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I don’t know much about fighter technology so please educate me.  Since it’s a 5th Gen fighter, as Maverick would say, does that mean that missiles couldn’t even lock onto them?  So, Fat Amy would basically have free reign over any battle space?

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Likely as well as anything.

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The Aviation Week Answer:

The F-35 will be completely mission ineffective against 8th gen Sukhoi fighters.  We read the ROSOBORONEXPORT sales brouchure and are 300% convinced that the vaporware Neosov threat will completely invalidate any Western fighter and that (Pierre Sprey authoring) only F-16's setup for daylight ops will solve the problem.  It's Aviation Week's estimation that the F-35 will be the next Vought Cutlass!

Real World:
F-35 would embarass the VVS in 12 hours.  There would probably be multiple Ace-in-a-days. The myth of Russian air power would be crushed in multiple smouldering wreckage piles as exposed-rivet/inlet "5th Gen" NeoSov S$%t falls to a AIM-120 bukkake they didn't see until it was too late.

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Multiple ace in a day assumes 10 flying RuAF aircraft.

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It’s doubtful they would even try and fly any kind of A/A sorties. They would have shots at them before they even had a chance to rendezvous with their wingman.

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With US pilots that 40 mile convoy and everything  at the staging area would have never left Russian. And just about everyone there would be dead.

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Figure out what airbase they are going to fly from. Draw a 600nm radius circle around it. Everything in that circle is vulnerable.  The hardest part is identifying and prioritizing targets.

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With US pilots that 40 mile convoy and everything  at the staging area would have never left Russian. And just about everyone there would be dead.

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Multiple ace in a day assumes 10 flying RuAF aircraft.

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Dominate. I suspect a few losses from S/A.

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The Aviation Week Answer:

The F-35 will be completely mission ineffective against 8th gen Sukhoi fighters.  We read the ROSOBORONEXPORT sales brouchure and are 300% convinced that the vaporware Neosov threat will completely invalidate any Western fighter and that (Pierre Sprey authoring) only F-16's setup for daylight ops will solve the problem.  It's Aviation Week's estimation that the F-35 will be the next Vought Cutlass!

Real World:
F-35 would embarass the VVS in 12 hours.  There would probably be multiple Ace-in-a-days. The myth of Russian air power would be crushed in multiple smouldering wreckage piles as exposed-rivet/inlet "5th Gen" NeoSov S$%t falls to a AIM-120 bukkake they didn't see until it was too late.

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They would absolutely dominate.

A Ukraine type environment is the one they were made for.

We know lightnings do well against S300s and stealth "defeating" radars (see, syria).

They would not do well in Ukrainian hands. Going from legacy soviet jets to a 5th gen plane is a big leap and some capabilities need to expand and grow first.

Baby steps..f16s.

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With US pilots that 40 mile convoy and everything  at the staging area would have never left Russian. And just about everyone there would be dead.

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They would absolutely dominate.

A Ukraine type environment is the one they were made for.

We know lightnings do well against S300s and stealth "defeating" radars (see, syria).

They would not do well in Ukrainian hands. Going from legacy soviet jets to a 5th gen plane is a big leap and some capabilities need to expand and grow first.

Baby steps..f16s.

The radar and missile performance of the primary Russian Su-35S and Su-30SM fighters has been impressive throughout the conflict. The N035 Irbis-E and N110M Bars-M radars on the two respective fighters give them a major advantage over Ukrainian fighters in a meeting engagement with up to five times the effective range, greater tactical flexibility with track-while-scan (TWS) capabilities, and significantly better ability to burn through electronic interference compared to the radars carried on Ukrainian Su-27P and MiG-29 fighters. Both radars have also performed well in look-down, shoot-down engagements against very low-flying jets, helicopters, and UAVs trying to hide in ground clutter. Su-34 fighter bombers and also Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have also generally carried L-175 “Khibiny” electronic warfare pods throughout the war, although during the first week many did not have them fitted. The Khibiny pods have proven effective at degrading Ukrainian in-flight communications and radar performance, although they also interfere with Russian radar performance when in use.

Meanwhile, the use of the AA-12B medium range air-to-air missile has consistently allowed Russian pilots to fire at much greater ranges than their Ukrainian opponents, who have been limited to shorter ranged R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C) missiles for beyond-visual-range combat. The combination of an active-radar seeker head on the AA-12B and the TWS capabilities of the N035 and N110M radars has also allowed Russian fighters to engage Ukrainian fighters and ground-attack jets without sacrificing situational awareness or giving a tracking lock or missile launch warning to their opponents. TWS also allows Russian pilots to guide multiple missiles simultaneously against multiple targets, and the active seeker on the AA-12B allows the launching fighter to turn away and break radar lock to maintain positional advantage or defend against any incoming shots once the missile has “gone active” and acquired the target for itself. By contrast, Ukrainian pilots have had to get much closer and illuminate Russian aircraft in a single-target-track (STT) lock before firing. An STT provides reflected radar energy to guide the semi active seeker on the AA-10A/C missile, but the lock must be maintained until missile impact. Furthermore, the amount of concentrated radar energy involved in an STT lock also generally ensures that Russian pilots receive warnings about locks and missile launches from their radar-warning receivers.

