Brothers saved dozens at Nova, fighting terrorists with commander’s phoned-in advice

Two brothers saved dozens of lives during the massacre by Hamas terrorists at the Supernova music festival on October 7 by providing fire cover for escapees with weapons they found in a tank, while receiving instructions over the phone from an IDF officer. Some 360 of the 1,200 people killed in southern Israel that day were slaughtered at the outdoor festival.

According to a Channel 12 news report, rave attendees Daniel and Neria Sharabi fended off terrorists with firearms from the tank near the site of the massacre, also treating the wounded who were hiding with them.

With Daniel’s former IDF commander, Yoni Skariszewski, advising them by telephone, the brothers saved some 30 partygoers sheltering behind the tank amid the Hamas onslaught, the report said.

The Sharabi brothers were partying at Supernova when rocket sirens started blaring at 6:30 a.m. In a video captured by Neria, he and his friends Karin Journo and Yosef-Haim Ohana can be seen seeking shelter behind some parked cars, jokingly wondering why the terrorists in Gaza couldn’t wait until later to begin launching their missiles.

Neria told Channel 12 (Hebrew link) that they were ordered to disperse, and he left Karin — who had a broken leg prior to the event — and together with his cousin Shalev Yehoshua, went to retrieve his car. Minutes later, Karin was murdered.

The brothers said they began to hear gunfire and immediately realized from their army service that it was the sound of Kalashnikovs, rather than fire coming from Israeli military weapons.

Daniel was a combat medic during his service, and Neria served in the infantry.

Realizing this was no regular bout of rockets from Gaza, they fled toward the highway.

Daniel administered first aid to an injured woman, when he, Neria, Yosef, and Shalev were called upon by two soldiers, Sgt. First Class Itai Bausi and another identified only as Ben, to help them evacuate the wounded on a stretcher.

Soon, terrorists armed with automatic weapons stormed the scene in pickup trucks, firing incessantly.

Itai and Ben were killed, as Daniel, Neria, Shalev and Yosef managed to take cover behind some parked cars. The car near Yosef was hit by an RPG missile. This was the last time the Sharabi brothers saw him before he was snatched by terrorists who took him to Gaza, where he is still being held hostage.

The brothers recounted that shortly after 9 a.m., under heavy shelling, a damaged tank veered off the highway toward the parking lot, running over some of the vehicles. A member of the tank’s crew died, as the other three escaped; two of them were killed.

The survivor, tank driver Ido Somekh, valiantly fought off scores of terrorists before he was overpowered, the brothers said. About a dozen terrorists attempted to kill Somekh with his own gun, which fortunately malfunctioned.

Realizing they would need to fend off the approaching terrorists, Daniel and Neria entered the tank, rummaging for firearms. The tank’s fallen crew member was splayed on the floor. Neria furiously searched the body for a weapon, as he apologized profusely to the dead soldier.

Finally, Neria found the soldier’s gun, which was full of sand and therefore likely to malfunction. With a tiny tub of Vaseline from a woman hiding behind the tank, Neria lubricated the weapon so that it could be used.

Daniel took the tank’s machine gun. Both brothers, who had served as infantry soldiers, did not know their way around a tank and were initially unable to find ammunition for the machine gun.

Daniel scoured his phone contacts for anyone who might know where to find the ammunition.

“I just wrote ‘army’ in my contacts, and searched, and called everyone,” he said.

Ultimately, he spoke with Yoni Skrisewsky, a commander of his reserve company, who told him where to look in the tank.

“Where is the army, where is the air force?” Daniel begged Skrisewsky, who reassured him that help was on the way.

Yoni, whose own father Rody was murdered in the Hamas onslaught, left Tel Aviv for Re’im with three other members of his reserve company to help fight off the terrorists.

For five hours, until he arrived at Re’im, Skrisewsky gave tactical advice to the Sharabi brothers over the phone, as they fended off their assailants, giving cover for injured Nova attendees and applying improvised tourniquets to their wounds.

Their heroic actions saved dozens from murder or abduction.

“We told them that whoever could fight, must fight. Whoever can treat [the wounded], must treat. And everyone else must pray,” the brothers said of their instructions to those sheltering behind the tent.

Hours later, in the afternoon, the group was finally rescued by security forces.

They recalled finally sitting down having saved so many lives, and rolling a joint, at which point a police officer shouted at them “what do you think you are doing?”

When told that they were heroes, the brothers demurred: “The heroes are the ones who died that day.”

“The medics who were killed, those who heroically fought and died, those who were kidnapped [are the heroes],” Daniel said.

On October 7, some 3,000 Hamas terrorists crossed the border from Gaza into Israel, brutally murdering about 1,200 people, mainly civilians, and engaging in widespread violence, including sexual assault, as they took some 240 hostages. Over 360 of those massacred were at the Nova music festival.

Battalion chief told hostage to approach; when he did, a soldier shot him, probe finds

The Israel Defense Forces on Thursday published its final findings of a probe into the mistaken killing of three Israeli hostages by troops in Gaza City’s Shejaiya neighborhood earlier this month, saying forces on the ground did not have “sufficient awareness” of the possibility that troops would encounter Hamas-held captives while not engaged in a special operation to rescue them, despite the army having intelligence of possible hostages in the area.

The soldiers involved in the incident were not expected to be dismissed or to stand trial due to their actions.

The three hostages killed by troops were Yotam Haim, Samar Talalka and Alon Lulu Shamriz.

The probe, conducted by the head of Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman, found that on December 15 during “intense fighting” in Shejaiya, a soldier of the Bislamach Brigade’s 17th Battalion opened fire at three figures he had wrongly identified as a threat, killing two, while the third fled to a nearby building.

Commanders at the scene called on the soldiers to cease their fire in order for the third figure to be identified. Some 15 minutes later, the battalion commander heard someone shouting from the building “Help” and “They are shooting at me” in Hebrew, and again ordered troops to halt their fire, while shouting back at the figure: “Come my way.”

The third man — later confirmed to be Haim — came out of the building toward the troops, but two soldiers who, according to the probe, had not heard the commander’s order due to noise from a nearby tank, shot and killed the hostage.

The IDF said that based on its analysis and aerial footage, the three hostages were shirtless and one was waving a makeshift white flag as they initially approached the forces. The probe says the position from which the first soldier opened fire at the hostages gave him limited vision of the trio.

After the gunfire, commanders at the scene sent the men’s bodies to Israel for identification.

Before the incident, on December 10, the IDF said troops found a note next to a tunnel shaft in Shejaiya, reading “Help” in Hebrew. It said that next to the note was an ID card belonging to a Hamas operative. The note was taken for examination, but the probe said there was no information linking it to the presence of hostages in the Shejaiya area, and troops assessed it was an attempt by Hamas to lure them into an ambush.

IDF Spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari in a press conference Thursday said the three hostages had been held in that tunnel.

“We estimate that due to our ground operation in Shejaiya, the terrorists holding the hostages came out from underground and moved to a hideout building,” Hagari said.

Also on December 10, troops of the Golani Brigade’s reconnaissance unit operating in Shejaiya raided several buildings to locate Hamas gunmen and weapons. In one building that the troops breached, a dog of the Oketz canine unit was sent in, after which a gun battle broke out between Hamas operatives and Golani soldiers.

The Golani troops returned fire, killing at least one Hamas gunman. The Oketz dog was also killed in the battle.

Amid the fighting, Golani commanders heard shouting of “Help” and “Hostages” in Hebrew from the building, but the troops believed it was an attempt by Hamas to lure them into an ambush.

Combat engineers with the Golani force also suspected the building was booby-trapped, and the troops did not enter further into the building.

“Some of the forces heard the cries but suspected it was an attempt by the terrorists to draw the forces inside the building to harm them, as had happened in the past,” the probe said.

The IDF said the forces left the building and directed an attack helicopter and tanks to strike the building. In the strikes, at least five Hamas operatives were believed to have been killed.

Only on December 18, when troops scanned the building where the gun battle had taken place and recovered the camera on the Oketz dog, did the military find that it had recorded the three hostages’ cries for help. The three were not seen in the video, only heard.

“At the end of the battle, after the terrorists holding the hostages were killed, the hostages likely fled the building,” the probe said.

On December 14, a day before the deadly shooting, signs written in Hebrew reading “SOS” and “Help, 3 hostages” were identified in drone footage on the side of a building around 200 meters from where the incident with the canine took place. “Near the building, blue barrels were spotted commonly found in rigged locations forces had encountered in the Shejaiya area, thus it was suspected as a trap,” the probe said.

The IDF said the investigation revealed that commanders involved had information about the presence of Israeli hostages in the Shejaiya area, “and even took actions to prevent strikes on locations suspected of having hostages inside.”

As part of the assessments on the issue, special forces were prepared in every combat zone, immediately available for intervention in case a force identified a building with hostages inside, it said.

But “in this case, there was no intelligence about either building where the hostages were.”

The probe added that “there was insufficient awareness among the forces in the field regarding cases of hostages reaching IDF forces, or regarding forces encountering hostages during the clearing of buildings as part of combat and not as part of a special operation to free hostages.

“IDF soldiers involved in the incident had experienced complex combat situations in the days preceding the incident and were in a state of high alert for a threat. During the battles, they encountered deceptions by the enemy and attempts to draw them into shafts and buildings rigged with explosives,” the probe concluded.

IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi in a statement said the shooting of Haim, Talaka and Shamriz was a “grave event with very grave outcomes.”

“The IDF failed in its mission to rescue the hostages in this event,” he said.

“The entire chain of command feels responsible for this grave event, regrets this outcome, and shares in the grief of the families of the three hostages,” Halevi said in his conclusion of the probe.

Halevi said the shooting of the hostages “could have been prevented” but that “there was no malice in the event,” and that the soldiers believed they were acting correctly in the moment.

“The shooting at the hostages should not have occurred. This shooting did not match up to the risk and the situation. However, it was carried out under complex circumstances, and in intense combat conditions under a prolonged threat,” he said.

The chief of staff also emphasized “the utmost importance of adhering to open-fire regulations.”

“In a situation where there is no immediate threat and the identification is not a clear enemy, there is a need for a moment of examination before firing, given the opportunity. This action is necessary to prevent, among other things, incidents of our forces firing at our forces. In this case, the three hostages were not moving threateningly and held up a white flag; therefore, it was appropriate to confirm the identification before firing. The pressure conditions and operational environment made it difficult for the soldiers to implement these aspects,” Halevi said.

“We, the commanders, must ensure that the operational instructions are clear, and that forces’ actions in the field take into account use of soldiers’ and commanders’ discretion. The open-fire regulations are necessary, and they are also intended to protect us, so that we do not kill our own forces. They determine and impact fateful decisions, as happened in this event,” he added.

Halevi also instructed all commanders to review the probe and raise awareness for hostages among forces, including possible locations, their photographs and other various findings about them.

Responding to a question, Hagari said Thursday it was not possible to judge “what was going through the soldiers’ heads when they carried out the shooting.”

“The fighting includes very difficult and complex moments. After days of encountering explosives, seeing friends die, getting shot at with RPGs, and encountering gunmen in civilian clothing without weapons trying to lure you to bombs in the streets — in this situation, a soldier had limited vision and made an error,” he said.

“He opened fire in error, this needs to be said. But still, he saw, and reported truthfully after the gunfire that one of them was holding a white flag, he spoke the truth,” Hagari said.

“This is an operational investigation to draw lessons, nothing further,” he added.

The probe was also shared with the families of Haim, Talaka and Shamriz, the IDF said.

Hostage Yotam Haim, 28, was a drummer for the heavy metal band Persephore. He was last seen in a video he took on the morning of October 7, showing himself in the front door of his Kfar Aza home, before he was abducted to Gaza.

Samar Talalka, 22, from Hura, was working in the Kibbutz Nir Am hatchery, where he often did the weekend shifts, when Hamas terrorists stormed the kibbutz.

Alon Lulu Shamriz, 26, a computer engineering student, was abducted from his Kibbutz Kfar Aza home on October 7.

Battalion chief told hostage to approach; when he did, a soldier shot him, probe finds

The Israel Defense Forces on Thursday published its final findings of a probe into the mistaken killing of three Israeli hostages by troops in Gaza City’s Shejaiya neighborhood earlier this month, saying forces on the ground did not have “sufficient awareness” of the possibility that troops would encounter Hamas-held captives while not engaged in a special operation to rescue them, despite the army having intelligence of possible hostages in the area.

The soldiers involved in the incident were not expected to be dismissed or to stand trial due to their actions.

The three hostages killed by troops were Yotam Haim, Samar Talalka and Alon Lulu Shamriz.

The probe, conducted by the head of Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman, found that on December 15 during “intense fighting” in Shejaiya, a soldier of the Bislamach Brigade’s 17th Battalion opened fire at three figures he had wrongly identified as a threat, killing two, while the third fled to a nearby building.

Commanders at the scene called on the soldiers to cease their fire in order for the third figure to be identified. Some 15 minutes later, the battalion commander heard someone shouting from the building “Help” and “They are shooting at me” in Hebrew, and again ordered troops to halt their fire, while shouting back at the figure: “Come my way.”

The third man — later confirmed to be Haim — came out of the building toward the troops, but two soldiers who, according to the probe, had not heard the commander’s order due to noise from a nearby tank, shot and killed the hostage.

The IDF said that based on its analysis and aerial footage, the three hostages were shirtless and one was waving a makeshift white flag as they initially approached the forces. The probe says the position from which the first soldier opened fire at the hostages gave him limited vision of the trio.

After the gunfire, commanders at the scene sent the men’s bodies to Israel for identification.

Before the incident, on December 10, the IDF said troops found a note next to a tunnel shaft in Shejaiya, reading “Help” in Hebrew. It said that next to the note was an ID card belonging to a Hamas operative. The note was taken for examination, but the probe said there was no information linking it to the presence of hostages in the Shejaiya area, and troops assessed it was an attempt by Hamas to lure them into an ambush.

IDF Spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari in a press conference Thursday said the three hostages had been held in that tunnel.

“We estimate that due to our ground operation in Shejaiya, the terrorists holding the hostages came out from underground and moved to a hideout building,” Hagari said.

Also on December 10, troops of the Golani Brigade’s reconnaissance unit operating in Shejaiya raided several buildings to locate Hamas gunmen and weapons. In one building that the troops breached, a dog of the Oketz canine unit was sent in, after which a gun battle broke out between Hamas operatives and Golani soldiers.

The Golani troops returned fire, killing at least one Hamas gunman. The Oketz dog was also killed in the battle.

Amid the fighting, Golani commanders heard shouting of “Help” and “Hostages” in Hebrew from the building, but the troops believed it was an attempt by Hamas to lure them into an ambush.

Combat engineers with the Golani force also suspected the building was booby-trapped, and the troops did not enter further into the building.

“Some of the forces heard the cries but suspected it was an attempt by the terrorists to draw the forces inside the building to harm them, as had happened in the past,” the probe said.

The IDF said the forces left the building and directed an attack helicopter and tanks to strike the building. In the strikes, at least five Hamas operatives were believed to have been killed.

Only on December 18, when troops scanned the building where the gun battle had taken place and recovered the camera on the Oketz dog, did the military find that it had recorded the three hostages’ cries for help. The three were not seen in the video, only heard.

“At the end of the battle, after the terrorists holding the hostages were killed, the hostages likely fled the building,” the probe said.

On December 14, a day before the deadly shooting, signs written in Hebrew reading “SOS” and “Help, 3 hostages” were identified in drone footage on the side of a building around 200 meters from where the incident with the canine took place. “Near the building, blue barrels were spotted commonly found in rigged locations forces had encountered in the Shejaiya area, thus it was suspected as a trap,” the probe said.

The IDF said the investigation revealed that commanders involved had information about the presence of Israeli hostages in the Shejaiya area, “and even took actions to prevent strikes on locations suspected of having hostages inside.”

As part of the assessments on the issue, special forces were prepared in every combat zone, immediately available for intervention in case a force identified a building with hostages inside, it said.

