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The following are the answers to the than Commandant’s (James Conway) concerns over adopting the IAR
CMC Concern 1: SAW may not be particularly accurate, but that's not the most important. This is the most difficult aspect of CMC's personal position to counter because it is rooted in a belief that mere volume of fire equates to effectiveness. Data demonstrates that the accuracy of the IAR surpasses that of SAW in the offensive and defensive modes it was tested in. The definition of fire superiority includes both volume and accuracy; separating accuracy from the effect on the enemy is not a good policy decision in our estimation. In discussions with CMC, it is recommended that accuracy and effectiveness be discussed as inseparable. The psychological effect of a high-volume of inaccurate fire diminishes over time as our adversaries adapt.
CMC Concern 2: SAW is Light Machinegun and will win out in a fight with an automatic rifle. Machineguns dominate when employed in pairs to provide a wall of lead for assaulting enemies to run through. Machineguns are limited in actual effectiveness when employed in point shooting at individual targets from unstable platforms without the use of T&E's or tripods. Machineguns have always had significant weaknesses when being employed over broken terrain where the only effect they can achieve is in the beaten zone. The SAW is the least effective in the offense because of the relative lack of control of the beaten zone beyond 100 meters from all but prone or supported positions. Even the improvements in the para-SAW, adjustable stocks, and optics have not been able to match the overall accuracy/effectiveness of the IAR at any range beyond 100 meters.
CMC Concern 3: IAR fires 3-round burst. CMC is mistaken, if his statement indicates that he believe the IAR fires on 3-round burst. The IAR is a fully automatic rifle. One of the chief advantages of the IAR is that it enables a squad to move more effectively together and therefore to more effectively position the IAR gunner for maximal effect. A corollary advantage is that an IAR gunner is always able to select semi or automatic fire in response to the myriad circumstances presented to him on the battlefield. This discriminatory aspect of the IAR makes it more useful to a broader range of military operations.
CMC Concern 4: Psychology of fire superiority and the "200-round drum keeps on giving" Unfortunately, the limitations of our range and training facilities have developed the tactically unfortunate practice of training Marines to move when "someone is shooting from my side" rather than moving when "the enemy is suppressed and is not firing". Ineffective suppression gets assault elements killed, yet we prepare Marines to listen for audible cues of friendly fire rather than focus outwardly on the enemy.
There is an historical concern from the 1920-1960 period when rifle squads were armed with a variety of slow firing weapons, including the Browning Automatic Rifle. This concern led to the development of a high-capacity ammunition source within the squad that could help overcome the relative lack of firepower. The SAW gunner now typically moves with an assault pouch of 100-rounds and have 200 additional rounds on his gear; the remainder of his ammunition is spread loaded among the squad. The development of the M-16 series of rifles has overcome the original concern about lack of firepower, but we remain tied closely to the SAW despite the fact that overall firepower from an infantry squad is significantly greater than previously.
When prone or stationary in a vehicle, the SAW gunner does have the ability to provide point suppression of targets effectively. It is crucial to point out however, that his ammunition usage to achieve a similar effect on target is much greater than IAR. This greater ammunition consumption forces additional ammunition and weight to be spread loaded among the squad. Data demonstrates that ammunition usage is 50-100% greater for SAW than for IAR to achieve equal measurable results. This not only reduces the time that a SAW gunner can effectively suppress a target, but also increases the rate at which required to cross-level ammunition.
In addition, there is ample anecdotal evidence of Marines and enemy personnel moving through seemingly impossible volumes of fire. After actions reports demonstrate that often these personnel did not know they were being shot at. The conditions of auditory exclusion and singular focus mean that it is possible for targets to ignore or block out near misses when being engaged by non-exploding-tip small arms fire. The IAR is proven to be more accurate and therefore more effective than SAW. For Marines going into harms way, it does not appear to be good policy to equip them with a heavier, bulkier, more complex weapon that is also more prone to stoppages. These factors are multiplied when conducted at night.
