I would argue that the MBT is a medium with better doctrine. If you look at the first MBTs (M60 was the first doctrinal US MBT, T64 for the Soviets) they were developed from mediums and were similarly armed and armored to their medium ancestors. The MBT concept is an acknowledgement of the failure of both the heavy tank concept and the tank destroyer concept. Specialized vehicles intended to only be used in specific circumstances (spearheading breakthroughs and countering enemy breakthroughs) are ultimately inferior to general purpose tanks useful in all circumstances.

I would agree. There are certainly some MBTs that trend towards heavy (Merkava) but most are more about balancing firepower and armor with mobility, usually favoring mobility. Some like the Leopard 1 are fairly lightly armored.

I mentioned operation Dracula on page 7

I never said any such thing about the T26. You are putting words in my mouth and backing it up with nothing.  Where did anyone say that a T26 takes three times as long to make as a Sherman?  Did you make that up?

There were approximately 45 infantry divisions in the ETO on V-E day.  The divisional tank battalions had a total of 2300 tanks.  I have advocated that a jumbo-like tanik, or Churchill like variant, with 150mm of armor would have provided frontal protection against 75mm pak40s and panzerschrecks, as well as Mark IVs and STugs unless very close ranges. That would have been the most effiecnt use of resources.

Rounding down, 45,000 35 ton Sherman tanks required 1,575,000 tons of steel and other resources.  Uparmoring the divisional tanks would have required approx 4 tons per tank, or 9200 tons. That would have taken two liberty ships to retrofit in the UK, or, put another way, 6/10 of one percent of the resources spent, to generate a vehicle that in Summer 1944, had a zero percent survivability rate aganst any hit from any German AT weapon at any angle.

So yeah, thats what I said. Woudlnt have slowed down teh war, would have increased survivability for the infantry, and against the majority of threats.

Interesting quote, and right from the end-users mouth:

Ok, so what was it?  My reading skills were called out on a previous page because it was implied I lacked the ability to read and understand the Army's doctrine of the time, and yet we have field grade armor officers (a LTC, no less) contradicting that same "doctrine" cited as gospel in this very thread.

Lol...

You know what really stood out to me, though?  The author of that article Albin F. Irzyk (LTC, AR) conceded that the Germans fielded tanks with superior armor and main gun armament, and then goes on to rationalize the failings of the M4 Sherman for tank-on-tank engagements because it was mechanically reliable and it's main gun was really good at shooting shit as long as it wasn't a tank or tank-like target.  Well, that's really swell, Albin.  I mean, God forbid we have both!

How was the taste of that conformity like for you?

Some shit never changes.  Over seven decades of making excuses for poor decisions.  What a joke.



Thank GOD the Abrams design team expended the intellectual rigor required to field a superior product once that idiot McNamara and his stupid MBT-70 / XM-803 disaster was flushed down the shitter.

Driving 200+ miles in two days is nice.  Why did they stop? Gasoline.

The ability to drive these great distances with low mainteance is an overrated capability.  They could have had an operational rate one quarter of what they did have, because after the end of the race across France their OR rate went to ZERO because THEY WERE OUT OF GAS.

Moreover, it wasnt Patton's breakout, it was the Allied Breakout.  The race across France in Aug Sep 1944 was made possible because the Allies, mostly the Brits, had attrited down some formations like 1SS, 2SS, 9SS, 10SS, 2Pzr, 116th, 17SS, Panzer Leher, 21st Panzer, etc...with Shermans.

The author served in 4th Armored, which is cool, but remember that that wonderful pursuit, which came and went in a week, would not have happened without the slogging and attrition warfare and dying that resulted for months prior to that.

The Allies took nearly a quarter of a million casualites before the breakout, so perhaps looking at the shortcomings in the head to head slugfest is more pertintnet then how well the vehicle drove down roads, absent of resistance.  Which really isnt indicative of much.  A tank that has a reliably low mechanical breakdown rate but reliably fails to protect its crew from everything fired at it is a bonus as long as noone is shooting at it.

The Allies could have walked across France and taken an extra week and it would have made little difference.

Oh, we can listen to veterans now? Goodie.

" The consensus of opinion of all personnel in the 66th Armored Regiment is that the German tank and anti-tank weapons are far superior to the American in the following categories.
Superior Flotation.

Greater mobility. This is directly contrary to the popular opinion that the heavy tank is slow and cumbersome.

The German guns have a much higher muzzle velocity and no telltale flash. The resulting flat trajectory gives great penetration and is very accurate.
The 90-mm, although an improvement, is not as good as either the 75 or 88. If HVAP ammunition becomes available, it will improve the performance of both the 76-mm and 90-mm guns.

German tank sights are definitely superior to American sights. These, combined with the flat trajectory of the guns, give great accuracy.

German tanks have better sloped armor and a better silhouette than the American tanks.

The fact that our equipment must be shipped over long distances does not, in the opinion of our tankers, justify our inferiority. The M4 has been proven inferior to the German Mark VI in Africa before the invasion of Sicily, 10 July 1943.

It is my opinion that press reports of statements by high ranking officers to the effect that we have the best equipment in the world do much to discourage the soldier who is using equipment that he knows to be inferior to that of the enemy."