But “in this case, there was no intelligence about either building where the hostages were.”

The probe added that “there was insufficient awareness among the forces in the field regarding cases of hostages reaching IDF forces, or regarding forces encountering hostages during the clearing of buildings as part of combat and not as part of a special operation to free hostages.

“IDF soldiers involved in the incident had experienced complex combat situations in the days preceding the incident and were in a state of high alert for a threat. During the battles, they encountered deceptions by the enemy and attempts to draw them into shafts and buildings rigged with explosives,” the probe concluded.

IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi in a statement said the shooting of Haim, Talaka and Shamriz was a “grave event with very grave outcomes.”

“The IDF failed in its mission to rescue the hostages in this event,” he said.

“The entire chain of command feels responsible for this grave event, regrets this outcome, and shares in the grief of the families of the three hostages,” Halevi said in his conclusion of the probe.

Halevi said the shooting of the hostages “could have been prevented” but that “there was no malice in the event,” and that the soldiers believed they were acting correctly in the moment.

“The shooting at the hostages should not have occurred. This shooting did not match up to the risk and the situation. However, it was carried out under complex circumstances, and in intense combat conditions under a prolonged threat,” he said.

The chief of staff also emphasized “the utmost importance of adhering to open-fire regulations.”

“In a situation where there is no immediate threat and the identification is not a clear enemy, there is a need for a moment of examination before firing, given the opportunity. This action is necessary to prevent, among other things, incidents of our forces firing at our forces. In this case, the three hostages were not moving threateningly and held up a white flag; therefore, it was appropriate to confirm the identification before firing. The pressure conditions and operational environment made it difficult for the soldiers to implement these aspects,” Halevi said.

“We, the commanders, must ensure that the operational instructions are clear, and that forces’ actions in the field take into account use of soldiers’ and commanders’ discretion. The open-fire regulations are necessary, and they are also intended to protect us, so that we do not kill our own forces. They determine and impact fateful decisions, as happened in this event,” he added.

Halevi also instructed all commanders to review the probe and raise awareness for hostages among forces, including possible locations, their photographs and other various findings about them.

Responding to a question, Hagari said Thursday it was not possible to judge “what was going through the soldiers’ heads when they carried out the shooting.”

“The fighting includes very difficult and complex moments. After days of encountering explosives, seeing friends die, getting shot at with RPGs, and encountering gunmen in civilian clothing without weapons trying to lure you to bombs in the streets — in this situation, a soldier had limited vision and made an error,” he said.

“He opened fire in error, this needs to be said. But still, he saw, and reported truthfully after the gunfire that one of them was holding a white flag, he spoke the truth,” Hagari said.

“This is an operational investigation to draw lessons, nothing further,” he added.

The probe was also shared with the families of Haim, Talaka and Shamriz, the IDF said.

Hostage Yotam Haim, 28, was a drummer for the heavy metal band Persephore. He was last seen in a video he took on the morning of October 7, showing himself in the front door of his Kfar Aza home, before he was abducted to Gaza.

Samar Talalka, 22, from Hura, was working in the Kibbutz Nir Am hatchery, where he often did the weekend shifts, when Hamas terrorists stormed the kibbutz.

Alon Lulu Shamriz, 26, a computer engineering student, was abducted from his Kibbutz Kfar Aza home on October 7.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad, backed by Iran, massacred 1,200 Israelis on Oct. 7, resulting in full-scale war in Gaza. Hezbollah, also backed by Iran, has launched more than 1,000 rockets at northern Israeli communities since then, risking regional conflagration. Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen are attacking and hijacking ships in the Suez canal, threatening one of the world’s most vital waterways. Militias in Syria and Iraq, with support from Iran, are attacking U.S. bases and—as always—threatening moderate Arab nations.

Notice a pattern? The Iranian regime is at the center of most of the Middle East’s problems and much of global terror. Yet inexplicably, almost nobody is touching it. For the past 45 years, the regime has been the source of endless war, terror and suffering throughout the world. I’ve come to realize that enough is enough. The evil empire of Iran must be brought down.

As a young officer in Israel’s special forces, I spent a great deal of time fighting Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy. I studied its methods and vulnerabilities. I targeted its commanders and fighters. In 2006, as a reservist, I commanded a special search and destroy team in the second Lebanon War.

Only after that war, in which I lost my best friend, did I begin to realize our great folly. We were fighting the wrong battle, and that is exactly what Iran wants us to do.

In the late 1980s, Iran embarked on a simple yet brilliant strategy: Set up terrorist proxies across the Middle East. Fund them, train them and arm them. Let them do the dirty work of fighting and dying.

Iran executed this plan well. There is little direct war taking place between Iran and Israel. Instead, Iran constantly attacks Israel via its proxies in such places as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Gaza and Yemen. Its brutal Quds unit exported terror around the globe. Iran’s terrorist proxies have waged war on every moderate element in the Middle East. They’ve attacked the Saudi oil company Aramco, the United Arab Emirates, the Kurds and Israel on many occasions. The most amazing part: Iran has largely gotten away with it.

There is a new cold war taking place in the Middle East. On one side, there is a corrupt, incompetent and hollow empire—the Islamic Republic of Iran—similar to the Soviet Union in the 1980s. On the other side, there is a thriving, free and strong democracy—Israel (and its allies)—reminiscent of the U.S. in the original Cold War.

When I became prime minister in June 2021, I decided to change this. I told my three security chiefs—the heads of the Israel Defense Forces, Mossad and Shin Bet—that my goal was to avoid, if reasonably possible, local clashes with Hezbollah and Hamas. Rather, Israel’s national-security resources must be focused on weakening our primary enemy—Iran.

There are many ways to weaken Iran: empower domestic opposition, ensure internet continuity during riots against the regime, strengthen its enemies, increase sanctions and economic pressures. But Israel can’t and shouldn’t do this alone. The U.S. should be leading the effort. This doesn’t require a full-scale war, just as the demise of the Soviet Union didn’t result from total war. Rather, the Soviet Union collapsed from internal rot coupled with external pressure applied by the U.S.

Opinion | IDF Faces a Harsh Reality in Southern Gaza

What is happening in southern Gaza—and as important, what isn’t happening—threatens to leave the Middle East violently unstable for years. The battle for Khan Younis is forcing Israel to face a harsh reality: Hamas likely won’t be totally annihilated. And Israel’s two goals, killing Hamas’s leaders and rescuing all the hostages, are coming into contradiction.

Since Israel has mostly taken over northern Gaza, Khan Younis is essentially the last fortress of Hamas’s leadership. The terrorists who have controlled Gaza for the past 16 years are fighting there more ferociously than anywhere else. Visiting Khan Younis on Dec. 21, I saw how intense the battle is even after three weeks and despite the Israeli military’s efforts to wrap up the fighting.

Despite past successes such as the daring and ingenious operations to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons for more than 20 years, Israel has often ignored Hamas since it took over Gaza. Even the differing results so far in northern and southern Gaza have raised questions about whether Israel has the will and endurance to sustain the battle.

On Nov. 22, I visited northern Gaza’s Al-Shifa Hospital and Hamas’s underground tunnels there. After 16 years of treating that hospital as untouchable, Israel now was showing the region that after the Oct. 7 massacres, nothing would stop it from rooting out Gaza’s rulers even in the most sensitive civilian locations.

In southern Gaza a month later, I saw what initially appeared to be similar resolve, with a crater where Gaza chief Yahya Sinwar’s house had been. But events in the days immediately before and after my visit revealed inconsistencies.

Few signs of Hamas’s resistance to Israel were visible during my Al-Shifa visit, but in Khan Younis I heard more explosions and constant gunfire. Most of the journey to Al-Shifa in the north was in open jeeps, while travel to Khan Younis was entirely in closed armored personnel carriers. The instructions that the commanders gave the drivers before we left the military base made clear they were far more concerned about being attacked than they had been in northern Gaza.

Classified briefings by Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfus, who commands the invasion of Khan Younis, revealed that full control could take months, lasting beyond the deadline Israel has set for large-scale military operations. He declined to guess how soon he could find Hamas’s leaders and the approximately 130 remaining Israeli hostages.

Nearly the same period, three weeks, had passed since the beginning of operations in each area of Gaza I visited, but the pace of military success was much different.

The Israel Defense Forces has been confronted by four different kinds of geography in Khan Younis, instead of the relatively homogeneous battle terrain in northern Gaza. Hamas has learned from northern Gaza that large battles with the IDF will fail. Nonstop guerrilla warfare—hit-and-run tactics using antitank missiles and ambushes—succeeds more often. Most important, Hamas’s top leaders have few places to run from southern Gaza, and Israeli intelligence believes the remaining Israeli hostages are being held there. All this makes Hamas’s fighting fiercer, while the IDF sometimes pulls its punches to avoid accidentally killing more hostages.

Israel has hinted that it may consider granting Hamas’s leaders passage to Qatar in a deal to release the hostages. If Hamas doesn’t accept this deal, the outcome could be significant losses of hostages or an extended campaign lasting several months. Either result could destabilize Israel’s government and any attempts by Israel and the West to establish new rulers in Gaza.

The uncertainty extends throughout the Middle East. Northern Gaza taught Iran and Hezbollah that Israel won’t tolerate another Oct. 7 and that any aggression toward Israel will receive a deadly response from Jerusalem. But southern Gaza seems to be showing them that even the anger of Oct. 7 will gradually fade under the daily toll of dying Israeli soldiers, now more than 150 during the invasion.

Waiting out Israel’s anger may take years, but Iran and Hezbollah are patient long-term planners. By the late 2020s they may be able to resume aggressive moves at a time when Israel’s unwillingness to focus on long conflicts could expose it to further vulnerabilities.

How will this threat affect Israel and the West’s plans to rebuild a more stable Gaza and possibly restore a diplomatic process? Or plans to restore stability to Israel’s northern border? How will it influence Iran’s plans to try to incrementally take over more of the region and eventually obtain nuclear weapons?

If Gaza City seemed to answer these questions, Khan Younis has left them—and the fate of the region—wide open.

Mr. Bob is senior military analyst for the Jerusalem Post and co-author of “Target Tehran: How Israel Is Using Sabotage, Cyberwarfare, Assassination—and Secret Diplomacy—to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Create a New Middle East.”

Appeared in the December 30, 2023, print edition as 'IDF Faces a Harsh Reality in Southern Gaza'.

Where Was the Israeli Military?

A Times investigation found that troops were disorganized, out of position and relied on social media to choose targets. Behind the failure: Israel had no battle plan for a massive Hamas invasion.

Dec. 30, 2023, 12:01 a.m. ET

Far beneath the Israeli military headquarters in Tel Aviv, in a bunker known as The Pit, commanders were trying to make sense of reports of Hamas rocket fire in southern Israel early on the morning of Oct. 7, when the call came in.

It was a commander from the division that oversees military operations along the border with Gaza. Their base was under attack. The commander could not describe the scope of the attack or provide more details, according to a military official with knowledge of the call. But he asked that all available reinforcements be sent.

At 7:43 a.m., more than an hour after the rocket assault began and thousands of Hamas fighters stormed into Israel, The Pit issued its first deployment instructions of the day. It ordered all emergency forces to head south, along with all available units that could do so quickly.

But the nation’s military leaders did not yet recognize that an invasion of Israel was already well underway.

Hours later, desperate Israeli citizens were still fending for themselves and calling for help. Roughly 1,200 people died as the Middle East’s most advanced military failed in its essential mission: protecting Israeli lives.

The full reasons behind the military’s slow response may take months to understand. The government has promised an inquiry. But a New York Times investigation found that Israel’s military was undermanned, out of position and so poorly organized that soldiers communicated in impromptu WhatsApp groups and relied on social media posts for targeting information.

Commandos rushed into battle armed only for brief combat. Helicopter pilots were ordered to look to news reports and Telegram channels to choose targets.

And perhaps most damning: The Israel Defense Forces did not even have a plan to respond to a large-scale Hamas attack on Israeli soil, according to current and former soldiers and officers. If such a plan existed on a shelf somewhere, the soldiers said, no one had trained on it and nobody followed it. The soldiers that day made it up as they went along.

“In practice, there wasn’t the right defensive preparation, no practice, and no equipping and building strength for such an operation,” said Yom Tov Samia, a major general in the Israeli reserves and former head of the military’s Southern Command.

“There was no defense plan for a surprise attack such as the kind we have seen on Oct. 7,” said Amir Avivi, a brigadier general in the reserves and a former deputy commander of the Gaza Division, which is responsible for protecting the region.

That lack of preparation is at odds with a founding principle of Israeli military doctrine. From the days of David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister and defense minister, the goal was to always be on the offensive — to anticipate attacks and fight battles in enemy territory.

In response to a series of questions from The Times, including why soldiers and officers alike said there had been no plan, the Israel Defense Forces replied: “The I.D.F. is currently focused on eliminating the threat from the terrorist organization Hamas. Questions of this kind will be looked into at a later stage.”

The Times investigation is based on internal Israeli government documents and a review of the military’s cache of materials, known as Pandora, that contains tens of thousands of videos, including footage from body cameras worn by terrorists and closed-circuit surveillance cameras. The Times interviewed dozens of officers, enlisted troops and eyewitnesses, some of whom spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about military operations.

The documents and interviews revealed new details about the attack, including military assessments and orders like the one given by The Pit early that morning. Taken together, they show that much of the military failure was due to the lack of a plan, coupled with a series of intelligence missteps in the months and years before the attack.

Israeli security and military agencies produced repeated assessments that Hamas was neither interested in nor capable of launching a massive invasion. The authorities clung to that optimistic view even when Israel obtained Hamas battle plans that revealed an invasion was precisely what Hamas was planning.

The decisions, in retrospect, are tinged with hubris. The notion that Hamas could execute an ambitious attack was seen as so unlikely that Israeli intelligence officials even reduced eavesdropping on Hamas radio traffic, concluding that it was a waste of time.

None of the officers interviewed, including those stationed along the border, could recall discussions or training based on a plan to repel such an assault.

“As far as I recall, there was no such plan,” said Yaakov Amidror, a retired Israeli general and a former national security adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “The army does not prepare itself for things it thinks are impossible.”

The Israeli government had determined that the loosely organized civilian guard, known as Kitat Konnenut, would serve as the first line of defense in the towns and villages near the border. But the guardsmen had different standards of training depending on who was in charge. For years, they warned that some of their units were poorly trained and underequipped, according to two Israeli military officials with direct knowledge of the volunteer teams.

Additionally, the Israeli military reservists were not prepared to quickly mobilize and deploy. Some described heading south on their own initiative.

Davidi Ben Zion, 38, a major in the reserves, said reservists never trained to respond at a moment’s notice to an invasion. The training assumed that Israeli intelligence would learn of a looming invasion in advance, giving reservists time to prepare to deploy.

“The procedure states that we have the battalion ready for combat in 24 hours,” he said. “There’s a checklist to authorize the distribution of everything. We practiced this for many years.”

Hamas capitalized on these errors in ways that further delayed the Israeli response. Terrorists blocked key highway intersections, leaving soldiers bogged down in firefights as they tried to enter besieged towns. And the Hamas siege on the military base in southern Israel crippled the regional command post, paralyzing the military response.

Much remains unknown about that day, including what orders were given inside Israel’s senior military leadership in Tel Aviv, and when. The Times investigation builds on and adds new details to aggressive coverage in the Israeli media of the military response.

Officers and reservists who headed south that morning, whether under orders or on their own, soon learned of the chaos that they were entering.

Gen. Barak Hiram, who was scheduled to soon take over command of a division along the Gaza border, drove south to see firsthand how the soldiers there responded to what seemed like a routine Hamas attack.

In an interview, he recalled the text messages he received from soldiers he knew in the region.

“Come save us.”

“Send the army, quickly, they are killing us.”

“Sorry we’re turning to you, we’re already out of weapons.”

Unprepared for Battle
Commando units were among the first to mobilize that morning. Some said they rushed into the fight after receiving messages pleading for help or learning about the infiltrations from social media.

