smarter than me should dig into and analyze that. If that is true, and ICBM cannot be effectively used to counter intra-continental strikes, then China may actually be the best beneficiary of the treaty. Russia has mentioned China as an example. However, due to the cold war, I still think the typical American sees China and Russia as allies. So that is not going to get far in public sentiment over here. I've always at those two as enemies of each other but only allied against a common enemy (USA) when the need requires it. Of course, we know that the press has reported Trump saying the New START is a bad deal back in January. I think anything Obama negotiated is suspect, so there maybe some truth there. However, the people that really know whats going on, don't talk. They face jail time, execution, or just simply disappear. |
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On Thermonuclear War, by Herman Khan. Managing Nuclear Operations, by the Brookings Institute and edited by Ashton Carter. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
On Thermonuclear War, by Herman Khan. Managing Nuclear Operations, by the Brookings Institute and edited by Ashton Carter. |
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It's actually more than 1550 warheads that are allowed in New START. It's not simple numerical listing in the treaty, so verification is the only way to ensure conformance regarding the final number allowed. This is for both countries. There not a separate calculation for the Russians that favor them. Some bloggers seem to think so. Also, it does not become enforced until next year, but then will expire in 3 years after that. There are quite a lot of information on the web about it. Limiting armament favors Russia because of the greater geographical area of their country. Something like just under 2x the amount. It was often said by analysts in the cold war years that we have the edge on delivery and accuracy over the Soviets. I don't read about that much anymore so it's likely some gap closure has been made. Russia, on the other hand, says the New START favors the USA because we don't have nuclear powers that are a close threat as they do. There might be some basis for that argument. Close threats would seem to be ideal for the intermediate range nuclear weaponry that the treaty bans. Somebody much smarter than me should dig into and analyze that. View Quote As for IRBMs, the Russkies have just stopped abiding by that INF treaty for the reasons you stated. They have their hypersonic Iskander missiles and the new intermediate mobile cruise missiles. These are a threat to NATO in Europe, but not to the United States homeland. |
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You forgot Boston, Philly, and NYC. Dude...do realize how much better our country would be OVERNIGHT if those places were just gone? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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No San fransico No D.C No L.A No Seattle No Portland No Chicago No Memphis No Austin Etc etc Come on Ruskies/China/Nk if you're gonna do it at least do the common people a solid and purge our shitholes. |
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The majority of which can't be launched/used, just like ours. For example: there were 5,280 W68 reentry vehicles built for the Poseidon missile (predecessor to Trident). The last one of those was put in the inactive reserve stockpile in 1991. Not only is that weapon "inactive," we couldn't use it today, because the way that weapon talked to its weapon system was unique, and getting it to where it could be used by a current weapon system today would require so much rework it'd be easier to design a whole new weapon. In other words, it's Poseidon, so no hablo Trident or Minuteman or B2, so no worky. So, misleading and irrelevant number. The number you are looking for is 1550, which is the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons allowed by treaty. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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IIRC Russia has around 6-7k warheads. I don't trust any treaty, plan on every state capitol and major city being hit. For example: there were 5,280 W68 reentry vehicles built for the Poseidon missile (predecessor to Trident). The last one of those was put in the inactive reserve stockpile in 1991. Not only is that weapon "inactive," we couldn't use it today, because the way that weapon talked to its weapon system was unique, and getting it to where it could be used by a current weapon system today would require so much rework it'd be easier to design a whole new weapon. In other words, it's Poseidon, so no hablo Trident or Minuteman or B2, so no worky. So, misleading and irrelevant number. The number you are looking for is 1550, which is the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons allowed by treaty. Thanks |
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Malmstrom CRF 05-08 . 564th and group training before that. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes |
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My Dad was there 78-81 and again 82-84, with a short PCS to Wurtsmith AFB in there. (Just long enough of a PCS to cause me to have to attend four different schools for 5th and 6th grades.) View Quote |
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I wonder how that map looks if you add in the Chinese and the Pakistanis (in the event a hostile government takes over in a coup or wins by elections). Then there's the issues of North Korea/Iran getting a tactical nuclear device(s) into the US.
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I will forever be able to navigate those dirt roads, no map necessary. Oh there was so much fun had. I'm sleep, need to drunk. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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My Dad was there 78-81 and again 82-84, with a short PCS to Wurtsmith AFB in there. (Just long enough of a PCS to cause me to have to attend four different schools for 5th and 6th grades.) Of course, the game wardens didn't play around. One of them took a truckload of Security Forces guys into custody one night because, rather than just checking the silos, they were also using the spotlight on the truck to spotlight deer in the fields. He took them, their truck, their weapons, and everything else into custody until someone from the base came and signed for them. |
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You missed Hampton Roads, VA the highest concentration of military instillations on earth. View Quote Pentagon is close enough to DC that DC would catch a few from the horrid CEP of Russian missiles, not to mention being well within the blast/overpressure damage zone. |
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Here is the paradox of nuclear war; when MAD was assured nuclear war was impossible because the outcome was too horrible and now that MAD is gone, there is still no way to win with nuclear parity.
