User Panel
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Well that is certainly your prerogative. While the implementation of MCAS was tragically and inexcusably terrible I don't think that MCAS itself is a bad thing. Boeing is and will pay a price for their failure and contributing factor in those incidents, and it won't be insignificant. But out curiosity, what do you think Boeing should have done in that situation? Ceded the market to Airbus for 5-10 years while they developed a clean sheet design? Do you think the MAX was just a knee-jerk reaction without a significant amount of technical and business analysis? That Boeing knowingly risked the lives of the traveling public with an inherently problematic design? Do you think that fellow members here who have actually flown the MAX are being dishonest with their generally favorable opinions of the airplane? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again. Its one of the worst debacles ever and Boeing is just trying to save face. It was a flawed idea from the start, and whats worse is it seems like the FAA was in on it as well, simply rubber stamping Boeing. ETA: I'll never fly on a MAX. Thats 100% certain. I would hop on one operated by a US or European carrier right now. Right now it is being scrutinized and vetted more than any other commercial airplane in service. If anything, once that process is complete, improvements have been made, it is deemed turd world proof and receives regulatory approval to return to service, it will arguably be the safest commercial airplane flying. Also very ironic to see remarks like this on a forum dedicated to a product that had an even worse introduction to service. I work closely with Aviation stuff, and the whole thing and outcome doesnt give me the warm and fuzzies. My biggest issue though is the plane is a bastard design with inherent problems which Boeing tried to solve with software. All as a way to avoid being left behind when Airbus beat them at their own game. While the implementation of MCAS was tragically and inexcusably terrible I don't think that MCAS itself is a bad thing. Boeing is and will pay a price for their failure and contributing factor in those incidents, and it won't be insignificant. But out curiosity, what do you think Boeing should have done in that situation? Ceded the market to Airbus for 5-10 years while they developed a clean sheet design? Do you think the MAX was just a knee-jerk reaction without a significant amount of technical and business analysis? That Boeing knowingly risked the lives of the traveling public with an inherently problematic design? Do you think that fellow members here who have actually flown the MAX are being dishonest with their generally favorable opinions of the airplane? From a business standpoint Boeing should have never allowed Airbus to beat them at their game. They got too comfortable with their market position. The MAX was 100% a knee jerk reaction, and management fucked it up from the start. Id say it was more business analysis than technical analysis that led to it. The core of the problem is that to be competitive with Airbus, Boeing had to fit larger engines to the plane than it was capable of. That meant a number of changes were needed to the airframe - not just MCAS. Boeing did all of this to avoid developing a new aircraft (which they were already beat on). To make it worse, regulators were buddy buddy with Boeing and rubber stamped a number of critical decisions. It doesnt give me much faith moving forward into the future... And all of this doesnt even touch on how horrible the MAX is for passengers... sheesh thats a whole different tirade. Ask those arfcommers who fly it how they like the lav. |
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No, its not "just a 737 with more fuel efficient engines" View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again. Its one of the worst debacles ever and Boeing is just trying to save face. It was a flawed idea from the start, and whats worse is it seems like the FAA was in on it as well, simply rubber stamping Boeing. ETA: I'll never fly on a MAX. Thats 100% certain. The MAX is just a 737 with more fuel efficient engines. You're doing exactly the same thing that libtards do, when they so passionately espouse their opinions, based only on emotions, ignorance, hysteria, propaganda and hype. Fwiw, I hate what Boeing did with the MCAS system, it was incredibly stupid. I won't defend them, but I will defend common sense. Quoted:
I work closely with Aviation stuff, and the whole thing and outcome doesnt give me the warm and fuzzies. My biggest issue though is the plane is a bastard design with inherent problems which Boeing tried to solve with software. All as a way to avoid being left behind when Airbus beat them at their own game. I’m trying to decide if its worth discussing with you. . We had a multi page thread once, where an “F-15 Pilot” was holding forth on his strongly held expert opinion...until he was finally unmasked as an F-15 Remote Control Pilot.. So, I please don’t take affront to my request that you elaborate on your SME claim. |
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The Anglo American legal tradition has a long history of general purpose criminal statutes, case law and legal principles, which render specific statutes essentially unnecessary. RCW 9A.32.060 Manslaughter in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (a) He or she recklessly causes the death of another person; or (b) He or she intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child. (2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class A felony. RCW 9A.32.070 Manslaughter in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person. (2) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class B felony. RCW 9A.08.010 General requirements of culpability. … (c) RECKLESSNESS. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. (d) CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. … (4) Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Production of an unsafe aircraft. RCW 9A.32.060 Manslaughter in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (a) He or she recklessly causes the death of another person; or (b) He or she intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child. (2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class A felony. RCW 9A.32.070 Manslaughter in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person. (2) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class B felony. RCW 9A.08.010 General requirements of culpability. … (c) RECKLESSNESS. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. (d) CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. … (4) Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears. I suppose stranger things have happened, but I very strongly doubt that convictions would be had on either of those charges. Especially when considering that it was only one contributing factor. As stated, it sounds like more of a civil matter. Which is where it is being handled. I would also be VERY careful about opening that door. A bunch of gun industry executives might wind up sharing cells with Boeing executives. |
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That would take a lot of heat off, but the thing that hurt them most is the CEO saying they're still perfectly fine airplanes, pilots are bad, and public has a short memory sort of struck many people wrong (even if he was sort of correct in some ways on those points). View Quote |
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Ok, please state what you mean when you say "I work closely with aviation stuff". I'm trying to decide if its worth discussing with you. . We had a multi page thread once, where an "F-15 Pilot" was holding forth on his strongly held expert opinion...until he was finally unmasked as an F-15 Remote Control Pilot.. So, I please don't take affront to my request that you elaborate on your SME claim. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again. Its one of the worst debacles ever and Boeing is just trying to save face. It was a flawed idea from the start, and whats worse is it seems like the FAA was in on it as well, simply rubber stamping Boeing. ETA: I'll never fly on a MAX. Thats 100% certain. The MAX is just a 737 with more fuel efficient engines. You're doing exactly the same thing that libtards do, when they so passionately espouse their opinions, based only on emotions, ignorance, hysteria, propaganda and hype. Fwiw, I hate what Boeing did with the MCAS system, it was incredibly stupid. I won't defend them, but I will defend common sense. Quoted:
I work closely with Aviation stuff, and the whole thing and outcome doesnt give me the warm and fuzzies. My biggest issue though is the plane is a bastard design with inherent problems which Boeing tried to solve with software. All as a way to avoid being left behind when Airbus beat them at their own game. I'm trying to decide if its worth discussing with you. . We had a multi page thread once, where an "F-15 Pilot" was holding forth on his strongly held expert opinion...until he was finally unmasked as an F-15 Remote Control Pilot.. So, I please don't take affront to my request that you elaborate on your SME claim. Im not a pilot. -SNIPPED- Thats all im sharing about me. This place has arocked people before and i dont need that. Dont quote me please as im removing the above two paragraphs shortly. My opinion is and remains that the MAX was a shit business and technical decision, and the hole that it is keeps getting dug deeper. ETA: Dont think pilots are the end all be all final answer to this problem. They might like the plane and fly it fine, but from a technical standpoint it is hugely flawed. |
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Well I don’t think that you are wrong. But I am also not sure what he should have said instead. Silence wasn’t an option, either. Maybe just a no-win situation. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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That would take a lot of heat off, but the thing that hurt them most is the CEO saying they're still perfectly fine airplanes, pilots are bad, and public has a short memory sort of struck many people wrong (even if he was sort of correct in some ways on those points). |
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Sigh, every fucking time it turns into a dick swinging contest... Im not a pilot. ——SNIP—— That gives me more than enough knowledge of the issue to have my opinions, and everything i say here is my own opinion. Thats all im sharing about me. This place has arocked people before and i dont need that. Dont quote me please as im removing the above two paragraphs shortly. My opinion is and remains that the MAX was a shit business and technical decision, and the hole that it is keeps getting dug deeper. ETA: Dont think pilots are the end all be all final answer to this problem. They might like the plane and fly it fine, but from a technical standpoint it is hugely flawed. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again. Its one of the worst debacles ever and Boeing is just trying to save face. It was a flawed idea from the start, and whats worse is it seems like the FAA was in on it as well, simply rubber stamping Boeing. ETA: I'll never fly on a MAX. Thats 100% certain. The MAX is just a 737 with more fuel efficient engines. You're doing exactly the same thing that libtards do, when they so passionately espouse their opinions, based only on emotions, ignorance, hysteria, propaganda and hype. Fwiw, I hate what Boeing did with the MCAS system, it was incredibly stupid. I won't defend them, but I will defend common sense. Quoted:
I work closely with Aviation stuff, and the whole thing and outcome doesnt give me the warm and fuzzies. My biggest issue though is the plane is a bastard design with inherent problems which Boeing tried to solve with software. All as a way to avoid being left behind when Airbus beat them at their own game. I'm trying to decide if its worth discussing with you. . We had a multi page thread once, where an "F-15 Pilot" was holding forth on his strongly held expert opinion...until he was finally unmasked as an F-15 Remote Control Pilot.. So, I please don't take affront to my request that you elaborate on your SME claim. Im not a pilot. ——SNIP—— That gives me more than enough knowledge of the issue to have my opinions, and everything i say here is my own opinion. Thats all im sharing about me. This place has arocked people before and i dont need that. Dont quote me please as im removing the above two paragraphs shortly. My opinion is and remains that the MAX was a shit business and technical decision, and the hole that it is keeps getting dug deeper. ETA: Dont think pilots are the end all be all final answer to this problem. They might like the plane and fly it fine, but from a technical standpoint it is hugely flawed. I’m under no illusion that pilots know every single thing about every subsystem, but the Max successfully flew (hundreds of thousands?) of flights, until the MCAS issues turned up. There may well be people here, who actually do know more about how the various systems interrelate. My request has nothing whatsoever to do with “dickmeasuring” It’s just that when someone appears to be talking out of their ass, it’s very difficult Not to respond. I’m sure you can see how your generalized uneducated gonzo comments like: “The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again.” And “the Max was a shit business and technical decision” require a bit of explanation. In addition, your bitching about the size of the Lav, as if that somehow adds to your claims, well, it’s just really strange. With all due respect, it makes you seem like one of those typical know nothing blowhards. If you are aware of other legitimate reasons for thinking the Max will have safety related issues, I would truly appreciate you posting them, or sending an IM. Thanks. |
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Quoted: Thanks for the response. I snipped out out the personal parts, as I'm 100% in agreement, as to keeping a low profile. I'm under no illusion that pilots know every single thing about every subsystem, but the Max successfully flew (hundreds of thousands?) of flights, until the MCAS issues turned up. There may well be people here, who actually do know more about how the various systems interrelate. My request has nothing whatsoever to do with "dickmeasuring" It's just that when someone appears to be talking out of their ass, it's very difficult Not to respond. I'm sure you can see how your generalized uneducated gonzo comments like: "The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again." And "the Max was a shit business and technical decision" require a bit of explanation. In addition, your bitching about the size of the Lav, as if that somehow adds to your claims, well, it's just really strange. With all due respect, it makes you seem like one of those typical know nothing blowhards. If you are aware of other legitimate reasons for thinking the Max will have safety related issues, I would truly appreciate you posting them, or sending an IM. Thanks. View Quote Completely outside of its issues its unconfortable as all hell for passengers, hence the lav part. It was designed to cram more people in. Not a comfortable plane for a passenger. Tack on the software and design problems, and just not something ill fly on. My main concern on the safety side is that the fix will come through no matter what - damn the consequences - because the pressure on boeing, airlines, and regulators is just too high. Neither side will back down and say "you know what, this just isnt gonna work". Think of it this way. If it was a simple single issue with the MCAS software the fix would have been done already and theyd be in the air. Theyre not. Turns out, things are getting more involved as they go on. When you begin to realize though, that the same agency responsible for ensuring the MAX was safe in the first place, and rubber stamped the MAX is the same agency overseeing the fixes, it makes you concerned. You also begin to see from this whole thing that Boeings software design is questionable, and its come out that boeing is doing questionable things (indian software devs, ignoring engineers, etc). Thats not the Boeing a lot of people knew. ETA: To be specific on the technical issues that bother me: its that the plane has a critical processing issue, and the software fix wasnt just with the mcas but also with another flight control system. The reported fix to mcas induced other issues in the software, and showed some limitations of the hardware its running on. In other words, the plane got more softwarr than it could handle, and its likely boeing knew about this limitation before the mcas changes. |
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U.S. House panel wants Boeing CEO to allow employee interviews on 737 MAX crashes
"Congress on Thursday asked Boeing Co’s chief executive to make several employees available for interviews as part of a congressional probe into the design, development and certification of 737 MAX aircraft involved in two crashes that killed 346 people. House of Representatives Transportation Committee Chairman Peter DeFazio and Representative Rick Larsen, who chairs the aviation subcommittee, said in a statement that while Boeing has provided substantial documents and shared senior management’s perspective, “it’s important to the committee’s investigation to hear from relevant Boeing employees.” The committee plans another Boeing hearing in the coming weeks and previously asked whistleblowers to come forward with any information about the plane’s development. Boeing has provided more than 300,000 pages of documents, a person briefed on the matter said, speaking on condition of anonymity. Boeing said in a statement it was “deeply disappointed the committee chose to release private correspondence given our extensive cooperation to date. We will continue to be transparent and responsive to the committee.” " |
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Boeing “is making good, solid progress” on 737 MAX return