Other units were on standby and received formal activation orders.

The small size of the teams suggested that commanders fundamentally misunderstood the threat. Troops rolled out with pistols and assault rifles, enough to face a band of hostage-taking terrorists, but not to go into full-scale battle.

Previously undisclosed documents reviewed by The Times show just how drastically the military misread the situation. Records from early in the day show that, even during the attack, the military still assessed that Hamas, at best, would be able to breach Israel’s border fence in just a few places. A separate intelligence document, prepared weeks later, shows that Hamas teams actually breached the fence in more than 30 locations and quickly moved deep into southern Israel.

Hamas fighters poured into Israel with heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, land mines and more. They were prepared to fight for days. Israeli commandos apparently believed they would be fighting for just hours; one said he set out that morning without his night-vision goggles.

“The terrorists had a distinct tactical advantage in firepower,” said Yair Ansbacher, 40, a reservist in a counterterrorism unit who fought on Oct. 7. He and his colleagues mainly used pistols, assault rifles and sometimes sniper rifles, he said.

The situation was so dire that at 9 a.m., the head of Shin Bet, Israel's domestic security agency, issued a rare order. He told all combat-trained, weapons-carrying employees to go south. Shin Bet does not normally activate with the military. Ten Shin Bet operatives were killed that day.

Making matters worse, the military has acknowledged that it moved two commando companies — more than 100 soldiers — to the West Bank just two days before the attack, a reflection of Israel’s mistaken belief that a Hamas attack was not an imminent threat.

That left three infantry battalions and one tank battalion along Gaza’s border. But Oct. 7 was the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah, and the Sabbath. One senior military officer estimated that about half the 1,500 soldiers in the area were away. He said that another infantry battalion had been reassigned years earlier after Israel finished building a security wall around Gaza.

Whether Hamas knew that the military was understaffed is unclear, but it had fatal consequences. When the attacks began, many soldiers were fighting for their lives instead of protecting residents nearby. Hamas stormed one base, Nahal Oz, forcing soldiers to abandon it and leave behind dead friends.

And just as the civilian volunteers had warned, the first line of defense inside Israel was quickly overwhelmed. Some units barely had enough weapons for an hourslong battle, officials said.

Hamas also worked strategically to weaken Israel’s advantage in firepower. Terrorists targeted Israeli tanks, hitting several of them, said Brig. Gen. Hisham Ibrahim, the commander of the armored corps. Tanks ran out of ammunition, leaving crews to fight with ground soldiers.

In another instance widely covered in the Israeli media, Hamas fired on an Israeli helicopter, forcing it down near Gaza. The paratroopers escaped injury before the helicopter burst into flames.

All of this should have been a clear sign that Israel was under broad attack, facing a dire situation.

But Hamas made another strategic strike that morning that all but blinded Israel’s military at a critical moment.

‘What a Mistake’
The assault on the Re’im military base left soldiers there fighting for their lives rather than coordinating a response to the invasion.

Re’im is home to the Gaza Division, which oversees all military operations in the region. It is also home to two brigades, northern and southern, dedicated to protecting about 40 miles of the border.

Like other bases, Re’im was understaffed because of the holiday. A brigade commander and key staff were away from the base, according to a senior military officer. They were summoned back before dawn, officials said, as Israeli intelligence officials tried to make sense of unusual Hamas activity just over the border in Gaza.

Many soldiers, though, were allowed to keep sleeping. One told The Times that some did not know they were under attack until Hamas was in their sleeping quarters. Several were killed in their bunks. Others barricaded themselves in safe rooms.

The scope of the catastrophe, if not the attack itself, was preventable, according to records and interviews.

“After they built the fence, they put the headquarters in the middle of the sector,” said General Samia, the former head of the Southern Command. He said the three commanders of the brigades and division never should have been housed together so close to Gaza’s border.

“In the same camp, you all had three of them — in the same location,” he said. “What a mistake. What a mistake.”

The Israeli authorities also knew, years in advance, that Hamas planned to take out Re’im as part of its invasion, documents previously obtained by The Times showed. They dismissed that plan, like the prospect of overall invasion, as implausible.

Even in May, when intelligence analysts raised alarms about Hamas training exercises, Israeli officials did not increase troop levels in the South.

The assault on Re’im led to a near blackout of communication inside the unit that coordinates troop movements across southern Israel, according to one soldier who was based there on Oct. 7.

The division that was supposed to be directing the battle was trying not to get overrun.

Even at noon, according to another Southern Command official, officers there did not understand what was happening. They assessed that Hamas had sent about 200 gunmen into Israel. They were off by a factor of 10.

It took the military most of the day to retake control of the Re’im base.

“When your division is under fire, you’re focused on clearing it from terrorists,” said General Ibrahim, the commander of the armored corps, which is based in southern Israel. “It distracts from management of the fighting more broadly.” General Ibrahim defended the military’s response, saying there are few modern armies that could have recaptured the region as quickly as Israel did.

But nobody had trained to repel an invasion.

Despite the siege of Re’im, reinforcements were not far away. Thousands of soldiers were less than 40 minutes from the towns that were under attack. But as terrified citizens waited in bunkers or hid from gunmen, Israeli soldiers were hung up on the highway, unable to reach them.

A central highway connects military bases in the center and south of the country to the communities near Gaza. Pockets of Hamas gunmen set up ambushes along the route, videos from Pandora show. Israeli commanders were hesitant to send soldiers into those traps, according to two Israeli military officers who took part in conversations that morning.

“Hamas is all over the roads,” one Israeli soldier reported in a conversation recounted by a participant. “They own the street, not us.”

One of the deadliest junctions was Sha’ar HaNegev, the intersection of two main arteries leading to the besieged towns and communities known as kibbutzim. Hamas seized the junction by killing motorists, setting fire to their cars and blocking roads, according to military officials and videos.

“Every encounter at the intersections resulted in the killing of the terrorists and slowing our advance,” said Mr. Ansbacher, the counterterrorism reservist, recounting the team’s frustrating progress.

“As we go along, we understand that we are really delayed. In the kibbutzim, they need us and people are getting killed.”

Fog of War

The elite Maglan commando unit operates out of a base about 25 minutes from Gaza.

Its deputy commander activated the unit at about 6:30 a.m. on Oct. 7, according to one officer familiar with the operations that day. But the team received little guidance from top Israeli generals or the Gaza Division headquarters, which, they did not realize, was itself under attack.

Maglan’s commandos specialized in operating behind enemy lines, where Israel always expected the fighting to occur. None of them had trained to respond to an invasion, the officer said.

The officer said there were no “concrete missions.” Soldiers were told to “just take a gun” and “save people.”

With communication out of Re’im disrupted and military leaders in Tel Aviv struggling to understand the scope of the attack, Maglan turned to an unlikely source for information: Refael Hayun, a 40-year-old who lived with his parents in Netivot, about five miles from Gaza.

Mr. Hayun watched Hamas videos of the attack in real time on social media and relayed information to Maglan’s officers. He began fielding WhatsApp messages from people trying to save their children, friends and themselves.

“Hi Refael, we’re stuck in a trash container near the party location,” one message read. “Please come rescue us. We’re 16 people.”

Mr. Hayun relayed those locations to the commandos, but they did not grasp the enormity of the fight. One Maglan team killed several terrorists near a base in Zikim, just north of Gaza, but they didn’t realize until 11 a.m. that Hamas fighters had stormed Kfar Aza, where some of the worst fighting took place.

Soldiers crowdsourced information. One team commander told soldiers aboard a helicopter to check Telegram channels and news reports to pick targets.

One general, a reservist who fought that day, said there were many heroes on Oct. 7. But an army only needs heroes, he said, when things have gone wrong.

Soldiers are among those asking how things went so wrong.

Major Ben Zion, the reservist, said that his paratrooper unit left its base in central Israel, not far from Tel Aviv, in a convoy at about 1:30 p.m. They mobilized on their own, without a formal call-up order. To save time, they left without night-vision equipment or adequate body armor.

He expected to see the roads packed with soldiers and equipment and armored vehicles heading south.

“The roads were empty!” he recalled in an interview. Roughly seven hours into the fighting, he turned to the reservist next to him and asked: “Where’s the I.D.F.?”

The Ruined Landscape of Gaza After Nearly Three Months of Bombing

The war in the Gaza Strip is generating destruction comparable in scale to the most devastating urban warfare in the modern record.

By mid-December, Israel had dropped 29,000 bombs, munitions and shells on the strip. Nearly 70% of Gaza’s 439,000 homes and about half of its buildings have been damaged or destroyed. The bombing has damaged Byzantine churches and ancient mosques, factories and apartment buildings, shopping malls and luxury hotels, theaters and schools. Much of the water, electrical, communications and healthcare infrastructure that made Gaza function is beyond repair.

Most of the strip’s 36 hospitals are shut down, and only eight are accepting patients. Citrus trees, olive groves and greenhouses have been obliterated. More than two-thirds of its schools are damaged.

Israel says that the bombing campaign and ground offensive has inflicted thousands of casualties on its intended target, Hamas. That U.S.-designated terrorist group’s cross-border assault on Oct. 7 killed 1,200 Israelis, most of them civilians, according to Israeli officials. The attackers tortured residents and burned homes as they went.

In Israel’s response, its bombs, artillery shells and soldiers have killed more than 21,000 Palestinians, according to health officials in Gaza. The figure doesn’t distinguish between civilians and militants. Most of them are women and children, those officials said.

The destruction resembles that left by Allied bombing of German cities during World War II. “The word ‘Gaza’ is going to go down in history along with Dresden and other famous cities that have been bombed,” said Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago and the author of a history of aerial bombing. “What you’re seeing in Gaza is in the top 25% of the most intense punishment campaigns in history.”

Three months ago, Gaza was a vibrant place. Despite decades of Israeli occupation, sieges and wars, many Palestinians enjoyed living there beside the Mediterranean Sea, where they gathered in cafes and seaside restaurants. Families played on the beach. Young men crowded around TVs in the evening to watch soccer.

Today, Gaza is a landscape of crumpled concrete. In northern Gaza, the focus of Israel’s initial offensive, the few people who remain navigate rubble-strewn streets past bombed-out shops and apartment blocks. Broken glass crunches underfoot. Israeli drones buzz overhead.

In the south, where more than a million displaced residents have fled, Gazans sleep in the street and burn garbage to cook. Some 85% of the strip’s 2.2 million people have fled their homes and are confined by Israeli evacuation orders to less than one-third of the strip, according to the United Nations.

The Israeli military said it is targeting Hamas and taking steps to avoid killing civilians, including by encouraging residents to leave areas it is attacking. The Israeli air force has said its bombing campaign is causing “maximum damage.” Israeli military spokesman Daniel Hagari said in October that “while balancing accuracy with the scope of damage, right now we’re focused on what causes maximum damage.”

Israel has accused Hamas of using civilian buildings to hide entrances to tunnels in which it stores weapons and hides commanders. “When you ask why civilian infrastructure is being damaged in Gaza, look at where Hamas built its military infrastructure, then point your finger at Hamas,” Eylon Levy, a spokesman for the Israeli prime minister’s office, said on Dec. 17 on X, formerly Twitter. The U.S. recently pressed Israel to try to limit the number of civilian casualties.

With the war zone mostly closed to the outside world, experts are surveying damage by analyzing satellite imagery and using remote sensing, which monitors physical characteristics by measuring reflected and emitted radiation at a distance. Their findings, they said, are initial and will need verification on the ground, but are likely an underestimate.

According to analysis of satellite data by remote-sensing experts at the City University of New York and Oregon State University, as many as 80% of the buildings in northern Gaza, where the bombing has been most severe, are damaged or destroyed, a higher percentage than in Dresden.

He Yin, an assistant professor of geography at Kent State University in Ohio, estimated that 20% of Gaza’s agricultural land has been damaged or destroyed. Winter wheat that should be sprouting around now isn’t visible, he said, suggesting it wasn’t planted.

A World Bank analysis concluded that by Dec. 12, the war had damaged or destroyed 77% of health facilities, 72% of municipal services such as parks, courts and libraries, 68% of telecommunications infrastructure, and 76% of commercial sites, including the almost complete destruction of the industrial zone in the north. More than half of all roads, the World Bank found, have been damaged or destroyed. Some 342 schools have been damaged, according to the U.N., including 70 of its own schools.

An assessment by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence found that Israel dropped 29,000 weapons on Gaza in a little over two months, according to U.S. officials. By comparison, the U.S. military dropped 3,678 munitions on Iraq from 2004 to 2010, according to the U.S. Central Command. Among the weapons provided by the U.S. to Israel during the Gaza war are 2,000-pound “bunker buster” bombs designed to penetrate concrete shelters, which military analysts said are usually used to hit military targets in more sparsely populated areas.

Gaza has a rich 4,000-year history. It was a Canaanite and Pharaonic port city that served as a waypoint on trade routes between Africa and Asia. Through history, it built back from wars, sieges, plagues and earthquakes. In 332 B.C., it was the last city to resist Alexander the Great’s march to Egypt—an act of defiance that fueled a mythology of a people who would never bow. The municipality of Gaza’s symbol is a phoenix.

The majority of Gaza’s residents are either refugees themselves or descendants of those who fled land that is now the state of Israel.

Israel seized the Gaza Strip from Egypt in 1967. In 2005, a year after another Israeli military operation against Hamas in Gaza, it withdrew its remaining soldiers and settlements, although it maintained control over the enclave’s borders, coastline and airspace. Israel and Egypt severely restricted movement in and out of Gaza in 2007 after Hamas took control of it, ending decades in which many Gazans worked inside Israel and learned Hebrew.

The current war hasn’t spared treasured historic sites. The Great Omari Mosque, an ancient building that was converted from a fifth-century church to a Muslim place of worship, has been destroyed, its minaret toppled. An Israeli airstrike in October hit the fifth century Church of Saint Porphyrius, killing at least 16 Palestinians sheltering there.

“The loss of the Omari mosque saddens me more than the destruction of my own house,” said Fadel Alatel, an archaeologist from Gaza who fled his home to shelter in the southern end of the strip.

The exclusive Rimal neighborhood, with its broad boulevards and beauty salons, was reduced to rubble in the opening days of the war. Israeli attacks have destroyed Gaza’s main courthouse, parliament building and central archives.

Israel says many of its airstrikes have targeted Hamas’s network of tunnels underneath Gaza, which they say also hid hostages taken on Oct. 7. Those tunnels lie beneath densely populated areas in ground that contains important municipal infrastructure, making for a challenging battlefield.

“It’s not a livable city anymore,” said Eyal Weizman, an Israeli-British architect who studies Israel’s approach to the built environment in the Palestinian territories.

Any reconstruction, he said, will require “a whole system of underground infrastructure, because when you attack the subsoil, everything that runs through the ground—the water, the gas, the sewage—is torn.”

Europe’s cities were rebuilt after two world wars. Beirut rose again after civil war and Israeli bombardment. Iraq’s Mosul and Syria’s Raqqa have limped back to life after U.S.-led air campaigns leveled them during the war against Islamic State, though reconstruction has been slow for both.

Gaza faces unique challenges. No one knows who will take control if Israel achieves its aim of destroying Hamas. Israel has said it opposes a U.S. plan to place the Palestinian Authority, which runs parts of the occupied West Bank, in charge of the strip.

The enclave’s unusual status as a territory with borders controlled by Israel further complicates any road to recovery. After other recent wars in Gaza, Israel has sometimes blocked the entry of construction materials, arguing Hamas could use them for military purposes. In 2015, a full year after a 2014 cease-fire, only one house had been rebuilt—not because of a lack of funds, but because cement wasn’t allowed in.

An analysis by the Shelter Cluster, a coalition of aid groups led by the Norwegian Refugee Council, concluded that after the current war, it will take at least a year just to clear the rubble, a task complicated by having to safely remove unexploded ordnance.

Rebuilding the housing will take seven to 10 years, if financing is available, the group said. It will cost some $3.5 billion, it estimates, not including the cost of providing temporary accommodation.

