[ARCHIVED THREAD] - The new USMC Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR)...here is the full story behind this mystery program (Page 1 of 2)
Posted: 1/10/2009 7:09:27 PM EDT
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No Cliff Notes for this! A lot to read, yes, but interesting.
link Automatic Rifle Concept: Part I—History and Empirical Testing by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby ‘Those German units fortunate enough to have officers who understood the effect of modern firepower went into battle in dispersed skirmish lines, with as many as six meters between each man and with each man granted the freedom to make use of whatever cover was available during his forward movement.’1 —Bruce Gudmundsson Stormtroop Tactics The relationship between the lethality of weapons and the dispersion of the troops found on the same battlefield has been a consideration for commanders since man first engaged in combat. From the Spartan phalanx to German stormtroop operations, combat leaders have been forced to adjust their tactics to the technology of the day. The dispersion of the troops has always been a critical aspect of the tactics employed. As the lethality of weapons has increased so has the dispersion necessary to preserve combat power. History Throughout history, advances in technology have driven tactical changes. As smaller units of combatants have gained greater firepower, dispersion has become a critical function of survivability on the battlefield. Dispersion is not merely a function of physical distance between elements but also incorporates the elements of mobility, command, and control. One end of the spectrum of dispersion is a massed armed force in physical contact, slow to move, and under the direct observation and control of its senior leader. The opposite end of the spectrum is a force of individual skirmishers moving quickly and guided only by a general intent. Commanders have continually adjusted the deployment of their forces in order to most effectively bring fire to bear on the enemy while simultaneously attempting to minimize the effects of enemy fire on their own forces. The combatants of World War I learned a number of lessons as they attempted to resolve how to increase dispersion in the face of increased firepower, while still maintaining some type of control over their squads and platoons. By increasing the training standards of the individual soldier they hoped to enable themselves to decentralize command and increase dispersion.2 Better trained soldiers could operate more effectively without direct supervision. Realizing that coordinated rushes drew fire, soldiers began advancing using stealth, microterrain, and individual rushes.3 The development of a light machinegun and trench mortar—fielded at the squad level—increased the unit’s firepower without having to resort to linear formations of riflemen.4 Without the need to “build up the skirmish line,” squads could maneuver freely, furthering dispersion while maintaining offensive momentum.5 By the beginning of World War II almost all combatants possessed squad organizations built around light machineguns and automatic rifles (ARs). Armies fielded units capable of the dispersion necessary to survive and operate on this new, more expansive battlefield in both offensive and defensive operations. As World War II progressed, American Army and Marine Corps squads focused on gaining further firepower that improved their survivability and allowed for further dispersion and movement. Army experiences in the bocage country of Normandy and the woods of the Huertgen forest led to two and even three Browning ARs (BARs) at the squad level. The American “light” machinegun—a water-cooled, .30 caliber model—could not be used in the assault due to its weight.6 The Marine Corps developed the fire team concept. As early as the Corps’ Nicaragua experience, Marines recognized the need for a squad-level automatic weapon.7 Through World War I and into the Pacific campaigns of World War II, Marine Corps squad development continually evolved toward smaller maneuver elements, each armed with an AR. In keeping with the “triangle” concept, the Corps finished World War II with the 3 fire team, 13-man squad still utilized today.8 By Vietnam the Marine Corps rifle squad lost the BAR as an AR largely due to logistical, vice tactical, concerns.9 Attempts to replace the BAR with a modified M14, a never fielded M15, or the M60 medium machinegun proved to be failures.10 After the Vietnam War the Marine Corps led development of the M16A2 to replace the M16A1. However, with the loss of the M16A1’s full automatic capability, even the fiction of an AR at the fire team and squad level disappeared.11 As the M16A2 was fielded the Marine Corps searched for an available weapons system to fill in the AR void. While some testing apparently occurred, the vagaries of the contracting system and the urgency of fielding demands led to the selection of the FN Minimi light machinegun—the M249 squad automatic weapon (and the introduction of the term “SAW” to the Marine Corps lexicon).12 The Assessment The relationship between lethality and dispersion has recently come under scrutiny in the context of a debate over the role of the M249 SAW within the Marine rifle squad and the need for a true automatic weapon in the infantry. Two articles will discuss the role of the M249 SAW, the need for a true automatic weapon in the infantry, and the constrained reorganization of the infantry company to best utilize the strengths of organic weapons systems. This article will address the relationship between lethality and dispersion, examine the historical background of the AR, and provide the results of a 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) sponsored assessment of three ARs and the M249 SAW. In May 2001 the 1st MarDiv commissioned a study tasking 2d Battalion, 7th Marines to execute a quantitative and qualitative assessment of several AR candidates alongside the M249 SAW. The objective of this assessment was twofold: • Determine if the AR is more effective than the SAW in an operational environment during day, low-light, and night in selected