-Brigadier General J. H. Collier, Commanding Combat Command "A"

"Mechanically our tanks are at least the equal of any German tank and on good, firm terrain or on roads are more mobile.
Our tank's armor does not withstand German direct fire weapons of 75-mm high velocity and larger with the result that in a head on one tank against one tank fight ours always comes out as a casualty.

In my opinion, the reason our armor has engaged the German tanks as successfully as it has is not due to by any means to a superior tank but to our superior numbers of tanks on the battlefield and the willingness of our tankers to take their losses while maneuvering to a position from which a penetrating shot can be put through a weak spot of the enemy tank.

The few undamaged German tank sights I have seen are definitely superior to our sights in clearness and speed in laying.

Our tanks should: carry a gun that will penetrate any enemy tank at a minimum of 2,000 yards; carry sufficient armor to turn the German light anti-tank gun (smaller than 75-mm) at any range; sufficient mobility to outmaneuver the enemy on any terrain; have a lower silhouette than at present; have a better sight; and have an increased ammunition storage space.

The new tanks now being received are a far step in the proper direction but still do not possess the gun power necessary to penetrate the German tank for a crippling shot on the first hit.

In spite of the often quoted tactical rule that one should not fight a tank versus tank battle, I have found it necessary, almost invariably, in order to accomplish the mission. "

-Colonel S. R. Hinds, Commanding Combat Command "B"

" Armor - Insufficient to prevent penetration by high velocity ammunition used by German tanks and anti-tank weapons.

Armament- Both 75-mm and 76-mm guns with available types of ammunition are incapable of neutralizing enemy tanks at ranges at which the latter are capable of neutralizing our tanks. When engaged at closer ranges with HVAP [high velocity armor piercing], 76-mm guns have disable German tanks but penetration seems to be rare.

Flotation- Not sufficient on Sherman M-4. Very good on M4A3E8.

Maneuverability- Not known, except that statements of tank crewmen indicate that of German tanks equal if not superior to ours. This is due in part probably to better flotation of enemy tanks and consequent greater maneuverability over muddy ground.

I believe the necessity for equipping troops with tanks capable of engaging enemy tanks on an equal basis outweighs all other considerations. Being close to the using personnel I am acutely aware of the morale factor involved in equipping troops with present tank equipment.

My opinion as to the ability of M26 with 90-mm gun to meet Panther and Tiger on equal terms is based only on knowledge that present tank destroyers equipped with 90-mm gun and 'souped up' ammunition have been able to knock out such tanks where 75-mm and 76-mm guns were unable to. It is therefore reasonable to believe that a more equal footing would be obtained by supplying the M26."

-Colonel Paul A. Disney, Commanding 67th Armored Regiment

" My personal opinion about the comparative quality of U.S. and German tanks can be stated briefly as follows: if such a choice were possible, I would prefer to fight in the present German Mark V or VI tank against the present U.S. medium tank and tank destroyer with the 90-mm gun. The feeling among the tank crew personnel, men who have four, five and six full campaigns to their credit, is the same. Everything has been done and every effort made to instill a feeling of confidence in their equipment in these men. No effort has been spared to train them to use it properly.

Our M4 tank does not compare favorably with the German Mk V or VI in armor plate. Theirs is much thicker than ours and sloped so as to prevent strikes against it at angles approaching the normal. I have inspected the battlefield at Faid Pass in Tunisia, being with the force which retook it. Inspection of our tanks destroyed there indicated that the 88-mm gun penetrated into the turret from the front and out again in the rear. Few gouges were found indicating that all strikes had made penetrations. Our tanks were penetrated by 88, 75, and 50-mm caliber in this engagement in all parts of the hull and turret. I personally measured many of the holes.

I know of many cases to prove the fact that the German 75-mm and 88-mm mounted on Mk IV, V, and VI tanks will penetrate our tanks, while our weapons will not penetrate theirs at the same range. Many tests have been made and the results have been published of these facts. We have been out-gunned since Tunisia, when the Germans brought out their Mk IV Special with the long-barreled 75-mm gun. The higher muzzle velocity of the German guns increases their accuracy, as range estimation are of less importance with such a flat trajectory. I have fired all our tank weapons and know this to be so. Our 76-mm gun is a big improvement over the 75-mm.
It has been claimed that our tank is the more maneuverable. In recent tests we put a captured German Mk V against all models of our own. The German tank was the faster, both across country and on the highway and would make sharper turns. It was also the better hill climber.

Some of my tank crews claim penetrations on the front plate of Mk V tanks, using the 76-mm gun and HVAP ammunition (3400 feet per second). They have more confidence in this combination than any other we have. So far, however, we have never been able to supply a tank with more than two or three rounds of this ammunition. We have been unable to obtain it. So far, we have been unable to obtain more than seven tanks out of seventeen mounting a 76-mm gun. So far, in this battalion, I have three tanks with the wide E8 suspension and track out a total of fifty-four tanks.

Tank crews in this battalion are adding sand bags to their tanks, about 170 bags for each tank, in an effort to make up for the tank's lack of armor and the penetrating ability of German guns.

