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Posted: 10/11/2012 9:22:56 PM EST

[#1]

Quoted:

Quoted:

Grren Fuel initiatives - let industry work alternative fuels and open it up to coversion of coal and natural gas not just $52 per gallon BIO-Jet A

Fuel is our biggest cost and most critical requirement. We need to fund research into alternatives, and that does come cheap.

The next pentagon guy that proposes a uniform change.

The answer now should be everyone adopting the Navy Type II. Extend the date on Army Greens, so you guys can have three uniforms, too!

If you put three Sailors together, likely they will have 4 different uniforms on.

That's a great way to spend a few million dollars, but it accomplishes nothing.

There's absolutely no reason to go from the type I to the Type II. It doesn't save any money, it doesn't solve any problem, there's no point. It's nothing but a silly Navy Times article.

Posted: 10/11/2012 9:36:33 PM EST

[#2]

Quoted:
I'm willing to lose pilots to keep my nation solvent.

We can buy three of the newest variants of generation four fighters for every generation five aircraft, and fly them for the same price as well.

I would prefer that nobody in congress or anywhere have that attitude. Where does that end?

Posted: 10/11/2012 9:45:37 PM EST

[#3]

Quoted:

Quoted:
we've got two amazing jets in the works the F22 and the F35. Both are in fear of being cut. The F22 atleast flies but has a couple issues. Lets drop the F35 and finish the F22 That way we save some money and atleast get one of the projects finished. The F35 files can go in a big locked box that no one touches until it looks like the world is going to hell again. It seems like as long as we have one air superiority fighter to take out enemy fighters first, our currently existing airforce could bombard the ground all it needs.

What year is it in your world?

Posted: 10/11/2012 9:48:19 PM EST

[#4]

Quoted:

Quoted:
I'm willing to lose pilots to keep my nation solvent.

We can buy three of the newest variants of generation four fighters for every generation five aircraft, and fly them for the same price as well.

I would prefer that nobody in congress or anywhere have that attitude. Where does that end?

What Combat_Jack doesn't understand is that attitude ends up with a Naval force that cannot project power as it was designed to do, which guts a significant portion of our foreign policy.

The CSG is not a tool of war, it is a tool of diplomacy –– it's the stick that enables diplomacy.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:03:03 PM EST

[#5]

Quoted:

Quoted:
I'm willing to lose pilots to keep my nation solvent.

We can buy three of the newest variants of generation four fighters for every generation five aircraft, and fly them for the same price as well.

I would prefer that nobody in congress or anywhere have that attitude. Where does that end?

What Combat_Jack doesn't understand is that attitude ends up with a Naval force that cannot project power as it was designed to do, which guts a significant portion of our foreign policy.

The CSG is not a tool of war, it is a tool of diplomacy –– it's the stick that enables diplomacy.

I was more worried that some jackass in the future would end up with an attitude like, "Meh, the grunts don't need better armor. I'm willing to lose a few dozen more grunts to keep my nation solvent."

If that attitude reigned supreme during my time in, I would have gone to Iraq wearing an RBA or Flak jacket. No thanks. My objection is based solely in self preservation.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:04:21 PM EST

[#6]

Quoted:

Quoted:
I'm willing to lose pilots to keep my nation solvent.

We can buy three of the newest variants of generation four fighters for every generation five aircraft, and fly them for the same price as well.

I would prefer that nobody in congress or anywhere have that attitude. Where does that end?

What Combat_Jack doesn't understand is that attitude ends up with a Naval force that cannot project power as it was designed to do, which guts a significant portion of our foreign policy.

The CSG is not a tool of war, it is a tool of diplomacy –– it's the stick that enables diplomacy.

Saving pilots is a weak argument. I can respect an argument that the F35 is necessary to project power (though it's not). But telling me that the extra $300,000,000 for a fifth generation aircraft over a brand new superbug is worth it because the pilot is more likely to survive combat?

A serviceman costs $513,000 in entitlement and SGLI spending at the moment of his death, plus repatriation costs, replacement costs in the millions for a pilot and a premium that represents whatever America is willing to pay to keep that serviceman alive. That is likely millions but I want to see someone say with a straight face that it's worth $300,000,000.

Josh, I'm told now by several experts in air defense that stealth aircraft will be detectable by peer and near peer enemies by the time the 35 is ready to fight. You're welcome to refute that.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:09:10 PM EST

[#7]

Quoted:

Quoted:
I'm willing to lose pilots to keep my nation solvent.

We can buy three of the newest variants of generation four fighters for every generation five aircraft, and fly them for the same price as well.

I would prefer that nobody in congress or anywhere have that attitude. Where does that end?

What Combat_Jack doesn't understand is that attitude ends up with a Naval force that cannot project power as it was designed to do, which guts a significant portion of our foreign policy.

The CSG is not a tool of war, it is a tool of diplomacy –– it's the stick that enables diplomacy.

