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Posted: 11/21/2014 10:32:57 PM EDT
A combined U.S. Air Force and Army team of 40 Americans--led by Army Colonel "Bull" Simons--conducts a raid on the Son Tay prison camp, 23 miles west of Hanoi, in an attempt to free between 70 and 100 Americans suspected of being held there. Planning for the mission--code-named Operation Ivory Coast--began in June 1970. The plan called for U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) to be flown to Son Tay by helicopter and crash-land inside the compound. The plan was for one group of Green Berets to pour out of the helicopter and neutralize any opposition while Green Berets in other helicopters, landing outside the walls, would break in and complete the rescue operation. At 11:30 p.m. on November 20, the raiding force departed Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand. As the force approached the camp, U.S. Air Force and Navy warplanes struck North Vietnamese troop installations and antiaircraft sites in the area. Part of the force initially landed at the wrong compound, but otherwise the mission came off without a hitch. Unfortunately, the Green Berets could not locate any prisoners in the huts. After a sharp firefight with the North Vietnamese troops in the area, the order was given to withdraw--27 minutes after the raid began, the force was in the air headed back to Thailand. The raid was accomplished in a superb manner and all Americans returned safely, but it was learned later that the prisoners had been moved elsewhere in July. Despite that disappointment, the raid was a tactical success and sent a message to the North Vietnamese that the United States was capable of inserting a combat force undetected only miles from their capital. Stunned by the raid, high Hanoi officials ordered all U.S. POWs moved to several central prison complexes. This was actually a welcome change--the move afforded the prisoners more contact with each other and boosted their morale. if you haven't already read up on the raid you really need to do so! the logistics and plans are over the top complicated. |
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Operation Ivory Coast was a rescue mission conducted in North Vietnam during the Vietnam War by United States Special Operations Forces and other elements of the U.S. military. It was also the first joint military operation in United States history conducted under the direct control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast#cite_note-jg9-8][7][/url] On 21 November 1970, a joint United States Air Force/United States Army force commanded by Air Force Brigadier General LeRoy J. Manor and Army Colonel Arthur D. "Bull" Simons landed 56 U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers[url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast#cite_note-st56-2][2][/url] by helicopter in the Son Tây prisoner-of-war camp located only 23 miles (37 km) west of Hanoi, North Vietnam. The mission's objective was the recovery of 61 American prisoners of war thought to be held at the camp, situated in an area where 12,000 North Vietnamese troops were stationed within 5 miles (8.0 km).[url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast#cite_note-af141-9][8][/url] The mission did not achieve its main objective when it was found during the raid that all the prisoners had been previously moved to another camp. The specially selected raiders extensively trained and rehearsed the operation at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, while planning and intelligence gathering continued from 25 May to 20 November 1970.[url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast#cite_note-10][9][/url] Despite the absence of prisoners, the raid was executed with a high degree of success,[url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast#cite_note-11][10][/url] incurring only two minor casualties and the loss of two aircraft, one of which had been part of the plan from the start.[url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast#cite_note-manor-7][6][/url][url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast#cite_note-cvg-12][11][/url][url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast#cite_note-thom121-13][12][/url] Criticism of intelligence failures to determine that the camp was empty of U.S. POWs, both public and within the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, led to a major reorganization of the United States intelligence community a year later.[url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast#cite_note-Schemmer_1976.2C_p._206-14][13][/url] fuck the rhodesian war cock gobblers! we have our own military to be proud of! |
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Was this the only time US troops set foot in what was North Vietnam?
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Werent there also rumors of the Green Berets killing Caucasian troops, ala Russkies?
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Don't see Dick Meadows mentioned up there. That's nearly a crime.
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Truly an outstanding raid by outstanding men. The men made the mission.