...[Russian fighters] have continued to pose a serious threat to Ukrainian fighter, ground-attack, helicopter, and TB-2 Bayraktar UAV sorties near the front lines, even at very low levels. The range at which Russian combat air patrols (CAPs) can take valid missile shots against Ukrainian aircraft has also significantly increased since September 2022. The key change has been the use of large numbers of the long-range R-37M (AA-13) air-to-air missiles by both Mig-31BM interceptors and modified Su-35S fighters. Better coordination has also been observed between Russian fighters on CAP and supporting A-50U and Il-20 command and control and surveillance aircraft as the war has progressed. Therefore, one area where the VKS can be assessed as having been reasonably successful is in its use of fighter CAPs to provide an enduring threat and deterrent against Ukrainian sorties close to the front lines.

...VKS training sorties have... almost always been flown in small formations or by single aircraft, and largely involve simple navigation sorties, unguided weapon deliveries on open ranges, ground-controlled interception tasks, and SAM-target simulation serials. Furthermore, the typical Russian fast jet pilot flew only around 80–100 hours per year before the invasion, and VKS regiments do not have access to the sort of modern simulator facilities that Western air forces increasingly rely on for complex synthetic training. Together, this lack of exposure to large formation tactics in training and previous operations, limited live flying training hours for frontline pilots, and a focus on relatively simple tasks during those training hours explains why the VKS was not able to fly [composite air operations] COMAOs in Ukraine.

...In terms of a threat to NATO nations in a medium-term context, the Russian airpower picture remains largely unchanged. The two major Russian military capability areas that threaten the ability of NATO to establish and exploit air superiority, and thereby credibly defend its territory in the event of Russian aggression, have always been the [integrated air defense systems] IADS and long-range precision strike capabilities. Both of these capabilities have performed very effectively in Ukraine. Russian SAM systems have proven extremely lethal against both Ukrainian aircraft and also, in many cases, munitions when emplaced and operating within the IADS as doctrinally intended. From very long-range S-400 launches against low-flying Ukrainian fighters and ground-attack aircraft guided by exotic radars like the 48Ya6-K1 to medium- and short-range engagements by SA-17s and SA-15s, Russian SAMs remain the primary killer of Ukrainian fast jets, helicopters, and UAVs. Furthermore, despite some success with the AGM-88 HARM missile since summer 2022, Russian SAM losses in Ukraine remain a small fraction of Russia’s total inventory. As such, the Russian IADS remains a serious threat to NATO’s ability to rapidly establish control of the air over the battlespace in any medium-term clash. The extent that this remains the case will depend on whether or not European NATO air forces prioritise the regeneration of the capability to conduct SEAD/DEAD against Russia’s modern, mobile SAM systems at scale in the coming years.

In terms of cruise and ballistic missiles, salvos from VKS LRA, ground-based Iskander systems, and naval platforms have consistently proven accurate enough hit their targets in quantity at great distances. The threat to NATO from the VKS was always primarily cruise missiles and air-launched quasi-ballistic missiles fired from the LRA Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers and Mig-31K modified interceptors, respectively. These assets allow the VKS to credibly threaten NATO air forces with large salvos of accurate precision-guided missiles against the main operating bases lacking air defenses that are largely the norm in Europe following decades of uncontested Western air operations. Against Ukraine, the LRA fleets have consistently maintained solid readiness and a reliable launch tempo from the first waves of the invasion to the winter bombardment of Ukrainian power and water infrastructure. These bombardments have depleted stockpiles, but Russia maintains the ability to produce at least 6 9M723 Iskander ballistic missiles and around 40 cruise missiles per month, so even a pause of a few years would allow the VKS to rebuild a sufficient arsenal to cause major damage to NATO bases not protected by layered GBAD.

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We aren't giving them to the Russians

Just the people fighting Communists.

Same folks tearing down communist monuments across eastern Europe.

Who said anything about giving Ukraine 35s? They can't handle them at the moment. In the future they would be a fantastic upgrade.



Chatting with a pilot and watching the F35B take off and land outside 14th Marines



Hit the source of the cruise missiles and launch other PGMs targeting the airbases and bombers themselves.

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Multiple ace in a day assumes 10 flying RuAF aircraft.

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I don't know much about fighter technology so please educate me.  Since it's a 5th Gen fighter, as Maverick would say, does that mean that missiles couldn't even lock onto them?  So, Fat Amy would basically have free reign over any battle space?

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Too many variables to consider before you even scratch the surface on actual 5th gen capes.  Who is flying them? Who is providing planning info? How many are available? What restrictions (ROE) are there?

How successful was the F-117 in Kosovo?  Low observable is not invisible.

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What would be the nationality of the pilot(s) of said F-35 in your question?

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I mean. Ukraine is running SEAD with mig29s and CAS with SU25s and they're surviving. I imagine an F-35 would fare even better.

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Israel bombed Syria unopposed using them and Syria had S400s. Lol

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It was extremely successful, except piss poor mission planning led to the same ingress (or egress) route being run far too many times.

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Presuming a trained NATO pilot, I would imagine a few F-35s could establish air dominance in short order.

Not sure Air Supremacy is possible anymore with ALCMs and hypersonic, or how that strategic theorem works when the other side uses SRBMs and MRBMs in the same manner we use bombers and strike aircraft.  Doubly so when strikes are launched from non-combatant nations like Belarus.

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That was my point, the F-117's success was limited by self imposed constraints along with some help from some of our "allies."
The OPs question is too vague to give much insight to without framing it more or just making a bunch of assumptions.