First off, tremendous props to LoBrau, who saw Ukraine coming well in advance and started a record setting thread. May that record stand forever, because nothing would please us more than for there to no longer be anything to talk about.

What has become evident since February of 2022 is that there is a global reshuffling taking place, with three primary players behind most of the conflict in the world today. Discussion of current geopolitics cannot be constrained to one country or conflict.

What this thread is:
News and discussion related to political / military actions by Russia / Iran / China and their proxies, chief among those, North Korea.
News and discussion of the relationships between Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
News and discussion of responses to Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
Related Grey Zone / hybrid warfare / “competition short of war.”
Relevant or interesting technical discussion.
Relevant economic / social / historical discussion.
Reliable reporting from Russian / Iranian / Chinese sources.
Russian / Iranian / Chinese perspectives and factual evaluation thereof.
Political topics in the US and / or elsewhere which bear directly on these issues, including the politics of foreign aid.
Current focus is on the Russian war against and in Ukraine, however this could change if the Ukraine war cooled off and Taiwan heated up.  Related topics are always allowed.
Secondary but related topics like Wagner in Africa, uprising in Georgia, or a Third Chechen War.
Reasonable tangents.

What this thread is not:
US and / or foreign political issues which do not directly bear on these topics, including campaigning / advocating for one party or candidate.

General rules:
Discussion is expected to be conducted in good faith and assertions of fact should be substantiated.
In case of a question on whether a subtopic or line of discussion is relevant to this thread, the following members should be considered co-owners with decision making authority- AlmightyTallest, Capta, and SaltwaterHillbilly.

The Axis of Upheaval
How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order
By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine
May/June 2024
Published on April 23, 2024

In the early morning of January 2, Russian forces launched a massive missile attack on the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv that killed at least five civilians, injured more than 100, and damaged infrastructure. The incident was notable not just for the harm it caused but also because it showed that Russia was not alone in its fight. The Russian attack that day was carried out with weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran. Over the past two years, all three countries have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Moscow has deployed more than 3,700 Iranian-designed drones. Russia now produces at least 330 on its own each month and is collaborating with Iran on plans to build a new drone factory inside Russia that will boost these numbers. North Korea has sent Russia ballistic missiles and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, just as Ukrainian stockpiles have dwindled. China, for its part, has become Russia’s most important lifeline. Beijing has ramped up its purchase of Russian oil and gas, putting billions of dollars into Moscow’s coffers. Just as significantly, China provides vast amounts of warfighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar- and communications-jamming equipment and jet-fighter parts. Customs records show that despite Western trade sanctions, Russia’s imports of computer chips and chip components have been steadily rising toward prewar levels. More than half of these goods come from China.

The support from China, Iran, and North Korea has strengthened Russia’s position on the battlefield, undermined Western attempts to isolate Moscow, and harmed Ukraine. This collaboration, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Cooperation among the four countries was expanding before 2022, but the war has accelerated their deepening economic, military, political, and technological ties. The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval—a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape.

The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance. It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system. When these four countries cooperate, their actions have far greater effect than the sum of their individual efforts. Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to enforce global rules. Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States.

Too many Western observers have been quick to dismiss the implications of coordination among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The four countries have their differences, to be sure, and a history of distrust and contemporary fissures may limit how close their relationships will grow. Yet their shared aim of weakening the United States and its leadership role provides a strong adhesive. In places across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the ambitions of axis members have already proved to be destabilizing. Managing the disruptive effects of their further coordination and preventing the axis from upsetting the global system must now be central objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

THE ANTI-WESTERN CLUB

Collaboration among axis members is not new. China and Russia have been strengthening their partnership since the end of the Cold War—a trend that accelerated rapidly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. China’s share of Russian external trade doubled from ten to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021, and between 2018 and 2022 Russia supplied a combined total of 83 percent of China’s arms imports. Russian technology has helped the Chinese military enhance its air defense, antiship, and submarine capabilities, making China a more formidable force in a potential naval conflict. Beijing and Moscow have also expressed a shared vision. In early 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint manifesto pledging a “no limits” partnership between their two countries and calling for “international relations of a new type”—in other words, a multipolar system that is no longer dominated by the United States.

Iran has strengthened its ties with other axis members as well. Iran and Russia worked together to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power after the onset of civil war in 2011. Joining Russia’s efforts, which include major energy agreements with Iran to shield Tehran from the effects of U.S. sanctions, China has purchased large quantities of Iranian oil since 2020. North Korea, for its part, has counted China as its primary ally and trade partner for decades, and North Korea and Russia have maintained warm, if not particularly substantive, ties. Iran has purchased North Korean missiles since the 1980s, and more recently, North Korea is thought to have supplied weapons to Iranian proxy groups, including Hezbollah and possibly Hamas. Pyongyang and Tehran have also bonded over a shared aversion to Washington: as a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, declared during a ten-day trip to Iran in 2017, the two countries “have a common enemy.”

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened the convergence among these four countries in ways that transcend their historical ties. Moscow has been among Tehran’s top suppliers of weapons over the past two decades and is now its largest source of foreign investment; Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent in the first ten months of 2022. Over the past two years, according to the White House, Russia has been sharing more intelligence with and providing more weapons to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, and Moscow has defended those proxies in debates at the UN Security Council. Last year, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of crude oil and trade between the two countries topped $240 billion, a record high. Moscow has also released millions of dollars in North Korean assets that previously sat frozen in Russian banks in compliance with Security Council sanctions. China, Iran, and Russia have held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman three years in a row, most recently in March 2024. Russia has also proposed trilateral naval drills with China and North Korea.

The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each country claims a sphere of influence: China’s “core interests,” which extend to Taiwan and the South China Sea; Iran’s “axis of resistance,” the set of proxy groups that give Tehran leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; North Korea’s claim to the entire Korean Peninsula; and Russia’s “near abroad,” which for the Kremlin includes, at a minimum, the countries that composed its historic empire. All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing these spheres of influence, and they want Washington’s presence in their respective regions reduced.

All reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West’s championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and foment domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define democracy for themselves. In the end, although they may make temporary accommodations with the United States, they do not believe that the West will accept their rise (or return) to power on the world stage. They oppose external meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances, the stationing of American nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of coercive sanctions.

Any positive vision for the future, however, is more elusive. Yet history shows that a positive agenda may not be necessary for a group of discontented powers to cause disruption. The 1940 Tripartite Pact uniting Germany, Italy, and Japan—the original “Axis”—pledged to “establish and maintain a new order of things” in which each country would claim “its own proper place.” They did not succeed, but World War II certainly brought global upheaval. The axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The countries’ shared opposition to the present order’s core tenets and their determination to bring about change form a powerful basis for collaborative action.

Fissures do exist among members of the axis. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia, for instance, while Iran and Russia compete for oil markets in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The four countries have complicated histories with each other, too. The Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941; Russia and China settled their long-standing border dispute only in 2004 and had both previously supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear programs and to isolate North Korea. Today, China may look askance at North Korea’s deepening relationship with Russia, worrying that an emboldened Kim Jong Un will aggravate tensions in Northeast Asia and draw in a larger U.S. military presence, which China does not want. Yet their differences are insufficient to dissolve the bonds forged by their common resistance to a Western-dominated world.

CATALYST IN THE KREMLIN

Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The invasion of Ukraine marked a point of no return in Putin’s long-standing crusade against the West. Putin has grown more committed to destroying not only Ukraine but also the global order. And he has doubled down on relationships with like-minded countries to accomplish his aims. Cut off from Western trade, investment, and technology since the start of the war, Moscow has had little choice but to rely on its partners to sustain its hostilities. The ammunition, drones, microchips, and other forms of aid that axis members have sent have been of great help to Russia. But the more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are taking advantage of their leverage over Moscow to expand their military capabilities and economic options.