It has been stated that our tanks are supposed to attack infantry and should not be used tank versus tank. It has been my experience that we have never found this ideal situation for in all our attacks we must of necessity fight German tanks. Therefore, it is necessary for a tank to be designed to meet adequately this situation. Elimination of German tanks in these attacks has proven to be a time-consuming and expensive task. At Samree, Belgium, during the attack to secure Houffalize, a precision adjustment with eight-inch howitzers failed to dislodge a German Mk VI tank which could not be eliminated by direct fire of any available weapon, including the 90-mm tank destroyer. This tank could not be outflanked. It had destroyed three of our M4 tanks at the same range. The tank withdrew during the night.

Close support aircraft has helped in our advanced by bombing enemy armor. I saw them work during the breakthrough at St. Lo and the advance across France. I saw them break up a German counterattack after we had secured Barmen, which is on the west bank of the Roer, north of Julich.

Following the Tunisian Campaign and in England and in France, I have been interviewed by War Department representatives who were gathering facts concerning our equipment. Many of the enlisted men who had considerable experience were interviewed at the same time. The same points, considered most vital to tank personnel and those needing urgent improvement at this time and which are stated above, were told to representatives of the War Department and Ordnance representatives almost two years ago. "

-Lt. Col. Wilson M. Hawkins, Commanding 3rd Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment

You DO realize that was written immediately after the fact, don’t you?

There no ‘seven decades’ there wasn’t even a half a decade. When that article was written there was nothing in the world that an M4 Easy 8 couldn’t take on & the fact had recently been proven.

AARs recorded very recently after actual operations (and without an agenda) are probably more accurate than the crap pontificated upon in GD 70+ years after the fact.

Next?

The Abrams is a MBT.  The Sherman was a medium tank.  Both the US and Russia viewed the tank's roll as similar to that of cavalry - breakthrough and exploitation.  Because it had to fulfill this general purpose role, it was not as adept as a heavy tank or designated tank destroyer at destroying other tanks.  But by the same token a tank destroyer or heavy tank was not as good at the breakthrough and exploitation role, which is the Colonel's main point.  Now after WWII everyone went to the MBT concept.  And in this sense it is unfair to compare the Sherman to the Abrams because they operate in different environments.  Yes, the Abrams can kill any tank on the battlefield today, but that's due in large part because every tank on the battlefield today is in the Abrams' weight class.  You could theoretically built a 120 ton modern "Tiger" that would laugh at a 120 mm sabot, but why?  The anti-tank role has shifted to AT missiles, artillery, and helicopters/aircraft.  The Sherman could kill every tank in its weight class (T-34, Panzer 3/4) just like the Abrams can.  The difference is the environment in which they operated.

Victory in the ETO DEPENDED on air superiority.  That fact was dictated long before the D-Day invasion in 1944.

The only time German armor was an issue was when weather would not allow the fighters to get in the air; Battle of the Bulge really stands out here.

The Tiger was a ‘better’ tank than the M4

The FW 190 was a ‘better’ fighter than the P51.

The Bismarck & Yamato were ‘better’ BB’s than the Iowa’s..

Where did it get them? None were built in sufficient numbers & deployed in ways that mattered, in the end.

In the end, you’re better off with ‘good enough’ in sufficient numbers & viable enough tactics to actually matter in the end.

Perfect? No. But this ain’t baseball where a W really doesn’t mean much & the Germans weren’t the Iraqis just setting & waiting to get ran over. Every day the allies didn’t spend ending the war was a loss of WAY more lives. WAY more.

The overlaying fact in all this, that seems to be forgotten, is that the will of United States took a nearly non existent Military in 1938 & in a short 7 years built not only the proven strongest military power in the world but we also managed to rebuild every other allied military into the successive military powers of the world with with our industrial power. All this while still not out from under the worst economic times - ever.

No other country, in the history of the world has ever accomplished so much in so little time.

Now, go on arguing about how another inch of armor or a little bit better gun on a tank would have changed history...

An AAR immediately written by ONE witness?

Didn’t we already discuss how multiple witness stories can ALL be flawed?

I’m going with the report that history, actual facts & evidence back up.

No offense taken at all, but experience and context shouldn't be outright dismissed as you and others suggest.  The lessons learned from WWII and subsequent conflicts were and are passed on in official US Army and US Marine Corps doctrine, improved tanks that are fielded by those respective services, and formal schools for the tank crewman and Armor officer MOS.

Amateur historians and armor hobbyists such as those we encounter here in GD will NEVER understand the full spectrum and nuances of armor warfare without being immersed in it at some point in their youth and living the origins of, and training for war based on those same lessons learned.

History you say?  History like the 75 mm M3 equipped M4 Shermans were so bad at tank-on-tank engagements after D-Day that the 76 mm Sherman tanks left behind in England "because nobody wanted them" were then in great demand in less than a month thereafter?  Too bad the 76 mm M1 cannon was documented to be lacking in penetration as well.

Lol.

I won’t disagree with what you say, but I will add that I’d consider armored warfare to be the absolute last of a very long obsolete form of such warfare.

Too easy to defeat & no point wasting lives at it.