I was more worried that some jackass in the future would end up with an attitude like, "Meh, the grunts don't need better armor. I'm willing to lose a few dozen more grunts to keep my nation solvent."

If that attitude reigned supreme during my time in, I would have gone to Iraq wearing an RBA or Flak jacket. No thanks. My objection is based solely in self preservation.

Yet those decisions are made every day. We have the OTV instead of a Crye cage. Because its affordable in bulk. Just one example.

Someone, or many someone's, sit down at their desk and calculate the cost of equipment versus the cost of life or death to the men that use it. It has always been this way. It will always be this way.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:17:01 PM EST

[#8]

Quoted:

Quoted:
I'm willing to lose pilots to keep my nation solvent.

We can buy three of the newest variants of generation four fighters for every generation five aircraft, and fly them for the same price as well.

I would prefer that nobody in congress or anywhere have that attitude. Where does that end?

What Combat_Jack doesn't understand is that attitude ends up with a Naval force that cannot project power as it was designed to do, which guts a significant portion of our foreign policy.

The CSG is not a tool of war, it is a tool of diplomacy –– it's the stick that enables diplomacy.

Saving pilots is a weak argument. I can respect an argument that the F35 is necessary to project power (though it's not). But telling me that the extra $300,000,000 for a fifth generation aircraft over a brand new superbug is worth it because the pilot is more likely to survive combat?

A serviceman costs $513,000 in entitlement and SGLI spending at the moment of his death, plus repatriation costs, replacement costs in the millions for a pilot and a premium that represents whatever America is willing to pay to keep that serviceman alive. That is likely millions but I want to see someone say with a straight face that it's worth $300,000,000.

Josh, I'm told now by several experts in air defense that stealth aircraft will be detectable by peer and near peer enemies by the time the 35 is ready to fight. You're welcome to refute that.

There aren't any experts in air defense or otherwise who have the information to discuss that subject in this forum.

The better argument about saving pilots is going to UAS, and the tech going into the JSF will eventually do that. The future of Naval aviation is not Rhinos, and building your future strategy on throwing out anything newer than 20 years old is pretty myopic.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:22:41 PM EST

[#9]

Quoted:

Quoted:
I was more worried that some jackass in the future would end up with an attitude like, "Meh, the grunts don't need better armor. I'm willing to lose a few dozen more grunts to keep my nation solvent."

If that attitude reigned supreme during my time in, I would have gone to Iraq wearing an RBA or Flak jacket. No thanks. My objection is based solely in self preservation.

Yet those decisions are made every day. We have the OTV instead of a Crye cage. Because its affordable in bulk. Just one example.

Someone, or many someone's, sit down at their desk and calculate the cost of equipment versus the cost of life or death to the men that use it. It has always been this way. It will always be this way.

Not the same, and you know that. The OTV and CAGE are carriers, not armor. I used a bad example saying "RBA". I meant the RBA and the Plates that go with them. And the flak jacket and LACK of plates. As technology moves forward, they'll make better armor systems, and they'll be evaluated and issued. I don't know about you, but in 20 years I wouldn't want my ass swinging in the breeze wearing an IBA.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:25:03 PM EST

[#10]

Yet you see the point.

Someone made a call, to buy a workable system rather than the best and to live with the consequences.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:27:24 PM EST

[#11]

Quoted:

Quoted:
I'm willing to lose pilots to keep my nation solvent.

We can buy three of the newest variants of generation four fighters for every generation five aircraft, and fly them for the same price as well.

I would prefer that nobody in congress or anywhere have that attitude. Where does that end?

What Combat_Jack doesn't understand is that attitude ends up with a Naval force that cannot project power as it was designed to do, which guts a significant portion of our foreign policy.

The CSG is not a tool of war, it is a tool of diplomacy –– it's the stick that enables diplomacy.

Saving pilots is a weak argument. I can respect an argument that the F35 is necessary to project power (though it's not). But telling me that the extra $300,000,000 for a fifth generation aircraft over a brand new superbug is worth it because the pilot is more likely to survive combat?

A serviceman costs $513,000 in entitlement and SGLI spending at the moment of his death, plus repatriation costs, replacement costs in the millions for a pilot and a premium that represents whatever America is willing to pay to keep that serviceman alive. That is likely millions but I want to see someone say with a straight face that it's worth $300,000,000.

Josh, I'm told now by several experts in air defense that stealth aircraft will be detectable by peer and near peer enemies by the time the 35 is ready to fight. You're welcome to refute that.

There aren't any experts in air defense or otherwise who have the information to discuss that subject in this forum.

The better argument about saving pilots is going to UAS, and the tech going into the JSF will eventually do that. The future of Naval aviation is not Rhinos, and building your future strategy on throwing out anything newer than 20 years old is pretty myopic.

For what it is worth the CNO published an article indicating much the same.

I'm not opposed to stealth. I'm opposed to $350,000,000 airplanes.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:29:22 PM EST

[#12]

Quoted:
Yet you see the point.

Someone made a call, to buy a workable system rather than the best and to live with the consequences.