Even before the Russian invasion, Moscow’s military assistance to Beijing was eroding the United States’ military advantage over China. Russia has provided ever more sophisticated weapons to China, and the two countries’ joint military exercises have grown in scope and frequency. Russian officers who have fought in Syria and in Ukraine’s Donbas region have shared valuable lessons with Chinese personnel, helping the People’s Liberation Army make up for its lack of operational experience—a notable weakness relative to more seasoned U.S. forces. China’s military modernization has reduced the urgency of deepening defense cooperation with Russia, but the two countries are likely to proceed with technology transfers and joint weapons development and production. In February, for instance, Russian officials confirmed that they were working with Chinese counterparts on military applications of artificial intelligence. Moscow retains an edge over Beijing in other key areas, including submarine technology, remote sensing satellites, and aircraft engines. If China can pressure a more dependent Russia to provide additional advanced technologies, the transfer could further undermine the United States’ advantages.

A similar dynamic is playing out in Russia’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Moscow and Tehran have forged what the Biden administration has called an “unprecedented defense partnership” that upgrades Iranian military capabilities. Russia has provided Iran with advanced aircraft, air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber-capabilities that would help Tehran resist a potential U.S. or Israeli military operation. And in return for North Korea’s ammunition and other military support to Russia, Pyongyang is reportedly seeking advanced space, missile, and submarine technology from Moscow. If Russia were to comply with those requests, North Korea would be able to improve the accuracy and survivability of its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and use Russian nuclear propulsion technology to expand the range and capability of its submarines. Already, Russia’s testing of North Korean weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has supplied Pyongyang with information it can use to refine its missile program, and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea launch a military spy satellite in November after two previous failures last year.

Strong relations among the four axis countries have emboldened leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran. Kim, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, indulged in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, and expressed a lack of any interest in talks with the United States. And although there does not appear to be a direct connection between their deepening partnership and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, growing support from Russia likely made Iran more willing to activate its regional proxies in the aftermath. The coordinated diplomacy and pressure from Russia and the West that brought Iran into the 2015 nuclear deal are now a distant memory. Today, Moscow and Beijing are helping Tehran resist Western coercion, making it easier for Iran to enrich uranium and reject Washington’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement.

AMERICA UNDERMINED

Collaboration among the axis members also reduces the potency of tools that Washington and its partners often use to confront them. In the most glaring example, since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has supplied Russia with semiconductors and other essential technologies that Russia previously imported from the West, undercutting the efficacy of Western export controls. All four countries are also working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar. The share of Russia’s imports invoiced in Chinese renminbi jumped from three percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2022. And in December 2023, Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct bilateral trade in their local currencies. By moving their economic transactions out of reach of U.S. enforcement measures, axis members undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions, as well as anticorruption and anti-money-laundering efforts.

Taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia can build trade and transportation networks safe from U.S. interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones and other weapons to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the United States has little power to stop transfers. If the United States were engaged in conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing could seek support from Moscow. Russia might increase its overland exports of oil and gas to its southern neighbor, reducing China’s dependence on maritime energy imports that U.S. forces could block during a conflict. Russia’s defense industrial base, now in overdrive to supply weapons for Russian troops in Ukraine, could later pivot to sustain a Chinese war effort. Such cooperation would increase the odds of China’s prevailing over the American military and help advance Russia’s goal of diminishing the United States’ geopolitical influence.

The axis is also hindering Washington’s ability to rally international coalitions that can stand against its members’ destabilizing actions. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, made it far easier for countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to do the same. And Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. Last year, they elevated Iran from observer to member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a predominantly Asian regional body, and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS—a group that China and Russia view as a counterweight to the West. Iran’s regional meddling and nuclear pursuits have made other countries wary of dealing with its government, but its participation in international forums enhances the regime’s legitimacy and presents it with opportunities to expand trade with fellow member states.

Parallel efforts by axis members in the information domain further weaken international support for U.S. positions. China, Iran, and North Korea either defended or avoided explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they all parroted the Kremlin in accusing NATO of inciting the war. Their response to Hamas’s attacks on Israel last October followed a similar pattern. Iran used the state media and social media accounts to express support for Hamas, vilify Israel, and denounce the United States for enabling Israel’s military response, while the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese media sharply criticized the United States’ enduring support for Israel. They used the war in Gaza to portray Washington as a destabilizing, domineering force in the world—a narrative that is particularly resonant in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even if axis members do not overtly coordinate their messages, they push the same themes, and the repetition makes them appear more credible and persuasive.

AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER?

Global orders magnify the strength of the powerful states that lead them. The United States, for instance, has invested in the liberal international order it helped create because this order reflects American preferences and extends U.S. influence. As long as an order remains sufficiently beneficial to most members, a core group of states will defend it. Dissenting countries, meanwhile, are bound by a collective action problem. If they were to defect en masse, they could succeed in creating an alternative order more to their liking. But without a core cluster of powerful states around which they can coalesce, the advantage remains with the existing order.

For decades, threats to the U.S.-led order were limited to a handful of rogue states with little power to upend it. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the restructuring of interstate relations it prompted have lifted the constraint on collective action. The axis of upheaval represents a new center of gravity, a group that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. The axis is ushering in an international system characterized by two orders that are becoming increasingly organized and competitive.

Historically, competing orders have invited conflict, especially at the geographical seams between them. Wars arise from specific conditions, such as a territorial dispute, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to the survival of a regime. But the likelihood that any of those conditions will lead to war increases in the presence of dueling orders. Some political science researchers have found that periods in which a single order prevailed—the balance-of-power system maintained by the Concert of Europe for much of the nineteenth century, for example, or the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War era—were less prone to conflicts than those characterized by more than one order, such as the multipolar period between the two world wars and the bipolar system of the Cold War.

The world has gotten a preview of the instability this new era of competing orders will bring, with potential aggressors empowered by the axis’s normalization of alternative rules and less afraid of being isolated if they act out. Already, Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens to engulf the wider Middle East in war. Last October, Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo in 2023, too, and Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana in December. Although internal conditions precipitated the coups in Myanmar and across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, the rising incidence of such revolts is connected to the new international arrangement. For many years, it seemed that coups were becoming less common, in large part because plotters faced significant costs for violating norms. Now, however, the calculations have changed. Overthrowing a government may still shatter relations with the West, but the new regimes can find support in Beijing and Moscow.

Further development of the axis would bring even greater tumult. So far, most collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has been bilateral. Trilateral and quadrilateral action could expand their capacity for disruption. Countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all of which chafe against the U.S.-led, Western-dominated system—could also begin working more closely with the axis. If the group grows in size and tightens its coordination, the United States and its allies will have a more difficult time defending the recognized order.

TAKING ON THE REVISIONISTS

For now, U.S. national security strategy ranks China as a higher priority than Iran, North Korea, or even Russia. That assessment is strategically sound when considering the threat that individual countries pose to the United States, but it does not fully account for the cooperation among them. U.S. policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should undercut the axis’s appeal by sharpening the attractions of the existing order.

If the United States is to counter an increasingly coordinated axis, it cannot treat each threat as an isolated phenomenon. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe, for example, in order to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. It is already clear that Russia’s success in Ukraine benefits a revisionist China by showing that it is possible, if costly, to thwart a united Western effort. Even as Washington rightly sees China as its top priority, addressing the challenge from Beijing will require competing with other members of the axis in other parts of the world. To be effective, the United States will need to devote additional resources to national security, engage in more vigorous diplomacy, develop new and stronger partnerships, and take a more activist role in the world than it has of late.

Driving wedges between members of the axis, on the other hand, will not work. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some strategists suggested that the United States align itself with Russia to balance China. After the war began, a few held out hope that the United States could join China in an anti-Russian coalition. But unlike President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s, which took advantage of a Sino-Soviet split to draw Beijing further away from Moscow, there is no equivalent ideological or geopolitical rivalry for Washington to exploit today. The price of trying would likely involve U.S. recognition of a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence in Europe and Asia—regions central to U.S. interests and ones that Washington should not allow a hostile foreign power to dominate. Breaking Iran or North Korea off from the rest of the axis would be even more difficult, given their governments’ revisionist, even revolutionary aims. Ultimately, the axis is a problem the United States must manage, not one it can solve with grand strategic gestures.

