LOL

Nope.  He's never been found.  If he stayed on the air long enough, we could locate him but he doesn't talk long enough and it would take at least three stations to get an accurate fix.  Then if that was in port Said say...or in Aden, you might never find him in all the ships.



Funniest one I ever heard was one day when we were out in the NAS.  The VHF skip was very strong that day and we could hear BTB traffic up near the Straights of Hormuz.  There was an American repair ship, the USS Jason (AR 8) steaming around up that way, just getting in everybody's way.  Now, the Jason was one of the first ships to have females in the crew.  We heard a female officer using the BTB radio to call up another vessel.  The conversation went something like this...



Jason officer:  "Unknown vessel, this is United States Navy warship 8.  What is the name of your vessel, what is your cargo and your destination?"



Other vessel:  <<crickets>>



Jason officer with slight bit of irritation:  "Unknown vessel, this is United States Navy warship 8.  What is the name of your vessel, what is your cargo and your destination"?



Other vessel:  "How big are your tits?"



Jason officer (Now VERY pissed off.):  "Unknown vessel, this is United States Navy warship 8. What is the name of your vessel, what is your cargo and your destination"?



By now, we are just about falling down with laughter on the bridge of our real warship, a Spruance class destroyer.



About this time, the Monkey asked her again about her bewbies and then added he wanted to SIIHPAPP.  I thought she was going to have a coronary!  



So...the ship finally woke up and answered.  We knew it had been The Filipino Monkey...but she didn't.



The ship gave his information, but she didn't copy it and asked again.



Finally our OOD grabbed the radio and passed the info along...which elicited a polite, "...roger, out" from our sister officer.



Fun and frivolity in the NAS.  

We have in fact been discussing those very factors within our retired/former SWO ranks around here.



More later...

That's what I thought.  I'm not a smart man (in general, but especially on Navy stuff), but this sounds like an error that can only occur systemically, when the other safeguards built into the system are negligently and/or intentionally circumvented.

Not like the USAF has any experience with that (cough Minot nukes cough)....

For those interested, the following link has the AIS track (think of it as GPS tracking for every commercial ship in the world) for the M/V OTOWASON:

http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/default.aspx?zoom=9&oldmmsi=371687000&olddate=8/11/2012%201:00:00%20PM

It appears the Otowason was indeed outbound and the Porter inbound.  Looking at the damage on the Porter and the Otowason's track at the link, I don't see how this could've been caused by anything other than the Porter turning to...port in front of the tanker.

http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/default.aspx?zoom=9&oldmmsi=371687000&olddate=8/11/2012%201:00:00%20PM

AIS track for the tanker.

http://shipfinder.co/?bounds=26.249719,55.808374,26.48811,56.302759

You can use that to show the AIS replay around the incident. Looks like it was fairly crowded.

USS Porter isn't on there, because most Navy ships don't broadcast. But you can see the tanker suddenly do that turn.

EFB

Considering that the ship was navigating in restricted waters, I doubt very seriously that the CO was in his bunk.  He was most likely on the bridge overseeing the watch.





 

When two ships of this size collide, how much time is there before impact where everyone know it's going to happen?  Is there a 30 second period where it's obvious neither vessel will be able to maneuver or slow enough to prevent the accident?  Do multiple minutes pass?  Were alarms sounding on the Porter for a while so everyone could brace for the impact?

Do my questions even make sense?

WIth the speed our warships can achieve, I have to guess they can put a hell of a lot of lateral thrust on their sterns hard over and ahead flank.  If they can't spin around in a boatlength or two I'd be shocked.

A relative of mine who is very familiar with the situation says the top speed of a DDG is 30 knots, and it can turn in a very short radius for a vessel that size.  With 100,000 HP, the DDG could literally run circles around that tanker even if it was going its top speed, which is about 15 knots.



 

I also thought that our currant ships can stop in 1-1/2 ship lenght from full speed?

I'm not sure, but they can stop fast enough to spill every cup of coffee or bug juice on board.



 

Do Naval ships have a shipboard version on a flight data recorder?

NAV systems record all that type of data and there are many detailed logs onboard to record the ship's status, position, plant configurations, equipment line-ups etc.

Whatever happened shouldn't really be a mystery to the people who have access to the ships records.

The damage , being to the starboard side of the naval vessel indicates that it was trying to cut in front of the tanker which would have had the right of way. BAD idea.