I see what you mean, but we both picked stupid examples. Except in a few isolated incidents, a carrier won't save your life. The plates have saved plenty of lives, though. Are those the best on the market? I would guess the E-SAPI probably is. I've never heard of better, anyway.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:36:27 PM EST

[#13]

Quoted:

Quoted:
Yet you see the point.

Someone made a call, to buy a workable system rather than the best and to live with the consequences.

I see what you mean, but we both picked stupid examples. Except in a few isolated incidents, a carrier won't save your life. The plates have saved plenty of lives, though. Are those the best on the market? I would guess the E-SAPI probably is. I've never heard of better, anyway.

The non releasable carriers result in drowning deaths. But you're right we're getting stuck in details.

Lives come with dollar values attached...it isn't something people like to talk about but that's how it works.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:36:34 PM EST

[#14]

Quoted:
I don't think you folks who suggest we scrap it and go with a new design understand what it takes to go from accepting bids to procurement. They're not designing next years truck with different cup holders from the pervious year and calling it good.

Integrated Air Defense in the years to come is what you have to look at. At present S-300 and S-400 can easily detect our legacy aircraft and strike them even while they're operating far beyond an enemies airspace. We simply can't afford for ourselves or allies to be intimidated by far reaching surface to air threats particularly during an age of increasing dependence on global trade and rising nuclear proliferation. You can do many things to improve electronic countermeasures, but you can't take a present airframe and give it the same low radar signature the F-35 JSF has. To simply update existing legacy aircraft would be to fall short of our duty to provide our pilots who we place in harm's way with the best product we can presently produce.

We simply can't kick the can down the road. Our current aircraft are dated and not the best most capable platforms to protect our pilots from the dangerous threats we place them infront of time and time again. Another 10 years is too long to go. UCAV technology isn't there yet and will not be for some time to replace manned aircraft. The F-35 JSF is the best option we have to move forward with a multi-service multi-role aircraft. If anyone can produce a better aircraft for the next 25 years they're free to try and they were free to try during the JSF competition. The F-35 JSF is the best there is hands down.

Are you talking about the F-35, or the bill our grandkids are going to get for todays fighter jet?

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:37:24 PM EST

[#15]

Quoted:

For what it is worth the CNO published an article indicating much the same.

I'm not opposed to stealth. I'm opposed to $350,000,000 airplanes.

I recall that article.

I'm sure there are cheaper ways to make airplanes. One of the cost drivers is that we're doing a fuckton of R&D with the project, as we did with the F22. That R&D doesn't go away, I'm sure many of the things learned from the F22 are going into the JSF.

Posted: 10/11/2012 10:43:06 PM EST

[#16]

Quoted:
Saving pilots is a weak argument. I can respect an argument that the F35 is necessary to project power (though it's not). But telling me that the extra $300,000,000 for a fifth generation aircraft over a brand new superbug is worth it because the pilot is more likely to survive combat?

A serviceman costs $513,000 in entitlement and SGLI spending at the moment of his death, plus repatriation costs, replacement costs in the millions for a pilot and a premium that represents whatever America is willing to pay to keep that serviceman alive. That is likely millions but I want to see someone say with a straight face that it's worth $300,000,000.

Josh, I'm told now by several experts in air defense that stealth aircraft will be detectable by peer and near peer enemies by the time the 35 is ready to fight. You're welcome to refute that.

That is cold hearted realism if I ever saw one. I don't rate a comment and I'm not saying it's good or bad, it's just very interesting.

Posted: 10/11/2012 11:46:54 PM EST

[#17]

Quoted:

Quoted:
Saving pilots is a weak argument. I can respect an argument that the F35 is necessary to project power (though it's not). But telling me that the extra $300,000,000 for a fifth generation aircraft over a brand new superbug is worth it because the pilot is more likely to survive combat?

A serviceman costs $513,000 in entitlement and SGLI spending at the moment of his death, plus repatriation costs, replacement costs in the millions for a pilot and a premium that represents whatever America is willing to pay to keep that serviceman alive. That is likely millions but I want to see someone say with a straight face that it's worth $300,000,000.

Josh, I'm told now by several experts in air defense that stealth aircraft will be detectable by peer and near peer enemies by the time the 35 is ready to fight. You're welcome to refute that.

That is cold hearted realism if I ever saw one. I don't rate a comment and I'm not saying it's good or bad, it's just very interesting.

Your number is low 513,000 is just the average for SGLI, death gratuity and back pay. The figure used by OMB is 7 million dollars for 1 life.

Posted: 10/12/2012 2:32:06 AM EST

[#18]

That's an incredible amount of money foe one KIA.

Wow.

Posted: 10/12/2012 2:50:23 AM EST

[#19]

Quoted:
There's absolutely no reason to go from the type I to the Type II. It doesn't save any money, it doesn't solve any problem, there's no point. It's nothing but a silly Navy Times article.

Actually it does save the Navy money. Instead of the Navy providing uniforms as organizational clothing the burden is shifted to the Sailor.