Neither the West nor the axis will become wholly distinct political, military, and economic blocs. Each coalition will compete for influence all over the world, trying to draw vital countries closer to its side. Six “global swing states” will be particularly important: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey are all middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order. These six countries—and others, too—can be expected to pursue economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ties with members of both orders. U.S. policymakers should make it a priority to deny advantages to the axis in these countries, encouraging their governments to choose policies that favor the prevailing order. In practice, that means using trade incentives, military engagement, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent swing states from hosting axis members’ military bases, giving axis members access to their technology infrastructure or military equipment, or helping them circumvent Western sanctions.

Although competition with the axis may be inevitable, the United States must try to avoid direct conflict with any of its members. To that end, Washington should reaffirm its security commitments to bolster deterrence in the western Pacific, in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States and its allies should also prepare for opportunistic aggression. If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompts U.S. military intervention, for instance, Russia may be tempted to move against another European country, and Iran or North Korea could escalate threats in their regions. Even if the axis members do not coordinate their aggression directly, concurrent conflicts could overwhelm the West. Washington will therefore need to press allies to invest in capabilities that the United States could not provide if it were already engaged in another military theater.

Confronting the axis will be expensive. A new strategy will require the United States to bolster its spending on defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic communications. Washington must direct aid to the frontlines of conflict between the axis and the West—including assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, all of which face encroachment by axis members. Revisionists are emboldened by the sense that political divisions at home or exhaustion with international engagement will keep the United States on the sidelines of this competition; a comprehensive, well-resourced U.S. strategy with bipartisan support would help counter that impression. The alternative—a reduction in the U.S. global presence—would leave the fate of crucial regions in the hands not of friendly local powers but of axis members seeking to impose their revisionist and illiberal preferences.

THE FOUR-POWER THREAT

There is a tendency to downplay the significance of growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. By turning to Beijing, this argument goes, Moscow merely signals its acceptance of the role of junior partner. Obtaining drones from Iran and munitions from North Korea demonstrates the desperation of a Russian war machine that incorrectly assumed that conquering Ukraine would be easy. China’s embrace of Russia shows only that Beijing could not achieve the positive relationship it originally sought with Europe and other Western powers. North Korea remains the world’s most isolated country, and Iran’s disruptive activities have backfired, strengthening regional cooperation among Israel, the United States, and Gulf countries.

Such analysis ignores the severity of the threat. Four powers, growing in strength and coordination, are united in their opposition to the prevailing world order and its U.S. leadership. Their combined economic and military capacity, together with their determination to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War, make for a dangerous mix. This is a group bent on upheaval, and the United States and its partners must treat the axis as the generational challenge it is. They must reinforce the foundations of the international order and push back against those who act most vigorously to undermine it. It is likely impossible to arrest the emergence of this new axis, but keeping it from upending the current system is an achievable goal.

The West has everything it needs to triumph in this contest. Its combined economy is far larger, its militaries are significantly more powerful, its geography is more advantageous, its values are more attractive, and its democratic system is more stable. The United States and its partners should be confident in their own strengths, even as they appreciate the scale of effort necessary to compete with this budding anti-Western coalition. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine

Listening on my drive to lunch

'Bout 10 minutes in. Pretty good.

https://www.ukrinform.net/amp/rubric-ato/3857407-spains-defense-minister-confirms-plans-to-send-patriot-missiles-to-ukraine.html


Attached File

https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/04/28/italy-supplies-ukraine-with-storm-shadow-missiles-uk-defense-secretary-discloses/

Attached File


https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-gets-cruise-missiles-from-italy/?amp

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Ukrainian War - Week 17 | 2024

Label colors:

Ukraine
Gains (+ 1.19 km²) 🟨
Losses (- 36.33 km²) 🟦

Russia | LPR | DPR
Gains (+ 26.69 km²) 🟥
Losses (- 0.43 km²) ⬛️

Guerre d'Ukraine - Semaine 17 | 2024

Couleurs des étiquettes :

Ukraine
Gains (+ 1.19 km²) \uD83D\uDFE8
Pertes (- 36.33 km²) \uD83D\uDFE6

Russie | LPR | DPR
Gains (+ 26.69 km²) \uD83D\uDFE5
Pertes (- 0.43 km²) ?? #UkraineRussianWar #GuerreEnUkraine pic.twitter.com/G8395mkkof

Poulet volant  (@Pouletvolant3) April 28, 2024

⚔️Battles in Kislivka continue, the enemy continues to press, but the village has not been captured

🐷 Despite the statements of drunk tank gunners, there were no significant changes in the tactical situation on April 28.

🫡 We would like to recognize the volunteers from the 17th and 34th battalions of the 57th, who quickly came to the rescue, showed themselves to be real lions, repelling the attacks, even when they were wounded. Air reconnaissance is also working well, but the enemy does not let you relax.

????? ? ???????? ????????, ????? ????????? ????, ??? ???? ?? ???????

\uD83D\uDC37?????????? ?? ????? ?'???? ????????-?????????, ???????? ???? ? ????????? ?????????? ?? 28 ?????? ?? ?????????.

\uD83E\uDEE1 ?????? ?????????? ???????????? ? 17 ? 34 ??????????? 57-?, ??? ?????? ??????? ?? ?????,… pic.twitter.com/Z1qizAUI7k

— DeepState UA (@Deepstate_UA) April 28, 2024

🇺🇦 The Defense Forces are inflicting damage on katsaps in the settlement of Netaylové

🐷 Unfortunately, the enemy does not stop the pressure after the successes in Pervomaiskyi and tries to advance further with infantry forces, entrenching themselves in the houses. The situation is getting complicated...

📍 http://deepstatemap.live/#18/48.10605/37.55820

\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 ???? ??????? ???????? ???????? ?? ??????? ? ?????????? ?????? ?????????

\uD83D\uDC37 ?? ????, ????????? ?? ???????? ???? ????? ??????? ? ?????????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????????? ??????????? ????, ????????????? ? ????????. ???????? ?????????????...

\uD83D\uDCCD https://t.co/BDbtnIm2c7 pic.twitter.com/3zaMhWb1jw

— DeepState UA (@Deepstate_UA) April 28, 2024

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-buys-81-soviet-fighter-jets-from-russian-ally-20k-2024-4?ampq

"Kazakhstan, which is upgrading its air fleet, auctioned off 117 Soviet-era fighter and bomber aircraft, including MiG-31 interceptors, MiG-27 fighter bombers, MiG-29 fighters, and Su-24 bombers from the 1970s and 1980s.

The declared sale value was one billion Kazakhstani tenge, or $2.26 million, said the Post, meaning the average value of each plane was $19,300."

The MiG-31 will be interesting to have in our museums The MiG-29s and Su-24s will be sent to Ukraine who will make the determination of what can still be flown or used as spare parts and the MiG-27s will get turned to scrap metal. Either way it keeps them out of Iranian and North Korean hands. These are my best guesses anyway.

I’ll pay $20k for a MiG-29. Happily.

It’ll look great sitting in front of the house.

Huge thread, many satellite images.

1/ Analysis on @Vishun_military footage of the 22nd, 227th/769th, 1295th, 111th, 1311th, 3018th/6018th and 2544th Russian storage bases. pic.twitter.com/vwVuk9WwUF

Jompy  (@Jonpy99) April 28, 2024

TLDR-

Here is very crude and no doubt overly simplistic calculation based on your numbers.

I tried to figure out how long will these resources last, assuming average rate of reduction will continue to the future.

In both BMP and BTR cases, end of May / beginning of June 2025. pic.twitter.com/u4YeJCeEhR

AntaresTuitero  (@AntaresTuitero) April 28, 2024

Fits with my own estimation of 1/1,5 years left.

Jompy  (@Jonpy99) April 28, 2024

Cannibalization is one of the hardest factors to quantify.