It laid the groundwork for specialized DA units in SOF. In addition to the DA tactics and equipment perfected for the raid, it highlighted the need for training in planning and logistics unique to these type missions, and a group of RW pilots who could fly low level penetration flights deep into the back woods. -Look up Galen Charles Kittleson. He was an Alamo Scout, participated in the raid on Cabanatuan, was an SF Tm Sgt in Vietnam, and took part in the Son Tay raid. |
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Truly an outstanding raid by outstanding men. The men made the mission. It laid the groundwork for specialized DA units in SOF. In addition to the DA tactics and equipment perfected for the raid, it highlighted the need for training in planning and logistics unique to these type missions, and a group of RW pilots who could fly low level penetration flights deep into the back woods. -Look up Galen Charles Kittleson. He was an Alamo Scout, participated in the raid on Cabanatuan, was an SF Tm Sgt in Vietnam, and took part in the Son Tay raid. View Quote IIRC he was involved in a third POW rescue mission. the book Raider by Sasser is worth the time. |
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IIRC he was involved in a third POW rescue mission. the book Raider by Sasser is worth the time. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Truly an outstanding raid by outstanding men. The men made the mission. It laid the groundwork for specialized DA units in SOF. In addition to the DA tactics and equipment perfected for the raid, it highlighted the need for training in planning and logistics unique to these type missions, and a group of RW pilots who could fly low level penetration flights deep into the back woods. -Look up Galen Charles Kittleson. He was an Alamo Scout, participated in the raid on Cabanatuan, was an SF Tm Sgt in Vietnam, and took part in the Son Tay raid. IIRC he was involved in a third POW rescue mission. the book Raider by Sasser is worth the time. Yes he was, and yes, it is. |
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Quoted: Truly an outstanding raid by outstanding men. The men made the mission. It laid the groundwork for specialized DA units in SOF. In addition to the DA tactics and equipment perfected for the raid, it highlighted the need for training in planning and logistics unique to these type missions, and a group of RW pilots who could fly low level penetration flights deep into the back woods. -Look up Galen Charles Kittleson. He was an Alamo Scout, participated in the raid on Cabanatuan, was an SF Tm Sgt in Vietnam, and took part in the Son Tay raid. View Quote dusty |
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http://armyphotos.togetherweserved.com/116538.jpghttp://weaponsman.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Bull-and.jpghttp://www.sontayraider.com/Slide25.JPG mid 80's the SF museum on FT. Bragg had the original sand table the raiders used to train on. the display was very large and comprehensive. View Quote Yep. Used to love looking at the model. It's amazing that those guys could even fit in the helicopters, due to their huge balls. |
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Why do they have so much tacticool stuff hanging off their rifles?
They should have used KISS rifles because that's what real men shoot. |
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Truly an outstanding raid by outstanding men. The men made the mission. It laid the groundwork for specialized DA units in SOF. In addition to the DA tactics and equipment perfected for the raid, it highlighted the need for training in planning and logistics unique to these type missions, and a group of RW pilots who could fly low level penetration flights deep into the back woods. -Look up Galen Charles Kittleson. He was an Alamo Scout, participated in the raid on Cabanatuan, was an SF Tm Sgt in Vietnam, and took part in the Son Tay raid. View Quote Yet those RW pilots wouldn't get a full time SOF mission until another mission had ended badly. |
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Great read! Man those guys are badasses. Thanks for posting this.
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Wasn't that raid also the debut of red dot optics for the US military?
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Son Tay is the consummate example of the a good plan executed violently is infinitely superior to the perfect plan executed too late.
The mission failed. Not to take anything away from the men who executed it, but 6 months to plan a raid is a raid operating on expired intelligence. |
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Quoted: Werent there also rumors of the Green Berets killing Caucasian troops, ala Russkies? View Quote |
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I remember hearing about this guy who was supposed to go to a position behind a certain tree. When he got there all that was left was a stump. He still took that position. That's how detailed it was.