Not saying it is the right way of doing business, but it does save the Navy money.

Posted: 10/12/2012 2:53:24 AM EST

[#20]

Quoted:
There aren't any experts in air defense or otherwise who have the information to discuss that subject in this forum.

You mean like the CNO openly discussed in a Proceedings article? Stealth as we know it is shape. Shape is unchangeable. That is its weakness. Our enemies know that.

Another way of fooling radars is called electronic countermeasures. It does not rely on shape. It can be put anywhere it has enough power and cooling. It can be upgraded without changing the aircraft carrying it. That is the way of the future.

The better argument about saving pilots is going to UAS, and the tech going into the JSF will eventually do that.

Not really.

The future of Naval aviation is not Rhinos, and building your future strategy on throwing out anything newer than 20 years old is pretty myopic.

Ironically, it will probably be more than 20 years between X-35 and F-35 operational capability.

Posted: 10/12/2012 2:54:04 AM EST

[#21]

Quoted:

Quoted:

For what it is worth the CNO published an article indicating much the same.

I'm not opposed to stealth. I'm opposed to $350,000,000 airplanes.

I recall that article.

I'm sure there are cheaper ways to make airplanes. One of the cost drivers is that we're doing a fuckton of R&D with the project, as we did with the F22. That R&D doesn't go away, I'm sure many of the things learned from the F22 are going into the JSF.

Obviously we didn't learn. Look at the cost.

Posted: 10/12/2012 3:25:13 AM EST

[#22]

Quoted:

Quoted:

I'm willing to lose pilots to keep my nation solvent.

We can buy three of the newest variants of generation four fighters for every generation five aircraft, and fly them for the same price as well.

I would prefer that nobody in congress or anywhere have that attitude. Where does that end?

What Combat_Jack doesn't understand is that attitude ends up with a Naval force that cannot project power as it was designed to do, which guts a significant portion of our foreign policy.

The CSG is not a tool of war, it is a tool of diplomacy –– it's the stick that enables diplomacy.

Saving pilots is a weak argument. I can respect an argument that the F35 is necessary to project power (though it's not). But telling me that the extra $300,000,000 for a fifth generation aircraft over a brand new superbug is worth it because the pilot is more likely to survive combat?

A serviceman costs $513,000 in entitlement and SGLI spending at the moment of his death, plus repatriation costs, replacement costs in the millions for a pilot and a premium that represents whatever America is willing to pay to keep that serviceman alive. That is likely millions but I want to see someone say with a straight face that it's worth $300,000,000.

Josh, I'm told now by several experts in air defense that stealth aircraft will be detectable by peer and near peer enemies by the time the 35 is ready to fight. You're welcome to refute that.

Tidbits like that keep me from getting the wife to join ARFCOM. I don't want to spend my next deployment worrying about the bad guys and the contents of my care packages

Posted: 10/12/2012 3:28:03 AM EST

[#23]

Quoted:

Quoted:
There aren't any experts in air defense or otherwise who have the information to discuss that subject in this forum.

You mean like the CNO openly discussed in a Proceedings article? Stealth as we know it is shape. Shape is unchangeable. That is its weakness. Our enemies know that.

Another way of fooling radars is called electronic countermeasures. It does not rely on shape. It can be put anywhere it has enough power and cooling. It can be upgraded without changing the aircraft carrying it. That is the way of the future.

The better argument about saving pilots is going to UAS, and the tech going into the JSF will eventually do that.

Not really.

The future of Naval aviation is not Rhinos, and building your future strategy on throwing out anything newer than 20 years old is pretty myopic.

Ironically, it will probably be more than 20 years between X-35 and F-35 operational capability.

The Rhino was first fielded around 15 years ago, IIRC, as they ran their carrier trials on my first ship shortly after we commissioned –– that was my 20 years reference. Yes, the F22 and the JSF were both conceived of well over 20 years ago, the F22 reached IOC far less than 20 years ago and the JSF hasn't yet and won't for several more years.

You can argue UAS all day long, but in reality we're already fielding them. The Standard Missile and the Tomahawk are UAS, they just have bombs on the end of them and are single use.

Again, not going to discuss ecm or any of the associated issues here, to answer C_J's question in any level of detail simply would be inappropriate.

Posted: 10/12/2012 3:30:10 AM EST

[#24]

Quoted:

Quoted:

For what it is worth the CNO published an article indicating much the same.

I'm not opposed to stealth. I'm opposed to $350,000,000 airplanes.

I recall that article.

I'm sure there are cheaper ways to make airplanes. One of the cost drivers is that we're doing a fuckton of R&D with the project, as we did with the F22. That R&D doesn't go away, I'm sure many of the things learned from the F22 are going into the JSF.

Obviously we didn't learn. Look at the cost.

R&D costs a ton of money. If we want to sustain the top military in the world we have to spend it. We can argue about the exact projects to spend it on all day long, but bottom line it costs money to develop weapon systems.