Externally visible cannibalization represents only the "endgame" for a vehicle, as equipment cannibalized to that extent are likely to have already lost any useful interior/under the hood parts, too. https://t.co/FUw6wbNKGG

Ben  (@bentanmy) April 28, 2024

36/ Still, the shared conclusion between them and me is that Russian cannibalization has gone up recently and a huge share of their remaining armor stockpiles isn't useful anymore due to the lack of spares, or is destined to be consumed to be keep their active fleet operational… pic.twitter.com/4NuyStQoPf

Jompy  (@Jonpy99) April 28, 2024

💥 Two diesel locomotives were destroyed in Russia - details

✔️ On April 28, 2024, in the city of Orenburg, Russia, unknown persons burned to the ground a 2TE10M diesel locomotive.

🔗 https://gur.gov.ua/content/na-rosii-znyshcheno-dva-teplovozy-detali.html

\uD83D\uDCA5 ?? ????? ??????? ??? ????????? — ??????
 
?? 28 ?????? 2024 ???? ? ????? ???????? ?? ????? ???????? ????? ??????? ????? ????????????? ???????? ????? “2??10?”.
 
\uD83D\uDD17 https://t.co/QDMKeQgL1f pic.twitter.com/5EfwWFmWg8

— Defence intelligence of Ukraine (@DI_Ukraine) April 28, 2024

(not to imply this was sabotage)

\uD83D\uDD25 Russia: Assembly plant at the main KAMAZ factory on fire in Naberezhnye Chelny, Tatarstan. pic.twitter.com/5FjrZGJbKi

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) April 28, 2024

It is reported that since early this morning, the KamAZ automobile assembly plant is on fire in Naberezhnye Chelny, Tatarstan. pic.twitter.com/QiZu3yeTEq

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) April 28, 2024

ETA- I thought "there's no way AT didn't already post this", and then looked back and didn't see anything, but AT's an early riser.

Wow. New model of FPV drone now in service with our troops. Virtually silent with NV capability. They didnt have a clue it was there pic.twitter.com/6700s1igaj

— ????? ?k?a???! (@ConnieLingus123) April 28, 2024

Now for something actually new.

\uD83D\uDDFA? Russian troops entered Kyslivka, Kharkiv Oblast from the east and raised its flag in the center. The settlement is now contested. #RussiaUkraineWar pic.twitter.com/JyahZDWhmQ

Spatial Grounds  (@spatialgrounds) April 28, 2024

source:https://t.co/MFaVQCl7vX

Spatial Grounds  (@spatialgrounds) April 28, 2024

Russian flag on a building in Kyslivka
Location: Kyslivka, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine
49.638961, 37.910802@GeoConfirmed pic.twitter.com/0JuCOgl0rw

Bielitz  (@Bielitzling) April 28, 2024

This is a Polish Warmate drone.

??\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6The Ukrainian military of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine destroyed the \uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFARussian radio-electronic station "Repeynyk" pic.twitter.com/VbAgYwz4mh

— \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukrainian Front (@front_ukrainian) April 28, 2024

Article with some details says the Mig-31s are expected to be unusable as anything but scrap.  Reliability of this source is suspect.

Another article.  This one suggests some of the Mig-31s may be salvageable.

Ten-year old article about a Mig31 crash and the repair arrangements with Russia.  Kazakh source.

UA article

Beyond the obvious use of Mig-29s and Su-24s to support the Ukrainian fleet, there are some potential options.
Can a small number of Mig-31s be restored to flight status?  Even a couple would be useful, if they could be armed with a suitable LR missile.
Can some percentage of Mig-27s be turned into drone kamikazes?

The cost of making MiG-31s and MiG-27s flightworthy again far exceed the worth they'd get out of them. I'd assess that keeping them out of the Axis of Evil hands is good enough to justify this purchase similar to our purchases of MiGs from Moldova back in the 90s.

Awesome thread, thanks for posting!
My guess (just based on historical examples) is that engines and transmissions are the real problem, not hulls.  How many of those hulls had their engines pulled in the last 30 years or particularly in the last 2 years?

🇷🇺🇺🇦💡 Missile strike on the facilities of the energy infrastructure of Ukraine on April 27, 2024

By evening, details of today's missile strike on four thermal power plants on the territory of  Ukraine began to emerge.

At the Burshtynsʹka TPP, the missile hit the engine room between the 7th and 8th turbine generator, closer to the 7th. It also seems to have burned the generator transformer of the 7th generator and possibly the 8th. The station is most likely shut down. At the same time, earth protection shafts have been erected in the area of generator transformers No. 11 and No. 12, and the generator transformer on the 10th turbine generator is missing - apparently, it was moved somewhere else.

Meanwhile, Dobrotvirska TPP continues to operate, although it was damaged. Boilers No. 3, No. 4, No. 7 and No. 8 were damaged due to two hits in the boiler-turbine shop. At the same time, boilers and turbine generators No. 1 and No. 2 were not damaged, and the plant is operating on them. In the best case, 2 power units of 100MW each are lost during the strikes, in the worst case - one. And in any case, the possibility of exporting electricity to Poland remains (which was planned by Ukrenergo today, despite the strikes).

There are no specifics on the damage to the Prydniprivska and Kryvorizka TPPs. For the latter, there is indirect evidence of damage to the facility, but no data confirming serious damage. It is possible that these plants continue to operate.

\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83D\uDCA1 Missile strike on the facilities of the energy infrastructure of Ukraine on April 27, 2024

By evening, details of today's missile strike on four thermal power plants on the territory of  Ukraine began to emerge.

At the Burshtyns'ka TPP, the missile hit the engine room… pic.twitter.com/gZTpu97u1y

— Rybar Force (@rybar_force) April 28, 2024

Military expert Alexander Zimovsky:

The collapse of the Ukrainian energy industry turned out to be much closer than the Ukrainian authorities expected.

After today’s latest high-precision destruction of thermal generation facilities in the Dnepropetrovsk, Lvov and Ivano-Frankivsk regions of Ukraine, Zelensky was forced to come out with a special address “to the nation.”

By the way, the Burshtynska Thermal Power Plant, in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, was covered with sea-based Calibers.

Rumors about the final victory of Ukrainian naval drones over the Black Sea Fleet turned out to be somewhat exaggerated.  And the skeptics were put to shame.

Military expert Alexander Zimovsky:

The collapse of the Ukrainian energy industry turned out to be much closer than the Ukrainian authorities expected.

After today’s latest high-precision destruction of thermal generation facilities in the Dnepropetrovsk, Lvov and… pic.twitter.com/4idteKbkfc

Victor vicktop55  (@vicktop55) April 28, 2024

I wonder if any will end up in private ownership in the US to be restored to flight status?  I know there are some Mig-23s around but I don’t know of any Mig-27s.

That would be pretty cool but have read too many horror stories particularly from the USAF Red Eagles squadron about how difficult they are to fly. I think one of the privately owned MiG-23s crashed not too long ago if I remember correctly. But the MiG-27 is a neat variant that's still in active service with the Indian Air Force.

Wiki says India retired it 5 years ago and the last in service are Kazakhstan’s.
Do you have any links about the Red Eagles and Mig-23s?  That would be interesting reading.  I do know that they turned out to be something like the Russian F-104.

Full article:
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s42533-024-00153-w.pdf

This was ten days ago, but man is it a fun rabbit hole.

Russian rail system, infrastructure, import/export, the economy, and coal.
It's so much it may be totally unintelligible, but here goes.

?? Russian Railway Update:
(You might want to bookmark this)

Buckle in, because it’s really bad news.  It is really important that you read the build up to this bad news for you to REALLY appreciate how bad it is.  

Pease make sure read this\uD83D\uDC47 and ALL of the linked threads https://t.co/F3KYfBpZz6

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

Most of the background threads all in one spot-

Now I will AGAIN remind you that the Railroad is Russia’s backbone.  The country does not have high quality roads necessary to replace rail traffic with roads, in some cases, there are NO ALTERNATIVES.

Also the airports are falling apart, and air traffic just isn’t feasible.

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

??Russia:  “Old locomotives are pulling to wear out”

“Manufacturers propose to change the reliability requirements of machines”https://t.co/mNdwTK4LCT pic.twitter.com/rX9gHEeBH6

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

I want to remind you again (since you definitely read the previous threads right? \uD83E\uDD28) that a lot of the problems began for Russian Railways in 2013.