The starboard side of a ship show a green light to a ship to it's right. The tanker would have been showing a red light to the naval vessel. I doubt the Commander was complying with the rules. Not to mention that a warship is much faster, more maneuverable and has dozens of people manning a watch, the tanker would have had 2 on watch.  So I'm going to go out on a limb and say The NAVY fucked up.

Really? I guess it depends on what you were on . I was on a 1090', 300,000 DWT tanker and found the Suez much more stressful. Of course we could only use it when we were empty headed southbound, loaded we drew 72'. Gibraltar and the English Channel were worse with all the crossing traffic.

A further word or two about those logs. First of all, they are signed at the end of the watch by whoever was in charge to say that they are correct. It is a legal binding signature. Secondly, those logs contain just about everything that happens on that watch. Ie, seen ST II:TWOK? "Admiral on the bridge!"....such a thing would be noted in the log. They are rather extensive.



Yes, your questions make sense.

I was reading the JAG Manual investigation report on the collision of the Evans and Melbourne. One of the arguments against was that no collision alarm was sounded on the Evans. The first the crew knew was when the carrier hit the destroyer. Had the collision alarm sounded even seconds before, it might have given the sleeping crew a better chance at escape.

Another thing about collision procedures is that if one sees it is going to happen, one can try to turn the ship to try to make the impact a glancing blow instead of a direct hit. Now that may be a hard decision to reach since one is trying to the last second to avoid any impact.

Of a point of interest, in a collision that should have sent the Victor to the bottom of the ocean when it surfaced under the bow of the Kitty Hawk, that sub was in the right place for it instead to receive just a glancing blow.

Now, should the destroyer be able maneuver to avoid collision? Well, conceptually, yes. An example. During the Cold War, a carrier task force was going to operate a new weapon but the Soviet AGI was hanging tight to the test ship. The test ship's Captain, not wanting to give up the chance to do the test, closed on the carrier, went aft of the stern, and vanished from the sight of the AGI when it had the carrier inbetween. The AGI followsed but while the test ship was out of sight, it had accelerated so when the AGI sighted it again, it was "out of reach". Not sure what the test ship was but say it was a Spurance.

So if the ship can do it, conceptually at least, why didn't it happen in this case? The eventual report will probably say but......inexperience? following a wrong chain of thought to the end? tagged out equipment that removed such capabilities as options? another ship in the area that made the use of such capability not viable? local conditions, such as squat and water depth, that made such capabilities undesirable?

We don't know why yet.
_____________________________________________________________________
("Sir, at this time, I cannot confirm the inbounds. There is reason to believe that they may not exist."––"Brasshat", (w,stte), "Wargames")

If only it were that simple. Looking at what running lights were showing is a very simplistic approach to the situation. Anyone with a bit of sea time under their belt knows accidents rarely happen when things are that clear cut.

It appears that Porter was transiting into the Gulf, meaning she was in the northern part of the traffic seperation scheme. It also appears her tasking was to take her to the south. It also appears, using AIS data that has now been pulled, that she was negotiating traffic including one ship that was reporting itself to be restricted in its ability to maneuver (RAM), doing less than 5 knots, and may have been showing the lighting configuration for not under command (NUC). At the same time Porter was trying to clear this contact, it would appear the motor tanker (M/T) was overtaking the aforementioned contact on the right. It also appears, according to one eyewitness account that Porter did not have radar "paint" on the M/T. Anyone who has operated in the Gulf understands the weird atmospheric conditions there. If Porter did not have radar paint it is possible that she didn't receive an AIS signal from the M/T.

It would appear, given the very preliminary information available that both the M/T and the Porter were manuevering around this RAM/NUC contact and came out on the other side in very close proximity to each other.

Some questions are unanswered:
-Did Porter receive radar returns on the M/T?
-Did Porter receive the M/T's AIS signal?
-What was the bridge to bridge situation like? Was there a lot of prayers and Fillipino Monkey calls? Anyone who has operated in the Gulf knows at night it can be impossible to establish bridge to bridge comms.
-Was the RAM/NUC contact lightly loaded? There are reports that this contact was high in the water, while the M/T was loaded down. It is possible the M/T was visually concealed by the RAM/NUC contact.
-Are the rumors true that Porter had an engineering casualty just prior to the collision?

The CO is done. I'm sure he'll get the ship back to Norfolk and then be dismissed. Whether or not a subsequent investigation clears him is besides the point.