"On September 11, 2019, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Boeing, Dennis Muilenburg, spoke at the Morgan Stanley 7th Annual Laguna Conference at Laguna Beach, California. Muilenburg touched upon a few key subjects, but the 737 MAX crisis and the forthcoming end to the groundings were the main topics of Boeing’s presentation. Boeing is trying to steer through adversity without conceding too much damage to its brand and financial results. “The situation with the 737 MAX continues to be our focus,” Muilenburg noted as he started his speech, adding that “we continue to send our deepest sympathies to the families and loved ones of those who were affected by the two accidents”. The 737 MAX return to service remains the biggest question as Boeing continues to make “solid progress” and is “actively engaged with regulators around the world”. Nevertheless, the solid progress has encountered trouble, as the European Union Aviation Safety Agency’s (EASA) executive director Patrick Ky, while speaking at the European Parliament, has pointed to the fact that Boeing is yet to provide a working solution to some of the issues. In addition, EASA will test the 737 MAX software changes individually, rather than relying on the FAA." "Boeing’s CEO reiterated that the software onboard the aircraft is not the only update to the grounded 737 MAX. Training packages are being revised – an area, which industry experts heavily criticized after reports revealed that the pilots received a one-hour computer lecture with no simulator work at all. Boeing has “developed an enhanced computer-based training module” which will supplement the new training program for pilots – “a 24-day program, which is primarily in the simulator”, Muilenburg added." |
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The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again. Its one of the worst debacles ever and Boeing is just trying to save face. It was a flawed idea from the start, and whats worse is it seems like the FAA was in on it as well, simply rubber stamping Boeing. ETA: I'll never fly on a MAX. Thats 100% certain. View Quote |
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What do i think? From a business standpoint Boeing should have never allowed Airbus to beat them at their game. They got too comfortable with their market position. The MAX was 100% a knee jerk reaction, and management fucked it up from the start. Id say it was more business analysis than technical analysis that led to it. The core of the problem is that to be competitive with Airbus, Boeing had to fit larger engines to the plane than it was capable of. That meant a number of changes were needed to the airframe - not just MCAS. Boeing did all of this to avoid developing a new aircraft (which they were already beat on). To make it worse, regulators were buddy buddy with Boeing and rubber stamped a number of critical decisions. It doesnt give me much faith moving forward into the future... And all of this doesnt even touch on how horrible the MAX is for passengers... sheesh thats a whole different tirade. Ask those arfcommers who fly it how they like the lav. View Quote Boeing would be happy to put a lav that takes up the entire plane if that's what American, United, Delta, Southwest etc. etc. wanted. Hell, I'm not even sure if Boeing is actually the company who makes the space saving lavs or if they are coming from another OEM. Seats, IFE, Lavs, wifi, etc. etc. etc are all up the airline, not the airframe OEM. Boeing would have been insanely stupid to come out with a clean sheet airplane. Now, trying to make the MAX fly like an NG just to keep Southwest happy and the cockpit stuck in 1955....... BTW, don't get on any new Airbus narrowbodies at the US airlines, they have the tiny lavs in the back just like the 737(be it MAX or NG). And the older airbuses that don't have them are quick being modified to have them, if they haven't be already. |
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Quoted: Ok, please state what you mean when you say “I work closely with aviation stuff”. I’m trying to decide if its worth discussing with you. . We had a multi page thread once, where an “F-15 Pilot” was holding forth on his strongly held expert opinion...until he was finally unmasked as an F-15 Remote Control Pilot.. So, I please don’t take affront to my request that you elaborate on your SME claim. View Quote When I heard that the test pilots were INTENTIONALLY excluded from the final approval meetings, I’m willing to convict Boeing right then and there. There are no better SME’s than the test pilots. If their input is intentionally excluded, then, Boeing is trying to hide something. They did and they were. Throw the book at them. TC |
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What he said wasn’t wrong. It’s public knowledge that Boeing slapped together a system that would counteract the fucked up aerodynamics of the geared turbofan engines that had to go on this plane. It’s true. When I heard that the test pilots were INTENTIONALLY excluded from the final approval meetings, I’m willing to convict Boeing right then and there. There are no better SME’s than the test pilots. If their input is intentionally excluded, then, Boeing is trying to hide something. They did and they were. Throw the book at them. TC View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Ok, please state what you mean when you say “I work closely with aviation stuff”. I’m trying to decide if its worth discussing with you. . We had a multi page thread once, where an “F-15 Pilot” was holding forth on his strongly held expert opinion...until he was finally unmasked as an F-15 Remote Control Pilot.. So, I please don’t take affront to my request that you elaborate on your SME claim. When I heard that the test pilots were INTENTIONALLY excluded from the final approval meetings, I’m willing to convict Boeing right then and there. There are no better SME’s than the test pilots. If their input is intentionally excluded, then, Boeing is trying to hide something. They did and they were. Throw the book at them. TC “The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again.” And “the Max was a shit business and technical decision” An aviation professional should know better. I already stated that I’m not defending the mcas system and implementation. It was unforgivable. However, imho, it’s stupid and childish to extrapolate that into some crazy belief that the entire aircraft is trash. Time will tell, I guess. |
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India Plans to Conduct Its Own Checks on Boeing 737 Max Jets