It’s when they began to gut their ENTIRE maintenance department.  That was 11 years ago https://t.co/Vmoq7lcJEo

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

In 2013 Russian Railways got the dumb idea that so many companies do.

\uD83D\uDC49 THEY DECIDED TO OUTSOURCE!

THEY’RE A MONOPOLY & they decided to get rid of their maintenance department! pic.twitter.com/K3oGrwgSEt

Prune60  (@Prune602) March 15, 2024

And since this began

\uD83D\uDC49 11 YEARS AGO

They have not been able to properly maintain these trains.  By 2016 they knew it was bad, but they never fixed it!

(Seriously read the threads) https://t.co/V2Bf3p4BwQ

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

By 2016, they knew they had a problem.  Because things got worse, and quickly!

And the solution according to President of the National Research Center "Transportation and Infrastructure" Pavel Ivankin?

\uD83D\uDC49 return to the practice of repairing locomotives by Russian Railways. pic.twitter.com/8ZmA5IZEYO

Prune60  (@Prune602) March 15, 2024

So keep that in mind as we go forward.  Manufacturers expect equipment to have the routine maintenance done regularly. It’s called “preventative maintenance” (or PMs) for a reason.

It PREVENTS the equipment from breaking. It why you get an oil change on your car.

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

Russia hasn’t been doing the preventative maintenance at the proper intervals FOR 11 YEARS!

What follows is an article where they’re explaining something that shouldn’t have to be explained to this company.  Don’t worry, I’ll explain simply what they’re saying in each part.

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

But the fact that this even NEEDS to be explained to a company that has a MONOPOLY in Russia - THE LARGEST COUNTRY ON EARTH is mind boggling.

Back to the article

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

?? “Locomotive manufacturers are asking for a softening of reliability requirements for machines over 20 years old: they note that components are no longer produced for them, and maintenance due to wear becomes more expensive.”

Pay attention to that \uD83D\uDC46 pic.twitter.com/SwdixXWoH4

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

The MANUFACTURERS note that components are no longer produced for them

They aren’t making spare parts anymore. It’s REALLY hard to fix something without spare parts.

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

And remember that there’s a difference between just being 20 & being 20 with 11 years of HARD living.

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“Russian Railways is ready to discuss the problem, especially if it will lead to an increase in the efficiency of operation of locomotives, the problems with which are explained by the decline in loading on the network.”

\uD83D\uDE02 they’re ready to discuss the problem? lol, LMAO even pic.twitter.com/kRtXygOx0I

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“Experts consider the offers of service companies justified, but Kommersant sources say that just new locomotives are idle.”

Russian Railways made this mess.  Remember, these services companies exist because they eliminated their maintenance departments. pic.twitter.com/BDBCnB8o15

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“Kirill Lipa, General Director of Transmashholding (TMH), proposed to change the reliability requirements for traction rolling stock older than 20 years.” pic.twitter.com/fop2jjBTTu

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“As explained to Kommersant in LocoTech (provides service of locomotives produced by TMH), traction rolling stock with a service life of 20 years or more has a certain degradation wear.” pic.twitter.com/zAZxYmHLHw

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

Okay I’m going to take timeout to explain what is happening here.  Because it’s going to sound really complex when basically what we watching is someone trying to explain some REALLY OBVIOUS STUFF to an idiot (Russian Railways)

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

\uD83D\uDC69?\uD83D\uDD27: Dude, some of your stuff is old & they don’t make parts for it anymore, and you haven’t even been taking care of it properly because you’re a cheapskate and an idiot.  You need to understand it’s going to cost more & take longer to repair. If I can even find the parts!

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“"Individual components are no longer produced, the level of reliability of such locomotives is objectively lower than that of new machines or under warranty service," the company says” pic.twitter.com/agcnmUaqRM

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“"In addition, the longer the service life of the locomotive, the more time it takes for its maintenance, the labor costs increase."”

See \uD83D\uDC46 \uD83D\uDE02 pic.twitter.com/3AnRSxhZq9

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

Here is my beloved bathtub curve.  This next part is them explaining to Russia Railways that the right third of the graph EXISTS. \uD83D\uDE02https://t.co/3xwcueh6UN pic.twitter.com/TLfeo0g2xi

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“Reliability indicators are set in the technical specifications for new locomotives, they apply to design and production failures on the responsibility of the manufacturer during the warranty period, explain in LocoTech,…” pic.twitter.com/X22vMpCZEn

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“noting that today these indicators are decomposed to the entire fleet of locomotives.”

\uD83D\uDC69?\uD83D\uDD27: You can’t expect a 21 year old train to operate as well as a 5 year old train.  But for some reason YOU STILL DO. pic.twitter.com/h3v062hQgr

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“"It is necessary to change approaches and develop a methodology for taking into account the reliability of traction rolling stock depending on the features of its design, service life and other factors," the company explains.” pic.twitter.com/hoFKvkUfuV

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

??“The malfunction of locomotives was mentioned as one of the reasons for the drop in loading on the railway network in the first quarter.” pic.twitter.com/kWeyoC74Ei

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

(From one of the above threads)

Remember, this coal factory had to shut down because things couldn’t be shipped. https://t.co/UlveVLS9uK

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

Their plan on shipping grain is based on them making MORE trips https://t.co/XDclEvJBsQ

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

?? “Experts” are expecting Russia to have an increase in of exports grains by 3-5% IN SPITE OF A FLEET SHORTAGE.

But there’s problems they DID NOT ADDRESS.https://t.co/smg8Wcs1b7 pic.twitter.com/FWuycZjFy8

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 2, 2024

And the Ministry of the Economy has never taken into account what happens if the railway can’t ship! https://t.co/fdTl1sULvi

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“President of the National Research Center for Transportation and Infrastructure Pavel Ivankin notes that the actual volume of traffic has never been included in strategic forecasts based on deflator indices of the Ministry of Economy.”

\uD83D\uDE02 pic.twitter.com/nuXLA0fpvn

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 15, 2024

“At a meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov on March 28, it was reported that 200 locomotives were idle without movement due to insufficient service.”

They’re currently idle? pic.twitter.com/n1N4jwBVGt

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

Not that long ago, they were predicting 20 trains being unable.  Now it might be 200!

I told you it was a compounding problem! \uD83C\uDF7F https://t.co/IDpdDGJAmN

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

And you can see here that they are Currently predicting more that 20 trains everyday in 2024 being unavailable due to this.

But as I’ve pointed out, this is a COMPOUNDING problem. pic.twitter.com/qfa23GTbxs

Prune60  (@Prune602) March 15, 2024

“As follows from the minutes of the meeting at the Ministry of Transport on April 3, the technically sound operated fleet of traction rolling stock for the first quarter decreased by 142 units to the plan, and the unexploited fleet increased by 48 units to the level of 2023.” pic.twitter.com/oG6wr3opv5

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“"The main reasons are the lack of spare parts, including imported production, qualified personnel and the implementation of plans for factory repair of locomotives," the protocol says.”

All the things I said would happen \uD83D\uDE02 and it will continue TO COMPOUND pic.twitter.com/LOctBPLLzz

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“Pavel Ivankin, President of the National Research Center for Transportation and Infrastructure, says that the share of abandoned trains due to traction problems is already about 32%, whereas previously it was 22-25%.”

*how previous is previously? \uD83E\uDDD0 pic.twitter.com/UhgjsUcNnr

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

Translation: They’ve *tried* to start doing more preventative maintenance, which they should have been doing regularly.  It’s also possible that the trains are breaking down more often because they’re getting older and for all the years they didn’t do preventative maintenance.

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“although formally there are enough locomotives, in fact they are in repairs.”

Translation: On paper it looks like their should be a train, but really their isn’t because it’s in the shop.