WWII proved to be the true end of it.

Big lumbering machines are too easy to either just drive around or destroy en mass with great big kabooms, smaller kabooms for the singles. No better than a slightly more mobile version of a Maginot Line. You don’t need time in a tank to see what’s obsolete & what’s not.

Let the other guy spend his money & man power on the foolishness. Spend ours on cheap, easy & defendable ways to defeat their minimal threat on a battlefield.

The whole argument is ‘lol’.

At what point would history have changed? The few dozens of times that M4’s were actually defeated by Tigers?

Edit; The whole concept of armor on a battlefield is just the extension of a guy wearing chainmail & holding a wooden shield on a horse while carrying a spear!

Sir, you stated you're a farmer and it's my true belief that folks like you are the heart and soul of America.  Thanks for all you do and the hard work to feed this great country and for that matter, the world.

That said, you are completely misguided in your assessment of the value of armor on the battlefield.  "Shock, firepower, and mobility" are what tanks bring to the fight.  Nothing you mentioned above in your post can match that or occupy the objective, and the competition to field armor and the weapons to defeat them has been going on since man first started using large bludgeoning objects to kill each other.

Tanks aren't going away any time soon.

This thread is "lol", but he debate over what's effective on the battlefield isn't.

Seven decades of rationalization to justify a marginally-armed tank that may have been designed (or not, depending on who you ask) to fight other tanks and we can't even decide what the officers in that era thought the role of the medium tank was.

Thank God for TDs from the Field Artillery (but under OPCON of the Armored Division?) to save the armor that was supposed to support the infantry (except when it wasn't, but in fact was).

There’s still folks that argue in favor of the Battleship too. They too are part of the world gone by.

In farming, today, you have to realize technology is the way of the future. If you don’t grasp it, learn it & embrace it, you’re only a part of the past.

There’s no doubt that the M1A1 was the pinnacle of a long line of armored capability. Technology has left it long behind, now. Maybe not against a forth world military, but there’s few of them left that we’re likely to encounter. Even third would countries aren’t investing in armor now.

It’s an honored legacy you should be proud of. You were there for that pinnacle of proven success.

It’s over now, though. It’s too expensive to maintain for no real threat to it. 40 year old aircraft technology can beat it now. It’s so obsolete that even the most efficient aircraft in defeating it is now obsolete & only hangs on to budgets by its toenails.

If armor had a future, we’d be seeing it instead of rebuilding old hulls of already old M1A1’s.

If the outcome of the war had been challenged by armor, there’d be an argument. It never was. Not even close.

The war in the ETO was won by a blitzkrieg of our own. One that, as been explained, no other allied armor of the time but the M4 could have taken part in. Time wasn’t just money, it was lives. It was also an American public that was getting tired of war with no victory in sight. There were actually politicians in the US pushing for peace with Hitler & they were gaining a following. The US HAD to get victory in Europe ASAP. There was NO waiting for the next ‘greatest’ of anything. It was balls to the fucking wall in a fucking hurry.

Axis armor was never considered a threat to victory so it was WAY down the list. What was considered a major threat was Hitler with an A-bomb. The powers that be, then, knew where we were in development & genuinely thought that Germany was ahead of us in the development of a bomb. NOBODY cared about losing a few M4’s in the event a couple of Tigers couldn’t be defeated otherwise. WAY bigger fish to fry!!!

Ok, I'm sorry.  I gave you too much credit.

That’ll teach you...

You said the Sherman was not intended to fight other tanks. Not that fighting tanks wasn't it's primary purpose, but that it was not intended to fight tanks at all. So yes, I questioned your reading skills then and I question them now. LTC Irzyk's statement does not contradict the doctrine I cited.

You like to go on about the Abrams design team; what of the tanks that preceded the Abrams? Was the M60 immune to the gunfire of it's contemporaries? The M48?  Was our tank program in the decades following WWII similar to the Nazi tank program, featuring an emphasis on heavy tanks and rapid development of completely new models? Or was it similar to our own WWII tank program, emphasizing incremental improvement of our medium tanks and with an (almost) complete absence

Do you think it's possible the Abrams is a historical anomaly, wildly superior to it's competition due to a leap forward in technology coinciding with our opponent going bankrupt?

Finally, what imaginary tank would you have found adequate for WWII? You want frontal immunity to enemy gunfire with a gun capable of penetrating enemy tanks from any angle; how much armor do you imagine that would take, and what gun do you imagine would have that capability?

Sherman flotation in off road situations was greatly enhanced by "Duckbills"

So much so that the Army set up a factory in France to produce them.  In very short order any and every Sherman in theatre was so equipped.

Duckbills are not actually pictured until the very end of that article, I linked it as it has much good information.

As to up armoring with sand bags, logs, etc.  Look up Patton's thoughts about doing so.

I answered this question at 834PM yesterday.   Again, stop dancing around the issue with your baloney. Answer my question.

The tankers acknowledged that it would have been impractical to have armor proof against 88s. They simply wanted a gun.  17 pounder would have sufficed.  That was fielded before Normandy.