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Probably one reason why flexibility is so important in JSOC now. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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I remember hearing about this guy who was supposed to go to a position behind a certain tree. When he got there all that was left was a stump. He still took that position. That's how detailed it was. Probably one reason why flexibility is so important in JSOC now. Just don't be so flexible your turn into seals. there is a line between audacity and stupidity. |
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Quoted: Son Tay is the consummate example of the a good plan executed violently is infinitely superior to the perfect plan executed too late. The mission failed. Not to take anything away from the men who executed it, but 6 months to plan a raid is a raid operating on expired intelligence. View Quote |
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Just don't be so flexible your turn into seals. there is a line between audacity and stupidity. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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I remember hearing about this guy who was supposed to go to a position behind a certain tree. When he got there all that was left was a stump. He still took that position. That's how detailed it was. Probably one reason why flexibility is so important in JSOC now. Just don't be so flexible your turn into seals. there is a line between audacity and stupidity. Now you've done it. |
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Son Tay is the consummate example of the a good plan executed violently is infinitely superior to the perfect plan executed too late. The mission failed. Not to take anything away from the men who executed it, but 6 months to plan a raid is a raid operating on expired intelligence. View Quote Doesn't this show the need for trained troops to be ready to do such a raid? From my memory doing long range hostage rescue was not in standard SF training in those days. |
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my battalion commander preached violence of action all the time! View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Son Tay is the consummate example of the a good plan executed violently is infinitely superior to the perfect plan executed too late. The mission failed. Not to take anything away from the men who executed it, but 6 months to plan a raid is a raid operating on expired intelligence. on the other hand, tactical patience is essential to avoid bad things happening to you. Its almost like this war thing is an art. |
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on the other hand, tactical patience is essential to avoid bad things happening to you. Its almost like this war thing is an art. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Son Tay is the consummate example of the a good plan executed violently is infinitely superior to the perfect plan executed too late. The mission failed. Not to take anything away from the men who executed it, but 6 months to plan a raid is a raid operating on expired intelligence. on the other hand, tactical patience is essential to avoid bad things happening to you. Its almost like this war thing is an art. There's a great book title in there somewhere... just sayin! |
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Quoted: on the other hand, tactical patience is essential to avoid bad things happening to you. Its almost like this war thing is an art. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Son Tay is the consummate example of the a good plan executed violently is infinitely superior to the perfect plan executed too late. The mission failed. Not to take anything away from the men who executed it, but 6 months to plan a raid is a raid operating on expired intelligence. on the other hand, tactical patience is essential to avoid bad things happening to you. Its almost like this war thing is an art. |
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Some of the Raiders are still Sage G Chiefs in their late 60s/early 70s.
So, Simmon's accidental landing at the school/Russian barracks probably wasn't so accidental. |
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1970, U.S. forces attempted to rescue POWs from captivity in North Vietnam. American officials decided a daring operation in the heart of North Vietnam was worth the risk, and President Richard Nixon asked the Pentagon to explore "some unconventional rescue ideas." Planning the Raid The target was the Son Tay POW camp, only 23 miles west of the North Vietnamese capital Hanoi. Intelligence analysts believed as many as 55 prisoners were there. The raid was a joint-service operation. An Air Force assault group would fly Army Special Forces to Son Tay under cover of darkness, rescue the POWs, and leave. The Navy, meanwhile, would create a diversion by flying over Haiphong Harbor on the coast northeast of Hanoi and dropping flares to simulate an attack. More than 100 aircraft and many support and planning personnel were involved. The Air Force group included assault, attack, tanker, air defense suppression and command and control aircraft. The Army force included 56 handpicked Special Forces troops to engage the enemy on the ground, free the POWs and lead them to rescue helicopters. The teams trained intensely at Eglin AFB, Florida, where they used a full-size mockup of the camp. They also used the scale model on display in this exhibit. Kingpin On the night of Nov. 20, 1970, the raiding force of six helicopters, two large support aircraft, and five small attack planes took off from Thailand. Meanwhile, Navy carrier aircraft created a diversion over the Haiphong area. The raiders approached Son Tay at low level, arriving at about 2:18 a.m. The area was lit with flares, and the first helicopter over the camp destroyed guard towers and barracks with a hail of mini-gun fire. The next helicopter made a planned, controlled crash landing in the middle of the camp, chewing up trees with its blades. Green Berets piled out to rescue prisoners from their cells. A third helicopter landed outside the camp, firing on barracks and delivering more Army Green berets. Meanwhile, the fourth helicopter had mistakenly landed