\uD83D\uDC46THIS sort of stuff is why I tell you not to trust Russian…anything

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“Since its foundation in 2003, Russian Railways has purchased more than 9.5 thousand locomotives, that is, now only about half of the carrier's inventory fleet is under 20 years old, says Alexander Polikarpov, co-founder and managing partner of Rollingstock Agency.” pic.twitter.com/ozjzIUitpy

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

That means about half of the fleet is OVER 20 years old and they don’t make parts for it anymore.

AND THEY HAVE ZERO UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR HALF THEIR FLEET!

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“The wear and complexity of locomotive maintenance no longer depends on age, but on other factors - conditions and correct operation, quality of previous service and repair, availability of spare parts, stock equipment of the depot, quality of on-site management.”

Lol pic.twitter.com/tbs8zb8DAa

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“Russian Railways supports the initiative of TMH "for a comprehensive study of the resource intensiveness of the main components and parts, taking into account the timing of the production of various types of locomotives operated on the network."”

\uD83D\uDE82: We should make a plan \uD83D\uDE05 pic.twitter.com/OndpSIhjn4

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“According to Pavel Ivankin, if the regulations established today do not cover the necessary volume of service for locomotives of older series, this must be corrected at the regulatory level.”

Translation: They still might not fix it pic.twitter.com/D4LC2wJO1K

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“The Kommersant source in the industry notes that the main problem of maintaining the working fleet of locomotives concerns not old models,..”

Over half the fleet is old, they’re still a problem pic.twitter.com/ES4IuIyyLT

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

“…but new ones, which are undergoing "an objectively difficult process of ensuring production and maintenance in conditions of import substitution and personnel shortage".”

Translation: They can’t replace the old ones with new ones pic.twitter.com/Wgv7ePxfE0

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

To be clear: NO ONE HAS ADJUSTED THEIR ECONOMIC FORECASTS TO PLAN FOR RUSSIAN RAILWAYS COLLAPSE IN ANYWAY

And HALF of their trains are over 20 years and therefore, no one makes spare parts/components for them anymore.  And they can’t make enough new trains to replace them

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

Russian Railways is JUST NOW getting someone to give them a SCOPE of the problem.  They hadn’t even considered it was a problem before now.

They are JUST NOW beginning to notice there is a problem, and they probably won’t be able to fix it.

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

And the railway is ALREADY over extended. They cannot ship everything they need to ship.  This is a ticking time bomb, and they did it to themselves.

\uD83D\uDE43 You need trains to ship food

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

That concludes my long thread!  

Probably \uD83D\uDE18

IT WILL GET WORSE!

Prune60  (@Prune602) April 18, 2024

I am almost certain I have not captured everything in this thread.

Holy crap my info is outdated! Don't have a link but it's from what I remember reading the book back in 2009. If I remember correctly they were particularly difficult to land and they lost a pilot to one. They were some of the first aircraft to be retired en masse once the Cold War ended. The only positive attribute of the plane was its acceleration and speed having intercepted F-111s at Red Flag with the help of GCI controllers.

The petting zoo at Nellis has both a MiG-23 and MiG-27 with the latter being a relatively new addition.

"Angels of Victory"

Moschun, a town just northwest of Kyiv.

The local community established an improvised memorial site in this location of old dugouts and trenches from 2022.

During the Battle of Kyiv, Moschun was the only place where elite Russian forces managed to cross the Irpin River and consolidate a small bridgehead.

Their continued advance through Moschun would mean essentially entering Puscha Vodytsya (a recreational suburb in the woods) and then Kyiv's northwestern districts along the city beltway.

Yet... Ukrainian forces, mainly the 72nd Mechanized, in an act of valor and heroism, managed to keep Russians off in a terribly hard battle and eventually knocked the enemy out of the town by March 21.

This is where the Battle of Kyiv, and with it the modern history of Europe, was essentially resolved.

Kyiv was saved here, and so many paid with their lives for this.  

When you come to our country, don't hesitate to come over and pay respects to the guys who became angels in these dugouts in the woods.

"Angels of Victory"

Moschun, a town just northwest of Kyiv.

The local community established an improvised memorial site in this location of old dugouts and trenches from 2022.

During the Battle of Kyiv, Moschun was the only place where elite Russian forces managed to cross the… pic.twitter.com/mPdM4GYNTw

— Illia Ponomarenko \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@IAPonomarenko) April 28, 2024

The "Angels of Victory" memorial is dedicated to Ukrainian soldiers who died in the battle for Moschun, which lasted from February 27 to March 25, 2022, during the initial phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The battles for Moschun were one of the battles that helped the… pic.twitter.com/fBrj9p5t5b

— Oriannalyla \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@Lyla_lilas) January 15, 2024

JDAM strikes at Russian concentration points in the Donetsk region and Zaporizhzhia region. pic.twitter.com/wJh5gKpAre

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) April 28, 2024

BREAKING:

Tens of thousands of Georgian pro-EU protesters are heading toward the parliament in Tbilisi to protest against the Russian-style “Foreign Agents Law”

\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA pic.twitter.com/iS0rPuR1BR

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) April 28, 2024

Today #Tbilisi protests the Russian law; The second hearing of the draft law is scheduled for tomorrow morning. Organizers have stated that the draft law on foreign influence is unconstitutional, therefore they call for cancellation of the plenary hearing. Footage @RTavisupleba pic.twitter.com/AeFjtQcL0a

Katie Shoshiashvili  (@KShoshiashvili) April 28, 2024

"The government promised last year not to reintroduce this law, but they did it a year later.

Now, it's about our morals and dignity to protest against it."

Tbilisi Protesters #NoToRussianLaw
Follow @GAMZIRI24

\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA pic.twitter.com/zAdtYTgkUY

GAMZIRI24  (@GAMZIRI24) April 28, 2024

Special forces mobilized against the pro-EU protesters in Tbilisi, Georgia. pic.twitter.com/OsSKnzKv02

War Watch  (@WarWatchs) April 28, 2024

Before I’ll tell you why my fellow Georgians and myself are at the anti-Russian, anti-govt protests already 10 days in a row, I want to highlight that we kicked off ourmassive rally today with the EU and Georgian anthems. 1/10 pic.twitter.com/COhSBZI5cU

Eto Buziashvili  (@EtoBuziashvili) April 28, 2024

\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA Tbilisi, protest against the "foreign agents" law.  Clashes with the police began.  Security forces used tear gas. pic.twitter.com/AD5VQ0t8eY

— MAKS 23 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83D\uDC40 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) April 28, 2024

You can only see this scene at Georgian protests: a young couple choosing to spend their wedding day on Rustaveli Avenue, demonstrating against Russian Law, fighting for the country's European future. The solidarity displayed is truly remarkable. #Tbilisi #NoToRussianLaw pic.twitter.com/X4ILAbQ54q

Nodar Rukhadze  (@xonoda) April 28, 2024

When police understands what's happening and wants to be saved. pic.twitter.com/71WyTwb4Kf

— George Melashvili \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA (@geomel_ge) April 28, 2024

Situation at Rustaveli is tense. Riot police used pepper spray against the protesters. Earlier at 0030 Tbilisi time Public defender called the police not to use forces against the peaceful protesters. People in Georgia \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEAcontinue protesting Russian law. pic.twitter.com/rg7d8U3fvt

Katie Shoshiashvili  (@KShoshiashvili) April 28, 2024

"Don't go for it, people, it's impossible! You are my son's age. How should we sacrifice this country for the sake of 1 man?! Why!" — address of the rally participant to the special forces

Tbilisi, Georgia pic.twitter.com/K6FcaN4dc9

— Little Soldier Fella \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA (@soldier_fella) April 28, 2024

What we're seeing now in Tblisi is the point when Yanukovych, Lukashenko, Maduro and Assad got ready to call Putin to come and crush skulls, run some torture chambers and disappear protest leaders.