"India plans to conduct its own checks and demand simulator training for all pilots before Boeing Co.’s 737 Max jets can fly in the country again, even if the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration were to clear the grounded jets, a person with direct knowledge of the matter said. India plans to start its own assessment only after the FAA, the certifying authority of U.S.-made jets, declares the aircraft fit to fly, the person said, asking not to be identified discussing a private matter. The Indian Directorate General of Civil Aviation doesn’t expect Boeing’s best-selling plane to fly in the country before next year, according to the person, who’s directly involved in the nation’s decision-making process involving plane safety." |
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India Plans to Conduct Its Own Checks on Boeing 737 Max Jets "India plans to conduct its own checks and demand simulator training for all pilots before Boeing Co.’s 737 Max jets can fly in the country again, even if the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration were to clear the grounded jets, a person with direct knowledge of the matter said. India plans to start its own assessment only after the FAA, the certifying authority of U.S.-made jets, declares the aircraft fit to fly, the person said, asking not to be identified discussing a private matter. The Indian Directorate General of Civil Aviation doesn’t expect Boeing’s best-selling plane to fly in the country before next year, according to the person, who’s directly involved in the nation’s decision-making process involving plane safety." View Quote |
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corporate officers should get life in prison. it;s the only way to prevent the next Indian or Asian CEO from outsourcing all of our jobs overseas to third world countries. you the CEO of Fisher Price? You signed off on releasing a product without the basic testing? kids getting killed at home? You don't get to walk. You pay the price. View Quote They have to operate on the assumption that relevant and accurate information makes it's way up the chain of command. I'm guessing those layers of separation would provide legal plausible deniability for nearly any eventuality. Possibly, rightly so. How would you jail somebody because somebody made an error in coding, which slipped through testing, and had 2 or 3 levels of management sign off on it...before the Sr. Management ever sees any reports? |
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Corporate management have multiple levels of people under them, just like Generals do in the military. How many levels down is it reasonable to assume they could maintain complete knowledge and control of everything that transpires. There is no way for Sr. Management to determine anything multiple levels of staff beneath them. Not with 100% certainty. They have to operate on the assumption that relevant and accurate information makes it's way up the chain of command. I'm guessing those layers of separation would provide legal plausible deniability for nearly any eventuality. Possibly, rightly so. How would you jail somebody because somebody made an error in coding, which slipped through testing, and had 2 or 3 levels of management sign off on it...before the Sr. Management ever sees any reports? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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corporate officers should get life in prison. it;s the only way to prevent the next Indian or Asian CEO from outsourcing all of our jobs overseas to third world countries. you the CEO of Fisher Price? You signed off on releasing a product without the basic testing? kids getting killed at home? You don't get to walk. You pay the price. They have to operate on the assumption that relevant and accurate information makes it's way up the chain of command. I'm guessing those layers of separation would provide legal plausible deniability for nearly any eventuality. Possibly, rightly so. How would you jail somebody because somebody made an error in coding, which slipped through testing, and had 2 or 3 levels of management sign off on it...before the Sr. Management ever sees any reports? It's also true it will never get high up in the company, some layer of middle management will be the sacrificial lamb(s). |
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I was responding specifically, to a couple uneducated hysterical-gonzo quotes of his, ie: "The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again." And "the Max was a shit business and technical decision" An aviation professional should know better. I already stated that I'm not defending the mcas system and implementation. It was unforgivable. However, imho, it's stupid and childish to extrapolate that into some crazy belief that the entire aircraft is trash. Time will tell, I guess. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Ok, please state what you mean when you say "I work closely with aviation stuff". I'm trying to decide if its worth discussing with you. . We had a multi page thread once, where an "F-15 Pilot" was holding forth on his strongly held expert opinion...until he was finally unmasked as an F-15 Remote Control Pilot.. So, I please don't take affront to my request that you elaborate on your SME claim. When I heard that the test pilots were INTENTIONALLY excluded from the final approval meetings, I'm willing to convict Boeing right then and there. There are no better SME's than the test pilots. If their input is intentionally excluded, then, Boeing is trying to hide something. They did and they were. Throw the book at them. TC "The MAX needs to be done with and never fly again." And "the Max was a shit business and technical decision" An aviation professional should know better. I already stated that I'm not defending the mcas system and implementation. It was unforgivable. However, imho, it's stupid and childish to extrapolate that into some crazy belief that the entire aircraft is trash. Time will tell, I guess. Again, shit technical decision(s), and shit business decision. The BILLIONS Boeing lost and is currently losing shows that. |
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The 1979 Crash of a DC-10 led to the FAA de-certification of the plane... and the eventual demise of Douglas.....