Posted: 10/12/2012 5:09:35 AM EST

[#25]

Can someone answer the following questions:

What role with the F-35 play in air superiority compared to the F-22? What does it do better than the F-22 in this role that warranted canceling the F-22 line?

What does the F-35 do better than the A-10C, in an environment after air superiority has been achieved? I understand that there is a large threat from mobile SAM and ground to air fire units when fighting a conventional war.

What does the F-35 do better than the F-15E in an interdiction role? I understand stealth is a big plus. Can the F-35 carry a decent internal (stealth) payload for interdiction missions?

Can the F-22 be upgraded to perform an interdiction role besides the limited air to ground capabilities that it has? Does the F-35 have a greater internal capacity than the F-22 for air to ground missions?

Posted: 10/12/2012 5:23:17 AM EST

[#26]

it's been said a couple times in the thread...but I'll say it again

this plane is all about that dream of DOD of one platform for all roles
close air support
marine corps STOVL version
air to air dogfighter
carrier based version

I dont doubt it can do all that, the STOVL version is desperately needed to replace harrier
but replacing the F15, F18,F16? they all have a role specific to their branch, the navy has different needs than the air force and the coprs has a whole set of requirements as well
DOD has tried this before......in small arms it was the M14.....it did the battle gun role well but failed on other roles

I love the F35, but we are asking it to do too much.

Posted: 10/12/2012 5:30:57 AM EST

[#27]

Quoted:

Quoted:
I'm willing to lose pilots to keep my nation solvent.

We can buy three of the newest variants of generation four fighters for every generation five aircraft, and fly them for the same price as well.

I would prefer that nobody in congress or anywhere have that attitude. Where does that end?

What Combat_Jack doesn't understand is that attitude ends up with a Naval force that cannot project power as it was designed to do, which guts a significant portion of our foreign policy.

The CSG is not a tool of war, it is a tool of diplomacy –– it's the stick that enables diplomacy.

Saving pilots is a weak argument. I can respect an argument that the F35 is necessary to project power (though it's not). But telling me that the extra $300,000,000 for a fifth generation aircraft over a brand new superbug is worth it because the pilot is more likely to survive combat?

A serviceman costs $513,000 in entitlement and SGLI spending at the moment of his death, plus repatriation costs, replacement costs in the millions for a pilot and a premium that represents whatever America is willing to pay to keep that serviceman alive. That is likely millions but I want to see someone say with a straight face that it's worth $300,000,000.

Josh, I'm told now by several experts in air defense that stealth aircraft will be detectable by peer and near peer enemies by the time the 35 is ready to fight. You're welcome to refute that.

There aren't any experts in air defense or otherwise who have the information to discuss that subject in this forum.

The better argument about saving pilots is going to UAS, and the tech going into the JSF will eventually do that. The future of Naval aviation is not Rhinos, and building your future strategy on throwing out anything newer than 20 years old is pretty myopic.

He was referring to the CNO.

Posted: 10/12/2012 5:39:06 AM EST

[#28]

Quoted:

Quoted:

For what it is worth the CNO published an article indicating much the same.

I'm not opposed to stealth. I'm opposed to $350,000,000 airplanes.

I recall that article.

I'm sure there are cheaper ways to make airplanes. One of the cost drivers is that we're doing a fuckton of R&D with the project, as we did with the F22. That R&D doesn't go away, I'm sure many of the things learned from the F22 are going into the JSF.

Obviously we didn't learn. Look at the cost.

R&D costs a ton of money. If we want to sustain the top military in the world we have to spend it. We can argue about the exact projects to spend it on all day long, but bottom line it costs money to develop weapon systems.

The bitch of it is we're paying a shit ton of money on a dead end approach. It is volume constrained. It's one trick, some stealth from some aspects, can and will be overcome. And then what? How do you upgrade? Take volume away from the bomb bays?

Kinematically it offers marginal improvements over legacy systems at, optimistically, is twice the cost.

I won't even get into the fact that it's over integrated, so when you have to upgrade to keep up with the threat, it's going to cost you tons, not only to upgrade the software, but to flight test everything to make sure you're little software upgrade didn't do something to the other systems.

Posted: 10/12/2012 5:48:58 AM EST

[#29]

At least the knock-offs China is building with stolen F-35 data will be shit as well...

I say fix the F-35C to fill the F-117 role for all branches, then use Super Hornets and drones for the heavy lifting.

Posted: 10/12/2012 8:40:28 AM EST

[#30]

Quoted:

R&D costs a ton of money. If we want to sustain the top military in the world we have to spend it. We can argue about the exact projects to spend it on all day long, but bottom line it costs money to develop weapon systems.

First, do we have the resources to sustain "the top military in the world?" I'd argue we'll have to choose between which service is going to be top notch, and which ones will be competitive.