The level of damage in Gaza is almost double what it was during a 2014 conflict, which lasted 50 days, with five times as many completely destroyed buildings, according to the Shelter Cluster. In the current conflict, as of mid-December, more than 800,000 people had no home left to return to, the World Bank found.

“In a best-case scenario, it’s going to take decades,” said Caroline Sandes, an expert in postconflict redevelopment at Kingston University London.

Alaa Hasham, a 33-year-old mother living in Gaza City’s upscale Rimal neighborhood, used to enjoy sitting in her apartment’s rooftop garden, taking her children to a seaside resort on the weekends and playing chess with friends. She fled with her family soon after the bombing began, joining the small minority of Palestinians who were able to leave for Egypt.

Though her home is destroyed, she is clinging to hope that someday she will return to Gaza.

“People think I’m crazy for wanting to go back,” she said. “Gaza is a special place.”

Abeer Ayyoub, Anas Baba, Joanna Sugden and Suha Ma’ayeh contributed to this article.[

Khan Younis


Before and after Beit Hanoun.  One of the first areas to be taken after the start of the ground campaign, there are still Hamas shooters who attack IDF troops.
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YAHYA AYYASH, a leader of Hamas’s military wing and its chief bomb maker, was one of the deadliest opponents of peace. Ayyash planned many of the attacks and built the bombs used in almost all of Hamas’s major attacks in 1993 and 1994.

Ninety Israelis died as a result of his work. He also built bombs for Hamas’s ideological bedfellow—and sometimes rival—Palestine Islamic Jihad.  

Nicknamed “the Engineer,” Ayyash was a skilled craftsman and mechanic, able to repair televisions and other devices, even as a boy.

Ayyash wanted to get his master’s degree in Jordan, but Israel denied him an exit visa. Furious, he joined Hamas.  

As his role in the bombings became clear, Shin Bet’s hunt for Ayyash grew all-consuming. Efforts to get the Palestinian security services to arrest him failed, with Arafat often claiming he was not in Gaza. Israel even arrested family members and cut off services to his village. To elude his pursuers Ayyash constantly changed his appearance and most nights slept in different houses.

Former Shin Bet director Carmi Gillon told me, “I admired him. He was very professional. He didn’t make any mistakes.” But one mistake cost him his life.

On January 5, 1996, Shin Bet tracked down Ayyash and killed him while he was staying at the house of his friend and fellow Hamas member, Osama Hammad.

Shin Bet had recruited his friend’s cousin Kemal Hammad, and to keep him loyal threatened to inform Hamas that he was working with them. They then handed Hammad a cell phone, claiming only that it was bugged so Israeli intelligence could monitor Ayyash’s activities.

Unbeknown to Hammad, it also contained fifteen grams of the explosive RDX. As Ayyash took what he was told was a call from his father, an Israeli airplane monitored the conversation to confirm that Ayyash himself was on the other end. “Father, don’t call me on the mobile telephone” were reportedly his last words as the phone blew up in his hand and killed him. One Hamas official said later, “It was a quiet explosion, and they got what they desired—his head.”

Iranian-backed Houthi gunmen from Yemen had fired on American helicopters responding to an attack on a commercial ship, U.S. Central Command said.

Dec. 31, 2023Updated 6:31 a.m. ET

American military helicopters came under fire from Iranian-backed Houthi fighters in the Red Sea on Sunday morning and shot back, sinking three Houthi boats and killing those aboard, U.S. Central Command said.

The episode occurred after a commercial container ship was attacked by Houthi fighters in small boats and issued a distress call, prompting U.S. Navy helicopters to respond, the military said.

“In the process of issuing verbal calls to the small boats, the small boats fired upon the U.S. helicopters with crew-served weapons and small arms,” Central Command said in a statement on social media. “The U.S. Navy helicopters returned fire in self-defense, sinking three of the four small boats, and killing the crews.”

It was the latest and perhaps deadliest such incident involving the Houthis, who control a large swath of northern Yemen, since Israel went to war with Hamas on Oct. 7.

In solidarity with Hamas, which is also backed by Iran, the Houthis have launched dozens of missile and drone attacks against commercial ships and seized an Israeli-linked vessel. The attacks have prompted the United States and allies to deploy warships to the Red Sea, which is crucial for global shipping.

In early December, the U.S.S. Carney destroyer shot down three drones during a sustained Houthi attack on commercial ships in the Red Sea, the Pentagon said. The U.S. military has not struck directly at the Houthis in Yemen, wary of an escalation that could cause the war in Gaza to further inflame the Middle East.

The incident on Sunday involved a container ship operated by the shipping giant Maersk, which was transiting the southern Red Sea when it came under attack by Houthis, according to statements by Central Command and by Maersk.

The container ship, the Maersk Hangzhou, reported that it had been struck by a missile at about 8:30 p.m. on Saturday, when it was about 55 nautical miles southwest of Hudaydah, Yemen. The crew “observed a flash on the deck,” Maersk said in an emailed statement.

Two American vessels responded to the ship’s distress call, and one of them, the U.S.S. Gravely, a destroyer, “shot down two anti-ship ballistic missiles fired from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen toward the ships,” Central Command said on social media.

No injuries were reported, and Maersk said that its vessel had continued its journey north.

Then, on Sunday morning, four small boats piloted by Houthis attacked the Maersk ship, getting to within about 20 yards of the vessel, and attempted to board it, Central Command said in its subsequent statement. It said that security officers had opened fire from the container vessel, which issued another distress call, and that U.S. helicopters from the Gravely and the U.S.S. Eisenhower, an aircraft carrier, flew to the scene, where they came under fire from the Houthis.

The U.S. military did not indicate how it knew that the crew members of the three boats it sank had died. The fourth boat fled the area, Central Command said, adding that no U.S. personnel were harmed or equipment damaged in the episode.

The clash came just days after Maersk said that it was resuming voyages through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. For about a week before that announcement, the company’s ships had been avoiding the area because of safety concerns.

On Sunday, Maersk said in an emailed statement that it would pause “all transits through the area for the next 48 hours” as it investigates the attack and assesses security in the waterway. The crew of the Maersk Hangzhou, which was traveling from Singapore to Port Suez, was safe, the company said.

The attack was the 23rd by the Houthis in about six weeks, according to the United States. The incidents have prompted some companies to avoid the Red Sea, rerouting their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, pushing up shipping rates even as the longer voyages increase delays.

There was no immediate statement on the incident from the Houthis.

The United States announced this month that it had set up a naval task force to try to ensure safe passage for commercial ships in the Red Sea. The members of the security initiative, called Operation Prosperity Guardian, include Bahrain, Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands.

A surprise attack on IDF troops, a bloody battle and a heroic rescue in Beit Hanoun

At first there was only a flash of light. Blinding, glaring, it flooded the room in an instant. Then came a noise that was literally deafening – its volume so overwhelming that it left some of the soldiers and officers unable to hear one another. Then, before anyone could figure out what was happening, the shooting began. Relentless fire from the south. The commander of the force was wounded in both arms. Another soldier had collapsed on the floor and his friends couldn't tell if he was alive or dead. The shooting continued, and suddenly the full extent of the danger became clear: The wall that protected them had collapsed. They were completely exposed to the enemy.


Maj. Eitan Turgeman, 38, a dentist in civilian life and a combat officer in the army reserves, had been standing next to the wall that was shattered by a rocket-propelled grenade. He heard the blast and saw the flash of light, and immediately afterward realized he was falling. The room in which the unit was located, in the heart of the casbah of the city of Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip, was on the third floor of a residential building. Turgeman and two other fighters fell from the third floor into the yard below.

"I fell for sixth-tenths of a second and in that time my whole life flashed before my eyes," Turgeman told Haaretz in mid-December. "I thought of my wife and children. My wife had just given birth to a baby boy two weeks earlier." He was certain he would not survive the fall. But after crashing to the ground, he realized that life was still stirring within him. "I could feel my back and I realized I was alive," he recalls. "I tried to get up and walk, but bullets were flying all around me."

Turgeman was trapped in the line of fire, between his unit and a Hamas force that had targeted the building. With two shattered vertebrae and fractures in his arms, he nevertheless managed to get to his feet and began to walk, without knowing to where. His fellow fighters didn't know where he was. Then, suddenly, an arm reached out from an adjacent building and dragged him inside.

'Going all the way'

The battle took place in Beit Hanoun on November 16 at about 2 P.M. The Orev company of the 12th Brigade, a reservist infantry brigade that's been operating in Gaza since the war broke out, found itself in a tenacious battle against Hamas fighters in the center of the city. This battle, previously unreported in the media, was one of the most challenging in the first weeks of the fighting in the northern Strip. It started with a surprise attack – and ended in a crushing victory. The huge drama that unfolded is an example of the singular difficulties the Israel Defense Forces are up against in Gaza's built-up areas.

The Orev fighters, all of them reservists from different parts of the country, go back years together. Their commander is Maj. Aviv Goldstein, 40 – a product manager in Bank Hapoalim in normal times. The company was called up on October 7, shortly after Hamas' brutal incursion into Israel. Some of its soldiers took part in securing the breached border south of Ashkelon already on the first day of the fighting. The next morning they were sent to comb the site of the Nova music festival, looking for survivors but finding only dead bodies.

"The number of bodies there was unimaginable," relates Ari Kuznitsky, 30, a high-tech worker from Netanya who is a squad commander in the company. "It was a terrible feeling – I don't understand how something like that could have happened."

We roam around outside and they [Hamas] are in tunnels. They keep trying to snipe at us all the time. We're an army, they use guerrilla tactics. During those two weeks we didn't see any civilians at all.

Immediately after completing their grim mission at the Nova site, they began training.

"In every previous operation in Gaza, we were summoned for training, but in the end we never went into the Strip," Kuznitsky says. "During the training this time, we had a lot of conversations about this. Some guys thought we wouldn't go in this time either, but I was convinced this was different. I thought we'd be going all the way this time. After what I saw in the border communities on October 7, I couldn't imagine that it would be just another round that would end without a ground incursion."

Finally, on October 30, after a day of nerve-wracking uncertainty, the Orev fighters received the order they had been waiting for: They would enter the Gaza Strip and be deployed in the area around Beit Hanoun. "Until the last second, when we actually crossed the fence, I didn't believe that we would really enter Gaza," Turgeman recalls.

Turgeman: "I was there during the IDF operation in 2006, and as soon as we walked in [this time], it was obvious that the place looked completely different. The air force and artillery had done astounding work there. Many buildings were already destroyed."

The company's routine in Beit Hanoun was like a "cat and mouse" game, Kuznitsky says. "We operate in the city, move between houses, execute missions, and they [Hamas fighters] are hiding in tunnels and looking for opportunities to shoot at us."

Uriel, a squad commander whose full name cannot be published because when he's not in the army he works for a security organization, describes a similar combat routine. "We roam around outside and they [Hamas] are in tunnels. They keep trying to snipe at us all the time. We're an army, they use guerrilla tactics. During those two weeks we didn't see any civilians at all. The place was completely empty. Only we were there, and the terrorists in the spaces under us."

On November 13 a soldier from their battalion was killed and five others were wounded in a battle fought in the compound of a school run by UNRWA, the United Nations relief agency. That incident vividly brought home the dangers they faced. "After that event, I felt that things were heating up. I thought that our next battle would be more difficult," Turgeman recalls. Similarly, Goldstein, the company commander, notes, "Until the moment when people you know are wounded, you don't fully grasp the situation. Suddenly you realize that it could happen to you too."

Refrigerator wall

On the morning of November 16, the Orev fighters participated in a complex, battalion-wide operation involving the detonation of Hamas tunnels in the heart of the city's casbah. Engineering and armored units joined the effort, along with the senior commander of the 12th Brigade. "The engineers unit was in charge of blowing up the central shaft, and our mission was to secure them from the south," Uriel explains. "We situated ourselves in a three-story building and found firing positions." He was on the third floor, together with his combat squad and a command force that consisted of Goldstein, Turgeman and two other soldiers. "There was tension in the air, we were concerned that something would happen while we were there," Uriel says.

Kuznitsky was not with them at the time; he was commanding a rescue unit, which was stationed in an adjacent building to the north.

"I had a premonition that there would be an encounter, and I also remember talking about it the previous evening with Turgeman," he says. "It was clear to me that the terrorists would try to defend the tunnel, which was located beneath the center of Beit Hanoun. They apparently understood what was going on. We knew they would attack, but we didn't know precisely how, when or where."

The answers to those questions became apparent at 1:45 P.M., when a terrorist cell emerged from the tunnel south of the building where the soldiers had taken up their posts, and fired an RPG rocket at the third floor, blowing out its southern wall. Turgeman and two other soldiers fell three stories to the earth. In the meantime, the terrorists fired yet another rocket into the now-exposed room. Goldstein suffered multiple shrapnel wounds. Five troops who were on the third floor were seriously wounded; several other soldiers and officers were also wounded, in varying degrees of severity.

When the external wall of the building collapsed, the terrorists, who also filmed the attack, fired relentlessly at the Israeli forces. At the same time, at least one of them tried to advance toward the yard below.

"At this stage we faced two dangerous arenas at the same time," Uriel relates. "We were on the floor that took the rockets, with a number of wounded, some of them seriously, and terrorists were continuing to shoot at us. Down below, in the yard, were the guys who fell and we had no idea of what had happened to them." It seemed like an impossible situation.

"The wall that collapsed had been our only protection against the terrorists," Uriel continues. "Effectively, what remained was a central space – two rooms on the sides and a stairwell – that could only be reached by crossing the line of fire. We had wounded men and we needed to treat them and at the same time to return fire."

Outside, on the ground, Turgeman figured out who had yanked him out of the line of fire and saved his life: Maor Kalfon, 29, the deputy commander of the company, who had taken up a post in the building next door. "He acted with tremendous composure, came straight to me in the middle of all the chaos and just pulled me away," Turgeman says. After evacuating Turgeman for preliminary medical aid, Kalfon entered the building that had been hit and went up to the third floor to help rescue the wounded.

Turgeman, Goldstein, Kuznitsky and Uriel, all officers and commanders, are emphatic about the acts of heroism performed by the company's fighters. They're certain the troops should receive medals and citations after the war – among them Getenet, 36, a veteran fighter in the unit, who was in a nearby building at the start of the attack. After the explosion, he rushed into the damaged building and ran up and down the stairs in order to provide cover during rescue of the wounded troops, all the while firing at the terrorists by using the wounded fighters' weapons.

"He was exposed to enemy fire a few times, and used a grenade launcher to shoot at them. He displayed incredible courage," Kuznitsky relates.

Daniel Levinson, another Orev fighter, darted back and forth between the two third-floor rooms, to which the wounded soldiers had been moved, in order to shoot back at the terrorists. At a certain stage, when he grasped that the situation was too dangerous and that another explosion was just a matter of time, he ran to the kitchen, dragged out the large refrigerator and stood it between the two rooms, facing the collapsed outer wall.

What happened on October 7 was an incomprehensible blunder because citizens were harmed. My injury, in contrast, is painful, but normal. In a properly run country, soldiers risk their lives for the citizens.

Maj. Turgeman
"The refrigerator became our cover," Uriel explains. "Soldiers took up positions on both of its sides and fired back at the terrorists. That made it possible for us to go on fighting and at the same time to reach the wounded, take them down the stairs and evacuate them to the rear."

According to Kuznitsky, who was in charge of the rescue, "It's the kind of situation in which you can't think too much, because if you start to think, you won't act. Each of my soldiers who were there is a hero, there's no other word to describe them."

The wounded fighters were removed via large holes in the walls between the houses, a somewhat complicated operation with which the soldiers had no experience. "It sounds simple – you imagine a huge hole in a wall that you just walk through. But in the real world, next to the hole, there's a closet or a bed, and the wounded have to be borne on a stretcher at the right angle, and you have to ensure that nothing happens to them along the way," Uriel explains.