offensive and defensive operations. • Evaluate the SAW through organizational change by considering constrained reorganization that will experiment with a SAW consolidation within the infantry squad and platoon. Once the quantitative results were obtained (detailed results are included in this article), the battalion attempted to answer the following two questions: • Will the inclusion of the AR in the infantry squad and the consolidation of the SAW at the squad level enhance the effectiveness of the platoon? • Will the inclusion of the AR in the infantry squad and the consolidation of the SAW at the platoon level enhance the effectiveness of the company? In attempting to answer the two questions above, several other questions were generated that created more debate on the utility of the SAW and its role in the battalion and the role of the AR in the fire team. The debate centered on the following: • Should the M249 be replaced outright or have its role tailored to meet its capabilities (light machinegun or AR)? • Can the historical progression of increased lethality be forwarded and, if so, how? • How or should the Marine Corps rifle squad and platoon be organized to maximize strengths and minimize weaknesses of the SAW, increase dispersion in the face of the new lethality that might be developed with more automatic weapons in the rifle squads, and take advantage of new technologies? Before the assessment began the following generally held weapons definitions were adopted. A machinegun is a weapon possessing interchangeable barrels in order to allow continuous high-volume fires. The high volumes are achieved by using belt-fed ammunition. The machinegun will have an effective range beyond that of rifles as impacts of rounds can be directed onto targets by other members of the machinegun team. An AR will be designed around the battle rifle of the infantry (currently the M16A2) but may come with a heavy barrel to retard heat buildup. It will be magazine fed and possess the capacity to be employed in a fully automatic role. The effective range of the AR should be comparable to the rifle. According to Chuck Taylor, author of The Fighting Rifle: The automatic rifle is a small arm intended for short-term automatic fire missions against point targets. It is incapable of sustained automatic fire due to the lack of a quick-change barrel, which in turn, causes overheating, and the removal of the weapon from serviceable status. The AR is also fed from a detachable box magazine, not a belt, as is a true machine gun. Automatic rifles are NOT machine guns!13 An AR should be employed by an individual shooter and used in close combat. The AR, with its lower rate of fire, buffer spring, and greatly reduced recoil, gives added advantage of accuracy and shooter endurance. Unlike a light machinegun, an AR is designed to engage point or small area targets. It is intended to be a “mobile base of fire” around which the fire team maneuvers. The AR provides the maneuver element itself with an organic, moving volume of fire in the attack. Only infantry could gain ground. To make possible the advance of infantry in such circumstances required that some weapon, dominant in its firepower, readily mobile, extremely accurate at short range, capable of being handled by one man and easily concealed, should be available to fill in the gap between the lifting of the artillery barrage and the moment at which the arme blanche could be used.14 Based on the generally held weapons definitions adopted, three ARs were acquired off-the-shelf to participate in the assessment with the M249 SAW. These three weapons were the Colt AR, the Ultimax 100 (manufactured by Singapore Arms), and the Heckler & Koch (HK) G36. The Weapons The Colt is a variant of the current M16A2 with the exact same sights and commonality of parts. The Colt AR weighs 15 pounds—8 more pounds than the M16A2. The additional weight is due primarily to a heavy barrel intended to retard heat buildup. Other alterations include a pistol grip attached to the fore end, a hydraulic buffer to retard recoil and rise, and a design change enabling the automatic variant to fire from the open bolt, reducing the possibility of cookoffs from excessive heat buildup. The Colt has a rate of fire of 650 rounds per minute. The Ultimax 100 is similar in look to the M249 SAW. Like the SAW it fires from the open bolt but does not possess a spare barrel and is fed by magazine only. Because it weighs only 9 pounds, shooters can easily employ the Ultimax in a variety of methods. An adjustable gas regulator with 3 settings allows for a rate of fire varying from 450 to 600 rounds per minute. The HK is a lightweight rifle capable of being fired in a fully automatic role from the closed bolt. The version tested had optical sights with an over/under system. The lower sight system has a 3.5 magnified scope with multiple crosshairs. The upper system was an aim point dot variation for limited visibility shooting. Total weight of the weapons system tested was 7 pounds. The rate of fire is 650 rounds per minute. Testing Phase I began 21 July 2001 with the receipt of the test bed of ARs. Forty-eight Marines en route to the battalion from their recent graduation at the School of Infantry were selected as the test bed shooters in order to eliminate as much preexisting bias concerning the SAW as possible. The tradeoff for using new Marines was a lack of marksmanship understanding and a failure to grasp open-bolt firing concepts. The 48 Marines were divided into four 12-man squads labeled A, B, C, and D. Marines in each squad were then numbered 1 through 12. Each squad was armed with one of the four weapons systems (Colt, HK, Ultimax, and SAW). Each weapon was then zeroed to the individual shooter. Once a weapon was zeroed to a specific Marine, the other three Marines in his number series would shoot for an offset aim point; i.e., shooter A1 zeroed the SAW and then shooters B1, C1, and D1 used offset aim points for the SAW. All number one shooters would shoot all four of the number one weapons on each test. This allowed a much quicker transition from weapon to weapon throughout the test. Class SAW Colt Ultimax HK 1st 2 7 1 2 2d 8 19 10 6 3d 19 12 12 7 4th 19 10 25 33 Table 1. Test 1 results. Eight separate tests were designed to assess the accuracy of the three AR candidates and the SAW in various operational situations. The main focus of these tests was to determine if the ARs were more accurate than the SAW in various attitudes, ranges, and conditions. Test 1 was the M249 SAW paper qualification course fired from 36 yards. The purpose of this test was to use the M249’s strongest event to establish a baseline for comparison. The other weapons would compete against the SAW in its most favored environment. The most accurate weapon for this event was the Colt and the least accurate the HK. Table 1 shows that shooters using the Colt qualified in the first or second class two and a half times higher than shooters using the other weapons. Test 2 was a quick-kill course established at Range 105A. shooters engaged three targets from the standing, kneeling, and prone positions with nine rounds in a time frame of 20 seconds. A target hit was valued at 1; a miss was valued at 0. The quick-kill targets were established at ranges of 25, 50, and 100 yards. The purpose of Test 2 was to determine the accuracy of the weapons in the critical, last 100 yards of an assault. The Marines used all of the field firing positions to duplicate the firing methods of combat Marines in urban or jungle warfare. Table 2 shows the results of Test 2. 25 Yards 50 Yards 100 Yards Weapon Hits Rounds Accuracy Weapon Hits Rounds Accuracy Weapon Hits Rounds Accuracy SAW 130 432 30.09% SAW 119 432 27.55% SAW 100 432 23.15% Colt 161 432 37.27% Colt 161 432 29.86% Colt 176 432 40.74% Ultimax 130 432 30.09% Ultimax 130 432 24.54% Ultimax 131 432 30.32% HK 139 432 32.18% HK 139 432 28.94% HK 120 432 27.77% Table 2. Test 2 results. Figure 1. Extracted Table I from FM 23–9. RD Range (M) Time (Sec) RD Range (M) Time (Sec) 1 50 3 11 100 8 2 200 6 12 200 3 100 4 13 150 10 4 150 5 14 300 5 300 6 15 100 9 6 250 7 16 250 7 50 3 17 200 6 8 200 6 18 150 5 9 150 5 19 50 6 10 250 7 20 100 Weapon Hits Rounds Saved Rounds Accuracy SAW 231 1920 1 12.04% Colt 427 1920 64 23.00% Ultimax 368 1920 69 19.88% HK 386 1920 173 22.10% Table 3. Test 3 results. Figure 2. Task Range (M) Time (Sec) Rounds 1 200 5 6 2 300 10 6 3 100 10 6 4 300 15 6 5 100, 300 20 12 6 200, 300 20 12 7 100, 200, 300 25 18 Weapon Hits Rounds Saved Rounds Accuracy SAW 279 3168 327 09.82% Colt 384 3168 580 14.84% Ultimax 323 3168 642 12.79% HK 330 3168 338 11.66% Table 4. Test 4 results. Figure 3. RD Range (M) Time (Sec) RD Range (M) Time (Sec) 1 250 10 11 400 10 2 400 10 12 500 3 800 15 13 700 20 4 300 10 14 300 5 500 10 15 800 20 6 700 15 16 400 7 300 10 17 600 20 8 400 10 18 800 9 600 15 17 300 10 10 800 15 20 500 10 Weapons Hits Rounds Saved Rounds Accuracy SAW 148 4800 0 3.08% Colt 219 4800 290 4.86% Ultimax 216 4800 280 4.78% HK 151 4800 243 3.31% Table 5. Test 5 results. Standing results without masks Standing results with mask Weapon Accuracy Time (Sec) Weapon Accuracy Time (Sec) SAW 4.73% 1132 SAW 6.12& 1013 Colt 10.70% 1355 Colt 9.18% 1138 Ultimax 9.80% 1272 Ultimax 8.64% 1300 HK 13.51% 1621 HK 10.99% 1926 Table 6. Test 6 results. Kneeling results without masks Kneeling results with mask SAW 3.85% 1116 SAW 5.40% 1131 Colt 8.24% 1309 Colt 10.63% 1304 Ultimax 10.70% 1410 Ultimax 9.00% 1459 HK 11.22% 1490 HK 14.59% 1753 Table 7. Test 7 results. Task Range (M) Time (Sec) RD 1 200 5 6 2 300 10 6 3 100 10 6 4 300 15 6 5 100,300 20 12 6 200,300 20 12 7 100,200,300 25 18 Figure 4. Weapon Hits Rounds Saved Rounds Accuracy SAW 43 3102 728 1.81% Colt 50 3102 526 1.94% Ultimax Not available for this event. HK 88 3102 641 3.58% Table 8. Test 8 results. During Test 2 minor issues developed with each of the weapons systems. Shooters repeatedly had negligent discharges with the Colt, attributable to the Marines forgetting the difference between the closed-bolt M16A2 and the open-bolt AR. The young Marines kept riding the bolt home on a live round, thereby firing the round. With the Ultimax, the shooters realized that the sights were set too low in the rear. Once they achieved stock weld the sights proved to be lower than the eye could see, forcing stock weld to be broken and causing the shooter to search for the sights. With the HK the 3.5 power magnification proved too much at 25 and 50 yards but beneficial at 100 yards. Overmagnification at shorter ranges slowed down the presentation of the weapon onto the target. For the M249 SAW, the weight and length in general made this an extremely cumbersome weapon in field firing positions. Another problem resulted from the commonality of the Colt AR and the M16A2. The familiarity led to initial accuracy, as the young Marines had not yet become familiar with the other weapons. Test 3 was fired from the prone position, using bipods for stability, engaging popup targets ranging in distance from 50 to 300 meters, with a varied time limit (See Table 3.) A 20-target exposure using 40 rounds was fired from Field Manual 23–9 (FM 23–9), M16A1 and M16A2 Rifle Marksmanship Table I. (See Figure 1.) This evaluation determined quick reaction from a defensive position to an attacking enemy. Test 4 occurred on the same range as Test 3, firing Table II of FM 23–14, M249 Light Machinegun in the Automatic Rifle Role (see Figure 2), the SAW transition course of fire. A shooter in the prone position with 66 rounds engaged popup targets ranging in distance from 100 to 300 meters with a varied time limit. (See Table 4.) This test again gave the M249 the benefit of the doubt by firing a course of fire designed for the light machinegun. However, the only weapon that could qualify as a light machinegun, the M249 SAW, posted the worst results. Test 5 was fired using long-range popup targets without team leader assistance. Targets ranged from 250 to 800 meters. (See Figure 3.) Testing employed a 20-target exposure firing 100 rounds per weapon from a supported prone position with varied time exposures. (See Table 5.) The results from Test 5 identified difficulties for a single shooter to engage targets beyond 300 meters. To effectively and accurately engage targets at these ranges, weapons systems need to be operated by a team, fired from a tripod, and assisted by team leaders using magnified optics. Tests 6 and 7 (see Tables 6 and 7 for test results) consisted of field firing at elevated targets (simulating urban patrol engagements) placed at distances of 100 to 150 meters. The targets were automated, three-dimensional “Ivan” popup targets. A 5-target exposure was used and engaged with 15 rounds with no time limit, but total time for each shooter was recorded. Shooters fired from standing and kneeling positions with and without the field protective mask. Test 8 consisted of night fire on an automated range with targets arrayed from 75 to 300 meters. (See Figure 4.) Ambient light was less than 20 percent. All weapons were zeroed with PEQ–2s using the laser bore light prior to the range. (See Table 8.) The Ultimax 100 was not tested because there was no way to mount the PEQ–2 to the weapon. The final evaluation of the assessment was aimed at capturing intangible characteristics and qualities of the weapons that numeric data could not capture. Marines involved in the test filled out a shooter evaluation questionnaire that attempted to capture the intangibles of each weapon. The comparison of these questionnaires with actual range performance produced some interesting results. On average, during Tests 1 through 4 the 48 shooters preferred the weapons in the following order: Ultimax 100, HK, Colt, and M249 SAW. The questions on the questionnaire focused on nine areas: (1) overall performance, (2) using system sights, (3) detecting and identifying targets, (4) adjusting windage, (5) adjusting elevation, (6) adjusting weapons zero, (7) maintaining zero, (8) malfunctions, and (9) stoppages. Even though the Colt fired the most accurately in most stages, it was next to last in shooter preference. Recommendations for modifications were requested for each of the weapons systems. The M249 and Colt were viewed as too heavy. The HK failed to stay on target in burst fire while the Ultimax sight system did not present to the eye at all. When the shooter laid his cheek on the stock of the weapon and achieved a proper stock weld he found the sights of the weapon lay below the line of sight capability of his eye. Accuracy—although according to raw data better than the current M249 SAW in every test—was of such a limited amount as to be statistically insignificant. Only on Test 3 did any weapon outperform the SAW by more than 10 percent accuracy. “Automatic fire is inherently less accurate than semiautomatic fire.”15 The difficulty becomes achieving a balance between weapons that provide a combination of the accuracy of semiautomatic fire while maintaining the ability to employ full automatic fire when required. This is the reason the Marine Corps modified its BARs so they could fire semiautomatically—to provide both capabilities. Infantrymen feel strongly about replacing the M249 SAW with a true AR inside the fire team but feel just as strongly about keeping the M249 SAW for its automatic fire suppressive capability. Given the results of this assessment, accuracy alone is not a strong enough reason to replace the M249 SAW. However, most would argue that accuracy was never the problem with the M249 SAW. The problem with the M249 SAW was the lack of mobility when manned by an individual while attempting to move at the pace of a rifle team. The M249 SAW provides the accuracy that fire teams and squads require. The quantitative tests of Phase I proved the variation in accuracy between the M249 SAW and its competitors small enough to not be worth the time, money, and effort to replace it. Despite the mitigation of the accuracy issue, the M249 SAW could not meet the requirements of mobility and semiautomatic fire accuracy. Unfortunately, the competitors tested during Phase I of the AR assessment do not appear to offer what the Marine Corps needs. As stated previously, the HK failed to stay on target in burst fire while the Ultimax sight system did not present to the eye at all. The commonality of the Colt AR with the M16A2 appeared to be advantageous. Yet the Colt proved to be the only weapon that experienced negligent discharges during the firing of 120,000 rounds. This fault resulted, in part, from young Marines failing to understand the open-bolt system but also, in part, from weapon design. Open bolts are inherently dangerous. Traditionally, we fear carrying an open-bolt weapon in the condition one mode of ready to fire. The primary shooter can be trained to be safe with the weapon, but primary shooter casualties will soon place the weapons in untrained hands, quickly leading to friendly fire hazards. Using the assessment as a “jumping off” point, at the conclusion of Phase I of the AR test, a universal need statement (UNS) was drafted and submitted through 1st MarDiv. The statement requested that the M249 be replaced with a “true” AR. The weapon envisioned would fire 5.56mm ball ammunition, be capable of receiving the M16A2’s 30-round magazine, and would possess a selector lever that went from safe to automatic to semiautomatic (in that order), weigh less than 12 pounds loaded, employ sights equal to the M16A2, use clip-on bipods, and have a 450 to 600 rounds per minute rate of fire. Phase I testing did not provide a “yes” to the original question—“is an AR more accurate than the M249 SAW?” It did, however, highlight the need for a mobile AR, capable of semiautomatic fire at the fire team level. Further, it illuminated the need to address the future employment and role of the M249 SAW light machinegun and a “true” AR in the fire teams, squads, and platoons of the Marine Corps. Because of the results achieved in Phase I, testing carried forth with the same automatic weapons into Phase II. Experimental squad and platoon organizations were constructed in order to examine the idea of consolidating the SAWs at various levels of command. The next article in this series will fully addresses the AR UNS submitted by 1st MarDiv and the issues that arose from the experimental organizations. –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– link Automatic Rifle Concept: Part II—Reorganizing the Infantry Squad by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby This is the second article outlining the automatic rifle assessment conducted by 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7). The previous article summarized the relationship between weapons lethality and dispersion on the battlefield and the need for a highly mobile automatic rifle (AR)—reliable and capable of semiautomatic fire—at the fire team (FT) level. The first article also indicated that, rather than eliminate the M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) from the Marine Corps inventory, the weapon should be employed in its designed role as a light machinegun (LMG). The M249 as an LMG, coupled with a true AR at the FT level, would markedly increase the lethality of the infantry squad. It would further the historical paradigm, already outlined in the first article, of increased lethality resulting in the need for increased dispersion. Because of the results achieved in Phase I, experimental squad and platoon organizations were constructed in order to examine how the inclusion of a true AR and the consolidation of the SAWs at various levels of command would affect tactics, techniques, and procedures at the platoon, squad, and FT level. This article will summarize the results of the constrained squad reorganization. 2/7 reorganized its rifle companies in order to better utilize the SAW and to integrate the AR into the squads. The battalion hoped that different configurations in squad and platoon organization might prove better at taking advantage of the mass, flexibility, and command and control available when removing LMGs from the assault role. Each rifle company maintained one platoon, using the current table of organization (T/O) and with current tables of equipment, to act as the evaluation’s control group. The companies then reorganized one of their platoons, integrating the ARs and consolidating the SAWs at different levels of command. The first platoon in each company reorganized a squad by replacing the SAWs in the first and second FTs with one of the AR test variants and consolidating the SAWs in the third FT. The battalion reintroduced the billet of grenadier, since most unit leaders felt that the team leader became too preoccupied with controlling his team and paying attention to his surroundings to effectively employ the weapon. Because an AR does not require an assistant, the new organization eliminated the billet of the assistant automatic rifleman (AAR). Whereas Marines quickly fall behind with an M249 in the assault role, they can easily operate any of the AR test variants singlehandedly. The M249 SAW received the new moniker LMG, due to the increased accuracy of the description and to aid Marines in mentally separating the LMGs from ARs during discussion and employment. Using a gunner and assistant gunner for each LMG became a variant on the LMG FT. This variant allowed the LMG to be manned and enjoy the same benefits as a medium or heavy machinegun. Rather than merely carry extra ammunition and a spare barrel, the assistant would load, direct impacts, help move the gun, and observe for maneuver encroachment on the gun target line. The third platoon in each company consolidated their LMGs at the platoon level; i.e., the platoon organized itself into two rifle squads armed with test variant ARs, and the nine LMGs were placed into an LMG section. This configuration truly tested the principles of mass and the ease of command and control. (See Table 3.) The benefit gained from this configuration was that the squad leader turned section leader could quickly identify targets, talk the LMGs onto them and, therefore, mass overwhelming firepower. By entirely removing the LMGs from the squads and replacing them with ARs, they would not slow the movement of the rifle squads. In addition, as in the use of the LMG FT with assistant gunners, the battalion hoped to use the section leader to relieve the LMG gunner from having to remove his eyes from the sights to search and assess targets. Conclusions After reorganizing the companies, 2/7 exercised the modified T/Os in several venues and exercises to include battalion-level training and Combined Arms Exercise 6–02 (CAX 6–02) at Twentynine Palms, military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) training at Camp Pendleton, and helicopter operations during Weapons and Tactics Instructor Class 10–02 (WTI Class 10–02). In October 2001 Company G conducted a 3-week urban warfare training block at the MOUT facility at Camp Pendleton. The company evaluated the separate T/Os in a variety of scenarios and discovered pros and cons for each. The platoon with the SAWs organized at the squad level (LMG FT) proved the most effective. The LMG FT within the squad was able to effectively develop and maintain fire superiority—independent of the notional platoon fires (M240G machineguns) to cover the squad’s movement and entry into the objective. The two AR equipped FTs of the squad proved more mobile, versatile, and agile in the assault than conventionally configured squads with the M249s still in the FT. The modified squad’s ARs provided good suppressive fires at the team level while remaining light and wieldy enough to be effective during room clearing. Movement to and into the house proved rapid, decisive, and overwhelming. The key difficulty encountered with this organization manifested itself as traditional urban casualty rates occurred. LMG gunners had to transition from security roles inside the building to actual room clearing duties. The LMG’s bulk, weight, and general clumsiness proved deadly to the Marines attempting to employ them in room clearing operations. Marines solved this dilemma by reversing the traditionally accepted maxim of always keeping an automatic weapon in the fight. When tasked with room clearing duties, LMG gunners dropped their LMGs and picked up ARs or M16A2 rifles and ammunition from casualties to accomplish their assigned mission. The company’s third platoon used the LMG section (LMS). In order to evaluate squad and squad leader urban training conducted earlier, the LMS fought as an independent element. It did quite well due to a very capable section leader. The firepower generated by the massing of LMGs proved to be overwhelming to the FT-sized element of defenders in the house. They could do nothing to oppose entry into the building. Once inside, while suffering from many of the individual problems involved with the M249 and room clearing, the LMS did utilize the ability to answer the enemy’s individual rifle rounds with the concentrated, if imprecise, bursts of fire from three and four massed LMGs. The ARs within the third platoon’s maneuver squads performed as expected, providing local firepower to the teams but remaining light enough to use effectively in the assault. The Camp Pendleton training provided an excellent training and evaluation opportunity. The urban environment favored ARs once inside buildings. They remained lightweight and easy to maneuver with while providing good firepower at short ranges. The LMGs proved most effective when providing longer range suppressive fire to cover movement into buildings, while experiencing expected problems when used in the assault. The combination of ARs and LMGs within the squads provided the best of both worlds—LMGs used to provide overwhelming firepower to cover the squad’s movement and ARs used to provide overwhelming firepower within the building. Company F evaluated the new T/O while deployed in support of a number of evolutions: WTI Class 10–01 in Yuma, Exercise STEEL KNIGHT at Twentynine Palms, various squad- to company-level live fire exercises, and CAX 6–02. Company F found that the LMS provided the ability to mass firepower quickly, increased flexibility at the squad and platoon levels, and eased the command and control responsibilities of the FT, squad, and section leaders. The company organized into assault, support, and security elements during company live fire attacks. The M240G machinegun section and the 60mm mortar section were placed in general support of the company. Company F routinely tasked the platoon with the LMS configuration as the support element. The ability of this platoon—and the mass of fire its LMS could produce—provided the suppression needed to allow the company’s M240G machinegun and 60mm mortar sections to get into action without risking a survivability fight. Company F used the platoon with its LMGs consolidated into LMG FTs as the company’s assault element. As with Company G the LMG FTs proved adept at generating local support by fire positions, allowing the maneuver rifle teams to safely close the critical last 100 yards to the objective. As expected the ARs with the FTs provided them with the versatile automatic weapon needed in the assault role. Upon consolidation or withdrawal—in the case of a raid—the support element’s LMS aided the displacement of the company’s general support M240G machinegun and 60mm mortar sections. Especially during raids, the support element’s LMS gave the company a high-volume firepower asset to cover the company’s withdrawal with greater survivability and maneuverability than the company’s medium machineguns. The battalion also conducted squad and platoon combined arms live fire exercises. During the squad evaluation the squads conducted day and night security patrols, a live fire night ambush, and a day live fire attack. The squads tasked their LMG FTs as the support element for these tasks. Again, the battalion found that M249 LMGs consolidated into FTs proved more conducive to squad-level tactical operations. In all four graded tasks the LMG FTs provided the squad leader with a manageable element that could rapidly generate a lethal amount of suppression in the small unit fight. During the platoon evaluation, platoon commanders were augmented with a section of tanks, a squad of assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs), and an 81mm mortar team (two tubes). The platoons conducted defensive operations and attack rehearsals, a day live fire attack (including consolidation, casualty evacuation, reorganization, and resupply), a night live fire ambush (fragged over the radio late in the afternoon following the daylight attack), and a night retrograde in Mission Oriented Protective Posture 4 (MOPP 4) in order to decontaminate and conduct a MOPP gear exchange. The different platoons experimented with both the LMG FT and the LMS. Although both SAW organizations were used successfully, the learning point was that the SAWs were much more effective when they were removed from the FT in the assault. All of the platoons used their 81mm mortars and M240G machineguns to advance toward the enemy during the daylight attack. The more successful platoons utilized their LMG teams and sections to provide suppression over the last 200 meters of advance as battlefield geometry and constricted terrain forced the mortars and the machineguns (both ground mounted and tank/AAV mounted) to cease or shift firing to maintain safety parameters and surface danger zones (SDZs). In most cases the speed and rapidity of the mounted attack prevented the platoons from maintaining effective suppression from initial mortar and machinegun positions. The LMG teams and sections provided intermediate bases of fire (300 meters and in) in order to maintain the momentum of the attack. The final piece of the suppression puzzle provided by the SAW LMG squads and sections allowed the assault squads to maneuver freely without being held up due to a lack of effective suppression. The final evaluation of the reorganized units came during CAX 6–02. The LMG FTs and the LMS proved very effective throughout CAX, but especially so during block one—the Range 400 complex—and block two—the mobile assault course (MAC) and the helicopter assault course (HAC). A recurring problem during Range 410A and Range 400 is the inability of heavy machineguns and M240G machineguns to provide effective suppression during the entire course of the attack. There are several reasons for this phenomenon, but they are for another article. Battlefield geometry, SDZ restrictions, and excessive ammunition usage forced initial support positions to cease or shift fires causing gaps in suppression. The LMGs were able to cover these gaps and provided an indispensable tool for the small unit commander to directly influence his fight. He was able to quickly and easily direct precise, effective suppressive fire onto the objective while husbanding his assault element’s ammunition. The same effects were observed during the MACs and the HAC. The LMGs provided the small unit commander enough firepower and flexibility to directly influence the outcome of his close fight, leading to the success of the company as a whole. The Marine Corps should never stop looking at ways to increase the lethality of Marines and their weapons. The increase of night vision capability and squad-level communications assets represents the latest steps in that search. Indeed, the fact that these force multipliers are already in place presents the infantry with even more questions as weapons lethality increases. For example, if the historical paradigm of increased lethality resulting in increased dispersion holds true, then current communications and doctrinal capabilities allow the traditional infantry FT to be separated into autonomous two-man buddy teams. Canada, which is equipped with almost the exact same infantry weapons systems as the United States, already utilizes such organizations. Their infantry sections (squads) are broken down into four-man fire groups (FTs) consisting of two-man FTs (buddy teams). 2/7 believes that the next step in increasing the lethality of the rifle squad does not consist of replacing the M249 SAW. Rather, squad lethality, both quantitatively and qualitatively, can be greatly increased in two very cost-effective ways. First, the M249 SAW should be used in the LMG role for which it was designed, not the ad hoc AR role for which it was purchased. Second, to ensure that each rifle FT possesses the automatic weapon necessary for the close combat fight, a true AR should be acquired. As threat forces match the firepower of the current rifle squad, the Marine Corps must maintain the innovative edge for which it is famous. While experimentation is still required, the evaluations undertaken by 2/7 definitively indicate that the Marine Corps should place the M249 into an LMG role and add a true AR to the squad’s inventory. >>CWO3 Eby is the Marine gunner, 7th Marine Regiment. |
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Come on guys you can do it. 
It's interesting stuff, crowns. Call me crazy, though, but why don't they just put the auto control groups back in the A4's, with reduced ROF? That would give each marine in a team control over an automatic weapon as a secondary capability. You would lose the volume of fire capability of even the AR spec of an open bolt heavy barrel rifle, but you would gain a distribution of four of them in a team rather than one, allowing a team to recover from an out of action rifle being used in the AR role. |
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My friend carries the M249 with 200 on the gun... 200 on each hip plus another 200 on small of back... his partner carries another 400 rounds (200 on each hip) plus an M4 with ammo for it and both still carry their other regular gear... my friend is also a huge kid... I personally could never carry that much... im like 6'1 150 lbs lol... in good shape though... I back pack and all... just not SAW material lol...
They are a two man wrecking crew... |
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My friend carries the M249 with 200 on the gun... 200 on each hip plus another 200 on small of back... his partner carries another 400 rounds (200 on each hip) plus an M4 with ammo for it and both still carry their other regular gear... my friend is also a huge kid... I personally could never carry that much... im like 6'1 150 lbs lol... in good shape though... I back pack and all... just not SAW material lol... They are a two man wrecking crew... If you did more PT (run, run, just for fun) you could do it too!!! 
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FN IAR entrant: http://i85.photobucket.com/albums/k49/Spenserjb1216/FNM0157mb.png Colt: http://i291.photobucket.com/albums/ll294/shawnmt6601/Colt_IAR_6940.jpg HK: http://www.defensetech.org/images/H%26K-IAR-web.jpg Fuck HK. I see the Colt having a huge leg up as the lower and other parts are already in inventory = lower costs (training, transitioning, armoring, etc). The FN looks sweet, aside from the 1980's plastic movie prop/I-robot foot |
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I don't understand why if they want a squad automatic weapon they are getting away from a belt fed system....
The saw can be fired using a belt or a magazine, I always thought that was pretty good...I mean if you run out of ammo...use a magazine.... If the weapon is totally magazine based, you are limiting yourself.... All this coming from an M60 gunner..... |
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I don't understand why if they want a squad automatic weapon they are getting away from a belt fed system.... The saw can be fired using a belt or a magazine, I always thought that was pretty good...I mean if you run out of ammo...use a magazine.... If the weapon is totally magazine based, you are limiting yourself.... All this coming from an M60 gunner..... Hmmm this 0331 doesn't completely agree with you. It was always a pain in the ass to use an m60 in an assault, now covering fire from a static position was a piece of cake but actually assaulting with the 0311's was clumsy. Too fat and heavy. Oh, and I always despised the SAW. I remember at Geiger we were on of the first bunches to play with them when we got some wupped ones from the army. The old ones with the wire stock. I didn't like them, in fact most of MGers would piss on them. the ones we had wouldn't fire from a magazine to save your ass. Beltfed they were reliable. |
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OK here it is,,, after many months of gnashing teeth and cursing a blue streak, colt will get the contract for the M-4,A5... it will have a new and improved dust cover., |
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The automatic rifle concept is obsolete and it's bureaucratic intransigence that is making this an issue. What other military still uses an automatic rifle?
The solution is simple. Convert M16A2s to full auto capability instead of the horrible 3 round burst. Preferably they should also alter the barrel profile for better heat performance which can be done at little to no increase in overall rifle weight. "Automatic rifleman" tasks could then be fulfilled by all riflemen in the squad as the need would arise. Training would of course be needed in the correct use of automatic fire. There's no excuse for semi auto only riflemen, limited by training and mechanical restrictions, on the modern battlefield. |
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The automatic rifle concept is obsolete and it's bureaucratic intransigence that is making this an issue. What other military still uses an automatic rifle? The solution is simple. Convert M16A2s to full auto capability instead of the horrible 3 round burst. Preferably they should also alter the barrel profile for better heat performance which can be done at little to no increase in overall rifle weight. "Automatic rifleman" tasks could then be fulfilled by all riflemen in the squad as the need would arise. Training would of course be needed in the correct use of automatic fire. There's no excuse for semi auto only riflemen, limited by training and mechanical restrictions, on the modern battlefield. The British use the L85 which can be full auto. |
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...So what they want, is a BAR with a removeable barrel...
They made one of those, though... Seriously - man-portable, very low recoil (shoot that and then a Garand, and tell me which makes your shoulder sore)...accurate close and at distance. It's main disadvantage is that it takes 4 hands to swap magazines, and that no one's made a 30 or 40 round mag for it...the BAR belt with the cup in it, wasn't designed for shooting from the hip, but to stick the butt in upside-down, and swap mags ASAP, much faster than doing it free-hand. And, being .30 cal...it's pretty distinctive-sounding, and will chop through most cover. That'll keep heads down. |
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FNH's version fires closed bolt until it gets hot, then it switches to open bolt to make cook-offs impossible. I think that nifty little trick (if it doesn't make the internals too complicated) should give it a leg up on the others. I would like to know how it accomplishes this. |
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Quoted:
FNH's version fires closed bolt until it gets hot, then it switches to open bolt to make cook-offs impossible. I think that nifty little trick (if it doesn't make the internals too complicated) should give it a leg up on the others. I would like to know how it accomplishes this. Me too. 
But they claim that they did... "Today FN offers the new Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR), a unique, highly-adaptable, modular selective fire weapon system that fills the roles of both individual battle rifle and squad automatic weapon in one light, compact package. The magazine-fed FN IAR is capable of firing from a closed bolt in both semi-automatic and fully-automatic modes, yet automatically transitions into open-bolt operation in semi-automatic or fully-automatic before reaching cook-off temperature for a chambered cartridge." I really would love to see the guts of the thing. |
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I don't understand why if they want a squad automatic weapon they are getting away from a belt fed system.... The saw can be fired using a belt or a magazine, I always thought that was pretty good...I mean if you run out of ammo...use a magazine.... If the weapon is totally magazine based, you are limiting yourself.... All this coming from an M60 gunner..... Read the text, at least the pertitent parts. |
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Quoted:
Quoted:
FNH's version fires closed bolt until it gets hot, then it switches to open bolt to make cook-offs impossible. I think that nifty little trick (if it doesn't make the internals too complicated) should give it a leg up on the others. I would like to know how it accomplishes this. Magic |
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Quoted:
Quoted:
I don't understand why if they want a squad automatic weapon they are getting away from a belt fed system.... The saw can be fired using a belt or a magazine, I always thought that was pretty good...I mean if you run out of ammo...use a magazine.... If the weapon is totally magazine based, you are limiting yourself.... All this coming from an M60 gunner..... Hmmm this 0331 doesn't completely agree with you. It was always a pain in the ass to use an m60 in an assault, now covering fire from a static position was a piece of cake but actually assaulting with the 0311's was clumsy. Too fat and heavy. Oh, and I always despised the SAW. I remember at Geiger we were on of the first bunches to play with them when we got some wupped ones from the army. The old ones with the wire stock. I didn't like them, in fact most of MGers would piss on them. the ones we had wouldn't fire from a magazine to save your ass. Beltfed they were reliable. +1 on the SAW being a POS when feeding from a magazine. None of the SAWs we had could run a full mag without at least one jam but often several. A mag fed sqaud automatic weapon is just plain retarded. IMO we need to look at something like the HK21 in a shorter (14.5") version and chambered in 5.55x45mm. |
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Put new sights, and maybe a better stock on AR15 designer Jim Sullivan's Ultimax 100
and it wins. 
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Well, we'll see how it works...
The Army is going the opposite direction, looking to replace the 249 with another LMG - sans mag-feed option & using a specialized LMG-only cartridge... Of course, Army platoon organization is a bit different (3 squads of 2 FT per squad (1 SAW per team), 1 squad of 2 to 3 GPMG (M240) teams).... Unless they changed that.... |
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Well, we'll see how it works... The Army is going the opposite direction, looking to replace the 249 with another LMG - sans mag-feed option & using a specialized LMG-only cartridge... Of course, Army platoon organization is a bit different (3 squads of 2 FT per squad (1 SAW per team), 1 squad of 2 to 3 GPMG (M240) teams).... Unless they changed that.... Huh? They're ditching 5.56mm? |
[ARCHIVED THREAD] - The new USMC Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR)...here is the full story behind this mystery program (Page 1 of 2)
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