Second, if we want to develop these top notch systems, we're functionally pulling money away from the personnel side that mans them, and the O&M budgets that operate them. The USAF was right, this is a zero sum game. Short of a major global catastrophe, there is little to no evidence to suggest anything but a slow erosion of DOD spending, to the foreseeable future. The Navy is the most vulnerable to the cut in procurement, but more to the point we need to make the case that we're the logical answer to the state of the art force, versus the others.

The ultimate choice is going to be between our OPTEMPO and procurement. Something is going to have to give. Should OPTEMPO go down, our justification for force R&D and recapitalization goes with it. Also, the GCCs who are crying for our assets are going to have to either go without totally or accept some risk, and our force generation model is going to be need to be adjusted enormously.

Posted: 10/12/2012 8:46:40 AM EST

[#31]

Quoted:
We are 3/4 way across the river with the F35. No choice but to finish.

That is the worst argument for continued expenditure in the world.

Posted: 10/12/2012 9:01:54 AM EST

[#32]

Quoted:

Quoted:
We are 3/4 way across the river with the F35. No choice but to finish.

That is the worst argument for continued expenditure in the world.

Two stages of giant procurements.
Too early to tell, too late to stop.

Posted: 10/12/2012 9:12:04 AM EST

[#33]

Quoted:
Also, the GCCs who are crying for our assets are going to have to either go without totally or accept some risk, and our force generation model is going to be need to be adjusted enormously.

I would go so far as to say our commitments are unsustainable with this force structure.

Posted: 10/12/2012 9:21:01 AM EST

[#34]

Quoted:

Quoted:
Also, the GCCs who are crying for our assets are going to have to either go without totally or accept some risk, and our force generation model is going to be need to be adjusted enormously.

I would go so far as to say our commitments are unsustainable with this force structure.

I would absolutely agree.

Question is, which COCOM gets told, "no."

What is the game plan for the COCOM that gets told, "no." What assets are available, and how does that effect TSCs?

Posted: 10/12/2012 9:26:03 AM EST

[#35]

Quoted:

Quoted:
Also, the GCCs who are crying for our assets are going to have to either go without totally or accept some risk, and our force generation model is going to be need to be adjusted enormously.

I would go so far as to say our commitments are unsustainable with this force structure.

I would absolutely agree.

Question is, which COCOM gets told, "no."

What is the game plan for the COCOM that gets told, "no." What assets are available, and how does that effect TSCs?

I'm going to get skewered for saying this, but this is why AirSea Battle is important.

BTW, the answer is PACOM, for now.

Posted: 10/12/2012 9:59:59 AM EST

[#36]

Quoted:

I'm going to get skewered for saying this, but this is why AirSea Battle is important.

BTW, the answer is PACOM, for now.

We've agreed to disagree. I think there is an argument that we need to show surge, and not traditional presence in the PACOM AOR.

We should be wearing out our carry on bags travelling to and meeting with anyone in the PACOM AOR that will talk with us. We should be whoring out peeps to anyone who wants the bodies, via PEP or whatever mechanism we've got (I get the bureaucratic and community management issues with this, and I know that BUPERs, in our case, would end up working at cross purposes to the intent.)

Posted: 10/12/2012 10:02:32 AM EST

[#37]

what is modern warfare thread as requested yesterday

Posted: 10/12/2012 10:12:01 AM EST

[#38]

Quoted:

Quoted:
Also, the GCCs who are crying for our assets are going to have to either go without totally or accept some risk, and our force generation model is going to be need to be adjusted enormously.

I would go so far as to say our commitments are unsustainable with this force structure.

I would absolutely agree.

Question is, which COCOM gets told, "no."

What is the game plan for the COCOM that gets told, "no." What assets are available, and how does that effect TSCs?

I'm going to get skewered for saying this, but this is why AirSea Battle is important.

BTW, the answer is PACOM, for now.

And I'd argue that would be correct for the foreseeable future. Our greatest threats remain in CENTCOM.

Posted: 10/12/2012 10:15:48 AM EST

[#39]

Quoted:

Quoted:
Also, the GCCs who are crying for our assets are going to have to either go without totally or accept some risk, and our force generation model is going to be need to be adjusted enormously.

I would go so far as to say our commitments are unsustainable with this force structure.

I would absolutely agree.

Question is, which COCOM gets told, "no."

What is the game plan for the COCOM that gets told, "no." What assets are available, and how does that effect TSCs?

I'm going to get skewered for saying this, but this is why AirSea Battle is important.

BTW, the answer is PACOM, for now.

And I'd argue that would be correct for the foreseeable future. Our greatest threats remain in CENTCOM.

We need to start the groundwork for ASB to be successful in the PACOM AOR, and luckily I think we can do that cheap, were we of a mind to.

"Hey, [insert non-Chinese Pacific nation], would you like a training visit by an MP, ADA, Maritime CA and engineer unit for a few weeks?"

Posted: 10/12/2012 10:23:13 AM EST

[#40]

Quoted:
We need to start the groundwork for ASB to be successful in the PACOM AOR, and luckily I think we can do that cheap, were we of a mind to.