The battle and the rescue effort lasted 50 minutes. While the company's firefight with the terrorists was raging, other forces in the battalion that were engaged in missions nearby also joined in, shooting back at the terrorists, evacuating the wounded from the arena and contacting the air force to send in an attack drone to help neutralize the terrorists.

As mentioned, the terrorists' rocket that smashed the southern wall of the building was fired at 1:45 P.M. Within 10 minutes, a drone was at the scene, under the remote command of Lt. Col. Omer. He spotted the terrorists and fired two missiles at them just after 2 P.M. Most of the terrorists were killed by the ground troops' fire and the drone.

The company counted 13 wounded, a number of them seriously, but no one was killed.

Challenges ahead

"As someone who was seriously wounded in this incident," Turgeman notes, "it's important for me to say that the medical unit in the field did incredible work. The unit's commander, Moshe Krispin, was extraordinary. I feel tremendously indebted to him." After being administered first aid in the field, the wounded troops were evacuated by the battalion's mobile forces and the 669 search and rescue unit, and flown by helicopter to three hospitals in Israel. Goldstein, the company commander, who was also wounded, was the last to be evacuated from the site of the battle.

It had been an exceptionally difficult day, but all the interviewees agree that the days that followed, when the steep price of the war began to be clear, were equally trying.

"I found myself traveling between hospitals to visit my men, out of my mind with worry," says Uriel, who himself was wounded by shrapnel. Indeed, most of the interviews for this article were conducted at Sheba Medical Center at Tel Hashomer, in Ramat Gan. Goldstein spoke with Haaretz after his broken finger had undergone treatment, while Turgeman was interviewed between physiotherapy sessions and a visit from his family in the rehabilitation wing.

For him, being wounded is a source of pride. "My role as a fighter, including in the reserves, is to protect the country's citizens," he says. "What happened on October 7 was an incomprehensible blunder because citizens were harmed. My injury, in contrast, is painful, but normal – in a properly run country, soldiers risk their lives for the security of the citizens."

Still, he does have one regret, which he talks about with rare candor. "In the months leading up to October 7, during the terrible debate that split the country [over the government plan for a judicial overhaul], I was tremendously angry at the pilots who took part in the protests and I went as far as severing contact with some people. But inside Gaza during at least three incidents, including the Beit Hanoun battle, it was the air force that helped save my life."

There were differences of opinion within his own company, he added. "We have one soldier who took part in the protest movement every week, and another who's a full-fledged 'hilltop youth' [in the West Bank]. We've been together for years and we know how to overcome differences. It hurts me to think about what happened in the country this year."

Tremendous challenges await the company's personnel – both those who were wounded and those who evacuated their wounded buddies. At the moment, their hospital rooms are filled with both food and visitors. That will not necessarily continue after the war. But in the meantime, they are drawing encouragement from knowing that their most important battle ended without funerals.

"From my point of view, all the training we did during all these years led us precisely to this moment," Goldstein sums up. "They took us by surprise, but we won, and everyone returned home. That's what's most important."

IDF downs two apparent drones launched at Israel by Iran-backed Iraqi militia
31 December 2023, 11:46 pm 4
Israeli fighter jets Sunday night downed two apparent drones launched by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iran-backed paramilitary groups — one over northern Israel and the other outside Israeli airspace.

In a statement, the Israel Defense Forces said a “suspicious aerial target” — believed to be a drone — that was heading toward Israel from the east was downed by a fighter jet outside Israeli airspace.

It did not elaborate on whether the apparent drone was downed over Syria or Jordan.

Another aerial target — also thought to be a drone — that entered Israeli airspace from Syria was also downed by a fighter jet, the IDF said.

In the second incident, a drone infiltration alarm sounded in the southern Golan Heights communities of Keshet and Katzrin.

A statement from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a loose formation of armed groups affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces, itself a coalition of former paramilitary forces integrated into Iraq’s regular armed forces, said it attacked Israel using “appropriate weapons,” without elaborating.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq said the attack was in support of Gaza, given Israel’s war there against the Hamas terror group.

The incident Sunday marked at least the third drone attack on Israel carried out by the Iran-backed Iraqi militia amid the war in the Gaza Strip.

On Thursday night, an explosive-laden drone crashed in the Golan Heights, causing some damage to structures. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed for the attack.

Earlier this month, the group claimed it struck a “vital target” in the Mediterranean Sea several days prior. A source in the group told Al Jazeera that the target was the Karish gas rig off northern Israel’s coast.

The claims came shortly after the IDF announced it had downed a drone on December 15 over the sea near Lebanon as it approached Israeli airspace. The IDF did not elaborate further on where the drone was launched from, or why it published the incident a week after it happened.

The group has also repeatedly attacked US sites and troops in Iraq and Syria since October 7, when Hamas, also backed by Iran, launched its murderous attack on Israel, killing 1,200 people and taking 240 hostages. The group opposes US support for Israel in its war against Hamas.

A tally by US military officials has counted 103 attacks against its troops in Iraq and Syria since October 17. Most of the attacks have been claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

On Tuesday, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said Israel was being attacked in seven separate theaters, during the ongoing Gaza war, and the military has so far responded in six of them.

“We are in a multi-front war. We are being attacked from seven different arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), Iraq, Yemen, and Iran,” said Gallant at a meeting of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

“We have already responded and acted in six of these areas, and I say here in the clearest way: Anyone who acts against us is a potential target, there is no immunity for anyone,” he added.

The IDF has ratcheted up attacks on the Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent days, as the military aims to push the terror group back from Israel’s northern border.

Recent days have also seen several airstrikes in Syria attributed to the IDF, believed to be part of efforts by Israel to prevent Iran from supplying arms to Hezbollah during the ongoing skirmishes.

Last week, an alleged Israeli airstrike in Syria killed a senior officer in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Brig. Gen. Razi Mousavi, in the Damascus suburb of Sayeda Zeinab. Iran has vowed to retaliate.

Israeli man charged with impersonating soldier
He is even pictured with prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the front line

An Israeli man has been charged with impersonating a soldier to join the Gaza war, where he was even pictured on the front lines with prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israeli prosecutors charged Roi Yifrah with stealing munitions in an indictment that said he posed as a member of an elite Shin Bet unit, a combat soldier and a military sapper.

He wore a tactical uniform to join the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in battle on the southern front.

The top-rated Channel 12 TV aired a photograph of what it said was the 35-year-old, in full battle gear, posing with other soldiers alongside Mr Netanyahu at a helicopter landing site.

An Israeli official confirmed that Mr Yifrah had posed with Mr Netanyahu, but said the prime minister was never at risk due to “several layers of security at the site”.

The prime minister’s Office did not immediately reply to a request for comment.

Lawyer says he should be praised

The ruse “facilitated (Yifrah’s) access to firearms, ammunition and military and police equipment”, the indictment said, adding that a purloined haul found in Mr Yifrah’s home included an assault rifle, various kinds of bullets, smoke grenades and holsters.

The five counts against him, including aggravated fraud and larceny, could amount to a maximum prison sentence of 36 years. But Mr Yifrah’s lawyer argued that the defendant should be praised.

“My client is a medic who saved lives under fire, while risking his life and eliminating terrorists,” the lawyer, Eitan Sabag, told Channel 12, adding that “the defendant, under the circumstances, is the State of Israel – not Roi Yifrah”.

According to the indictment, Mr Yifrah stole a walkie-talkie, drone and various uniforms. He was arrested on Dec 17 with some of the weapons in his possession.

Four other suspects were interrogated over the case, including a police officer. They have been released to house arrest.

The indictment stated: “Despite the state of emergency which Israel is enduring, the accused presented himself as a combat soldier, who holds positions in security entities and special units, in order to steal large amounts of weapons, ammunition and equipment, all while reducing the amounts of the above available to the IDF and police.”

Israel Reshuffles Forces, Prepares for Long-Term Conflict in Gaza
TEL AVIV—Israel began preparations for prolonged fighting in the Gaza Strip, reshuffling forces as it weighs how to sustain lower-intensity fighting over the long term.

Israel’s top general said that it would take at least several more months to destroy Hamas’s military capabilities in the enclave.

On Monday, Israel said it would adjust its ground-force composition in Gaza, with plans to rotate five brigades—estimated to be thousands of troops—out of the Gaza Strip this week, some of which might be replaced. The military has also recalibrated the types of troops required, now relying more heavily on commando and combat-engineering forces, as Israel increasingly tries to penetrate subterranean tunnel infrastructure and hunt down senior Hamas leadership.

“These adaptations are designed to ensure planning and preparation for 2024,” Daniel Hagari, the Israeli military’s chief spokesperson, said Sunday night. “The war’s goals require prolonged fighting, and we are preparing accordingly.”

The prospect of an extended period of hostilities in Gaza comes amid friction between Israel and the U.S., its main ally, which has been pushing the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to begin winding down a war that has devastated the enclave and killed thousands.

One U.S. official said that Israel’s decision to change the composition of its forces in Gaza appears to be in line with a broader shift the Biden administration has been advocating toward the more discriminate use of force on the part of Israel’s military.

“This appears to be the start of the gradual shift to lower-intensity operations in the north that we have been encouraging, which reflects the success the IDF has had in dismantling Hamas’s military capabilities there,” the official said, referring to Israel Defense Forces.

Other Western officials were more cautious, saying that more time was needed to see how the next phase of Israel’s military campaign unfolds. American officials have repeatedly said that it is imperative that Hamas be defeated but that Israeli forces need to show more care to minimize civilian casualties.

On Sunday, the United Nations said 40% of the Gaza population is at risk of famine and all children under 5 years old—or a total of about 335,000—are at high risk of severe malnutrition. The war has displaced 85% of the population and pushed almost all Gazans into poverty, according to the U.N., amid a daily struggle to find food and avoid Israeli airstrikes.

While some Western officials and analysts have questioned whether Israel can succeed in its goal of eradicating Hamas, the new military plans reflect the country’s determination to continue to pursue that goal.

Swapping out forces who have been serving for long periods in Gaza is important to refresh weary troops ahead of a planned long campaign. Moreover, demobilizing a portion of the about 360,000 reservists called up for duty since Oct. 7 will ease pressure on Israel’s workforce and its economy.

Cycling out brigades from northern Gaza suggests that Israel has largely transitioned from offensive to consolidation efforts, according to Ofer Shelah, a military analyst with Tel Aviv’s Institute for National Security Studies.

“Once you stop advancing and you take over or you demolish enough infrastructure, to stay there with so many soldiers is what guerrilla forces want you to do,” he said.

The war in Gaza has sparked tensions elsewhere in the Middle East and has raised the risk of a broader confrontation between Iran, which has backed Hamas in its goal of destroying Israel, and the U.S., which has moved aircraft carriers and other military support to the area to deter Iran and its allies from attacking Israel.

Over the weekend, U.S. Navy helicopters sank three boats piloted by Houthi fighters, a Yemeni group backed by Iran, after those boats threatened a commercial vessel in the Red Sea. There have been more than 20 Houthi attacks on commercial vessels since November.

The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group will be leaving the region in the coming days, defense officials said. A second carrier, the Dwight D. Eisenhower, will continue operating in the Red Sea. Since the Oct. 7 start of the war, the U.S. also has deployed additional destroyers and amphibious assault ships throughout the region.

Tasnim, an Iranian semiofficial news agency close to the country’s security establishment, said Monday that an Iranian destroyer has been moved to the Red Sea near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key crossing between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

The clash between the Houthis and the U.S. Navy—the first involving close combat between U.S. forces and the militants—poses the question of whether the Biden administration should retaliate against the militants to deter further such aggression.

The Obama administration carried out cruise-missile strikes in 2016 against coastal radar sites controlled by the Houthis. That action was described at the time as “limited self-defense strikes,” and they were carried out after the Houthis fired missiles at a U.S. destroyer. The Biden administration has been more cautious in the face of persistent Houthi attacks against commercial shipping, as it seeks to avoid broadening the fighting in the region.

On Saturday, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke with Grant Shapps, the British defense secretary. Both agreed that the Houthi attacks were “profoundly destabilizing to the international rules-based order,” the Pentagon said, and Austin noted that “collective action” was needed.

The U.S. is working with Britain and other countries on a joint statement that would bluntly warn the Houthis against continuing their attacks, a U.S. official said.

On Monday, U.S. forces in Syria were the target of two attacks, one by multiple rockets and the other by a drone, according to U.S. officials. Since mid-October, there have been at least 115 attacks on U.S. and allied forces in Syria and Iraq, with many of them claimed by Iran-backed militants.

Israel launched what has become one of its most costly recent conflicts after Hamas—a group designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization—attacked southern Israel on Oct. 7, killing 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and kidnapping more than 240.

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, more than 22,000 people, mostly women and children, have been killed in Gaza since the war broke out. The figures don’t distinguish between civilian and combatant deaths. According to the health ministry in Hamas-controlled Gaza, 57,000 have been injured.

Shahd Swairki, 35 years old, who fled her home in Gaza City in the north to Rafah, a town on the border with Egypt, said that food is available in the south, but at very high prices. She is crowded with her extended family in a rented apartment. Many other displaced families are in tents. The lack of cooking gas has forced people to burn wood, or even garbage, to cook.

“People here live amid garbage, all of us are sick, the smoke from the fires we burn makes us feel more sick,” said Swairki. “The situation is just getting worse.”

Even as Israel announced the changes to its deployment, analysts say any shift to lower-intensity fighting is possible only as Israel establishes operational control over an area, meaning its forces can maneuver freely in the zone.

Nearly three months into Israel’s war against Hamas and other militants in the Gaza Strip, Israel says it has broken the main command-and-control lines in the enclave’s north and weakened them in the south, but small groups of Hamas fighters continue to ambush Israeli forces and fire rockets toward Israel from across the Strip.

On Monday morning, Hamas showed it has retained long-range rocket capabilities by launching an intense barrage at Tel Aviv at the stroke of midnight.

Two of the five Israeli brigades set to rotate out of Gaza are reservists, some of whom the military said will be demobilized. The remaining three are training brigades, which can be quickly redeployed into battle as needed.

Since the start of the invasion of Gaza, 173 Israeli soldiers have died and more than 900 have been wounded, according to the Israeli military.

Meanwhile, clashes continue across Gaza. In Gaza City’s Shujaiyeh neighborhood, the Israel military said on Monday that its forces raided a command compound used by Hamas and allied group Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In central Gaza, Israel said it killed a midranking officer commanding Hamas’s elite Nukhba fighting force in Deir al-Balah.

In addition to operating in Khan Younis, Israeli forces are also on the ground in Khirbat Ikhza’a, a border town that the military said was one of the launch points for Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack.

The U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees said Friday that humanitarian aid deliveries to Gaza are “limited in quantities and riddled with logistical hurdles,” saying Israeli restrictions and airstrikes on the border areas are constraining the flow of aid. The U.N. also said a breakdown in law and order and looting by desperate Gazans was also making it hard to secure convoys.

“There is a countdown to avert famine,” said Juliette Touma, a spokeswoman for the agency. “Much more food needs to get in.”

The Israeli military said it works to facilitate aid into Gaza and blamed logistical bottlenecks created by the U.N. for the delays.

The World Health Organization said that crowded and unsanitary conditions are causing hundreds of thousands of cases of infectious diseases and stomach ailments. Most of Gaza’s hospitals are no longer functioning and those still able to take patients have limited treatment available.

The U.N.’s children’s agency said Friday that it had delivered 600,000 doses of vaccines for children into Gaza.

Two weeks ago, the IDF spokesman revealed one of the biggest attack tunnels in the Gaza Strip — four kilometers long, wide enough for vehicles to drive through, and running from Jabaliya, north of Gaza City, up until some 400 meters from the Erez border crossing into Israel.

While the tunnel did not cross the border, it presumably could have enabled terrorists on motorcycles and other vehicles to drive underground from the Jabaliya area and exit close to the border before IDF surveillance soldiers or patrols could block them. The IDF did not specify whether this was the case when 3,000 Hamas-led terrorists poured into Israel on October 7, slaughtering 1,200 people and abducting 240.