And yet, a nuclear war is still not off the books, because little suicidal nuts like Lil' Kim and the Iranian Mullahs may well be willing to go out in a blaze of glory. The holocaust that we were sold on may not happen, but the loss of apocalyptic risk only made the possibility of nuclear war more likely. We were safer with Kennedy and Kruschev than we are with Trump and Kim. |
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Here is the paradox of nuclear war; when MAD was assured nuclear war was impossible because the outcome was too horrible and now that MAD is gone, there is still no way to win with nuclear parity. And yet, a nuclear war is still not off the books, because little suicidal nuts like Lil' Kim and the Iranian Mullahs may well be willing to go out in a blaze of glory. The holocaust that we were sold on may not happen, but the loss of apocalyptic risk only made the possibility of nuclear war more likely. We were safer with Kennedy and Kruschev than we are with Trump and Kim. View Quote In trying to solve the issues of North Korea and Iran (and for that matter, Saudi Arabia, Japan and Taiwan, all countries who have started to make noise about creating their own nuclear programs), what is the real failure point? Can we summarize the problem by saying the hostile actors are failing to be...what's the word...deterred? |
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Though Hillary did a reset and the Rooskies are our pals now?
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Good points, and leads to a couple of questions. In trying to solve the issues of North Korea and Iran (and for that matter, Saudi Arabia, Japan and Taiwan, all countries who have started to make noise about creating their own nuclear programs), what is the real failure point? Can we summarize the problem by saying the hostile actors are failing to be...what's the word...deterred? View Quote The failure point is we aren't willing to lose 50K citizens (or even allied citizens) to solve a problem. They are. |
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Good points, and leads to a couple of questions. In trying to solve the issues of North Korea and Iran (and for that matter, Saudi Arabia, Japan and Taiwan, all countries who have started to make noise about creating their own nuclear programs), what is the real failure point? Can we summarize the problem by saying the hostile actors are failing to be...what's the word...deterred? View Quote Some first assessments...countries that want nukes can get them. Nukes are 1930s physics and 1940s material science at this point. Two, in seeing this, and proving it multiple times in studies like the "Nth Country Experiment," the next step was to dissuade all possible actors, especially second tier powers and not-completely committed to the project powers that the rewards of proliferation weren't equal to the cost. Thus the US pursued a bipartisan foreign policy of collective regional security and counterproliferation. While only one of regional security condominiums was a success (NATO), a combination of bilateral defense agreements (ROK/US, JPN/US, RP/US), demonstrated willingness to intervene (Vietnam/Latin America) gave enough security to allies to not embark on WMD programs or abandon programs that were starting. We probably crossed a bridge too far in 1994 with the Budapest Memo. One, the Democrats probably figured it would never be invoked, and even by then there was 20 years of history that Democrats could commit the nation to armed action, and then successful backstab actual Republican efforts to wage the war, usually to gain some domestic political advantage. The few adult Democrats continued to sweet talk the Republican Charlie Brown that everyone was still committed to the same goals, and there would be no way that the Democratic Party Lucy would pull the ball away, this time. But, with the death/retirement of the national security Democrats, the DNC could maneuver completed unmoored, which it has. Meanwhile, the logic of a WMD program has proved itself to be irresistible once again. WMDs are unique political weapons, to be used in the last extreme, mostly as a threat. Saddam failed at it, and Assad has succeeded. I think after the Ukraine and the saga of Nork proliferation, I think that an reasonable power is likely dusting off the plans in the basement. I certainly would were I them. So, if we can't/won't stop proliferation, are their thresholds we can impose to create a safer environment? |
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Back to Kissinger (paraphrasing), "There is great advantage for the weaker party to appear irrational in his behavior." The failure point is we aren't willing to lose 50K citizens (or even allied citizens) to solve a problem. They are. View Quote I've said for a while that deterrence has two components, capability, and will. But at its heart, deterrence is about messaging. So the third implied component of deterrence is a receiver for the message being transmitted. IRN and NK have been rejecting our current deterrent message. Outcomes for communications attempts are fairly straightforward: 1. message not received 2. message not received accurately (misread, could be garbled at transmitter, receiver, or both), 3. Message received and acknowledged 4. Message received and rejected. For example, the Korean War was sparked by a case of Outcome 2, where the US negligently and inadvertently gave the message that we wouldn't care if S Korea was invaded. OTOH, the Cuban Missile Crisis can be viewed as a case of Outcome 3, where we told the Soviets in no uncertain terms what we were willing to go to war over. Two questions-- - What exactly is the deterrent message we're sending to Iran and NK, and - Which of those comms outcomes are the case with Iran and NK? |
