Quoted:

I'd argue that the German war aims would have been far more achievable had the Germans be able to harness the Belorussians and Ukranians, especially in the absence of lend-lease.

Without Lend-Lease, the Red Army is a horse drawn cart logistics army, period. I haven't done the math of culmination on that alone, but the Germans were the same, and were culminating logistically in France and Italy, let alone the scale of the war in the East.

Quoted:

Alas, you are wrong.  Kharkov Locomotive Factory can build locos and rail cars, OR T-34s - but NOT BOTH.  American supply of logistics support in the form of trucks, ships, cargo planes, locomotives, pipe, cable, rail cars, rails. etc. and FOOD is what made Soviet production of war material possible.   Without the U.S. Russian production or tanks and such goes DOWN, not up.

Quoted:

You have a few things out of order that I'd like to address.

Rommel was never supposed to drive into Egypt, let alone the Middle East (where most oil was still not discovered until the 50-60s, with still lots of other British forces there). He was there with the tiny Africa Corps (three German divisions, while 189 were in Russia) simply to assist the Italians. In fact, German air support did far more to ensure victory against the British than his meager ground troops did.

There was no plan or concept of operations to drive into the Middle East for oil. Rommel defeated the Eighth Army at Gazala and then took Tobruk in June 1942. At that point he was supposed to stop, as he was ordered by his superiors in Africa (Italian general acting as theater commander, Kesselring as the OB South commander, the entire OKH and OKW HQs back in Germany). Why stop? Because there were not supplies enough to drive deeper. But Rommel blew them all off and charged into Egypt hoping not to go to the Middle East, but to take Alexandria, HQ of British Forces in Egypt (Eighth Army HQ).

So Tobruk fell in late June 1942, the 1st Battle of El Alamein (which stopped the Germans, but didn't beat them) was only a few weeks later. During that short time period after Rommel charged east, a few people in Germany toyed with the idea that Rommel might be able to eventually seize the Middle East and link up with the successful Army Group South after having taken the Caucasus. But there was never any serious contemplation of it, as it was a 1,900 mile drive, which was longer than any portion of the Eastern Front from German controlled Poland (which could barely be supplied). There most certainly was no plan for it.

There was a plan to grab oil, it was Operation Blue, the big German summer offensive of 1942, which was planned in late winter and early spring of '42, well before Rommel won his decisive victories at Gazala and Tobruk. It was that operation that was supposed to net Germany its oil, as well as take it away from Russia (a win win). It didn't fail until late fall and early winter of '42.

North Africa was never more than a side show for nearly everyone involved. It had zero long term strategic benefits for any participant in the war, minus Italy, who actually had a good reason for being there (cheap wheat). It was even useless for the British, as the only thing of value was the Suez, but that was useless until the Mediterranean was secure, which didn't happen for years to come.

You also wrote:

"It wasn't until the invasion of Italy that the Americans really began to contribute something meaningful on land in the European theater. Due to the complete incompetence of American General Clark, who could set up a shit show in a brewery, the Italian campaign was a complete abortion."

Clark was far out of his element commanding an army, but most of the problems in Italy weren't his fault. Nobody in the US Army even wanted to be there, it was Churchill's idea to ignore France entirely and try to enter Germany from the "Soft Underbelly," which was idiotic since anyone who looks at a topo map of Italy will know that its the worst place to attempt to attack. The US had been pressing to invade France in '42, the British fought to stop that (and Operation Torch was the result). They wanted to invade France in '43, the British fought to stop it (Husky and Avalanche were the result). They wanted to invade France in '44, the British tried to stop it, finally the US was a stronger Allied partner and Churchill couldn't stop it. Which is the only reason Normandy happened, and we didn't try to fight up a dozen major mountains just to get to the Alps, then fight our way through there, to then get into Austria, to fight our way through the mountains there, then to try to get to Berlin (Churchill's plan).

Sure, Salerno was not exactly well planned but the US Army had to land somewhere and there were few options that were aligned with the desires of the overall theater commander of the Italian Campaign (a British officer, Alexander, who was taking direct orders from Churchill, who was micromanaging as he was want to do). The biggest problem was the Germans correctly guessed the invasion beach area beforehand so had ample Panzer forces nearby to counterattack the landing (which nearly worked).

The British and US Army advance toward Rome was botched because of those pesky mountains, besides being split in two by the Apennine Mountain range. Monte Cassino was just one of many, many such obstacles that dotted Italy and had to be forced or flanked, that were a defender's paradise. Anzio, designed to flank the forces at Monte Cassino, was Churchill's bright idea, he pressed it, Alexander pushed it, Clark had to do it even though he didn't have the forces or the support necessary, it was essentially doomed before it kicked off.

Italy was an expensive side show that tied down far too many Allied forces. The ONLY positive was it tied down numerous German top tier divisions, including many very good panzer divisions, and in the end a slightly higher number of Germans died compared to British and Americans.

Quoted:
World War II no the UK nor the USSR would have one with out our help.
World War I UK and France might have won eventually without our help.
That is very debatable.

Quoted:

The most convincing argument that Britain wouldn't have beaten Germany on its own is that it took the combined might of the British Empire, plus that of the Soviet Union, plus that of the US, three and one-half years to completely defeat Hitler.

On their own, the British would have only been able to hold off Germany.  Liberating Europe would have been a pipe dream.