The uncovering of this vast tunnel, of which there are several more in Gaza, has revived discussion of similar tunnels near, at and under the Lebanon border — especially amid the ongoing clashes there with the Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist army, the forced evacuation of tens of thousands of Israeli residents of the north, and the Israeli leadership’s repeated insistence that Hezbollah must be forced back from the border and deterred.

The Lebanon tunnel project was begun and developed long before the one in Gaza. Existing intelligence indicates a vast tunnel network in southern Lebanon, deep and multi-pronged.

At the Alma Research and Education Center, which focuses on the security challenges on Israel’s northern border, researchers have spent many years investigating Lebanon’s underworld. Tal Beeri, the director of Alma’s Research Department, who served for decades in IDF intelligence units, has exposed that subterranean network in material based on considerable open-source intelligence.

Several years ago, Beeri managed to track down on the internet a “map of polygons,” covering what he called the “Land of the Tunnels” in southern Lebanon. “The map is marked, by an unknown party, with polygons (circles) indicating 36 geographic regions, towns and villages,” he wrote in 2021 paper.

“In our assessment, these polygons mark Hezbollah’s staging centers as part of the ‘defense’ plan against an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Each local staging center (‘defense’) possesses a network of local underground tunnels. Between all these centers, an infrastructure of regional tunnels was built, interconnected [with] them.”

Beeri assessed that the cumulative length of Hezbollah’s tunnel network in south Lebanon amounts to hundreds of kilometers.

In an interview, Beeri recalls that the research paper on Hezbollah’s “Land of the Tunnels” was published immediately after 2021’s Operation Guardian of the Walls — where the IDF had engaged in tackling Hamas’s underground “metro” in Gaza, an operation that in retrospect did not achieve its goal of destroying the tunnels in the enclave.

The paper also featured a map assessing the likely 45-kilometer route of one “attack tunnel” in south Lebanon.

“A lot of people were quizzical because we relied on open sources,” says Beeri. “But we compiled and collected information from a series of sources and videos about the work on the tunnels, including a 2007 video in which Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah number two who was assassinated in February 2008, was seen inside the attack tunnel. We attached an original map that we found online, on which somebody had marked the route, and we did ‘reverse engineering.’ That’s how we put together what seemed to be the route of the 45-kilometer tunnel.”

Adds Beeri: “We found additional materials, including footage of pickup trucks inside a tunnel with various connecting branches. That particular video we decided not to publish initially, because we didn’t have definitive proof that it was filmed in a tunnel in Lebanon. We thought it was possible that somebody was deliberately trying to mislead us. Nonetheless, in the wake of several checks that we did, including looking at the vegetation, the kinds of vehicles and the route, we think it’s extremely likely that this is inside Lebanon.”

Tal Beeri: Absolutely, because we see the work that Hamas has been doing. And if that’s what’s been going on with the digging and building of the tunnels in Gaza, well, in Lebanon, it’s more sophisticated.

We have identified several kinds of tunnels in Lebanon: First, what everybody calls attack tunnels, particularly large and long tunnels that lead from area to area. One can enter them in vehicles and even medium-sized trucks.

Along with them, there are tactical tunnels, which the IDF exposed and destroyed in Operation Northern Shield in January 2019. They are intended for people only to move around in, and in extreme circumstances, maybe a motorcycle. Tactical tunnels are close to villages, and they enable terrorists to fight from underground — to fire from tunnel shafts and duck back in, to rearm from weapons stores inside, to rest, and emerge again.

In our assessment, it could be that there are also “proximate tunnels.” These are similar to the attack tunnels that the IDF thwarted in 2019 but don’t cross the border. They enable access almost to the border, and from there to emerge and attack. We’re talking about activities such as those by the Radwan force that has been planning to invade the Galilee.

An additional kind of tunnel are explosive tunnels. They are dug for the sole purpose of placing explosives inside, with the devices to be detonated when the IDF maneuvers on the ground inside Lebanon.

North Korea’s role in Hezbollah’s tunnel project was researched until 2014. What do you know since then?

Digging tunnels in Lebanon was done from the start with the assistance of North Korea — as far back as the 1980s and especially toward the end of the 90s. There is evidence of this. North Korea has historic expertise in the digging of tunnels in mountainous and rocky areas.

After the second Lebanon War in 2006, the connection with North Korea was maintained, and aid was also received from Iran.

Eventually, Hezbollah got everything it needed from the Koreans. By 2014, they’d had 25 years of interaction, in the course of which Hezbollah received knowledge and technology to the point where it was able to dig and build the tunnels by itself.

Subsequently, it set up civilian companies, Shiite-owned, that worked ostensibly on civilian infrastructure in the Baalbek region. These projects were overseen by a company called Jihad Construction, that presented itself as ostensibly carrying out agricultural projects and building reconstruction for the benefit of the Shiite community, but actually took on the building of the tunnels.

In the course of the work, additional “civilian” companies were established. One of them, the Mustafa Commercial and Contracting Company, even interacted with the United Nations Development Program, as a civil construction contractor.

How do Hezbollah’s precision-guided missiles, capable of hitting anywhere in Israel, fit into the tunneling picture?

It’s not complicated from their point of view. Fateh 110 [surface-to-surface ballistic] missiles are carried on trucks. The subterranean infrastructure enables a truck to transit to the place where the missile is to be fired. In theory, at the launch site, a platform can be constructed, or a slope leading up from the tunnel. The truck exits the tunnel, fires and goes back down.

Simulation of a missile launch from a tunnel exntrance in southern Lebanon (Alma Research and Education Center)
When one flies over the site, all one can see is the mountain. It’s very hard to find the launch site. They are able to carry out a fast, mobile launch of missiles.

Coordinated with Sinwar, tied to Hezbollah: Who was Saleh al-Arouri?

Killed on Tuesday evening in southern Beirut, al-Arouri was an influential and charismatic leader of Hamas' political wing. He was behind multiple terror attacks against Israel and participated in hostage-exchange talks

Saleh al-Arouri, who was killed in Lebanon on Tuesday in what is thought to be an Israeli assassination, was the deputy head of Hamas' political bureau as well as the man in charge of the organization's military wing in the West Bank.

He was considered very influential within Hamas, due mainly to his efforts to develop a military network in the West Bank and his residence in Lebanon, where he was in close contact with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. He and Yahya Sinwar, Hamas' leader in the Gaza Strip, were thought to share the same strategic worldview.

Born in 1966 in Arura, near Ramallah, al-Arouri became active in Hamas in the 1990s. Israel says he planned numerous terror attacks, including the kidnapping and murder of three teens in summer 2014. He spent 20 years in an Israeli jail, until 2010, and learned Hebrew there.

After his release, Israel deported him to Turkey, from which he gave orders for terror attacks for years. But under the 2016 reconciliation agreement between Turkey and Israel, he was expelled from Turkey and moved to the Qatari capital of Doha. A few months before becoming deputy head of Hamas' political bureau in 2017, he was expelled from Qatar and moved to Lebanon, where he worked to promote Hamas' relations with Hezbollah and Iran.

In 2018, he visited Gaza, with Israel's permission, as part of an Egyptian effort to negotiation a reconciliation of warring Palestinian factions and a lull in the fighting between Hamas and Israel.

Al-Arouri once said that "resistance is the essence of Hamas' existence" and the organization deals with nothing but "either preparing for the war or participating in the war."

In 2011, he was involved in negotiating the prisoner swap that freed kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. In 2017, he said in an interview with Kan 11 television, "this is one of Israeli society's strong points, and I say this to everyone … That the country is willing to go to war over one soldier and free 1,000 prisoners for one soldier is something positive. As someone on the enemy side, it would be better for me, I'd be happy, if Israel reached the point where the soldier or civilian doesn't interest it. That would weaken the other side, it would undermine the army, it would undermine the entire society."

In a recording disseminated last February, al-Arouri was heard explaining in a closed meeting why Hamas hadn't responded harshly to Israeli attacks on its facilities. He said it made a deliberate decision, based on the lessons of its war with Israel in 2021, not to divert attention to Gaza to enable violence in the West Bank to gather steam.

"Some people are preaching to us, 'where is Gaza, why doesn't Gaza help us,'" he said. "But on the strategic level, for the war in the West Bank to develop in the right direction, restraint is needed in Gaza."

"The moment Gaza enters the fighting, this leads to a higher-intensity military response, which leads to a decline in the scope of the popular struggle and underground activities, because people are bracing to be hit," he continued, and "all the attention" moves to Gaza. Consequently, resistance in the West Bank should be allowed to grow and be given every assistance except "launching a war and massive rocket fire" from Gaza.

Nevertheless, he stressed that this restraint wouldn't last forever, noting that the military wing was "ready to intervene" when necessary and had warned Israel that continued escalation in the West Bank could expand the fighting to Gaza.

In 2018, the United States announced a $5 million reward for anyone supplying information about al-Arouri.

All eyes on Nasrallah as Hezbollah chief set to address Israel-attributed killing
Hezbollah said on Tuesday that al-Arouri's killing in Beirut – widely attributed to Israel – will not go unanswered. Some, however, believe the retaliation will not be immediate

In Lebanon, Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, all eyes are on Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, who is scheduled to make a public speech in a few hours a day after the killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut.

Hezbollah said on Tuesday that al-Arouri's killing – widely attributed to Israel - will not go unanswered. Some in the organization, however, don't believe the retaliation will be immediate.

Hezbollah's television channel Al-Manar, as well as Hezbollah and Hamas-affiliated newspaper Al Ahkbar, reported extensively on al-Arouri's death, yet refrained from airing or printing messages calling for an immediate response. They did, however, publish calls to wait and follow developments – namely Nasrallah's evening address.

Nasrallah's speech was planned even before the latest events, to mark the fourth anniversary of another killing– that of the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani. Now, however, Palestinians see in his speech a new sense of urgency as the Gaza war threatens to expand.

Last August, Nasrallah proclaimed that "any assassination in Lebanese territory targeting a Palestinian, Lebanese or Iranian will not go quietly," but Hezbollah itself has emphasized that this was said before the Gaza war. Moreover, the fact that the killing took place in the midst of an armed conflict gives the group more room to maneuver as it weighs the timing and type of response – which could have implications for both the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and for the domestic Lebanese arena.

Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas official in Lebanon, echoed these messages on Tuesday when he said that the axis of resistance has already become accustomed to conflict with Israel and its killing policy, and therefore he predicts the response will be "well-planned" and will not be carried out "in a hysterical and emotional way."

According to the Lebanese news service, the al-Arouri's killing was carried out with a drone, and the strike targeted Hamas offices in Beirut while senior members gathered for a meeting. Also killed alongside al-Arouri were two top Hamas military wing leaders, Samir Findi Abu Amer and Azzam al-Aqraa Abu Ammar.

Though the Washington Post quoted an American official saying the IDF was behind the operation, Israel has not claimed responsibility. Army Spokesperson Daniel Hagari refused to comment on the matter, saying only that the Israeli army "is fully prepared on all fronts" and for every scenario. Hagari dded that the army "is focused on fighting Hamas and will continue to do so," while calling on the Israeli public to follow the instructions of the IDF's Home Front Command.

Besides Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran and Lebanon have also denounced the al-Arouri's killing. Ismail Haniyeh, whose deputy was al-Arouri, condemned the killing as "a terrorist act" and a breach of Lebanon's sovereignty, while Hezbollah called it a significant strike against Lebanon, vowing "it would not go unanswered."

Tehran has said that the strike will "only increase the resistance to Israel, while Lebanon filed a complaint to the United Nations Security Council for breaching its sovereignty.

Palestinians in the West Bank are calling to avenge al-Arouri, and a Ramallah rally on Tuesday included a show of support for Hamas' military wing, even if Hamas flags were not waved. Senior Fatah officials in the West Bank have, however, called a general strike Wednesday to protest the al-Arouri's death.

Diplomatic sources in the Arab world told Haaretz on Tuesday night that the killing of al-Arouri has brought negotiations between Israel and Hamas to a halt. Talks, they added, are now focused on preventing escalation, especially in the north of Israel.

Al-Arouri killing doesn't affect Israel's war in Gaza – but certainly the day after

While the killing of the senior Hamas leader in Beirut is an operational success, its effect on Israel's war in Gaza is minimal. It is possible, however, that it will accelerate the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, preserve Hamas' status and, as important, keep its leaders alive

The killing of Salah al-Arouri, who was in charge of Hamas in the West Bank, is an intelligence and operational success, but it doesn't affect the war that Hamas' Yahya Sinwar is waging in Gaza.

Salah Al-Arouri may have been second in Hamas' hierarchy after Ismail Haniyeh, but as far as we know, he didn't take part in the organization's attack on Israel on 7 October. Much like al-Arouri, the rest of the Hamas leadership abroad was busy with trying to reconcile with Fatah and discussed with Egypt on rehabilitating Gaza and a long-term cease-fire deal with Israel.

Sinwar and al-Arouri, who championed widespread armed struggle against Israel, were bitter political rivals. Sinwar even blamed al-Arouri of collaborating with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in trying to relieve him of his command in Gaza. And indeed, in 2021 Sinwar almost lost the elections.

After Sinwar was elected, he rushed to get rid of Haniyeh's men and to fire them from their positions. Since then, Sinwar has been running the show in Gaza exclusively. He is the one deciding how to navigate the negotiations with Israel on the hostages, and dictates the organization's replies to the efforts made by Egypt and Qatar.

Sinwar has recently suspected that Hamas' leadership abroad, and al-Arouri in particular, were seeking to amass political capital and obtain a favorable position in "a day after the war" plan at his expense. The killing of al-Arouri got rid of a threatening internal rival for Sinwar, but also clarified that Israel will not refrain from hurting him even if a hostage deal isn't struck.

While the focus of public interest passes now to what Hezbollah's expected response will look like, no less important is the question of the fate of the hostages held in Gaza as Sinwar realizes they no longer can serve him as a human shield.

Apparently, the killing of al-Arouri is an ultimate test for Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in the deterrence equation he established with Israel. As he understood it, his participation in the "axis of resistance" would be limited to responding to every attack on Lebanese citizens. Nasrallah expanded on this formula recently when he declared that the fire shot by Hezbollah from Lebanon toward Israel would continue as long as the war in Gaza lasts, but still within limits that Iran drew.

It's doubtful whether Iran, which still hasn't responded to the killing of Revolutionary Guards commander Sayyed Razi Mousavi or to the killing of other senior commanders and nuclear scientists in Lebanon, will let Hezbollah retaliate against Israel over the death of someone who wasn't one of the organization's own flesh and blood. Doing so would ruin the strategy Iran has pursued and subject all of Lebanon to an Israeli attack that would jeopardize Tehran's primary outpost in the region.

A central conduit
Al-Arouri was a central conduit in the Iran-Hamas relationship. When he still lived in Turkey, to where he moved from Qatar, he worked with Ismail Haniyeh to heal the rupture created between Hamas and Tehran. The break happened after former Hamas chief Khaled Meshal decided in 2012 to cut the organization's ties with Syria following the mass murder that Bashar Assad had committed.

The organization considered the step a strategic move that cut off Hamas from Iran's taps and from contact with Hezbollah, trading them for close ties with Qatar and Turkey, and for Meshal's efforts to revive ties with Arab states.

Relations were renewed between Hamas and Iran in 2019, when a delegation headed by al-Arouri visited Tehran. It was only three years later, and with Nasrallah's mediation, that the organization's relations with Syria were renewed – a step that caused much controversy within the organization.

Al-Arouri played the role of "foreign relations director" in all of these proceedings, effectively pushing aside Meshal and his people, who, for a long time, couldn't even meet Nasrallah. Al-Arouri, who just last year, was asked to leave Turkey following its renewal relations with Israel, considered the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas axis – without Qatar – as the operational axis around which Hamas should build its strategy.

Al-Arouri's appointment as head of Hamas in the West Bank granted him operational capabilities, while he simultaneously built up Hamas' military in Lebanon with Hezbollah's blessing and aid. This turned him into a direct competition to Sinwar, who headed the hottest front against Israel, garnering considerable political status and seeing himself as the only one who carries out an armed struggle against the enemy and therefore the only one worthy of leading all of Hamas, not just in Gaza.

Hamas-West Bank and Hamas-Lebanon were left without a top commander to lead strategy, but that didn't mean that they couldn't carry out tactical terrorist attacks.

As the debate over "the day after" in Gaza heated up in recent weeks, al-Arouri and Haniyeh were the two who, once again, reestablished channels with senior Fatah officials, including with figures who stepped down or were ousted by Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas, like Mohammed Dahlan.

The representatives discussed conditions for reconciliation and establishing a national unity government like that formed in 2014 only to collapse soon after. It seems that Sinwar, who wasn't a party to these moves, concluded that he was expected to pay the price, and therefore he should chart an independent path or cooperate with Meshal on the assumption that he would still be alive after the war.

It's possible that the killing of al-Arouri may accelerate the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, as a mean to preserve Hamas' status and, just as important, to preserve the lives of its leaders.

If that's the case, Hamas' leadership may present more flexible positions, which would enable Abbas and the Fatah leadership to overcome the threshold conditions that Abbas is demanding of Hamas to recognize Israel's legitimacy and the agreements that the Fatah has signed with Israel. This may result in the formation of a "new Palestinian Authority," which U.S. President Joe Biden proposed to manage Gaza after the war.

The TV Series That May Have Revealed October 7 Plans

In April 2022, the Hamas-produced series 'Fist of the Free' was screened in the Gaza Strip during Ramadan. It went largely unnoticed at the time, but the Arab world is now seeing it as a self-fulfilling prophecy

In May 2022, the Hamas-produced TV series "Fist of the Free" ("Qabdat al-Ahrar" in Arabic) was honored at a ceremony a month after it had debuted in the Gaza Strip. Hamas' leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, was present and personally handed out prizes to the directors, actors and production team.

"I commend the efforts of everyone who created and worked on this series," he said. "Your work brings us closer to liberation. This series is an integral part of what we're preparing in the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades," he added, referring to Hamas' military wing: "From the weapons being produced in their laboratories, to their plans and intelligence-gathering abilities for our liberation and return."

In recent weeks, the series belatedly made headlines in the Arab world – as well as sparking speculation that it shed light on the October 7 attack.

"The scenes that appear in the series are very similar to what actually happened on October 7 in the Gaza border area and the Hamas assault on military bases," noted a report on Qatar's Al-Araby channel. "Did the series 'Fist of the Free' prophecy the attack?" the presenter asked. "If you watch the show, you can see there's a connection between this series and what actually happened – the attack and speed of execution, the deception strategy and Hamas' combat plan."

The Jordanian-Palestinian critic Rashed Issa also discussed the matter in the Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper. "The TV series produced by Hamas – is it a prophecy or a strategic deception?" he asks. He notes that the series didn't arouse any interest when it debuted, but after the attack it started generating a great deal of curiosity among viewers.

"The first thing that comes to mind while watching are events from the Hamas attack: It's hard to ignore the similarities between what we saw on October 7 and scenes in the series itself," he writes. He finds it hard to give a clear answer to the question he poses, though, leaving it to the viewer to decide for themselves.

The 30-part series first aired on Gaza's Al-Aqsa satellite TV channel, which is owned by Hamas, and on the Al-Manar channel that is identified with Hezbollah. It was also available on the Dailymotion video channel.

'It's important to gather intelligence about the military bases, to damage the surveillance devices and infiltration alarms in the enemy's systems – and we're waiting for new weaponry that we should receive soon.'

The show begins with Shin Bet security service operatives entering the Gaza Strip with a single aim: to capture Abu Anas, a senior Hamas member who is the mastermind behind a secret plan.

Episode after 40-minute episode, his plan is revealed to the viewer: intensive training exercises for the Hamas militants, commanded personally by Abu Anas, followed by training in how to abduct soldiers from tanks and, finally, face-to-face battles in a mock-up of an Israeli military base. "From the inside, the building is very similar to the Re'im army base, but from the outside we deliberately built it differently in order to avoid suspicion," the commander says.

The plot becomes more complicated when the Shin Bet members are able to arrest Abu Anas and look to extract information from him, but he doesn't reveal anything and manages to get away.

The series also shows what happens in Hamas' underground lair – from planning the attack, to gathering information about military bases in southern Israel, to discussions surrounding the attack itself and how they intend to take soldiers hostage.

One of the scenes presents Hamas' main weapons production facility, headed by "The Doctor" – a scientist and enigmatic figure they're careful not to talk too much about, in order to preserve his life and avoid making him a target for assassination. In the show, he's one of the pivotal figures in the attack plan against Israel.

"How do you defeat the enemy?" he asks the Hamas members who work with him at the facility. "It's important to gather intelligence about the military bases, to damage the surveillance devices and infiltration alarms in the enemy's systems – and we're waiting for new weaponry that we should receive soon."

Al Jazeera correspondent Raed Mousa discussed the series when it first aired, mentioning that it was inspired by a real-life security incident in Khan Yunis in 2018. At the time, an Israel Defense Forces special unit operating undercover in the Strip was exposed. The security incident ended in a shootout that led to the deaths of seven Hamas gunmen, including a field commander, and one IDF officer.

"With this series, Hamas aspires to present a Palestinian narrative that is contrary to the Israeli narrative, and to emphasize the operational progress of the resistance force and its planning and combat capabilities. They're highly motivated to present themselves this way," Mousa wrote.

The head of Hamas' artistic production department, Mohammed Soraya, told Al Jazeera that the series is a battle for minds. "We aspire, with our modest abilities, to confront the deception of the Israelis, understanding the great influence of drama on public awareness." He said the budget for the entire series was a mere $90,000, with the 30 episodes filmed over six months.

"There are no locations for filming in Gaza, so we filmed in real places inside the cities, between the fields – and there were even scenes near the border," Soraya said. "That made it very hard for us to produce good shots. We filmed in the street, on the promenade in Gaza City; some of the crew even worked on a voluntary basis, free of charge."

One crew member told Al Jazeera there was no production equipment in Gaza, so "we worked with what there was and at bad angles. We had to compromise. We didn't have proper filming equipment and we used the daylight to shoot. At night, there wasn't enough light."

Local Palestinian actors, some of them amateurs, star in the show. "Our financial and technical capabilities for creating a drama in Gaza are very limited and that was reflected in the salaries of the actors and producers, and the short amount of time allotted to production," Soraya noted.

He said Hamas wasn't looking to make money from the show, and that its goal instead was to send a message to the Palestinian people to "keep up the good fight."

Naturally, no Israeli actors appear in the show. "That was the most significant challenge: to play Israeli characters and make them believable to the viewer," says Soraya. He says the actors put in a lot of work in order to play the Shin Bet members.

Actor Zohair Al-Belbisi, 65, plays a Shin Bet officer who's responsible for gathering intelligence about Hamas members in the Strip. In order to realistically portray a Shin Bet agent, Al-Belbisi met with a group of Palestinian prisoners who had been released from Israeli prisons to find out more.

Between fiction and reality

The film and TV industry in the Gaza Strip flourished in the 1950s, but in the past 20 years the number of series has declined significantly and budgets are very low.

About two months after taking control of the Strip in 2007, though, Hamas established its own production company. Its first show was a drama series about Emad Akel, who was assassinated by Israel in 1993. He was one of the founders of Hamas' military wing and was responsible for several terror attacks in Israel.

Soraya told Al Jazeera that a series produced by Hamas in 2020, "Heaven's Gate," became very popular. He said that the series – about Palestinian resistance in the West Bank and Jerusalem – had been watched over 30 million times.

It's difficult to say for sure whether "Fist of the Free" really predicted Hamas' attack plan on Israel. However, Sinwar's admiration for the show and his praise for it, as well as the connection he made between it and what was being prepared by Hamas' military wing, seemingly leave little room for doubt.

"We'll attack the military bases and we'll switch from defense to offense – whatever the cost," the Abu Anas character says to the fighters in the series.

He adds: "This is the most violent attack the enemy will experience: the weapons are ready and you're ready. On the day of the attack, we'll paralyze the enemy's entire aerial surveillance for 30 minutes and they won't be able to detect us infiltrating the border. Our operation is going to harm Israel and create unity around us for the liberation of Palestine."

The Abu Anas character is rather reminiscent of Sinwar himself, and his speech manages to blur the lines between fiction and reality.

"Fist of the Free" instructs us about the ambitions of Hamas, and its expectations of itself as an organization that continues to improve and develop. More than that, it demonstrates its understanding of an Israeli culture that sanctifies the value of life. "They'll do anything for their abductee, and that way we can release prisoners exactly as happened with the release of [Gilad] Shalit," says Abu Anas, as they prepare to embark on the attack.

The creators went even further with their vision, filming a scene that describes the initial reaction of the Israeli government to the attack: "The country is experiencing a serious event and we can't explain it. What's happening is a highly unusual event that's taking place in Israel, with the regional headquarters in the south in their line of fire. What's happening is totally abnormal. We have no satellites, no planes and no drones."

Ultimately, the series' secret plan became a self-fulfilling prophecy. And in reality, as we have unfortunately discovered, it is even more serious and deadly.

Islamic State claims responsibility for attacks near tomb of Qassem Soleimani

According to an 'informed source' cited by Iranian state media, two suicide bombers carried out the attack on behalf of the unnamed Islamic State group. The Sunni extremist group recently also called for global attacks against Jews and Christians in retaliation for Israel's war in Gaza

Investigators believe suicide bombers likely carried out an attack on a commemoration for an Iranian general slain in a 2020 U.S. drone strike, state media reported Thursday, as Iran grappled with its worst mass-casualty attack in decades and as the wider Mideast remains on edge.

A purported claim of responsibility circulated online attributed the attack to the Islamic State group, though it could not be immediately verified by The Associated Press.

Wednesday's attack in Kerman killed at least 84 people and wounded another 284. It targeted a ceremony honoring Revolutionary Guard Gen. Qassem Soleimani, held as an icon by supporters of the country's theocracy and viewed by the U.S. military as a deadly foe who aided militants who killed American troops in Iraq.

A report by the state-run IRNA news agency, later aired by state television, quoted an unnamed "informed source" for the suicide bombing information.

The outlets quoted the official as saying that surveillance footage from the route to the commemoration at Kerman's Matryrs Cemetery clearly showed a male suicide bomber detonating explosives. The official said the second blast "probably" came from another suicide bomber, though it hadn't been determined beyond doubt.

The purported Islamic State claim, circulated among jihadists online, claimed the two attackers' names were Omar al-Mowahed and Seif-Allah al-Mujahed. The claim said the men carried out the attacks with explosive vests. It also used disparaging language when discussing Shiites, which the Islamic State group views as heretics.

However, the alleged statement did not identify which arm of the Islamic State group carried out the assault and only bore the group's name at the top in English.

The Islamic State group, which once held vast territory across Iraq and Syria, ultimately were beaten back by U.S.-led forces. It has been in disarray in the years since, though it has mounted major assaults.

The Islamic State's affiliates still exist across the world and the group has claimed previous attacks in Iran in the past. High-casualty suicide bombings long have been a tactic for its militants.

The Iranian state media reports also gave new distances for how far apart the blasts happened, describing them as occurring 1.5 kilometer (about a mile) and 2.7 kilometers (1.68 miles) away from Soleimani's crypt. The official said the bombers likely chose the locations because they were outside of the security perimeter for the commemoration.

An earlier death toll of 103 was twice revised lower after officials realized that some names had been repeated on a list of victims and due to the severity of wounds suffered by some of the dead, health authorities said. Many of the wounded were in critical condition, however, so the death toll could rise.

The gathering marked the fourth anniversary of the killing of Soleimani, the head of the Revolutionary Guard's elite Quds Force, in a U.S. drone strike in Iraq. The explosions occurred as long lines of people gathered to mark the event.

Iranian state television and officials described the attacks as bombings, without immediately giving clear details of what happened. The attacks came a day after a deputy head of the Palestinian militant group Hamas was killed in a suspected Israeli strike in Beirut.

Iran has multiple foes who could be behind the assault, including exile groups, militant organizations and state actors.

While Israel has carried out attacks in Iran over its nuclear program, it has conducted targeted assassinations, not mass casualty bombings. A U.S. State Department spokesman, Matthew Miller, said American officials had "no reason" to believe Israel was involved in Wednesday's attack in Iran.

That was echoed by National Security Council spokesman John Kirby at the White House, who said "our hearts go out to all the innocent victims and their family members."

Sunni extremist groups including the Islamic State group have conducted large-scale attacks in the past that killed civilians in Shiite-majority Iran, though not in relatively peaceful Kerman.

On Thursday, the Islamic State also called for global attacks against Jews and Christians in retaliation for the ongoing Israeli military campaign in the Gaza Strip.

"O lions of Islam, hunt your prey from Jews, Christians and their allies in the streets and roads of the U.S., Europe and the world," spokesman for the hard-line jihadist militia, Abu Hudhaifa al-Ansari, said in a purported audio recording.

"Work to hit easy goals before difficult ones, civil before military, and religious targets such as synagogues and churches before others, because it heals the heart and shows signs of battle, our war with them is a religious war," he added.

He also called the Gaza War a "religious war."

In the 33-minute recording posted on propaganda outlets, the Sunni extremist also warned the Palestinian Islamist Hamas movement against cooperating with Shiite groups.

Blowing up millions of dollars: The Mossad's secret war on Hamas and Hezbollah funds

For years, Udi Levy headed a Mossad unit that monitored the flow of funds to terror groups. With creative methods and practically no restrictions, the unit managed to thwart the transfers of huge sums to Hamas and Hezbollah. Then it was shut down

In May 2010, a jeep carrying two passengers arrived at the Rafah border terminal. The men, who had driven from Cairo through the Sinai Peninsula, underwent a perfunctory security check after arriving at the Egyptian side of the crossing, and entered the Gaza Strip in their car. After they had gone a short distance, a missile exploded in front of them, out of the blue. The two leaped out of the vehicle in a panic and took shelter by the roadside. Seconds later another missile struck – this time hitting the jeep. It burst into flames and tens of thousands of scorched banknotes flew into the air.

"It was like something out of a movie," recalls Udi Levy, a former senior Mossad official.

The missiles were fired by an Israel Air Force drone, based on precise intelligence. The driver and passenger were not targeted, which is why the first missile was fired as a warning – to enable them to escape. The real target was the $20 million in the vehicle, which were transferred from a bank and from money changers in Egypt, and were earmarked for the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas.

High-ranking Hamas officials rushed to the site and quickly began to collect and pack up the blackened bills. A few days later, the Hamas men made their way back to Cairo, where they entered a branch of Banque Misr, Egypt's largest bank, with the aim of exchanging the damaged bills for new ones. The startled staff ordered them to leave the premises. At that point, personnel in the offices of the Tziltzal (Harpoon) unit, on the third floor of Mossad headquarters in Glilot, outside Tel Aviv, breathed a sigh of relief – among them Levy, the head of the now-defunct unit.

The destruction of Hamas' money in that incident was a successful, joint action undertaken by the Israel Defense Forces' Operations Directorate, headed at the time by Maj. Gen. Tal Russo, and Harpoon, the secret unit that had been established about a decade earlier in order to monitor, warn the world about and foil the transfer of money to terror groups and Iran. The "copyright" on the idea in its Israeli version belongs to the late Mossad head Meir Dagan and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. It was Dagan who appointed Levy, then a lieutenant colonel in the IDF, as the unit's commander.

During its 15 years of activity, Harpoon undertook a large number of operations. Mossad agents were dispatched to observe and penetrate the offices of money changers and also banks in Europe, South America and the Middle East, where terrorists and Tehran's regime were suspected of holding accounts.

"We kept tabs on money changers in a number of countries in Europe," an agent from the Mossad's ultra-secret operations unit, known as Kidon (Bayonet), who was later promoted to head a division in the espionage organization, tells Haaretz in an interview. "We monitored banks in Europe that were suspected of turning a blind eye to accounts of terrorist elements," adds another Mossad operative. According to The New York Times, money changers in Turkey were surveilled in particular.

Israel cooperated with local espionage organizations in these operations. Mossad and Harpoon agents warned their counterparts about suspicious accounts and passed on the information to banks, finance and other government officials in those countries. In one case, this led to the scuttling of an Iranian scheme to transport weapons out of a European country.

In another operation, carried out toward the end of the 2006 Lebanon war, the air force bombed two containers, hidden in the Shiite neighborhood of Dahiya in Beirut, which contained tens of millions of dollars.

"Hezbollah's leaders, headed by [Hassan] Nasrallah and [Imad] Mughniyeh, were flabbergasted," Levy says now. "They were stunned by the very fact that we knew where the money was hidden, that we succeeded in targeting the site so precisely. They were furious that all that money, earmarked for financing the organization's war, had been destroyed. How do we know about their reaction? We learned about it from intelligence materials that reached us after the operation."

Levy was the commander of Harpoon throughout most of its existence; he retired in 2016 and it was dismantled in 2017. Toward the end of his tenure he witnessed a change of approach among the top ranks of the Israeli government vis-à-vis the effort to torpedo the transfer of funds to Palestinian terrorist organizations.

"I started to see that the subject of terrorist funds was becoming less and less important for [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu," Levy recalls. "Since his reelection in 2015, he had refused to authorize operations of strategic importance that we had proposed, and expressed apprehensions about their implications." The operations in question, he says, mainly targeted Hamas.

The issue of how Palestinian terrorism is financed is of particular significance at present, in the wake of Hamas' vicious attack on October 7. For years, Netanyahu ignored the flow of billions of dollars from Qatar to the Islamist organization, and indeed encouraged that funding process. This was part of his effort to shelve the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But the money, which was supposed to buy quiet, was used to shore up Hamas' military capabilities, which took Israel by surprise on October 7.

Netanyahu began to shape his policy at the end of 2014. Yossi Cohen, then director of the National Security Council and later Mossad chief, supported it, as did Meir Ben Shabbat, who succeeded Cohen as head of the NSC. Among the few who questioned the policy were Avigdor Lieberman, the defense minister at the time; Tamir Pardo, who headed the Mossad from 2011 to 2016; and Levy himself. But Netanyahu took no heed of their warnings.

"The transfer of the funds to Hamas made possible the surprise attack of October 7," Levy declares. "I don't remember Netanyahu holding even one serious discussion about the possible implications of Hamas' growing economic power, even though he was shown the numbers." Indeed, according to Levy, for years the prime minister rejected the recommendations of the security establishment to wage serious economic warfare against Hamas.

Why?

Levy: "Netanyahu and Cohen thought that appeasing Hamas was a solution that served their worldview and their ideology. They didn't understand, or didn't want to understand, that this was actually the problem. It was a political decision."

And it was a decision, in Levy's view, that was contrary to Israel's national interests.

Levy, 61, was born in the Hatikva neighborhood of Tel Aviv. His Egyptian-born mother, Miriam, worked as a nurse in the area, where she met his father, Haim, the proprietor of a flower shop. Haim's family had arrived in Ottoman Palestine from Persia in the early 20th century. When Levy was 8, the family moved to Holon, south of Tel Aviv.

Levy was drafted as a "listener" in the elite 8200 intelligence unit. "I don't know why they chose me," he says. "My Arabic from home was very basic." Following a six-month course in the language, he was assigned to a listening post on the Lebanon border. In the 1982 Lebanon war he was sent to an officers training course and later served in a series of key intelligence positions. He also obtained a B.A. in Middle East studies from Tel Aviv University. After a promotion to the rank of major, he was appointed commander of an 8200 base in Jerusalem. "I didn't like the division of labor," he says. "I was responsible for the logistics side, but I wanted to engage in the essence, with intelligence materials."

To his good fortune, at the height of the first intifada, he met the head of the military government's Civil Administration, Col. Gadi Zohar. It was also from Zohar that he first heard about Hamas' growing economic power. "Gadi told me that the Shin Bet [security service] and Military Intelligence hadn't identified the general population's main problems," he says. "They were focused on terrorist squads, they didn't see the broader picture and didn't understand what was happening below the surface. As one of the lessons from this, a decision was made to create a small unit of intelligence personnel, under the auspices of the Civil Administration, to monitor the mood of the population. Gadi suggested that I join, and I was happy to accept."

What impressions did you get at the time?

"I met with [Palestinian] journalists, intellectuals and merchants, who spoke about the frame of mind in Palestinian society. They told me, 'You [Israelis] aren't paying attention to what's happening at the grassroots level. You're not seeing how Hamas, via nonprofits, is building hospitals, schools, preschools, welfare institutions, mosques. You're not seeing how much money is being channeled into the territories in order to maintain the monster that Hamas is building.'"

Levy started to collect information about Hamas' financial activities, and also, to a lesser extent, regarding those of Islamic Jihad. "When I wrote at that time, in the early 1990s, that Hamas nonprofits had injected about half a billion dollars from donations abroad into the West Bank and Gaza, the Shin Bet laughed at me," he recalls. "They claimed that the funds amounted to $10 million. Gideon Ezra, who was head of a Shin Bet department, told us: 'Don't talk nonsense. I'm not going to deal with schools and hospitals. My only task is to thwart terrorism.'"

But Levy found attentive ears in Maj. Gen. Ilan Biran, then head of Central Command, and in the coordinator of government activities in the territories, Maj. Gen. Danny Rothschild. "Our principal tool was court orders, which enabled us to shut down institutions and confiscate money. We pursued cases of money changers in the West Bank and Gaza, and of council heads. The code name for our activity was biur hametz [a Passover ritual referring, metaphorically, to eliminating unacceptable or harmful substances]."

In 1994, Brig. Gen. Meir Dagan, who was in charge of special operations in Gaza and the West Bank, paid a visit to Central Command. "I showed him the material I had collected," Levy says, "and to my surprise he showed a great deal of interest in it." Dagan and Levy later met with Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Matan Vilnai. "Vilnai said, 'I know Hamas like the back of my hand – I don't think you can tell me anything new.' Nevertheless, I did just that. At the end of the meeting, Vilnai was utterly astounded."

In 1996, when Netanyahu was elected prime minister for the first time, he tasked Dagan with establishing an independent counterterrorism unit. Dagan in turn appointed Levy, then a lieutenant colonel, to spearhead the search for terrorist funding.

"We began to enlist the international community, especially the United States and Europe, in an economic war against Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah," Levy relates. "We focused on a few Hamas and Islamic Jihad nonprofits that were operating in the United States, Britain, France and Germany."

The turning point came in 2001, partly in the wake of the 9/11 disaster, when the U.S. administration became more acutely aware of the importance of the struggle against terrorist financing, and of the connections between seemingly innocent charities and terror groups. A second watershed was Ariel Sharon's election as prime minister that same year. At Dagan's recommendation, Sharon agreed to create a secret body within the National Security Council, then headed by Uzi Dayan. Dayan named the unit Harpoon, under the inspiration of Melville's "Moby Dick." Levy was appointed to head it.

"In my adolescence I read 'Moby Dick' as an adventure story about the obscure world of whale hunters," Dayan recalls now. "Thirty-five years later, I went back to the book. I associated the code name Harpoon with the teller of the tale, Ishmael, who describes how his friend is waiting for just the right moment to hurl his lethal harpoon."

Underlying the work of the Harpoon unit was the well-known slogan "Follow the money."

Levy: "From 1993 until 2016, the methods used to move the money barely changed. In the first decade, from 1993 until 2003, the money for the terrorist organizations came primarily from Saudi Arabia – from its government and from donations by wealthy Saudis, who also underwrote Al-Qaida. They transferred the money directly from Saudi banks to Palestinian banks, or via Western Union. Saudi Arabia stopped the money transfers to Hamas in 2003, because of its fear of the United States' reaction, after it was revealed that the Saudis had underwritten Osama bin Laden's militants."

In the early 2000s, the Iranians replaced the Saudi Arabians as the dominant element financing Palestinian terrorism, taking control over transfers of money to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as to the Palestinian Authority. A case in point is the smuggling of arms from Iran to the PA in 2002 on the Karine A freighter, which was seized by the Israel Navy. Iran's Al-Quds Force financed the operation and purchased the weapons.

Parallel to the funding from Tehran, money flowed in constantly from dozens of nonprofits – in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Indonesia, Malaysia and also from Western countries: Germany, France, Holland, Denmark, France, Britain. These bodies carried out all manner of fundraising efforts: from collecting change in charity coffers in mosques, to procuring funds from large, socially oriented nonprofits in the West. "It's an insane network of worldwide nonprofits that continues to operate to this day," Levy says.

To track down and thwart the transfer of the funds, Harpoon was vested with unusual powers and authority from its inception. "Justice Minister Yaakov Neeman was behind us," Levy relates, "and all the bodies joined in the effort: the Israel Police, the Israel Money Laundering and Terror Financing Prohibition Authority, the Bank of Israel, the Israel Tax Authority, the banks, and the state and military prosecutors."

Levy's deputy was P., a field operative who had worked in enemy states, including Iran. Attorney Paul Landes, from the money laundering authority, joined the team and later served as Levy's deputy.

"There was a far-reaching, secret decision by the Sharon government that authorized us to receive information from any authorized source in Israel and to act on its basis, and to be in contact with any government in the world," Levy notes.

Those powers, however, bordered on an invasion of privacy. The unit could not access Israeli bank accounts, but if it had suspicions that Arab nonprofits in Israel – notably, the northern branch of the Islamic Movement – were acting as a conduit for transfer of funds to Hamas and to the territories, the information was passed on to the police and an investigation was launched.

One of Harpoon's important operations took place at the height of the second intifada, early in the 2000s, with the aim of tracing the assets of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, who was suspected of hiding hundreds of millions of dollars around the world.

"Arafat, his wife Suha and his aides were thoroughly corrupt," Levy says. The Palestinian president had many bank accounts – in Malta, France, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria – which were managed for him by his money man, Mohammed Rashid.

With the aid of the Mossad, Harpoon tried to get its hands on the bank accounts owned by Arafat and his wife. The unit had a double goal: First, they hoped to expose the accounts and disseminate information about them widely, as a means of psychological warfare, in order to besmirch Arafat and show him to be corrupt. In this effort, Harpoon and the Mossad were aided by foreign and Israeli journalists. One of the latter even went so far as to suggest that he pose as a foreign correspondent and try to make contact with Suha. The idea was turned down, but Levy and his agents did manage to persuade Bank Leumi to close Arafat's account.

The second aim was Robin Hood-like in nature: to seize the couple's bank accounts and transfer their money to a friendly country in the Middle East, an ally of Israel. But this time Harpoon was not successful.

The unit also utilized similar methods against Islamic Jihad. Its founder, Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, exercised highly centralized control of the organization and its funds. From his earliest days there, in the 1980s, Shaqaqi was a mercenary on behalf of Iran. Tehran underwrote his group, which carried out some of the deadliest terrorist assaults against Israel, including the attack at the Beit Lid intersection in January 1995 in which 22 Israelis were murdered. The following October, operatives of the Mossad's Bayonet unit assassinated him on a Malta street in broad daylight. Shaqaqi's successors searched for Islamic Jihad's funds but couldn't access the bank accounts. There were rumors that his wife had gotten hold of the money and taken it to Iran or elsewhere.

In his lifetime, Shaqaqi did not balk at accepting additional sources of financing, either. His money person in the United States was Sami al-Arian, a professor of computer engineering at the University of South Florida. Al-Arian was arrested in 2003 and charged with 17 counts of membership in a terrorist organization, financing a terrorist organization, money laundering and more.

Around that time Levy was dispatched on behalf of the State of Israel to Florida, where for three months he was authorized to share documents and intelligence information with the FBI and the Treasury Department. Ultimately Arian was acquitted on half the counts; he signed a plea bargain and served less than five years in prison. Following his release, in 2014, he was deported from the United States and established a research center at a university in Istanbul, which, according to Israeli intelligence, is also involved in transferring funds to terrorist groups.

Harpoon's greatest success was its economic battle against Iran. Thanks to its work, Israel was able over the years to persuade the United States and Western European countries to impose stiff sanctions on Iran, most of which are still in effect today. Specifically, Harpoon, together with the research divisions of the Mossad and Military Intelligence, provided information on whose basis recommendations were drawn up as to which industries and companies in Iran should be sanctioned.

"My tenure as Mossad director played a critical role in the economic warfare against Iran," Tamir Pardo tells Haaretz, "and against Hamas and Hezbollah."

Harpoon did not carry out actions on the ground against Iranian banks, because of operational issues and the fear of endangering its personnel. However, it was successful in tracking down and marking the funds used by Iranian enterprises and individuals that tried to sidestep the sanctions so as to smuggle in components for missile and nuclear projects. The information was passed to governments in the West and the Far East, which helped to prevent the smuggling of the equipment, which in many cases was confiscated.

One of the benchmarks of Harpoon's activities was to persuade Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank from 2011 to 2019, to take vigorous action against Iran. "Draghi helped us a great deal," Levy notes, adding that the most important development was the decision to deny Iran and its citizens access to the SWIFT international money clearing system. These actions brought Tehran to the negotiating table and led to the signing of the 2015 nuclear deal.

There have also been failed efforts to uncover and scuttle the sources of funding for terrorist organizations. Levy and a senior Shin Bet operative flew to Dubai, for example, to convince its leader to stop funding Hamas. He showed them the door.

"They are the biggest money launderers in the Middle East," Levy says of the Dubai government. "Almost all the companies affiliated with Iran's Revolutionary Guards and its intelligence service have representations and front offices in Dubai, which help them launder money and bypass the sanctions."

You knew the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah well. How deep do you estimate that their corruption runs?

"Imad Mughniyeh was corrupt – he had homes and bank accounts in Damascus and Iran [according to foreign sources, he was assassinated in a joint Mossad-CIA operation in 2008]. Nasrallah, too; he and his family are very wealthy. Nasrallah prefers not to keep his money in banks in Lebanon, because of the sanctions against it and against him, but rather in Syria and Iran."

And Hamas?

"At first the leaders of Hamas behaved modestly, and were certainly far less corrupt than the heads of the PLO. But in recent decades Khaled Meshal and Ismail Haniyeh have become billionaires, with many assets in Qatar, and accounts in that country's largest and most important bank, the National Bank."

And Yahya Sinwar?

"Ditto. Until the current war he had luxurious villas in Gaza, but he also has assets in Qatar and bank accounts there. In short, they and all their families and their children are taken care of."

* * *

Indeed, a dramatic shift had occurred in 2014: Qatar started to send funding to the Gaza Strip. Israel allowed it to bring in suitcases filled with millions in cash, via its ambassador in Ramallah. For his part, Levy retired in 2016 and went on to do a doctorate at Bar-Ilan, writing a dissertation on radical Islam, and got involved in private business ventures. That same year, Yossi Cohen became head of the Mossad. He decided to dismantle Harpoon and to divide its responsibilities between two offices. Meir Ben-Shabbat, who had just taken the helm at the NSC, says he was not involved in that decision, which was authorized by the security cabinet in March 2018. Instead of Harpoon, the Defense Ministry established the National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, now headed by Paul Landes. The defunct unit's other roles, notably gathering and concentrating relevant intelligence information, were transferred to the research department of Military Intelligence.

Cohen declined to respond to Haaretz's question as to why he decided to dismantle the unit. Levy, for one, finds it difficult to understand the rationale for the decision.

"Maybe he wanted to leave a mark by dismantling it and forming new units," he says. "What I do remember is that Yossi always asked me to put in a good word for him with Dagan, who was not only my teacher and mentor, but also a personal friend."

Netanyahu's office declined to comment for this article.