I advocate lessthen 1% additional production, to uparmor the support battalions in infantry divisions to 6 inches, 150mm frontal. This would have made them proof against shrecks and pak40s, as well as the 75mm/L48s of teh Mark Ivs and Stugs, down to point blank range.

Stop asking the same old rhetorical questions.  Its boring.

I didn't ask you because you've given up on the fantasy that the Sherman could have been replaced with a better medium tank and instead adopted the relatively reasonable position that we should have fielded more jumbos to fill the heavy tank role. It's not an inherently unreasonable position, and if I could just get you to admit that the Sherman was a good tank for the medium role equal or superior to it's contemporaries, then we could stop arguing.

USMCTanker, on the other hand, is arguing that we should have replaced the Sherman with a medium tank that was immune to enemy weapons along it's frontal arc, possessing a cannon that can penetrate enemy tanks from any angle. Since neither the Jumbo nor the Pershing had enough armor to be frontally immune to enemy weapons and the American 90 wasn't powerful enough to guarantee frontal penetration of Tiger IIs at normal combat ranges (forget about Jagdtigers), that's an inherently ridiculous position. To get what he wants we would have needed to field a medium tank weighing something like 50 tons, with a completely new gun.

Should the Sherman have been upgunned more aggressively? Yes, absolutely. But it was still an excellent medium tank.

Incidentally, late war panzershrecks could penetrate 170mm, so Jumbos were not immune to them.

I did not say it takes 3X as long to make.  It has to do with footprint and loading them on ships.  Because of the size and shape of the various tanks, and because of the way the holds are laid out in a Liberty Ship, 3 Shermans can be loaded onto a freighter in the space it takes to load 1 Pershing.  And no, I did not make that up.  So one "shipload" of Shermans is 3X as many tanks as 1 shipload of Pershings.
And has a 0% of being unloaded from a ship in port in Belgium or France until 1945.  And 0% of performing Patton's dash, relief of Bastogne, etc.
And also would never have happened, because the commanders in the field didn't WANT it.  They didn't take the 76mm Shermans they had.

It's an over-rated capability - until it is YOU that have to bust track, or help pull a power pack .... instead of eating and sleeping.  Oh, and BTW, you have to FIGHT when you get there.

Yes they ran out of gas -which would happen SOONER in a heavier tank.

https://worldoftanks.com/en/news/chieftain/The_Chieftains_Hatch_Dracula/

"A little while ago, you will recall, I came across a report of comparative testing between two British cruisers (Centaur and Cromwell) and Sherman in the US The British vehicles did not come across well. There was some speculation on the forum that perhaps there was a little national bias in the report, and that also there may have been issues with unfamiliarity with the foreign equipment. Well, I was doing a bit of digging in the British archives, and found an interesting counterpoint.

Firstly, a letter from a British observer, a chap named Alec Richardson, presumably of the British Tank Mission. Letter dated 15th October 1943, amongst other topics, there's a section entitled "On Centaur and Cromwell". I quote:

These tanks have made us a laughing stock out here. The Cromwell has had a variety of troubles, and it was mad only sending out only one of each. The Americans are politely indifferent to what happens to them and Waller, the Rolls Royce man with them, is most unhappy and wants them withdrawn as soon as possible. We are undoubtedly the world's worst salesmen!

I strongly advise we send out no more British tanks until they are reliable, and then, when we do, we send out about two trained troops with a first class officer in charge of them.

We have lost a lot of prestige over these pool lone derelicts.

Finally, and I consider this most important, WE MUST MAKE A FIRST CLASS CRUISER AND LIGHT TANK AT HOME, however long it takes us. The new Cromwell should fill the interim, for, say, the next year or two, but WE MUST REGAIN OUR PRESTIGE.

The Americans have been a bit in the doldrums lately with their T.20s, but they will emerge and produce the goods in due course.

This is our chance to get ahead of them, but we must redesign, and not be content with botching up an obsolescent type

Forgive me for being so didactic, as I feel it's mainly my fault we haven't got a good tank now!

Whether he felt the sample size was representative or not, in any case he makes no mention of perceived national bias. There is, however, a control case. There is a rather large file in the British archives about an "Exercise Dracula", in which the British Army, between 04AUG43 and 22SEP43, ran a full squadron of tanks against each other. At least 2x Cromwell III, 3x Cromwell I, 3x Centaur I, 3x M4A2 and 3x M4A4. The final report, marked "Most Secret", was filed by Major General A.C. Richardson.

The first ten days of the exercise was preparation and checking of the vehicles at Bovington. Then, 15AUG to 12SEP were road and cross-country trials round England, returning to Bovington after approximately 2,000 miles. The remainder of the exercise was "intensive road and cross-country running in the vicinity of Bovington"

The General noted:

Owing to the enthusiasm and keenness displayed by all ranks, and the competitive spirit between crews to achieve the maximum possible performance of their own particular machine, it must be assessed that the results are probably better than would have been the case under active service conditions, where the amenities such as concrete standings, blacked out workshops, etc, would not have been so readily available.

In order that the exercise should not be unduly delayed, it was decided to close down when one machine of each type reached 3,000 miles.