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Back to Kissinger (paraphrasing), "There is great advantage for the weaker party to appear irrational in his behavior." The failure point is we aren't willing to lose 50K citizens (or even allied citizens) to solve a problem. They are. View Quote People have assured us that Iran is not an irrational actor, but I am not convinced. This is a nation headed by religious zealots who adhere to an apocalyptic religious ideology. The mullahs either truly believe or are at least willing to convince their citizens that dying for the faith (particularly if you die killing unbelievers) is the ticket to paradise in the afterlife. How can a sane person possibly deter that kind of insanity? |
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Two questions-- - What exactly is the deterrent message we're sending to Iran and NK, and - Which of those comms outcomes are the case with Iran and NK? View Quote To NK, its been a touch more successful. People hear the message they want to receive. One important fact is that regime endstates and their metanarratives are nearly opposite. In the North Korean case, despite their propaganda of reuniting the Pen, the Koreans are in a defensive crouch. In the Iranian case, they are a dying civilization on the march to try to make a Persian Empire that will sustain and insulate the Qomists until either the conversion of the World to Twelver Shia or the return of the Maadi. |
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Hmnnnn Ft Bragg isn't on there.. I would think an Army Division, an SF group, a Corps command, Socom, Forcecom, and the red roof inn would be a great target. With the emphasis on FORCCOM View Quote No one is going to say, "Russia just hit the USA with a devastating nuclear attack. Let's invade Russia with the 82nd." |
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You hit the empty silo and there won't be any second wave of attacks. You leave the empty silo and the arsenals so that you can kill everyone in New York, DC, Boston, Los Angeles and Chicago, and there will be revenge strikes. View Quote |
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To Iran, its been a mess. To NK, its been a touch more successful. People hear the message they want to receive. One important fact is that regime endstates and their metanarratives are nearly opposite. In the North Korean case, despite their propaganda of reuniting the Pen, the Koreans are in a defensive crouch. In the Iranian case, they are a dying civilization on the march to try to make a Persian Empire that will sustain and insulate the Qomists until either the conversion of the World to Twelver Shia or the return of the Maadi. View Quote Garbled because we're sending mixed messages--words say "don't do this," actions to Iran say "but keep doing what you're doing," and to NK says "all we're going to do is talk about it, so basically we don't care." Which means the actual message to both ("we don't want you to have nukes") is getting rejected. By both. NK because we've proven we're just going to send them a harshly worded letter, and Iran because the Iranian deal actually paid them to continue their nuclear weapons research. So, how do we clean up the signal, and get an acknowledgement back? |
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So, how do we clean up the signal, and get an acknowledgement back? View Quote So, in the absence of a national strategy, because there is no consensus, just policy inertia, we procure to kill any selection of enemies on the planet. Thus, the military hopes to be able to give the POTUS some options. If that's sustainable is another question. |
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Last good national strategy was under Reagan (and Bush 41, who just continued Reagan's). The last four National Security Strategies have been...vague. Obama nuclear policies (signing up to essentially a no-first-use policy, making it clear that our nuclear umbrella didn't cover our allies anymore, etc) made that vagueness worse.
So, yeah, first we have to decide what our national objectives are before we can decide what we can or can't live with from other nation-states, THEN craft an unambiguous message to those nation-states to outline what our expectations of them are, THEN make that message appealing enough (either positively or negatively) to get them to change their behavior. Just that simple. |
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Agree on both points, but I think the problem is more basic than that. I've said for a while that deterrence has two components, capability, and will. But at its heart, deterrence is about messaging. So the third implied component of deterrence is a receiver for the message being transmitted. IRN and NK have been rejecting our current deterrent message. Outcomes for communications attempts are fairly straightforward: 1. message not received 2. message not received accurately (misread, could be garbled at transmitter, receiver, or both), 3. Message received and acknowledged 4. Message received and rejected. For example, the Korean War was sparked by a case of Outcome 2, where the US negligently and inadvertently gave the message that we wouldn't care if S Korea was invaded. OTOH, the Cuban Missile Crisis can be viewed as a case of Outcome 3, where we told the Soviets in no uncertain terms what we were willing to go to war over. Two questions-- - What exactly is the deterrent message we're sending to Iran and NK, and - Which of those comms outcomes are the case with Iran and NK? View Quote NK: As far as I can tell, most of the deterrent message we've sent in recent history has been "We'll keep our thumb on your international aid and ability to trade with countries whose name doesn't rhyme with China,", with perhaps just a touch of "It doesn't matter, you're too stupid and backward to develop this on your own" (a pretty naive concept, to be honest) for good measure. Iran: Case 3. NK: Case 4. When a weaker party engages in Case 4, they make it appear that either A.) they're irrational actors, B.) they're convinced of a lack of resolve on the part of the stronger party, or C.) they place no value on the assets the stronger party is using as a negotiating stance. In any of these options, our usual methods of diplomacy break down pretty quickly. |
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Agreed. With both countries, I think Outcome 2 and 4 are both at play--our messages are going at garbled at best, and they're either being misinterpreted or rejected by both actors. Garbled because we're sending mixed messages--words say "don't do this," actions to Iran say "but keep doing what you're doing," and to NK says "all we're going to do is talk about it, so basically we don't care." Which means the actual message to both ("we don't want you to have nukes") is getting rejected. By both. NK because we've proven we're just going to send them a harshly worded letter, and Iran because the Iranian deal actually paid them to continue their nuclear weapons research. So, how do we clean up the signal, and get an acknowledgement back? View Quote |
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@limaxray
What's your thoughts on the NNSA production facilities as targets. Pantex, Las Alamos, Oak Ridge? In your opinion do they care about the fundamental capability of production or just the command and control aspect of the mission? |
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Back to Kissinger (paraphrasing), "There is great advantage for the weaker party to appear irrational in his behavior." The failure point is we aren't willing to lose 50K citizens (or even allied citizens) to solve a problem. They are. View Quote I think they're not being deterred because they don't believe we'll ever use what we have, no matter what. As you said, there's benefit in appearing irrational, and delivering a physics pack to certain bad actors every once in a while would keep everyone afraid of pissing off the Americans. |
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Interesting thread. I am surprised that nobody has appeared bitching about OPSEC yet.
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@limaxray What's your thoughts on the NNSA production facilities as targets. Pantex, Las Alamos, Oak Ridge? In your opinion do they care about the fundamental capability of production or just the command and control aspect of the mission? View Quote |
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No San fransico No D.C No L.A No Seattle No Portland No Chicago No Memphis No Austin Etc etc Come on Ruskies/China/Nk if you're gonna do it at least do the common people a solid and purge our shitholes. View Quote |
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The general idea would be that the Russkies would have attacked NATO and the US would have used tactical nuclear weapons in theater against the red forces. The Russkies would respond by launching against our missile bases, sub bases and bomber bases. They would also take out Washington DC to try and take out our military and political leadership. After the Russian attack, whoever is president (it was assumed that the president would be killed in the first strike) would choose retaliatory options using surviving forces. The Pentagon didn't even want an immediate response, because they would want the new president to evaluate the situation View Quote If he ends up in charge it will get sporty. |
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That's all well and goof but the Ruskies do know that James Mattis is now 4th in line to the presidency, right? If he ends up in charge it will get sporty. View Quote |
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You know, I have always thought of nuclear war as a scenario where the Russkies launch first and attack us. I wonder how unlikely it would be that some American president decided to launch first.
I wonder how many people at the Pentagon are considering pre-emptive nuclear strikes against North Korea and/or Iran. I'm sure that there are warplans in someone's file cabinet for a whole bunch of pre-emptive nuclear strike scenarios. |
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You know, I have always thought of nuclear war as a scenario where the Russkies launch first and attack us. I wonder how unlikely it would be that some American president decided to launch first. I wonder how many people at the Pentagon are considering pre-emptive nuclear strikes against North Korea and/or Iran. I'm sure that there are warplans in someone's file cabinet for a whole bunch of pre-emptive nuclear strike scenarios. View Quote |
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That's all well and goof but the Ruskies do know that James Mattis is now 4th in line to the presidency, right? If he ends up in charge it will get sporty. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
The general idea would be that the Russkies would have attacked NATO and the US would have used tactical nuclear weapons in theater against the red forces. The Russkies would respond by launching against our missile bases, sub bases and bomber bases. They would also take out Washington DC to try and take out our military and political leadership. After the Russian attack, whoever is president (it was assumed that the president would be killed in the first strike) would choose retaliatory options using surviving forces. The Pentagon didn't even want an immediate response, because they would want the new president to evaluate the situation If he ends up in charge it will get sporty. Rex Tillerson is 4th. |
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I agree, we were always more likely to be able to carry out a decapitating first strike than anyone else ever was. View Quote In the 80s we had 117's, Pershing IIs, and GLCMs. These were all first strike decapitation capabilities. and the soviets had no counter for them to include massive retaliation because all would take effect prior to their decision cycle completing. 1st strike also matched our strategic defensive posture. |
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we were really the only one with the capability. In the 80s we had 117's, Pershing IIs, and GLCMs. These were all first strike decapitation capabilities. and the soviets had no counter for them to include massive retaliation because all would take effect prior to their decision cycle completing. 1st strike also matched our strategic defensive posture. View Quote The Premier loves surprises. |
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