No Russians are coming this time, thanks to Ukraine.
pic.twitter.com/41nwVM8ZVX

Jay in Kyiv  (@JayinKyiv) April 28, 2024

Now in Tbilisi, Georgia
The participants of the rally blocked the road of the special forces with iron barricades pic.twitter.com/3E9wpZ5mBT

— Samira Bayramova \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 (@SamBayramova) April 28, 2024

In #Tbilisi, #Georgia, there are scuffles between the protesters and the police during a #protest rally against the ‘foreign agents’ bill tonight:

pic.twitter.com/AFrQjqvJH0

Alex Kokcharov  (@AlexKokcharov) April 28, 2024

Ukrainian flags are prominently displayed at the anti-Russian protests in Tbilisi.

Tbilisi Protesters #NoToRussianLaw
Follow @GAMZIRI24

\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA

pic.twitter.com/EjXsJTPLq0

GAMZIRI24  (@GAMZIRI24) April 28, 2024

Young protesters from our beloved Ukraine living in Georgia who became internally displaced after Putin invaded Ukraine.

After her speech in English, she says in Georgian, '??? ????? ??????'! which means 'no to Russian law'!

This makes me cry!
Pig empire will fall!#Tbilisi pic.twitter.com/sX52kxS3qP

— Little Soldier Fella \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA (@soldier_fella) April 28, 2024

Police arrested several demonstrators in Tbilisi, one of whom is Alexi Petriashvili, the former State Minister of Georgia for integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures pic.twitter.com/tmeHBpvMv6

Rusa Shelia  (@RusaSh) April 28, 2024

Tbilisi municipality stated that the area in front of Parliament is reserved by the Georgian Dream from April 27-30, making the protesters' presence unauthorized.

They urge protesters to leave and allow preparations. pic.twitter.com/l5ENSjdwx6

GAMZIRI24  (@GAMZIRI24) April 28, 2024

\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA | More than 100,000 people are estimated to have attended today's #NoToRussianLaw protests in Tbilisi. pic.twitter.com/LlDHgfHa9O

Visioner  (@visionergeo) April 28, 2024

“My icon is the homeland and not your Rossiya [Russia]”. #NoToRussianLaw protest, Tbilisi, Georgia. pic.twitter.com/R1UAWjcGQF

Medea Ivaniadze  (@medeaivan) April 28, 2024

Family portrait at the demonstration.

Tbilisi Protesters: #NoToRussianLaw
Follow @GAMZIRI24

\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA pic.twitter.com/S4e6laSgz8

GAMZIRI24  (@GAMZIRI24) April 28, 2024

View from Freedom Square to Rustaveli Avenue #Tbilisi pic.twitter.com/LlWIXZNnNm

rayhan demytrie  (@rayhandemytrie) April 28, 2024

If you find yourself at a rally in Tbilisi and there's a risk of a police raid, don't be afraid. There's always someone distributing masks. It's becoming a civic duty.#NoToRussianLaw #TbilisiProtests #Georgia pic.twitter.com/iAq1d0Sr5z

Gvantsa Seturidze  (@GvantsaSeturid2) April 28, 2024

That's how it should be.

There should be no announcements. Just explosions.



Good



Give me the T72s please



I'm waiting for the Armor to get auctioned off

Wow, thanks for the effort on this.  1917 happened as a result of similar circumstances.

One tweet kinda stuck out to me:

In 2013 Russian Railways got the dumb idea that so many companies do.

\uD83D\uDC49 THEY DECIDED TO OUTSOURCE!

THEY’RE A MONOPOLY & they decided to get rid of their maintenance department! pic.twitter.com/K3oGrwgSEt

Prune60  (@Prune602) March 15, 2024

I smell a MASSIVE grift.  Maybe that’s a bit of a tautology with anything Russian, but offloading an expense-laden segment of their business just gives all sorts of opportunities.  And now that the bill is coming due, there is all sorts of incentive to lie about the situation once questions start bring asked.

They’re probably going to need the armor once Putin’s successor decides another SMO is needed.  If I were Kazakhstan I’d already be planning for that.

God be with those men and women.  Time to do what has to be done!

Below is all just my speculation, but I will say I predicted these developments nearly two years ago.  

It makes sense to me to string out the events in order to string out the pressure on Russia and take some off Ukraine.  Their expected offensive is 1-2 months away and there’s talk of another partial mobilization.  Maybe events in Georgia start boiling now and continue through June/July, culminating in the ouster of the Russian-friendly gov.  If the Georgian Legion has already gone home, there has been time to put some things in place.  No doubt Russia will do what they can to stop it, but they can’t do a whole lot compared to 2008.  It wouldn’t shock me if their interference was limited to nuclear armageddon threats and FSB assassinations and the like.  But they do have internal Rosgvardia units available, and maybe they’ll try that too.  I just doubt it.  They didn’t interfere in Armenia/Nagorno-Karabach either, but they probably couldn’t afford to antagonize Turkey.  So…who knows?

Then when the Russian counteroffensive is in full swing or winding down after being chewed up, the Chechens make their play.  The real Chechens will act at some point, but I doubt it will look like peaceful demonstrations in the street.  Some committed dude will blow up Kadyrov and/or his sons and then it will be on like donkey kong overnight.

Lets say that, as of now, Putin is on the fence about another mobilization.  I’ll also suggest that maybe Georgia-then-Chechnya events happen in order to goad Putin into mobilizing.  More mobilization, more Russians thrown into the line with no training, more losses, more social pressure and discontent, more economic and logistical dislocation…think about it.  We’ve set the hook.  The idea is to put maximum stress on the Russian political/military/economic/logistical/social structures and just wait for something to crack.

Daily Ukraine map thread \uD83E\uDDF5 for Sunday 28th April 2024

Highlights: Russian forces advances into Netailove and were geolocated in Kyslivka

New losses added from south Bakhmut direction after detailed drone overflight video

Map: https://t.co/jNogrb24rK

1/10 pic.twitter.com/hpNU5aKmih

Ukraine Control Map  (@UAControlMap) April 28, 2024

⚔️ The island of Nestryga is freed.
The enemy advanced to Netaylové, near Novooleksandrivka and captured Novomykhailivka.

\uD83D\uDD04 ???? ????????!

?? ????????? ?????? ????????. ????? ?????????? ? ?????????, ???? ????????????????? ?? ??????? ??????????????. pic.twitter.com/3T1kjldnkT

— DeepState UA (@Deepstate_UA) April 28, 2024

🇺🇦 Nestryga Island moves into the blue zone

💬 According to the words of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces:
"In the direction of Kherson, our units managed to advance in the area of ​​Veletenskyi and establish control over the island of Nestryga."

📍 http://deepstatemap.live/#14/46.5408/32.3865

\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 ?????? ???????? ?????????? ? ???? ????

\uD83D\uDCAC?????? ?? ???? ?????????????????? ???:
"???????????? ???????? ????? ??????????? ??????? ??????????? ? ?????? ????????????? ?? ?????????? ???????? ??? ???????? ????????".

\uD83D\uDCCD https://t.co/YJm201Gja6 pic.twitter.com/e7HwDDI4EK

— DeepState UA (@Deepstate_UA) April 28, 2024

Alot of that movement is a simple rotation of forces, you dont just ship in men and give them whatever the other unit had. Each piece of equipment from light arms to complex systems have their own quirks and likes and dislikes. Its good practice to keep these with the units and operators who know them.

I agree totally, America has abandoned and thrown under the bus so many allies over the years. Europe is finally realizing they are realistically on their own. No more free ride. If they want freedom they will have to pony up for it.

\uD83E\uDDF5 \uD83D\uDCA5 Russia: Checkpoint staffed with Putin's OMON enforcers attacked in Mara-Ayagy. The village is located 40 miles north of the border with Georgia.
A firefight ensued along with explosions. Casualties on both sides. pic.twitter.com/ODRLHHVkmc

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) April 29, 2024

This comes amid mass protests in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, against an anti-democratic pro-Russia bill that'd destroy Georgia's ability to join the European Union. 83% of the population want to join the EU.
These protests have been going on every day for nearly two weeks. pic.twitter.com/LNr84BdYML

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) April 29, 2024

“Do you hear? There were riot police there.”

Residents of the village of Mara-Ayagy in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic of Russia report the sounds of battle. According to preliminary data, unknown persons attacked a police post.

"Look, it's still moving."

The attack on a police… pic.twitter.com/vdBPA7hRFn

— Malinda \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDF5\uD83C\uDDF1\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDEE\uD83C\uDDF9\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDE7\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDF8\uD83C\uDDEA (@TreasChest) April 28, 2024

Attack on a police post in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic: preliminary, one policeman was killed, four were injured - media.

According to media reports, around midnight, unknown people drove up to the post, detonated a grenade and opened fire. During the clash, a seconded officer was killed and four local police officers were injured.

Two militants were killed by return fire. Security forces are currently on the scene.

The wounded terrorist may be one of five wanted terrorists who killed two law enforcement officers and escaped.

https://t.me/groupzarya/51644

Disappointing our Switchblade has been a POS. Good that other options work well for the Ukrainians though.

Im sorry to ask this after so long here, But how do you hotlink things for here, things I want to share , news, videos etc., rather than just being infrequent contributor. Thank you so much in advance. I want to help

Pokrovsk Raion offensive equipment loss numbers as of 26 April 2024.

In summary:
1040 Russian \uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFA losses vs. 166 Ukrainian \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 losses

Spreadsheet showing the losses in detail: https://t.co/RO07qaevJN pic.twitter.com/6qBRfo6CZ1

Naalsio  (@naalsio26) April 28, 2024

ISW assessment for April 28th.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2024

Switchblades are doing great, the most recent Ukrainian aid package includes more of them.  They were requested by the Ukrainians.

Ukrainian Switchblade strike against a rare modernized Russian 2B26 Grad-K MRLS. pic.twitter.com/6Etnt8dRzl

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) May 12, 2023

Video of a Switchblade 300 loitering munition strike on a Russian ATGM team by Ukrainian SSO. https://t.co/GUcd1VLGEX pic.twitter.com/16HQB782Ra

Rob Lee  (@RALee85) December 13, 2022

Basically the biggest complaint is that they can't get enough of them.

True.

It's a little different for everything but not hard to learn.

Websites are straightforward, just paste the web address into the "link" window that you get after you hit the little chain link looking icon.

YouTube is also pretty straightforward- hit the share button, hit "copy" and then right click and paste that link into what you get from the YouTube icon.

For Twitter you can do basically the same thing, but you have to-

1) delete a bunch of tracking stuff Twitter tacks onto the end of the url for ARF stuff to make the little preview window.
2) change "x" to "twitter"

https://x.com/Brick_Suit/status/1784330147434528804(?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw remove this)
The much easier way to deal with Twitter is to go directly to the Tweet you want and then copy what's in your address bar. That way you don't have the tracking stuff and it still says "Twitter".

.@AtlantaFalcons select Georgia Trooper in the NFL Draft.
Will see immediate improvement in pass rush. pic.twitter.com/01mgzT5JOB

— Brick Suit (@Brick_Suit) April 27, 2024

(been looking for an excuse to post this )

Thanks Prime!!!

https://youtu.be/VIrXvwJZE7w?si=Mu6t0Izcy3G6bNoZ

First try at embedding some intersting looks at light weapons, Garand Thumb does a great job!

Hit the youtube play button at the top in your reply.  Then paste the youtube url into the box that pops up.  Then submit post.

The ability to separate launchers up to 30 km from their Engagement Control Station allows Patriot batteries equipped with the PAC-3 family to have a greater defended footprint against Ballistic Missiles vs. earlier versions. This increases to roughly 7x the defended footprint. pic.twitter.com/fCbOcCmfH2

Zach  (@ThrustWR) April 28, 2024

This is how you get Gog and Magog.

We can blame Armageddon on Biden and the demmunists.

Any time



This seems like it'll be pertinent sometime.

one of the prettiest sankeys ive ever laid eyes on ???\uD83D\uDD25

global flows of cobalt, nickel, and manganesehttps://t.co/nMVYQITKci pic.twitter.com/PqqtGpe8kK

Nicholas Yiu  (@nicholasyiu) April 28, 2024

Amazing how vertically integrated Chile is for Lithium mining and refining pic.twitter.com/bH5aOQ2QPM

Quincy Lee  (@QuincyEdmundLee) April 28, 2024

"world’s largest copper producers have warned that there is a lack of mines under development to deliver enough to keep pace with the energy transition... warning comes as miners struggle with falling metal prices because of weakness of the global economy and cost inflation,… pic.twitter.com/dm2r4T9BOF

Shanu Mathew  (@ShanuMathew93) October 9, 2023

https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-to-get-laser-guided-bombs-from-uk/

UK giving GPS/ laser guided bombs for UA. I hope these are usable with the F16's.

Kilometer-long traffic jams on the M-12 "East" highway. Drivers queue for gas for two hours. Mash is worried and recommends that if you want to go to Kazan for May, take cans of gasoline with you.

Our subscribers send videos of crazy queues. The line of cars stretched for several kilometers in the Nizhny Novgorod region. The footage was taken near the city of Sergach. This is 270 kilometers from the capital of Tatarstan.

https://t.me/mash/53856

Biden forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022?  In 2014?  Georgia in 2008?  Chechnya again in 2000?  Chechnya in 96?  Poland in 81?  Afghanistan in 79?  Czechoslovakia in 68?  Hungary in 56?  Finland and  Poland in 39?  Forced Russia to murder millions in Ukraine in 32?   Poland in 21?  That’s just since 1917, and I’m sure I missed several.  Russia was and is the Evil Empire.
No man knows the day and the hour, but if the time comes, better to stand with the righteous than piss your pants like a coward.

Adam Kadyrov appointed curator of the Russian Special Forces University

“At the request of my dear BROTHER, I decided to appoint Adam Kadyrov as curator of RUS. I believe that he will cope with his assigned responsibilities perfectly,” Kadyrov

Kadyrov added that Adam, who is 16 years old, is closely familiar with the activities of this university, so he will cope well with his assigned responsibilities.

https://t.me/groupzarya/51648



Friends, today I had great pleasure in attending the open tactical shooting competition “OUR OWN PEOPLE”. They took place on the basis of the legendary Russian University of Special Forces named after Vladimir Putin in Gudermes. 20 teams consisting of fighters from elite security forces gathered here to demonstrate their skills and professional skills.
⠀
As part of the tournament, RUS instructors prepared 10 unique exercises, each of which tested not only shooting skills, but also the ability to quickly make decisions in conditions of increased complexity. Among them are shooting from various types of weapons, fire from automobiles and armored vehicles, hitting targets in motion, assault, and ambush. This is only a small part of everything that the teams had to go through.
⠀
Based on the results of all 10 exercises, the 16 best teams competed in the “Duel” relay race. In short, the struggle for leadership was serious. I was pleasantly impressed by the level of combat training of our units. Their professionalism, accuracy and efficiency in their actions cannot leave anyone indifferent.
⠀
At the end of the competition day, the team of the security service of the Head of the Chechen Republic "AKHMAT-SILA" won the overall competition. She also took first place in the most spectacular exercise - the "Duel" relay race. In second place was the “Dostum” detachment of the head of the security department of the Head of the Chechen Republic, Adam Kadyrov. The top three is completed by the fighters of the special police regiment named after Hero of Russia Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov, the AKHMAT-1 team. I sincerely congratulate everyone on their well-deserved victories!
⠀
Here, at the request of my dear BROTHER, the head of the RUS, Baybetar Vaikhanov, I decided to appoint Adam Kadyrov as the curator of the RUS. He is closely familiar with the activities of the famous university, so I believe that he will cope with his assigned responsibilities very well.
⠀
I thank Baibetar Vaikhanov and all the instructors of the special forces university for the high level of preparation for the competition. I especially thank my dear BROTHER, SOBR “AKHMAT” officer Adam Naurbiev for organizing the training of teams and developing exercises as close as possible to the real situation.

https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4723



Video of Heavy Sixlet running and gunning

Adam Kadyrov showed how he wields a weapon at the All-Russian tactical shooting competition near Gudermes.

https://t.me/groupzarya/51641

Amen.

Stand alone if you must. But Stand.