This was not possible in the case of Centaur as the top mileage machine was only 2,516 when the Cromwell and Shermans reached 3,000 miles, and the state of the machine was such as to preclude further running without major fitter attention." [Note to Americans: "Fitter" is English for mechanic]

The final conditions of the vehicles was as follows:

He continued:

"Special attention is drawn to the [table which shows] the comparative man-hours of specialist fitter attention required to keep the various types of machines on the road"

Yes, I know it says 5 Centaurs and only 3 are listed in the earlier table. I have no explanation, and neither is one given in the report. Possible it was just a typo. Interestingly, the appendix pages also make references to Cromwell Xs, without saying where they came from. I am fairly convinced that the entire report was not in the box.

Anyway, his overall opinions.

The performance of the Shermans throughout the exercise has been outstanding as regards reliability and durability, and the enthusiasm shown by their crews is proof of their confidence in this type of machine. This is not only in respect of their mechanical reliability, but also in respect of their "fightability", as was clearly proved at Lulworth when their armament was tested.

Centaurs: Underpowered, unreliable and unwanted as a tank, owing to its characteristics which do not compare favourably with tanks of current design.

Cromwells: Spectacular as regards speed, but doubtful as regards maneuverability and control, owing to unreliability of steering and brakes. Doubtful as regards durability over 2,000 miles, owing to the stresses and strains experienced by the Meteor engine when mounted in the hull of a tank and subjected to reverse torque, which an aero engine is not normally called upon to do

Should the Cromwell be made entirely reliable mechanically, there is still the question of its "fightability" to be considered as at present its gun mountings and accessories leave much to be desired

I'm not going to go into the various details of the failings the various vehicles suffered, but a general overview can be found here:

Some observations by the records keepers.

Oi/c Cruiser records, name not provided, stated, inter alia:

Cromwells: The performance of these machines was very disappointing as, without exception, the failures were all old troubles experienced before, and, one might have hoped by now, ought to have been rectified. With nearly all crews this was their first introduction to the Cromwells and it was obvious after the first few failures that the drivers had lost confidence in this machine. However, from a purely driving angle, all crews agreed that it is a beautiful tank to handle, and the power unit of 600hp is a definite  step forward in design.

Centaurs: These machines up to about 1,500 miles put up an improved performance in comparison to earlier machines. The biggest surprise being the clutch which now appears serviceable, whereas in our previous experience 800 miles was the limit before the races broke up in the cam box. The engine is still far from oil tight with the result that radiators have to be cleaned constantly. Petrol starvation was another constantly recurring trouble. [] One can only hope that units are receiving these machines for training purposes only.

Driving (Both). One of the biggest troubles with crews was their inability to adjust the brakes properly even when cold. This adjustment leaves much to be desired and when the vehicle is hot, medical attention is usually necessary for burnt arms, hands and necks etc. [] Two points of bad driving was constantly noticed. (1) overrevving (ii) bad cornering- usually trying to negotiate with (a) too high a gear or (b) with too few revs. Both of these points, to my mind, would be covered by a rev counter  an essential instrument conducive to good driving

His Sherman counterpart, a Captain Shaw, made the following observations, amongst others:

The Shermans on the whole were extremely reliable and gave very little trouble. All were fitted prior to the trial with rubber tracks and this in a large measure accounts for the little suspension trouble experienced during the trial. []

On the M4A2 type the engines have given no trouble except for the initial failure of the two injectors on No 9. The injectors on all vehicles have not been touched except for checking for correct adjustment.[]

On the M4A4 type little trouble has been experienced except for ordinary running maintenance jobs.

The next report in the packet was from a Major Ronald of the Westminster Dragoons, position un-stated. Excerpts follow:

Reliability: The outstanding lesson of this exercise has been to me the exceptional reliability of the American machines. All my ideas, based on 2  years experience with an armoured regiment equipped with British machines have had to be revised, and though before the exercise started I was inclined to think that perhaps Sherman was somewhat overrated I am completely convinced of the superiority of this machine over anything that this country has produced up to date.

It is evident that the commander of a unit equipped with Shermans can be confident of taking 99% of his vehicles into battle, at any rate during the first 2,000 miles of their life. On the other hand, if he were equipped with Cromwells or Centaurs he would be in a continuous state of anxiety as to whether enough of his tanks would reach the battlefield to carry out the normal tasks expected of his unit.

Conditions of Trial:

The exercise has been run under conditions which have been very favourable to the machines and particularly so to the less reliable ones. Long mileages have been done, but [] the squadron has always reached harbor in time to carry out maintenance in daylight. [] Even so, the British machines have only been kept on the road by dint of much hard work. It is safe to say that such conditions are never likely to be encountered during operations, and less easy conditions will, of course, react unfavourably on reliability and battleworthiness.

Fitter and Light Aid Detachment Staff:

A fine result has ben achieved in bringing back to the starting point 13 of the original 14 starters after 2,000 miles around England. It must be remembered, however, that the Squadron has had the advantage of far greater technical assistance than is available to the normal armoured squadron. It is only this very lavish scale of fitters, L.A.D. etc that has enabled the Cromwells and Centaurs to be brought back to Bovington under their own power and even then much night work and long hours have had to be worked.