Seems like both sises are trying to avoid a similar disaster? |
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Boeing board will reportedly call for structural changes after 737 Max crashes
"A committee is set to deliver its findings to Boeing’s board this week on how the company can design and build safer airplanes after the fatal crashes of two 737 Max jets, The New York Times reported on Sunday, citing people familiar with the matter. The recommendations include changing corporate reporting structures, creating a new safety group, and changing the cockpits of future planes to accommodate new pilots with less training, three people briefed on the matter told the Times. Engineers currently report mostly to Boeing’s business leaders. The committee will recommend that they report first and foremost to the company’s chief engineer in the future. There’s concern that engineers who identify safety issues might face pushback from business leaders who don’t want production to slow down. The committee will also call for the creation of a new safety group after an investigation into the process by which Boeing employees do certification work for the Federal Aviation Administration. The committee found that communication was inadequate within the engineering department and between Boeing’s commercial aviation offices in the Seattle area and its corporate headquarters in Chicago during the certification work. |
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Boeing board will reportedly call for structural changes after 737 Max crashes "A committee is set to deliver its findings to Boeing’s board this week on how the company can design and build safer airplanes after the fatal crashes of two 737 Max jets, The New York Times reported on Sunday, citing people familiar with the matter. The recommendations include changing corporate reporting structures, creating a new safety group, and changing the cockpits of future planes to accommodate new pilots with less training, three people briefed on the matter told the Times. Engineers currently report mostly to Boeing’s business leaders. The committee will recommend that they report first and foremost to the company’s chief engineer in the future. There’s concern that engineers who identify safety issues might face pushback from business leaders who don’t want production to slow down. The committee will also call for the creation of a new safety group after an investigation into the process by which Boeing employees do certification work for the Federal Aviation Administration. The committee found that communication was inadequate within the engineering department and between Boeing’s commercial aviation offices in the Seattle area and its corporate headquarters in Chicago during the certification work. View Quote |
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This is an issue I've never heard about. I'd like to know more. I imagine the same issue would be a problem at a high altitude airport, like the one in my county (6450'). View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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It certainly is looking more and more like the thing to do. I wonder how hard is Boeing looking for a quick replacement of the 737. One of the most annoying features of the 737 as a frequent flyer is the wing is too dam small. On hot summer days in AZ, I've been on cancelled flights because it's too hot for that wing. It's annoying to be told... "sorry the plane cannot take off because it's too hot, we can look to book you on another flight today, or spend the night for a morning flight out." Of course, the likely plane to be rebooked on for that day is a 757. Since then, the operating manuals have been updated. I fly out of Phoenix a lot, and have never had a flight cancelled due to density altitude issues. I hate flying on really hot days for other reasons - you usually get some nasty thermals on approach or takeoff, so you get bounced around a bit. |
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Boeing board will reportedly call for structural changes after 737 Max crashes "A committee is set to deliver its findings to Boeing’s board this week on how the company can design and build safer airplanes after the fatal crashes of two 737 Max jets, The New York Times reported on Sunday, citing people familiar with the matter. The recommendations include changing corporate reporting structures, creating a new safety group, and changing the cockpits of future planes to accommodate new pilots with less training, three people briefed on the matter told the Times. Engineers currently report mostly to Boeing’s business leaders. The committee will recommend that they report first and foremost to the company’s chief engineer in the future. There’s concern that engineers who identify safety issues might face pushback from business leaders who don’t want production to slow down. The committee will also call for the creation of a new safety group after an investigation into the process by which Boeing employees do certification work for the Federal Aviation Administration. The committee found that communication was inadequate within the engineering department and between Boeing’s commercial aviation offices in the Seattle area and its corporate headquarters in Chicago during the certification work. View Quote The corporate chief engineer comes from the auto industry and appears to believe that engineers are interchangeable. The standards for pilots are already the minimum deemed to be acceptable; maybe the pilots need to take things in hand by training up the pilots with potential and running off the duds and slackers. And don't fly on third world airlines with ab initio training. |
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Quoted: The standards for pilots are already the minimum deemed to be acceptable; maybe the pilots need to take things in hand by training up the pilots with potential and running off the duds and slackers. And don't fly on third world airlines with ab initio training. View Quote The American aviation industry is going towards ab initio and the multi-crew license, and the management and accountants will LOVE it. |
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Aviation authorities critical of FAA Boeing 737 MAX certification
"In the coming weeks, several world aviation authorities should submit a report on the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX. The conclusions will reportedly be critical of the way the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) handled the approval of the aircraft. The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), a committee set up by the FAA in April 2019, regroups the EASA, aviation authorities from Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Japan, and Singapore, as well as NASA. It was tasked with reviewing the approval procedures of the Boeing 737 MAX, after suspicions of collusion between the manufacturer and the U.S. regulator emerged. The report, which the JATR should submit in the coming weeks, is apparently critical of the FAA’s methods, particularly of the way it delegated some of the approval processes to Boeing’s engineers. According to a source close to the matter quoted by the Wall Street Journal, the report recommends an earlier involvement of the FAA in the design of new systems, particularly when they can influence pilot response times during emergency situations." |
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Checking for flights this winter and UAL has the 737 MAX listed on some of their flights.
Guess they anticipate it's going to be flying by then? |
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Checking for flights this winter and UAL has the 737 MAX listed on some of their flights. Guess they anticipate it's going to be flying by then? View Quote "United Airlines (UAL) took a similar step Friday, canceling 90 daily flights due to the 737 Max until December 19. " |
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html
“The system in question is complicated, and we will return to it later, but for now it is enough to know that after the loss of Lion Air 610, the company suggested that the 737 Max was as safe as its predecessors. Its tone was uncharacteristically meek, but not for lack of conviction. The company seemed hesitant to point the finger at a prickly customer — Lion Air — that had several billion dollars’ worth of orders on the table and could withdraw them at any time. The dilemma is familiar to manufacturers after major accidents in which it is usually some pilot and not an airplane that has gone wrong. Nonetheless, Boeing’s reticence allowed a narrative to emerge: that the company had developed the system to elude regulators; that it was all about shortcuts and greed; that it had cynically gambled with the lives of the flying public; that the Lion Air pilots were overwhelmed by the failures of a hidden system they could not reasonably have been expected to resist; and that the design of the MCAS was unquestionably the cause of the accident. But none of this was quite true.” Long article that does nothing to exonerate Boeing, but clarifies in frightening detail the low maintenance, piloting, and regulatory standards found in some parts of the world. |
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like any business in the last 20 years i suspect spreadsheet warriors took over and voices of dissent took backseat to productivity and "tracking"
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like any business in the last 20 years i suspect spreadsheet warriors took over and voices of dissent took backseat to productivity and "tracking" View Quote That, along with the concept that high performance airplanes can be engineered with templates that cover all contingencies or variations. |
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html “The system in question is complicated, and we will return to it later, but for now it is enough to know that after the loss of Lion Air 610, the company suggested that the 737 Max was as safe as its predecessors. Its tone was uncharacteristically meek, but not for lack of conviction. The company seemed hesitant to point the finger at a prickly customer — Lion Air — that had several billion dollars’ worth of orders on the table and could withdraw them at any time. The dilemma is familiar to manufacturers after major accidents in which it is usually some pilot and not an airplane that has gone wrong. Nonetheless, Boeing’s reticence allowed a narrative to emerge: that the company had developed the system to elude regulators; that it was all about shortcuts and greed; that it had cynically gambled with the lives of the flying public; that the Lion Air pilots were overwhelmed by the failures of a hidden system they could not reasonably have been expected to resist; and that the design of the MCAS was unquestionably the cause of the accident. But none of this was quite true.” Long article that does nothing to exonerate Boeing, but clarifies in frightening detail the low maintenance, piloting, and regulatory standards found in some parts of the world. View Quote |
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Quoted: My takeaway from that extremely long-winded article, even by NYT standards, is that Lion Air has a 95% pass rate for its pilots, who have minimal training compared to US airlines who draw heavily from more experienced pilots who are graduates of rigorous military jet training. View Quote Regardless of the basis of experience, once one has 3500, 6500, or 10000 hours of professional flying, the quality spread is low. |
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Quoted:
Checking for flights this winter and UAL has the 737 MAX listed on some of their flights. Guess they anticipate it's going to be flying by then? View Quote |
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Quoted:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html “The system in question is complicated, and we will return to it later, but for now it is enough to know that after the loss of Lion Air 610, the company suggested that the 737 Max was as safe as its predecessors. Its tone was uncharacteristically meek, but not for lack of conviction. The company seemed hesitant to point the finger at a prickly customer — Lion Air — that had several billion dollars’ worth of orders on the table and could withdraw them at any time. The dilemma is familiar to manufacturers after major accidents in which it is usually some pilot and not an airplane that has gone wrong. Nonetheless, Boeing’s reticence allowed a narrative to emerge: that the company had developed the system to elude regulators; that it was all about shortcuts and greed; that it had cynically gambled with the lives of the flying public; that the Lion Air pilots were overwhelmed by the failures of a hidden system they could not reasonably have been expected to resist; and that the design of the MCAS was unquestionably the cause of the accident. But none of this was quite true.” Long article that does nothing to exonerate Boeing, but clarifies in frightening detail the low maintenance, piloting, and regulatory standards found in some parts of the world. View Quote NO single point failure should exist, let alone create a dire emergency, let alone a crash. Attention needed, yes, not "20 seconds to respond exactly correct or everybody dies" attention, though. Boeing made some HUGE shortcuts and took a lot of freedoms letting that go, and I doubt the engineers were happy about it. The one who signed off on it likely did so to save his pension, rather than truly approve. |