"Hey, [insert non-Chinese Pacific nation], would you like a training visit by an MP, ADA, Maritime CA and engineer unit for a few weeks?"

ASB is not a one COCOM, one trick pony. Imagine, if you will, only one carrier in CENTCOM (CNO announced today we'll keep two in CENTCOM until March of next year at least). So how do you mitigate the risk of deploying only one carrier? You mitigate it by using airpower. Air power can deploy quickly. If our air forces and naval forces routinely exercised together and had a interoperable doctrine, then you could send aircraft out quickly to cover the gap until more forces can flow in.

Obviously, this has applications everywhere. It keeps our footprint in country low, until needed, very similar to the arrangements we had with the Kingdom from 1979 until 1990. It keeps our deployed naval forces to a minimum, extending shiplife, and it mitigates risk.

Posted: 10/12/2012 10:38:40 AM EST

[#41]

Quoted:
You missed the part about being short ranged and needing external stores that defeat the whole point of it being stealthy.

The F-35 is capable of stealth strike missions without external stores.

The F-22 can also carry external stores for missions where stealth is not required... Are you going to bitch about that too?

It doesn't make sense to take away the ability of a fighter aircraft to have external stores for certain missions.

All that said... How capable the F-35 is doesn't matter... We won't be buying enough of them to meet our needs. Congress will be sure of that.

Posted: 10/12/2012 10:39:42 AM EST

[#42]

Quoted:

ASB is not a one COCOM, one trick pony. Imagine, if you will, only one carrier in CENTCOM (CNO announced today we'll keep two in CENTCOM until March of next year at least). So how do you mitigate the risk of deploying only one carrier? You mitigate it by using airpower. Air power can deploy quickly. If our air forces and naval forces routinely exercised together and had a interoperable doctrine, then you could send aircraft out quickly to cover the gap until more forces can flow in.

Obviously, this has applications everywhere. It keeps our footprint in country low, until needed, very similar to the arrangements we had with the Kingdom from 1979 until 1990. It keeps our deployed naval forces to a minimum, extending shiplife, and it mitigates risk.

That's basically old wine in new bottles. The flow of forces into theater is a pretty robust process at this point, nearly so automated that Army officers do it.

In the case of the PG, the success of flowing forces into the theater was the result of a combination of decades of shaping operations, a level of interoperability with local forces and good infrastructure. These are three things we need to do more of in PACOM. I'd say we're really close to good with the ROK and JSDF. We can probably sham to success with the Aussies. Everyone else we kind of suck, and they suck worse.

Posted: 10/12/2012 11:23:58 AM EST

[#43]

Quoted:

Quoted:

ASB is not a one COCOM, one trick pony. Imagine, if you will, only one carrier in CENTCOM (CNO announced today we'll keep two in CENTCOM until March of next year at least). So how do you mitigate the risk of deploying only one carrier? You mitigate it by using airpower. Air power can deploy quickly. If our air forces and naval forces routinely exercised together and had a interoperable doctrine, then you could send aircraft out quickly to cover the gap until more forces can flow in.

Obviously, this has applications everywhere. It keeps our footprint in country low, until needed, very similar to the arrangements we had with the Kingdom from 1979 until 1990. It keeps our deployed naval forces to a minimum, extending shiplife, and it mitigates risk.

That's basically old wine in new bottles. The flow of forces into theater is a pretty robust process at this point, nearly so automated that Army officers do it.

In the case of the PG, the success of flowing forces into the theater was the result of a combination of decades of shaping operations, a level of interoperability with local forces and good infrastructure. These are three things we need to do more of in PACOM. I'd say we're really close to good with the ROK and JSDF. We can probably sham to success with the Aussies. Everyone else we kind of suck, and they suck worse.

We're good at flowing forces. The key is interoperable doctrine.

Posted: 10/12/2012 11:42:57 AM EST

[#44]

Quoted:

Quoted:
It is going to be the plane that ate the Dept of Defense.

There is no plan B.

Sure there is, it's just that our military leaders are putting their fingers in their ears and shouting "LA LA LA LA LA LA LA LA" to drown it out:

Shitcan the F-35 and buy upgraded Superbugs for the Marines and navy and buy more F-15s and F-16s for the air force. It's not "sexy," but it definitely gets the job done and for less money.

Posted: 10/12/2012 12:38:52 PM EST

[#45]

Quoted:

We're good at flowing forces. The key is interoperable doctrine.

We've got the doctrine.

The mindset is the problem. Our sister forces simply aren't expeditionary, no matter how much lipstick they put on the pig. Their footprint is too heavy, and the logistics too large and vulnerable.

If the enemy is capable of sustained deep strike, air forces will get punished. That was the untold lesson of 1939-1942, and the air forces who suffered under it built aircraft capable of real dispersal.

No F-22 or F-35 is going to get flown off a highway when it needs specialized hangers for its LO coatings.

Posted: 10/12/2012 12:43:21 PM EST

[#46]

Quoted:

Quoted:

We're good at flowing forces. The key is interoperable doctrine.