Design and erection

Taking a broad view of the exercise it appears that only a few defects can be ascribed to bad erection. Centaur governors and gear box oil seal on both Centaur and Cromwell should not have given trouble had erection and inspection been properly carried out and the many petrol stoppages are partly due to tanks having foreign matter in them on delivery

I suggest, however, that most of the troubles are really due to indifferent design. The radiator arrangement is simply asking for trouble and it is certainly a possibility that rod-operated steering control and re-positioned adjusters would go a long way to solve the steering troubles which were so frequent. The petrol tap is to the lay-mind a most unnecessarily complicated affair. The track adjustment on Centaur and Cromwell III is quite impossible from an operational standpoint and was, of course, tried out in a slightly simpler form on Covenanter and Crusader where it was never thought satisfactory by field units.

General conclusions:

The simplicity and reliability of the American machines in contrast with the British production is to me the chief lesson of Dracula. The Cromwell could, no doubt, be made into an equally good fighting vehicle but the re-designing necessary should, I suggest, have as its chief object simplicity which, in turn, will bring reliability.

The 2i/c, Captain Priestley of the Coldstream Guards, had a single page at the end, focusing on the sorts of things XOs focus on.

Cromwell: In theory the tank crews of this type should have had the easiest time in that, during the early stages of the exercise anyway, they were scheduled to arrive first.

In practice, however, on most occasions one or two of them arrived late at night, thus involving a late meal being required, guides being left out, petrol lorries being kept waiting and consequent loss of rest and sleep to a large number of personnel in addition to the tank crews themselves. It was also noticeable that Last Parade [American translation: After operations checks and services] took at least 1  hours which was greatly in excess of the time taken by the Shermans and consequently the crews showed much greater signs of fatigue.

Centaur: The same remarks apply as to the Cromwell, only in a far greater degree. Numbers of personnel were kept up until the early hours of the morning waiting to feed and replenish the tanks. Arrangements were always being made so that fitters, etc, could work all night on them. Added to this they almost invariably left late in the morning, thus hindering the clearing up of the administrative area. If they had to be refilled with ammunition as well, they could never have kept pace with the rest of the column.

Sherman (diesel) 4A2

These tanks were no bother from an administrative angle. They often arrived before even the Cromwells  they never required refilling en route, their Last Parade was short and their crews always received their hot evening meal at the correct time. A full night's rest was had by all and if it had only been a case of administering these tanks everybody would have had considerably more rest and sleep and dinners for all would have tasted much nicer owing to not having to be kept for long hours after they had been cooked.

Sherman (Petrol) 4A4

The same remarks apply to this type as to the other Shermans except that they took slightly longer to arrive. They did create one small problem in that owing to their heavier fuel consumption arrangements had to be made to refuel them en route when the remainder of the tanks could complete the distance quite comfortably without.

Conclusion:

In an exercise that is largely of a technical character it is easy to overlook some of the vital administrative points which stand out particularly when no actual fighting is being done. After considering the facts, however, it is plain that the crews of all Sherman tanks would have been 100% fighting fit on entering the battle area at any stage of the exercise. There would have been no extra problems in feeding and replenishing the crews and vehicles. The Cromwells, or a percentage of them, would have been tired with less sleep to look forward to and would have kept a large number of people busy in the harbor area most of the night.

The Centaurs would never have been at the right place at the right time and their crews would have been of little fighting value should they have had long approach marches or should they have been in action any length of time.

Finally, the words of the officer commanding, a Major Clifford.

Centaur: I should prefer not to take a squadron of Centaurs on active service. I consider it is underpowered and unreliable and require more maintenance in relation to running time than is justified. With good average crews and the best of technical knowledge and assistance available on this exercise it proved possible to get the Centaurs round most of the road work  and some of the cross-country, but in a normal field squadron with no more than a fitter per troop and the rest of the Regiment's demands on L.A.D and the Brigade's demand on workshops, I do not think that one of them would have completed this operation and many would have had to be abandoned at an early date. The crew fatigue in fighting and maintaining this type of tank would be I consider an impossible handicap. This tank can be dangerous to its crew and other road users. We narrowly averted two bad accidents and unfortunately had one fatal crash which were all due to circumstances over which the driver had no control.

Cromwell

This tank has, in my opinion, the makings of a wonderful fighting machine but I do not consider it to be out of the experimental stage yet. For this reason alone I should not be entirely happy to take a squadron of Cromwells to war although I feel they would give an excellent account of themselves if properly handled. As was ordered on this exercise I would keep their maximum speed down to 30mph otherwise a host of track and suspension trouble could be expected;  only on the rarest occasions and then in the fullest knowledge of what I was doing would I order a higher speed.

There appears much to be put right still and it is not the purpose of this report to trespass on technical grounds but I believe such points as improved cooling for brakes, a possibility of direct as opposed to hydraulic steering and a stronger suspension are now under test and will all assist to make this tank satisfactory for war. At the moment the relation of running time to maintenance, although nowhere near as high as Centaur,  is I think a severe problem when crews must fight, drive and maintain for days on end. [] Crews are [..] confused, and uncertain and are definitely suspicious of the Cromwell's steering reliability. []

Sherman

There is little that I can say. This type of tank seems to be almost without reproach and personally I would be delighted to take a Sherman squadron to war. They are utterly reliable and have a magnificent gun which in my opinion are the two main considerations. I do not think they are quite as good as the Cromwell across country when they are running on rather worn rubber tracks and the going is greasy, neither does one get as smooth a ride, but they appear so infinitely superior in every other way particularly in reliability with a minimum of maintenance that this cross-country consideration is completely overweighed.

In some respects I feel that the Sherman carries rather too many electrical gadgets which occasionally give rise to trouble and it would appear that some of them could well be done away with without any detriment to the machine's performance. Their slow speed (by comparison to the Cromwell) had very little effect on their time into harbor each night. This was largely due to the fact that they hardly ever had an involuntary halt and were able to keep a perfect distance and march discipline throughout the 2,000 mile run. Crew fatigue was at a minimum and maximum rest obtained.

[] I would be glad to take a Sherman squadron to war tomorrow and a Cromwell after several month's further trial and experiment.

Finally: On the firing trials at Lulworth it was found that only one tank of British manufacture was able to shoot without gun fitter attention, whereas all Shermans merely T and A'd their sights and drove up and fired all guns without a hitch.

Now, Dracula was only the first of two of such exercises. After a bit of tweaking, Cromwell was put through another round of testing a bit later, and it did a little better. The takeaways from this are firstly that Sherman had established and cemented a wonderful reputation with the British in 1943, especially in comparison with domestic machines, and secondly, that it is an indicator that the US Army's testing of the British product was quite fair, not subject to particular bias, and a generally accurate assessment of the state of British vs American tank production."

@fadedsun Another good read. Thanks for finding & posting it!

I bet he found it in the archives here.
It eventually makes it into most Sherman threads.  

I hung on to it in my head when I found it one day while perusing Moran’s stuff.

In that case, I’ll agree with you.  The Sherman was a good medium tank.  As good as the mark IV and T34.  That’s kinda like saying the Hood was a good battlecruiser and the HE111 was a good medium bomber.  But okay. I’ll agree with that.

The Hood was the best battlecruiser ever built.  Alas, battlecruisers die when they try to do battleship things.  Look at the Kongo class.

As to the Sherman, there was none markedly better in its weight class, and certainly none better for the way the Army used it.

Here you go.

linky

The first tank into Bastogne was, in fact, an M4A3E2 jumbo.  So clearly somehow it was miracled off a boat, and did make Patton's dash and the relief of Bastogne.

You are confusing the 76mm gun issue, and the armor issue.

Note that reliability was less of an issue then you'd think.

There are studies, that vary wildly, that estimate 10000 to 30000 hours to manufacture a medium tank.. Slice it up anyway you like, 85 man hours to retrofit a sherman isnt a significant strain on the war effort.  Worst case would have been a large amount of failures of volute springs in the chassis, which would have needed replacing.

In a strange twist this subject is like which is better 9MM (Sherman) or .45 (Tiger/Panther).

Perhaps you missed it when I posted that VERY TANK - Cobra King - earlier in this thread.  BTW - it didn't get shipped as a Jumbo - rather, it was field-modified in the theater, as it started life as a regular 75MM gunned tank.  It was up-gunned after the Battle of Bastogne.

You just "wish away" the extra costs and considerations of fielding a heavier tank.  Real life and real wars don't work that way.  What are you willing to give up to get that 85 man-hours?  One man cannot be in 2 places at the same time.

So fucking true!

If only there’d have been some way to measure who the real victor might have been...

‘‘Tis true!

You serious, Clark?

Well, that certainly settles it. Nothing is a threat to it, but everything short of sticks and stones can defeat it.

Do you read the bullshit you write before posting it?

Great book Tigers in the mud.  The tiger A was for the period an amazing machine.  The jagd based off the B variant was just huge.  Some action photos of a few of them. its size is massive.  To heavy for anytjing other than hard ground

Holy cow.. 14 pages?!

We have more tank experts here than AR shooters.

Sure was.

As long as you ignore that the Iowa's weren't intended to be a 1 to 1 equivalent.

That was the intention behind the Montana-class

Actually, the side that used Shermans and .45 ended up driving around in the capitol of the side using 9MM and Tiger/Panther, so ....

And yet, the Iowas had near-equal penetration, 5 more knots speed and radar with stable verticals, giving it far superior fire control.

In a 1 on 1 fight, Iowas would win against  Yamato class, and a Bismark isn't even competition.

In a 2 on 1 fight, which is what it would be, it isn't even a question.

The t-34 had its own problems with production. At times the
50mm equipped pz III could penetrate its plate do to manufacturing defects/ poor armor quality.

It wasn’t the super tank it was mad out to be.

T-34 vs pzIII comparison

The British actually captured and used Panther tanks they came across.

Captured Panther tank

There’s people in GD that will argue they were.

If you read some of the posts in the Yamato vs Arleigh Burke thread, we couldn’t even sink a Yamata class BB today. Forget where it’s been setting for the last, almost, 75 yeas.

So did the Germans.  Google Beutepanzer