Edited, beaten.

You realize Russian channels whine about it as well right?

They had 420 Gepards, all gone now - with the exception of a handfull museum pieces.

Document From 2022 Reveals Putin’s Punishing Terms for Peace

Archive link - non-pay wall



Excerpt in spoiler
Click To View Spoiler

Alternate link from Kyiv Independent (referencing the WSJ article).
https://kyivindependent.com/wsj-russias-peace-terms-include-ukraine-outside-nato-limited-military-2022-document-shows/

Also, very recently some Russian sources like Fighter-bomber were told by the Russian govt. to stop confirming Russian aircraft losses or else.

The Limitations of India and Russia’s Transactional Relationship
Russia’s isolation, differing approach to multipolarity and closer ties with China make deeper India-Russia relations unlikely.

Thursday, February 22, 2024 / BY: Dr. Jagannath Panda


Since Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it might seem as though ties between India and Russia have strengthened. While much of the West isolated Russia, India-Russia energy trade spiked, and India made efforts to accommodate Russia on the world stage. The two countries have also had visible public exchanges, such as a mid-January phone call between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s trip to Moscow at the end of 2023.

Yet such public displays of bonhomie appear to have mostly enforced transactional trade ties and maintained previous deals, with few new strategic outcomes for the relationship. In the year ahead, how India balances its relationship with Russia will continue to be shaped by Russia’s declining international standing and strengthening relationship with China, India’s growing ties with the United States, and Russia’s evolving role in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia.

Keeping Indian Interests on Top

One of the most notable aspects of the India-Russia relationship after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine was India’s unapologetic purchase of discounted Russian crude oil despite the questions it raised for the U.S.-India relationship.

The leap in crude oil trade helped the total trade between India and Russia reach nearly $50 billion from 2022-2023 — comfortably crossing the two countries’ previous aspiration of reaching $30 billion by 2025. India also exports a growing amount of food and pharmaceutical items to Russia, which are outside the ambit of Western sanctions. Meanwhile, Indian officials have not been shy about emphasizing that it is India’s refinement of Russian crude oil and the subsequent sale of it to other markets — including Europe — that has created some stability in the global oil market.  

In a scenario where Russia remains more or less internationally isolated, this bilateral trade boom stands to increase even further as Russia’s economic ties with India will likely expand from traditional exports to automotive and electronic parts or renewables. And as India seeks to reinvent itself as a major manufacturing hub, a trading powerhouse and an influential services provider, it is likely to look to Russia as an important global market.

But on the other hand, India’s diversification efforts, coupled with long-standing self-reliance goals in defense manufacturing, are slowly bearing fruit. Indian private defense firms will supply equipment to the military worth approximately $7.2 billion over the 2024 and 2025 fiscal years according to a study by the Investment Information and Credit Rating Agency.

The Ukraine war has accelerated this trend, as Russia’s inability to supply equipment (such as the delay in supplying Russian-built frigates and S400 air defense system) has impacted India’s military modernization plans. Even with talks about joint production of defense equipment under the “Make in India” initiative reportedly in progress, the two sides have thus far failed to establish a mutually agreeable payment structure, adding to the challenges. New EU sanctions against Russia target at least one Indian company, introducing new complications for India-Russia trade.

Overall, deeper India-Russia cooperation in other areas of defense — including in nuclear issues — is a high possibility. But India’s diversification strategy may be a barrier for Moscow to draw real-time confidence from India as a defense partner.

Concurrently, India is also prioritizing co-production with technologically advanced “like-minded” states such as the United States, France, the European Union (EU), Israel and South Korea. Its recent cutting-edge technological defense cooperation efforts with the United States and semiconductor collaboration under the framework of EU-India Trade and Technology Council appear promising, with buy-in from each partner. This will not just help India create forward-looking Indo-Pacific mechanisms, but also give momentum to India’s high-tech-oriented manufacturing makeover.