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Quoted: I see what they're saying, essentially "737 Max is fine if maintained and flew properly". However, there is/was a Single Point catastrophic failure mode that was found twice. NO single point failure should exist, let alone create a dire emergency, let alone a crash. Attention needed, yes, not "20 seconds to respond exactly correct or everybody dies" attention, though. Boeing made some HUGE shortcuts and took a lot of freedoms letting that go, and I doubt the engineers were happy about it. The one who signed off on it likely did so to save his pension, rather than truly approve. View Quote |
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Quoted: The majority of US pilots are not military trained, nor do those pilots do fundamentally "Better" as pilots in training programs. Regardless of the basis of experience, once one has 3500, 6500, or 10000 hours of professional flying, the quality spread is low. View Quote |
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Quoted: I see what they're saying, essentially "737 Max is fine if maintained and flew properly". However, there is/was a Single Point catastrophic failure mode that was found twice. NO single point failure should exist, let alone create a dire emergency, let alone a crash. Attention needed, yes, not "20 seconds to respond exactly correct or everybody dies" attention, though. Boeing made some HUGE shortcuts and took a lot of freedoms letting that go, and I doubt the engineers were happy about it. The one who signed off on it likely did so to save his pension, rather than truly approve. Can't say something is "exactly the same as a 737" to pilots unless it is exactly the same. The 737 didn't have any failure mode similar to the Max, there was not one thing Lion Air could have done, while Ethiopian air ran out of time in the confusion even though they had an idea of what they were supposed to do (but forgot to reduce throttle). |
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Quoted:
I see what they're saying, essentially "737 Max is fine if maintained and flew properly". However, there is/was a Single Point catastrophic failure mode that was found twice. NO single point failure should exist, let alone create a dire emergency, let alone a crash. Attention needed, yes, not "20 seconds to respond exactly correct or everybody dies" attention, though. Boeing made some HUGE shortcuts and took a lot of freedoms letting that go, and I doubt the engineers were happy about it. The one who signed off on it likely did so to save his pension, rather than truly approve. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
Quoted:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html "The system in question is complicated, and we will return to it later, but for now it is enough to know that after the loss of Lion Air 610, the company suggested that the 737 Max was as safe as its predecessors. Its tone was uncharacteristically meek, but not for lack of conviction. The company seemed hesitant to point the finger at a prickly customer Lion Air that had several billion dollars' worth of orders on the table and could withdraw them at any time. The dilemma is familiar to manufacturers after major accidents in which it is usually some pilot and not an airplane that has gone wrong. Nonetheless, Boeing's reticence allowed a narrative to emerge: that the company had developed the system to elude regulators; that it was all about shortcuts and greed; that it had cynically gambled with the lives of the flying public; that the Lion Air pilots were overwhelmed by the failures of a hidden system they could not reasonably have been expected to resist; and that the design of the MCAS was unquestionably the cause of the accident. But none of this was quite true." Long article that does nothing to exonerate Boeing, but clarifies in frightening detail the low maintenance, piloting, and regulatory standards found in some parts of the world. NO single point failure should exist, let alone create a dire emergency, let alone a crash. Attention needed, yes, not "20 seconds to respond exactly correct or everybody dies" attention, though. Boeing made some HUGE shortcuts and took a lot of freedoms letting that go, and I doubt the engineers were happy about it. The one who signed off on it likely did so to save his pension, rather than truly approve. |
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Quoted: Boeing was aware of the lower training of pilots and maintenance crews, as well as worse maintenance practices of customers when they were designing the airplane to market to those nations. Can't say something is "exactly the same as a 737" to pilots unless it is exactly the same. The 737 didn't have any failure mode similar to the Max, there was not one thing Lion Air could have done, while Ethiopian air ran out of time in the confusion even though they had an idea of what they were supposed to do (but forgot to reduce throttle). View Quote “Not one thing they could have done” ? How about slow down and deploy flaps? |
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View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
Quoted: Things have changed since we parked the Convair 880s, gramps. https://i.imgur.com/JMCyoZm.jpg |
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https://www.google.com/amp/s/mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSKBN1W31BI
Senior Canadian Pilots must be "good enough" to keep the MAX in the air. Lol |
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I'm pretty much a total outsider with regard to the aviation community. I've taken a few flight lessons but didn't get my private pilot's license when I realized that at my income level at the time, I would not be able to afford to keep flying regularly.
But...I have to wonder about this possible solution: Re-engineer the landing gear to have extra telescopic range, allowing the aircraft to sit high enough to place the engines in the "correct" position on the wings, that results in no need for MCAS or an equivalent system, as the thrust point/axis would be restored to what it should be. With multi-sectional telescopic gear struts, and maybe make them out of titanium to provide added strength without the weight penalty, it may be possible to fit this taller gear system in the existing gear bays without having to re-engineer the fuselage structure. I simply don't have any information that would tell me that this can't be done. |
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