We've got the doctrine.

The mindset is the problem. Our sister forces simply aren't expeditionary, no matter how much lipstick they put on the pig. Their footprint is too heavy, and the logistics too large and vulnerable.

If the enemy is capable of sustained deep strike, air forces will get punished. That was the untold lesson of 1939-1942, and the air forces who suffered under it built aircraft capable of real dispersal.

No F-22 or F-35 is going to get flown off a highway when it needs specialized hangers for its LO coatings.

Respectfully, we do not. On another medium I could point to several specific examples.

We have joint doctrine, which is design to be inoffensive, so the services can do what they want. We need interoperable doctrine, doctrine that compliments each other and where it is well understood how to plug into the other services. If you think we have that you're concentrating at the highest levels of doctrine where everything is sunshine and lollipops, because it is written to be uncontroversial.

Posted: 10/12/2012 12:51:56 PM EST

[#47]

Quoted:

We have joint doctrine, which is design to be inoffensive, so the services can do what they want. We need interoperable doctrine, doctrine that compliments each other and where it is well understood how to plug into the other services. If you think we have that you're concentrating at the highest levels of doctrine where everything is sunshine and lollipops, because it is written to be uncontroversial.

Having seen controlling doctrine up close and how its written and used, I don't want it for my Navy. It would not work and destroys the human element.

We have our weaknesses at operational planning, and we're not a Joint service by design. We might not need to be. Our battlespace, even when we project ashore, is different. Our platforms dictate our capability.

I've like some of the stuff coming out of NWC about shifting how we create CSGs, and getting away from the concept that the CSG HAS TO BE the first one there, kicking down the door. When I see something like ASB, the CSGs are the LAST things I want around. My other assets, esp. when not tethered to CSGs are much more effective and capable. Give the long shooters time to sanitize and carve reasonably secure parts of the battlespace out, and because fixed airfields should be out of the fight at D+5 anyway, if IRBMs are such an issue, having a carrier capable of 72 to 96 hours of operations could be valuable.

Of course, I think much of the IRBM threat from nuclear capable states should be answered with a clear pronouncement to the effect that the US will not be blackmailed into accepting launch on impact, and reserves the right to strategic response at the time and place of our choosing to such an attack. Call it the Screechjet doctrine.

Posted: 10/12/2012 1:07:43 PM EST

[#48]

Quoted:

Having seen controlling doctrine up close and how its written and used, I don't want it for my Navy. It would not work and destroys the human element.

I chose my words carefully. I'm talking about doctrine that works with other doctrine. I'm not talking joint, combined, nor controlling doctrine. I can think of two examples of what I'm talking about that we are working to codify. Both involve the USAF of course.

We have our weaknesses at operational planning, and we're not a Joint service by design. We might not need to be. Our battlespace, even when we project ashore, is different. Our platforms dictate our capability.1

We are not good at operational planning because our operating environment does not demand it and is by nature fluid. (Get it? Fluid?)

I've like some of the stuff coming out of NWC about shifting how we create CSGs, and getting away from the concept that the CSG HAS TO BE the first one there, kicking down the door. When I see something like ASB, the CSGs are the LAST things I want around. My other assets, esp. when not tethered to CSGs are much more effective and capable. Give the long shooters time to sanitize and carve reasonably secure parts of the battlespace out, and because fixed airfields should be out of the fight at D+5 anyway, if IRBMs are such an issue, having a carrier capable of 72 to 96 hours of operations could be valuable.

It appears you are confusing ASB with A2AD. A2AD is the stimulus. ASB is the response.

Of course, I think much of the IRBM threat from nuclear capable states should be answered with a clear pronouncement to the effect that the US will not be blackmailed into accepting launch on impact, and reserves the right to strategic response at the time and place of our choosing to such an attack. Call it the Screechjet doctrine.

What do you mean "launch on impact."

Posted: 10/12/2012 1:15:08 PM EST

[#49]

Quoted:

Quoted:
We are 3/4 way across the river with the F35. No choice but to finish.

That is the worst argument for continued expenditure in the world.

Absolutely...sunk costs are always to be disregarded. We need to decide what is best right now. If the billions we spent on F-35 make it billions cheaper then the new cost estimates should speak for themselves...

For the derps:
If you put 99,000 dollars towards a 100,000 dollar car, it is probably worth it to you to spend the 1,000 dollars that is left to own it.

If you put 99,000 dollars into that car and then it turns out it will cost 150,000 to repair some unforeseen damage, you bug the hell out and because the cost to have that car is now 151,000––-more than you're willing to pay.

It's like, maths and stuff

Of course, once votes become involved the formula is exponentially more complicated.

Posted: 10/12/2012 1:45:45 PM EST

[#50]

Here's something we can all agree on; the F-35 is an ugly turd. I would really like to see the area ruling map for that airplane, and get a look at the transonic drag rise. I think it's going to be a pig.

Here's the post demonstration, Boeing PWSC, the airplane shape that would have gone to production: