Investigation into killing of Israeli hostages by IDF reveals a string of errors and flaws
The military investigation concludes that the soldiers and senior commanders operating in the area were not informed of a building found two days before the incident on which the words 'Help, 3 hostages' and 'SOS' were painted

An investigation into the incident in which three Israeli hostages in Gaza who escaped Hamas captivity were shot dead by Israeli soldiers uncovers a string of errors and flaws in the operation of and coordination between IDF forces in the Shujaiyeh neighborhood of Gaza City.

The soldier who shot the three Israeli hostages Samer al-Talalka, Yotam Haim and Alon Shamriz confirmed that he saw them carrying a white cloth, but did not have time to "make sense" of the situation.

Other soldiers opened fire at Haim and killed him, in violation of an explicit order which, they say, they "did not fully understand," after their commander called on the hostage to emerge from the building he had run into.

The military investigation determined that the soldiers and senior commanders operating in the area were not aware of the possibility that hostages might be held there. They were likewise not informed of a building discovered in the area on which the words "Help, 3 hostages" and "SOS" were painted.

The force that operated in the Shujaiyeh suburb belongs to the IDF's Battalion 17. It consisted of cadets from a squad commanders' course in the IDF's Infantry School (Brigade 828), who were inducted into the army's Golani brigade six months prior.

According to sources familiar with the matter, the battalion entered the Gaza Strip after the war broke out, following pressure by the brigade commander to integrate them in combat missions.

The force was first sent to lie in ambush in a hen house that had previously been struck by the Israeli military and still contained dead animals. The battalion was subsequently returned to Israel after soldiers suffered vomiting and diarrhea.

In the following weeks, the battalion was stationed in an outpost near Kibbutz Nahal Oz, close to the Gaza border. According to soldiers' parents, they were mainly stationary at the site, in their armored vehicles.

Another source told Haaretz that the soldiers were supposed to return to the infantry school or to a location farther from the border, out of concern that they were in danger at their current location. The soldiers insisted on remaining in place and were backed by the brigade's commanders.

Two weeks before the hostages were shot, the army's Division 36 lead an extensive operation to take over the Shujaiyeh neighborhood. The operation included forces from the Golani and Kfir brigades, as well as armored forces.

On December 13, a day before the hostages were killed, drones identified a building in the area on which the hostage's pleas for help were scrawled. As far as is known, the command post dealing with hostages and missing persons, headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Nitzan Alon, was not informed of this.

Commanders in the area marked the building as dangerous, possibly serving to lure soldiers into an attack. Commanders later said they had encountered a similar situation, presenting a piece of paper with the word "help" they claim was found at a tunnel entrance.

In that case, adjacent houses were searched, but no hostages were found, leading commanders to think it had been a trap. Military sources told Haaretz that such a document was found by soldiers in Brigade 188, but this information wasn't passed on to Nitzan Alon's headquarters either. The nearby tunnel was not searched, and it was not determined whether the notice was a trap.

The day after the building holding the hostages was identified, part of the Kfir brigade was moved elsewhere, as the army was preparing to complete the takeover of Shujaiyeh.

That evening, at 9:30 P.M., they were replaced by a force from Battalion 17, which was tasked with guarding a supply route. They stayed in an open area where the houses had been mostly demolished by the IDF, and those that remained intact houses were manned by soldiers.

At 9:00 on Friday morning, one of the soldiers went to the third floor of an adjacent building to observe the surrounding area. He was armed with a rifle with telescopic sights, meant to allow precise identification before firing. Other soldiers were staying in the building's second floor.

At 9:46, the soldier identified three figures he considered suspicious, emerging from a house 500 meters away. Between them was another building, making it difficult to target the soldiers.

The order of events that led to the hostages' killing

The soldier fired three rapid shots, killing al-Talalka and Shamriz and wounding Yotam Haim. He later testified that 'for a split second' he noticed that the three were not wearing shirts and were waving a white cloth, but he didn't understand that they were trying to give themselves up to the IDF.

Haim fell to the ground but managed to get up and enter another building, 20 meters from where the soldiers were, crying "help!" Meanwhile, the battalion commander ordered, by shouting and over the radio, for his soldiers to desist from firing.

The commander, who saw the two dead men, called on Haim to come out of the building. He again told the soldiers not to shoot the wounded man or approach him, in case it was an attempt to lure soldiers.

At 9:49, two soldiers noticed Haim moving and opened fire, in spite of their commander's order. The hostage was killed instantly. The investigation determined that the order to hold fire was heard clearly, but the soldiers claimed that they hadn't understood the order, thinking it was a temporary order, meant to enable them to listen and ensure there was no enemy fire in the area.

When the shooting stopped, Engineer Corps soldiers were summoned to ensure that the bodies were not booby-trapped. The battalion commander suspected that Haim was Israeli when he saw the body, and the three bodies were sent for examination, where their identities were determined.

An investigation by the force's brigade commander showed that information collected by Alon's headquarters about hostages in the area was unknown to the soldiers or to senior divisional commanders. One lesson from the incident is that such information must henceforth reach every single soldier.

It was further argued that soldiers were not sure about the rules of engagement, especially with regard to unarmed men, even though the IDF is operating in a densely populated area, calling on Hamas fighters to surrender.

Another lesson is that "more alertness to unarmed civilians is required, especially when carrying white flags or wearing partial clothing." One source told Haaretz that this was a puzzling conclusion, since hundreds of civilians and Hamas fighters had surrendered in the preceding days.

"It's unclear how the investigation says that there were no similar cases of surrender or that the forces did not know how to handle such cases," said the source.

A further conclusion is that "commanders at all levels should be aware that other hostages may free themselves and search for a way to link up with our forces." This too is problematic.

Ron Krivoi, who was held by Hamas, said after his release that he had temporarily escaped, and another hostage may also have escaped for a short while, so that IDF soldiers should have already been prepared for such an event.

Battalion chief told hostage to approach; when he did, a soldier shot him, probe finds

The Israel Defense Forces on Thursday published its final findings of a probe into the mistaken killing of three Israeli hostages by troops in Gaza City’s Shejaiya neighborhood earlier this month, saying forces on the ground did not have “sufficient awareness” of the possibility that troops would encounter Hamas-held captives while not engaged in a special operation to rescue them, despite the army having intelligence of possible hostages in the area.

The soldiers involved in the incident were not expected to be dismissed or to stand trial due to their actions.

The three hostages killed by troops were Yotam Haim, Samar Talalka and Alon Lulu Shamriz.

The probe, conducted by the head of Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman, found that on December 15 during “intense fighting” in Shejaiya, a soldier of the Bislamach Brigade’s 17th Battalion opened fire at three figures he had wrongly identified as a threat, killing two, while the third fled to a nearby building.

Commanders at the scene called on the soldiers to cease their fire in order for the third figure to be identified. Some 15 minutes later, the battalion commander heard someone shouting from the building “Help” and “They are shooting at me” in Hebrew, and again ordered troops to halt their fire, while shouting back at the figure: “Come my way.”

The third man — later confirmed to be Haim — came out of the building toward the troops, but two soldiers who, according to the probe, had not heard the commander’s order due to noise from a nearby tank, shot and killed the hostage.

The IDF said that based on its analysis and aerial footage, the three hostages were shirtless and one was waving a makeshift white flag as they initially approached the forces. The probe says the position from which the first soldier opened fire at the hostages gave him limited vision of the trio.

After the gunfire, commanders at the scene sent the men’s bodies to Israel for identification.

Before the incident, on December 10, the IDF said troops found a note next to a tunnel shaft in Shejaiya, reading “Help” in Hebrew. It said that next to the note was an ID card belonging to a Hamas operative. The note was taken for examination, but the probe said there was no information linking it to the presence of hostages in the Shejaiya area, and troops assessed it was an attempt by Hamas to lure them into an ambush.

IDF Spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari in a press conference Thursday said the three hostages had been held in that tunnel.

“We estimate that due to our ground operation in Shejaiya, the terrorists holding the hostages came out from underground and moved to a hideout building,” Hagari said.

Also on December 10, troops of the Golani Brigade’s reconnaissance unit operating in Shejaiya raided several buildings to locate Hamas gunmen and weapons. In one building that the troops breached, a dog of the Oketz canine unit was sent in, after which a gun battle broke out between Hamas operatives and Golani soldiers.

The Golani troops returned fire, killing at least one Hamas gunman. The Oketz dog was also killed in the battle.

Amid the fighting, Golani commanders heard shouting of “Help” and “Hostages” in Hebrew from the building, but the troops believed it was an attempt by Hamas to lure them into an ambush.

Combat engineers with the Golani force also suspected the building was booby-trapped, and the troops did not enter further into the building.

“Some of the forces heard the cries but suspected it was an attempt by the terrorists to draw the forces inside the building to harm them, as had happened in the past,” the probe said.

The IDF said the forces left the building and directed an attack helicopter and tanks to strike the building. In the strikes, at least five Hamas operatives were believed to have been killed.

Only on December 18, when troops scanned the building where the gun battle had taken place and recovered the camera on the Oketz dog, did the military find that it had recorded the three hostages’ cries for help. The three were not seen in the video, only heard.

“At the end of the battle, after the terrorists holding the hostages were killed, the hostages likely fled the building,” the probe said.

On December 14, a day before the deadly shooting, signs written in Hebrew reading “SOS” and “Help, 3 hostages” were identified in drone footage on the side of a building around 200 meters from where the incident with the canine took place. “Near the building, blue barrels were spotted commonly found in rigged locations forces had encountered in the Shejaiya area, thus it was suspected as a trap,” the probe said.

The IDF said the investigation revealed that commanders involved had information about the presence of Israeli hostages in the Shejaiya area, “and even took actions to prevent strikes on locations suspected of having hostages inside.”

As part of the assessments on the issue, special forces were prepared in every combat zone, immediately available for intervention in case a force identified a building with hostages inside, it said.

But “in this case, there was no intelligence about either building where the hostages were.”

The probe added that “there was insufficient awareness among the forces in the field regarding cases of hostages reaching IDF forces, or regarding forces encountering hostages during the clearing of buildings as part of combat and not as part of a special operation to free hostages.

“IDF soldiers involved in the incident had experienced complex combat situations in the days preceding the incident and were in a state of high alert for a threat. During the battles, they encountered deceptions by the enemy and attempts to draw them into shafts and buildings rigged with explosives,” the probe concluded.

IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi in a statement said the shooting of Haim, Talaka and Shamriz was a “grave event with very grave outcomes.”

“The IDF failed in its mission to rescue the hostages in this event,” he said.

“The entire chain of command feels responsible for this grave event, regrets this outcome, and shares in the grief of the families of the three hostages,” Halevi said in his conclusion of the probe.

Halevi said the shooting of the hostages “could have been prevented” but that “there was no malice in the event,” and that the soldiers believed they were acting correctly in the moment.

“The shooting at the hostages should not have occurred. This shooting did not match up to the risk and the situation. However, it was carried out under complex circumstances, and in intense combat conditions under a prolonged threat,” he said.

The chief of staff also emphasized “the utmost importance of adhering to open-fire regulations.”

“In a situation where there is no immediate threat and the identification is not a clear enemy, there is a need for a moment of examination before firing, given the opportunity. This action is necessary to prevent, among other things, incidents of our forces firing at our forces. In this case, the three hostages were not moving threateningly and held up a white flag; therefore, it was appropriate to confirm the identification before firing. The pressure conditions and operational environment made it difficult for the soldiers to implement these aspects,” Halevi said.

“We, the commanders, must ensure that the operational instructions are clear, and that forces’ actions in the field take into account use of soldiers’ and commanders’ discretion. The open-fire regulations are necessary, and they are also intended to protect us, so that we do not kill our own forces. They determine and impact fateful decisions, as happened in this event,” he added.

Halevi also instructed all commanders to review the probe and raise awareness for hostages among forces, including possible locations, their photographs and other various findings about them.

Responding to a question, Hagari said Thursday it was not possible to judge “what was going through the soldiers’ heads when they carried out the shooting.”

“The fighting includes very difficult and complex moments. After days of encountering explosives, seeing friends die, getting shot at with RPGs, and encountering gunmen in civilian clothing without weapons trying to lure you to bombs in the streets — in this situation, a soldier had limited vision and made an error,” he said.

“He opened fire in error, this needs to be said. But still, he saw, and reported truthfully after the gunfire that one of them was holding a white flag, he spoke the truth,” Hagari said.

“This is an operational investigation to draw lessons, nothing further,” he added.

The probe was also shared with the families of Haim, Talaka and Shamriz, the IDF said.

Hostage Yotam Haim, 28, was a drummer for the heavy metal band Persephore. He was last seen in a video he took on the morning of October 7, showing himself in the front door of his Kfar Aza home, before he was abducted to Gaza.

Samar Talalka, 22, from Hura, was working in the Kibbutz Nir Am hatchery, where he often did the weekend shifts, when Hamas terrorists stormed the kibbutz.

Alon Lulu Shamriz, 26, a computer engineering student, was abducted from his Kibbutz Kfar Aza home on October 7.