CMC Concern 5: Suppression is effected by more frequent magazine changes. The test data clearly demonstrated that there was a minor advantage to IAR in times required to change magazines. The advantage for the IAR is much greater at night because the complexity of SAW function/operation means that it experiences a greater frequency of stoppages and malfunctions. The IAR is so similar in layout and function to the M-16 series of rifles, that a Marine would have very little trouble in employing the IAR as a result of casualties. Additionally, if the IAR is moved within the squad due to a casualty the new IAR gunner has a ready source of ammunition on his equipment and will be able to effectively employ the weapon. Although the SAW is a core infantry weapon, it is more complex and difficult to employ without adequate and recent training.
CMC Concern 6: How do the Marines feel about it? And is this going to change the whole dynamic? Anecdotally, Marines are in two distinct groups on their opinion about the IAR vs. the M249. These two groups are separated by their recent employment experiences. The first group who love the M249 are those who employed one of the 10,000 existing M249's from a non-mobile defensive position, or from the back of one of the vehicle variant options currently available. Success was measured by "shooting towards the enemy in a suppressive manner" and by "surviving the incident". Success was not measured by "closing with and destroying", or by "verifying the wounding or lethal effects of the engagement". The majority of after action reports speak to this type of engagement and strengthens the desire to maintain this role for the M249 at the tactical level, without realizing the negative effects these actions have had at the strategic level when the populace who receives these errant fires during COIN operations become hostile to our presence.
The second group of Marines comes from our infantry units. These are those rare squad members who have actually had to "fire and move" towards a defended position while armed with the M249. While expected to be performed regularly, this type of action has become very rare in the last 7 years and it is hard to find anyone who has actually performed as expected. When these individuals are found, they detest the heavy, cumbersome M249 for its inability to remain in the fight during the actual assault.
A third non-combat group exists as well. This third group are those who actually conducted one of the experiments by MCOTEA while at 29 Palms in Nov-Dec 2009 and are very similar to the second group listed above. Having actually been forced to assault, been forced to measure results beyond the un-measurable psychological effects; this group preferred the IAR over the M249.
We do believe that it will change the squad dynamic for the better. The IAR preserves the volume of fire, decreases stoppages, increases familiarity across the squad, makes ammunition common, reduces weight, streamlines tasks-to-train, and regains mobility to the entire small unit. The IAR decreases negative strategic impact in the area of operations during low intensity while increasing positive tactical impact against a threat when effects are truly measured against a determined enemy.
CMC Concern 7: Volume of fire and impacts of having to exchange ammo among the squad. The ammunition efficiency and enhanced accuracy of the IAR means the basic load of ammunition will be effective for longer than the SAW. This goes to the heart of the Commandant's issue with the IAR. The SAW requires a greater spread load of ammunition, and complicates the ability to cross-level during a firefight because not every Marine will typically carry additional drums. The IAR alternately is magazine fed from identical magazines to every other Marine in the squad. This fact alone means the IAR is simpler to resupply in contact.
CMC Concern 8: Variance with the US Army The Marine Corps diverges from the Army in a number of weapons in the small arms inventory, for a variety of reasons. We are buying and fielding 2,000 Multi-Shot Grenade Launchers that the Army has no requirement for. We issue the M40A5, they use the M24. They are fielding the M320 Grenade Launcher while we are sticking with the M203. They are fielding a pure fleet of M4s, while we are committed to the M16A4. Variance is justifiable, is not a new thing, and doesn't necessarily cost the taxpayer any more money. The Army has articulated that the reason they are not participating in the IAR program is that smaller size of their squads necessitates that they hold on to the firepower of the M249. Testing results indicate that the Army is incorrect in their assumption that the M249 adds firepower to the squad. The Army has already expressed interest in the IAR for some other roles such as designated marksmen. They may be more interested in participating after reviewing our test data.
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Good post. I initially was against the IAR concept. The above answers changed my viewpoint.