That was a proof of concept and demonstration project in the end.

It proved that bore sighting a laser in a noodly airplane structure to shoot targets at very long range was a hard job.

It also demonstrated a fleet was not affordable.

I suspect that some technologists recognized that we were on the cusp of advanced lasers more appropriate for an airborne weapon and convinced the Pentagon to drop the program.

The big 3 contractors build to a contract to satisfy the requirements of the Pentagon.  There is very little wiggle room for independent innovation, and in the case of the Navy, practically none.

Boeing isn't about to spend a dime of its own money unless there's a high likelihood of reimbursement in the near future.  I can recall very few IRAD projects that weren't reimbursed later by the government.

Most people don't see the work on "innovation" for years before a contract is proposed for a new airplane.  A couple of examples - Work on the engines for ATF started in the early 80's.  Various equipment development for ATF and other advanced airplanes was flying in the mid 80's in F-15 flight test airplanes.

The problem with most of that work is that it usually doesn't lead to the final product.  That leads to simultaneous development after the contract starts so all of the deficiencies must be driven out at that point, and that's a good way to drag out a contract until it's late and we get "IOC" airplanes on the ramp that cannot fly over hostile beaches.

Don't hold your breath for slam dunks at Boeing.  There are very few that are tall enough and can find the baskets, and those are diverted by the mundane.  Most engineering employees don't give a damn, the bureaucracy drives their enthusiasm out in a year or two at most.