at a similar-looking compound nearby--easy enough to do in the fog of war. There, Green Berets found themselves in a firefight, but suffered no casualties. A scenario where part of the assault force could not reach the objective had been practiced many times, and the group recovered quickly by exchanging attack roles. "Negative Items" The raiders found that the prison camp held no POWs. They reported "negative items" (no POWs) on the radio, boarded two helicopters and withdrew. As the force left North Vietnam, one Wild Weasel F-105 fighter was hit with a surface-to-air missile. Its crew ejected over Laos, and two of the returning Son Tay helicopters quickly rescued them. The raid had taken 27 minutes, and the raiders suffered one broken ankle and one minor wound. All 56 Army personnel plus the aircraft crews returned safely. Aftermath Despite rescuing no prisoners, the raid proved a success in other ways. It caused North Vietnam to gather POWs in fewer locations to prevent similar raids, making POW communication and organization easier. POW morale soared. Later, one recalled that "...the Son Tay rescue attempt dispelled all doubt: We were not forgotten; our country cared!!" The daring raid so close to Hanoi demonstrated that the U.S. had the will and means to carry out exceptional operations to ensure POW well-being. The Son Tay raid was one of the most complex and dangerous missions of the Southeast Asia War. It laid the groundwork for future joint forces operations by serving as a model of organization, cooperation, and flexible execution |
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I am pretty sure if you were a pilot that got shot down just over the border they would attempt to come in and get you, as for Russians there was a description in the book The Battle for Firebase Ripcord where a Captain was part of a element trying to take a hill, he was on the radio talking to his superior and calmly asked him to wait one....he clearly sees a white guy, blond hair, and a big red star on his helmet in a trench up the hill, his calmly raises his rifle, squeezes off 3 well aimed shots and sees the guy jerk and dust fly off his uniform, when they make it to that trench line there is no body but a big pool of blood where he was, another little tidbit it was highly discouraged for any officer talking to the press to make any mention of Chinese advisors in the South, everybody knew they were there, you just weren't to mention it.
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Was this the only time US troops set foot in what was North Vietnam? View Quote |
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I read the book, The Raid by Ben Zimmer (IIRC). According to him, Bull Simon`s helicopter pilot got disoriented in the dark and landed at the "secondary school". Supposedly Simons was swearing a blue streak because he realized quickly what had happened. He then shot a NVA soldier who popped out of his foxhole half naked to see what all the noise was. Then according to the author approx. 200 Manchurian Chinese or Siberian Russian advisors poured out the building, and were promptly wiped out in less than 15 minutes by the Green Berets. Apparently the shotguns among other weapons were used to good effect.
As for the intel, the CIA was supposedly monitoring the camp, but withheld info from the DIA, and the Raid planners. They didn`t reveal rain making operations along the Ho Chi Minh trail that led to flooding in the Son Tay area and caused the North Viet Namese to relocate the prisoners because flood waters reached the wall of the camp. They also didn`t want to have too many over flights as that would alert enemy. They also rehearsed and planned the Raid the way they did to reduce the chance of the raiders becoming POWs themselves. |
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Doesn't this show the need for trained troops to be ready to do such a raid? From my memory doing long range hostage rescue was not in standard SF training in those days. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Son Tay is the consummate example of the a good plan executed violently is infinitely superior to the perfect plan executed too late. The mission failed. Not to take anything away from the men who executed it, but 6 months to plan a raid is a raid operating on expired intelligence. Doesn't this show the need for trained troops to be ready to do such a raid? From my memory doing long range hostage rescue was not in standard SF training in those days. It's still there but shuffled toward the bottom of the training syllabus. Long range PR is still a unique skill set that has a hundred ways to fail for every one way to succeed. With the shift in focus, I expect to see a lot more of the IW/UW skill sets getting much more emphasis. |
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Son Tay is the consummate example of the a good plan executed violently is infinitely superior to the perfect plan executed too late. The mission failed. Not to take anything away from the men who executed it, but 6 months to plan a raid is a raid operating on expired intelligence. View Quote Son Tay is the classic example of perfect being the enemy of good enough. |
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It's always bothered me that there wasn't better intelligence on this mission. It would seem that if the Americans were moved in July then U.S. command should have known this by November.
Maybe I'm completely off-base on this though. I enjoyed the Tom Clancy follow-up in Without Remorse. Maybe there's more truth to that book than fiction. |
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Quoted: Army Colonel "Bull" Simons View Quote This is who Ross Perot went to for planning the extraction of his employees from Iran. 'On Wings of Eagles' is a great book on the matter. |
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This is who Ross Perot went to for planning the extraction of his employees from Iran. 'On Wings of Eagles' is a great book on the matter. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Army Colonel "Bull" Simons This is who Ross Perot went to for planning the extraction of his employees from Iran. 'On Wings of Eagles' is a great book on the matter. Very good book. |
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