In contrast, the Indian government is rethinking any major new strategic collaborations with Russia amid concerns that it will stall India’s growth and modernization due to current geopolitical constraints on Moscow. This reticence is reflected in India’s recent deals with Russia, including on the Kundankulam nuclear power project, which appear to be extensions of previous deals rather than new projects.

Notably, even India and Russia’s common connectivity project, the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) — which also includes Iran and some Central Asian states, among others — is far from complete. The tensions in South Caucasus, the growing conflict in the Middle East and the Red Sea, and India’s enthusiasm for the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor offer additional reasons to question whether India will place serious emphasis on the INSTC or other connectivity initiatives that require cooperation with Russia.

India’s delicate downgrading of its relationship with Russia — which Moscow is so far acquiescing to — is further exemplified by India forgoing the once-annual prime minister-level summit with Russia while continuing to hold multiple foreign minister-level meetings. India seems to be staying firm to its narrative of “India First,” whether it is buying Russian oil or positioning itself in the Indo-Pacific. But sooner or later, India’s strategic tilt to the West led by Prime Minister Modi’s personal diplomacy — be it with Europe or the United States — is likely to overwhelm the historical, steady relations with Russia.

Much Ado About Multipolar Narratives

On the surface, multilateral cooperation between India and Russia seems robust, especially as Russia plans to host the expanded BRICS summit next year. The two also continue to coordinate positions at the U.N. and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

However, a closer analysis suggests that effective cooperation in multipolar spaces is limited. This has less to do with India’s emerging partnership with the United States and more with India’s rising rivalry with China.

Beijing is a consistent limitation on effective cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi in multilateral forums. Russia and India are engaged in multiple non-Western trilateral and multilateral forums, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Russia-India-China trilateral (RIC). Of these, the RIC has become effectively moribund, particularly since the 2020 border standoff and Galwan clashes between India and China. Russia today simply lacks the capacity to balance the two Asian rivals amid its own growing challenges, including losing strategic influence in its backyard, be it in Central Asia or the South Caucasus.

While the SCO and BRICS have each considered recent expansions, the complexity and fragility of inter-state relations among members, the forums’ limited achievements, and China’s asymmetric dominance have posed problems for both India and Russia. In the SCO, where China’s financial clout over Central Asian states holds sway, Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine has already cost it its traditional influence. India is looking to make bilateral gains in Eurasia, but it cannot match China’s expansive and Belt and Road Initiative-led footprint. Even Russia and India’s combined capabilities are not enough to offset China’s influence in these multilateral forums, at least under the present scenario.

Furthermore — as the recent attacks by Iran against fellow SCO member Pakistan and Argentina’s refusal to join BRICS indicate — forums comprised of largely autocratic, often fickle countries will find it increasingly difficult to bond over larger economic, developmental or technological aims despite the bombastic intent of creating the so-called “post-Western” order.

Within this context, Russia and India’s convergence on multipolarity seems little more than empty rhetoric, their disparate visions for such multipolarity notwithstanding.
For Russia, promoting a multipolar, Eurasia-led world politics against the U.S.-led global order is definitively an anti-West foreign policy goal that would prioritize stable partnerships with both China and India.

India’s vision, in contrast, certainly sees a multipolar Asia as a fight against Western dominance in global institutions — but, importantly, it does not seek to exclude the West entirely, nor does it tap into the China-and-Russia-led anti-West narratives. However, India is known to not hesitate in using anti-West imagery in international financial institutions, particularly if its majoritarian shift or its strategic neutrality is questioned by the West.

Rising Stakes: Russia-China vs. India-U.S. Congruence

For India, its time-tested relationship with Russia has a strong basis in the Cold-War era, particularly in the public eye, where a large portion of Indians view Russia and Putin favorably. In addition to public attitudes, India’s policy approach, which centers around multi-alignment and its Asian-led multipolar vision, prioritizes Russia to maintain the balance vis-à-vis China.

However, India is wary of the emerging partnership between China and Russia and expects Moscow to keep its options open while dealing with China, which is what matters to India. Meanwhile, Russia’s growing hostilities with the West; its increasing economic and security cooperation with China; and its declining clout in mediating India-China disputes have lessened India’s ambitions and interests in the relationship. India has simultaneously reinvigorated its ties with the West both bilaterally and through minilateral mechanisms like the Quad.

Two years since the start of the war in Ukraine, India is still unlikely to play ball in the West’s attempts to isolate Russia. However, stability in the Indo-Pacific is a core foreign policy driver for a politically and technologically ambitious India — a desire that is likely to push it toward a closer embrace of the West. As a result, the transactional ties with Russia will have its limitations and will not affect India’s growing ties with the United States.

Therefore, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a decided — although not always immediately apparent — shift in the profile and trajectory of India-Russia relations. Regardless of their deep-rooted historical connections, India is increasingly prioritizing its own interests, which include a delicate balancing vis-à-vis Russia. While it continues to engage with Moscow on the economic, defense and multilateral fronts — as well as a potential counterbalance to China — New Delhi is now more cautious in its approach toward Russia. The degree and speed of India’s shift away from Russia is indeterminate. Moving forward, Russia will be less central in Indian foreign policy, with the primary focus instead being strategic maintenance rather than elevating relations.

Dr. Jagannath Panda is the head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Sweden and a senior fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies in The Netherlands.

https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/limitations-india-and-russias-transactional-relationship

Mistakes were made.

Yep. And the way they are confirming them is they haven’t been calling bullshit on the public cheering by Ukraine each time.

Some of those channels want to be honest about loses to help or pressure leadership to keep their guys safe. They wanted people to know loses and while they may stop doing free BDA for ukraine it seems they aren’t refuting g Ukraines claims either.

Excellent.

+1 Appreciate the extra analysis.

Here is how I think the Taurus Call got intercepted:

The recording starts from what appears to be a call between two people, over telephone, and one is pulling this call into a conference call.

I believe the recording is from the two people talking on a cellphone conference,…

C Schmitz  (@chrisschmitz) March 1, 2024

Yep, I'm having the same thoughts when I see the numbers of destroyed material on both sides.

When the mud season is over, the Orcs will push with everything they have.

The 25mm gun turns cover into concealment, then it turns the concealment into dust and leaves Orcs' broken bodies strewn everywhere.

??The moment when the \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6JDAM air bomb hit the location of the \uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFARussian military at the Avdiivka coke plant pic.twitter.com/Y9odpq7QbB

— \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukrainian Front (@front_ukrainian) March 1, 2024

Germany: We barely have a military and what we have doesn't work.

\uD83D\uDD25Our pilot shoots down an enemy drone, remains in the air, accompanies another, dropping a powerful ammunition on an enemy dugout, and both successfully return home. Zaporozhye direction. Jaguar Battalion.??#UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar #UkraineWarNews pic.twitter.com/WPuVNLeang

— ?? Hunter UA ? \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@UaCoins) March 1, 2024

Big Trouble in Little Transnistria

It was a surreal scene, one that evoked the Kremlin parlor game that preceded Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. First, Vadim Krasnoselsky—the leader of the pro-Russian microstate of Transnistria, sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine—called for an extraordinary session of the Congress of Deputies in mid-February.

The assembly hadn’t convened in 18 years, since George W. Bush was president of the United States, but Krasnoselsky said it was urgent: The tiny Black Sea country of Moldova, which Transnistria broke away from after a brief war in the early 1990s—was putting social and economic pressure on it and “violating the rights” of Transnistrians. On Jan. 1, Moldova imposed new customs duties on imports to and exports from Transnistria.

On Wednesday, that meeting finally took place, just one day before Russian President Vladimir Putin’s yearly state of the nation speech. One by one, lawmakers raised their hands to vote in favor of a resolution calling for Russia to come to their aid. Like the Ukrainian pro-Russian separatist republics in the Donbas, they said they wanted protection

And although the lawmakers stopped short of asking for Russia to annex the territory, the vote immediately sparked concerns in the West that Putin might do just that.

“Given Russia’s increasingly aggressive role in Europe, we are watching Russia’s actions in Transnistria and the broader situation there very closely,” U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said on Wednesday.

Response. Putin hasn’t taken the bait so far. Coughing through the last lines of his speech, a day before dissident Alexei Navalny’s funeral is set to take place in Moscow, Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons if Western nations put military boots on the ground in Ukraine, but he did not say anything about annexing Transnistria—or mention it at all.

Viorel Ursu, Moldova’s ambassador to the United States, told SitRep in a text message that separatist authorities in Transnistria have made requests for help from Russia at least three times in the past two years, including twice when they were in Moscow. He also seemed less concerned that annexation would happen.

“The assumptions regarding request for annexation—largely spread in the press before the event—were in fact well-placed disinformation and [an] example of panic-generating informational pressure on Moldova,” Ursu said. “I believe the main reason behind this congress was to remind Russia that they still exist and to ask for more funding from the Kremlin.”

Maria Zakharova, Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, accused Moldova and the West of needlessly stoking tensions with speculation about a possible Russian annexation. “NATO is literally trying to shape another Ukraine,” she said.

But the breakaway province’s leaders are appealing to Russia using the same kind of rhetoric that the Kremlin used to justify its invasion of Ukraine: that Moscow has a duty to protect Russian speakers. Transnistria’s Congress of Deputies called on Russia’s two houses of parliament to “protect Transnistria in the face of increasing pressure” from Moldova given that “more than 220,000 Russian citizens permanently reside in the region.” Earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said he was “concerned” about Russian citizens in Transnistria.

Flash point. For more than three decades, Transnistria has been considered a possible flash point for a conflict in Russia’s near-abroad. About the geographic size of Anchorage, Alaska, with a population about the size of that of New Orleans, Louisiana, it has hosted small legions of Russian troops since its war in the ’90s.

So it wouldn’t be a huge swath of territory to occupy should Putin decide to annex it. But as Russia’s military is recuperating amid the war in Ukraine, and with Putin planning to swell the ranks to 1.3 million troops, officials and experts caution that it would still be a heavy lift.

Russia has 1,500 soldiers in Transnistria, the remnants of the former 14th Guards Army that was based in Moldova when it was a Soviet territory. Mihai Popsoi, the former speaker of the Moldovan parliament who is now the country’s top diplomat, told SitRep in October that many of the troops are Moldovan passport holders, keen to earn an extra buck.

“They haven’t rotated since 2014-2015, after the annexation of Crimea,” Popsoi said. “Given that they haven’t rotated, their military capability is questionable.”

Moldovan officials estimate that the Russians have stashed about 22,000 tons of Soviet-era ammunition in Transnistria, making it the largest repository of Soviet-grade ammo in Eastern Europe.

There are also about 300 to 400 Ukrainian and Moldovan peacekeepers in the breakaway province, a mission that the Moldovan government has been trying to shutter to transition to a civilian job.

Ursu said that while his country’s government expects more harsh rhetoric from Tiraspol, the Transnistrian capital, Moldova doesn’t anticipate significant changes on the ground.

Spoiler alert. But even if Putin doesn’t act on Transnistria’s call for aid, the Kremlin could still act as a spoiler in Moldova’s upcoming elections, which are expected to take place in the fall. Moldova’s pro-Western government previously warned of a coup plot led by the now-deceased Yevgeny Prigozhin and his mercenary Wagner Group.

“We are likely to see more of this type of action in the coming months,” Ursu said, referring to this week’s vote in Transnistria, “in order to instill fear and uncertainty in Moldova and in this way to shape the outcome of presidential elections and of the EU referendum.”

Moldova is trying to insulate itself. The defense budget has moved from 0.3 to 0.55 percent of GDP, and Moldova is investing in new radars to ward off Russian infringement of its airspace. It has European Union aspirations. It has boosted military spending by nearly 70 percent—but it’s still under 1 percent of the country’s GDP.

Popsoi, in his new job as foreign minister and first deputy prime minister, told SitRep at the Munich Security Conference earlier this month that Moldovan officials have seen evidence of Russian disinformation and sabotage, including bribing and intimidating voters. And the Moldovans are building a new strategic government communications center charged with identifying and stanching Russian narratives and malign influence.

“The Russians are relying on proxies that they have in the Moldovan political system, some fugitive oligarchs that are outside of the country that are using the money that they’ve stolen from the Moldovan people and probably Russian money as well to undermine the democratic process in Moldova,” Popsoi said. The goal for Russia is “ideally for them, [to] change the government and have a Russian and anti-Ukrainian government, anti-Western government.”

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/29/breakaway-transnistria-asks-for-russian-aid/

I wish for once the west would jump Russias shit.

We all know what’s going on there…..they think the west won’t move u til forced to (which has been true in many instances).

Ukraine needs to get weepy little Moldova and assure them they will wipe out the Russians there and then just do it.

Wreck Russias timeline.

We're at a point in which the Russians smell blood in the water, and likely feel they can get the rest of the Donbas, if not more (Dnipro, Kharkiv, and maybe even Odessa). They likely feel this way due to the state of Western aid and the issues with the Ukrainian mobilization system. Now is the time for the Russians to push, push, push. However, it's dangerous for them, because if the UAF manages to hold on long enough for their mobilization system to be fixed and for them to truly feel the impact of increased Western production capacity, the Russians run the risk of taking monumental losses, degrading their own capabilities, not achieving war winning territorial goals, and facing a reinvigorated enemy. It's also possible that they grind down the UAF over the course of 2024 and secure significant territorial gains. There's lots of factors at play here, and these are really dangerous times for both sides.

What Su-34 doing shenanigans

\uD83C\uDFB5 Every Time We Touch by Cascada \uD83C\uDFB6 pic.twitter.com/UlEwbsQAMH

— ZeroGravity Fella\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 (@6ZeroGravity9) March 1, 2024

What do you do with 191bn frozen euros owned by Russia?
The question that now confronts Western policymakers

Feb 28th 2024

In economic terms, an asset has value because an owner might derive future benefits from it. Some assets, like cryptocurrencies, require a collective belief in those benefits. Others, like wine, will undeniably provide future pleasure, such as the ability to savour a 1974 Château Margaux. Still others, like American treasuries, represent a claim on the government of the strongest economy in the world, backed by a formidable legal system.

To derive such benefits, however, an owner must be able to access their assets. And that is where the Central Bank of Russia struggles. Much like every other central bank, the cbr stores reserve assets abroad. After Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the g7 froze these assets and prohibited financial firms from moving them. Of the €260bn ($282bn) of Russia’s assets immobilised in Japan and the West, some €191bn are held at Euroclear, a clearing-house in Belgium. When coupon payments on Russia’s assets come due or bonds are redeemed, Euroclear puts the cash into a bank account. This account is now home to roughly €132bn. Last year it earned a return of €4.4bn, which conveniently belongs to Euroclear, as per the clearing-house’s terms and conditions.

Western policymakers are now considering whether these assets can be used to help Ukraine. Russia might one day have to compensate the country for war damages, which the World Bank already puts at more than $480bn. Ukraine now needs money and weapons to push back Russian advances, as well as to maintain its state and economy. At the same time, Western governments are increasingly struggling to find room in their budgets to support the war effort, as well as to get approval from legislatures for such spending. On February 26th Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign minister, once again argued that Russia’s assets should be confiscated. A day later Janet Yellen, America’s treasury secretary, called on her colleagues “to unlock the value” of those funds. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, wants to use Euroclear’s windfall to buy military kit for Ukraine.

How exactly could this be done? Taking assets from someone usually requires a court order, but in international law things are a little more complicated. The International Court of Justice would only be able to rule on the matter should Ukraine and Russia agree to let it decide upon reparations, which is unlikely at present. The un Security Council has the ability to pass binding resolutions, over which Russia unfortunately holds a veto.

Some, including Lawrence Summers, a former American treasury secretary, want to make use of states’ right to take so-called countermeasures. These are otherwise unlawful actions that are sometimes allowed in response to unlawful acts. That Ukraine is entitled to deploy countermeasures is undisputed. How broadly the same rules apply to those acting in support of Ukraine is more controversial. Sanctions and asset freezes fall under the category, and have been widely used against Russia. Asset confiscations do not, at least in most interpretations of international law. That is because they are irreversible and would seek to punish Russia, not induce a change in its behaviour.

As Lee Buchheit, a veteran of international law, notes, the problem reflects a geographical mismatch. Ukraine has strong claims on Russia, but no frozen Russian assets it could use to settle them. The West has no claims but plenty of assets. Thus the challenge is to find a way to match these assets and claims.

In a recent paper, Mr Buchheit and co-authors suggest just such a way. They argue that the West could provide a loan to Ukraine, in return for which Ukraine could offer its claims on Russia as collateral. The West would agree to use only this collateral for redemption of the loan. When Russia inevitably refuses to pay up, the West would then be able to foreclose on the collateral.

Would this work? One difficulty is that an international body would still have to determine precisely how much Ukraine is owed. Perhaps the un General Assembly could enlist the World Bank to crunch the numbers. But this would require careful diplomacy on behalf of the West, as well as the support of France and Germany, which have so far been unimpressed by suggestions involving creative interpretations of international law. Mr Buchheit argues the shift in approach is not quite as big as it might appear at first. The West has already gone quite far by freezing assets and making clear that it will not give them back unless reparations are paid. As he notes: “Russia won’t pay reparations. War reparations are paid by the vanquished to the victor, and this situation does not end with the Ukrainian flag flying over the Kremlin.” In effect, he argues, the West has already taken the assets.

A second difficulty is posed by Belgium, which has access to most frozen Russian assets and would therefore need to receive most of the claims against Russia from Ukraine. It might be reluctant to play such a pivotal role, given the potential for retribution. It would also be unfair to expect a country of its size to be the main provider of the initial loan to Ukraine. In order to overcome this difficulty, Mr Buchheit suggests that the initial loan to Ukraine is set up in a syndicated manner with a sharing clause, which would enable lending countries to group together both when providing the money and receiving collateral. Such an approach was adopted to fund emerging-market governments in the 1970 and 1980s before bond-financing markets took over. Just as is the case now, a mechanism was needed to share risk and access to collateral.

Gold rush
But perhaps, after all the debate, there is no need to seize Russian assets. Indeed, the eu is already planning to implement a windfall tax on any profits they accrue. If returns continue to be siphoned off indefinitely, the difference between confiscating the asset and a windfall tax becomes smaller and smaller. In economic terms, the West is already the owner of Russia’s assets. All that is left now is to fund Ukraine’s fight. ■

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/02/28/what-do-you-do-with-191bn-frozen-euros-owned-by-russia

What does escalation look like?

Thoughts?

Footage of Ukrainian Air Force Su-27 Flankers and MiG-29 Fulcrums conducting SEAD strikes with US-supplied AGM-88 HARMs. pic.twitter.com/7mpiKJlNdR

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) March 1, 2024

A good first step towards block 0, now order 400 more

I guess I understand now all the "Chipi chipi chapa chapa" posts on Twitter when a Russian plane gets shot down.