Ships have several data recorders. There is a data recorder that records all the voice communications in the combat information center. There are data recorders in the voyage management system, the ship's gyro, and the Aegis Weapon System has at least four data recorders in it. The ship's engineering software also has a "bell recorder." Given there is also information available from AIS, which has recently been pulled from public view, there will be a lot of information to reconstruct this incident.

Your relative is in a very good position to know.

Third hand...but apparently accurate.



They are in far worse shape than we've been told.



<<snip>>



First of all, thanks for checking up on us. Everything is ok here but
the ship has seen better days! The pictures don't even crack the surface
on all the damage we sustained. I was on watch in .... when the walls
started caving in. Ill give you the short version as we are still in the
process of figuring out what went wrong. ... we were doing a Straight
of Hormuz transit .... There was a conversation over the net between the
bridge and the TAO about a possibly (sic) contact not under command in
front of us. We avoided that contact, checked the radar and didn't have
much. SWS had a few hits on the radar but there was not a steady track
on the contact. Over the net in heard the OOD say that we were coming up
to flank speed to avoid the NUC contact. We went hard right, then hard
left to avoid this contact. All of us in combat thought we were clear
when we heard we were slowing to 5 knots. Not more than 30 seconds later
the ship started coming through the wall. Combat had no warning at all
that we were going to collide as we had no paint on this guy. It
happened so quickly that there was no time to brace for shock or the
collision alarm. It happened so fast. I will never forget that sound or
the smell that went along with it.



As of right now, we do not
have a starboard break. When the ship came through the wall, the fire
main and chill water pipes exploded and we had water pouring out at
alarming rate all over energized equipment. My GQ station ... so as you
can imagine, fires were breaking out all over the place. Radio was
completely submerged as a result of the ruptured fire main and chill
water pipes that burst. Besides the gigantic hole in the side of the
ship, radio seems to have sustained the most damage. It was filling up
so fast that everyone in radio had to use to escape trunk to get out.
Cleaning that up is a gigantic mess! We still have not been able to get
the ACs back online so the temperature on the ship is well over 130
degrees and has been deemed uninhabitable. The first night in port,
everyone slept topside as no one knew what to do with 300 homeless
sailors on such short notice. We have about 100 or so cots set up not
but that still leave people sleeping topside.



We have every tech
rep known to man on board right now along with VADM Miller (5th fleet),
the Captain in charge of this area, and so many other military
representatives. We really won't know the full extent of the damage for
quite a while now but as you can imagine, there isn't much good news
coming out of this. The divers were here yesterday and we are starting
to hear some of the results from their dive are starting to surface.
After this week, we should have a slightly better idea of the extent of
the damage and want we are going to do. We do know that whatever fixes
they will made here are only temporary and permanent repairs will be
made back in Norfolk.





Located here...http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2012/08/porter-collision-1st-hand-report.html



She will be in dock for a long time.  Sux to be them for sure.  Glad nobody was hurt.


 

They didn't detect a ship the size of Rhode Island on a collision course?
 

nevermind, keeping my opinion to myself on this one given how many .mil folks there are around here....

So, you're saying a month or two in the yard, tops?  

Sounds like the bridge may have done everything right after all, it was just a situational awareness fail, and they were simply today's winner in the "sucks to be you" lottery.

Chicken.

How were visibility conditions?  I assume they post lookouts.  
 

Dude, as someone that was in the Navy, I still can't see how that ship is in such bad shape (outside of the collision damage)....



 

Sounds like the ship was masked by another, and they just pulled out right in front of it.  Damn.

aw, fuck it. if naval vessels were a bit less cryptic about their locations and negotiating passings, crossings, overtakings, etc. with merchant ships collisions would be much less likely.  I think a lot of SWO's don't realize a number of things:
1. how good their radar systems are and more importantly how much better they are than ours (merchant ships) not to mention (correct me if I'm wrong here) a naval ship ALWAYS has someone watching the scope, on the merchant ship there may not always be someone watching the scope.
2. just how poorly of a return their ships give on a radar (mainly the arleigh burke class from what I understand)
3. how un-maneuverable a big merchant ship is.

now I realize it'shard to put yourself in the shoes of the merchant sailor who can't see you worth shit on his radar, can't maneuver worth a damn and the SWO's he's talking to  on the radio is being les than cooperative while you're trying to get a passing, crossing, over taking or what have you. not to mention if it's a foreign crew their english may be less than ideal.

I'm not trying to assign blame here, just making some observations.

flame away....

Combat ..........Con.



Con Aye.



CPA is 20 feet!.



Con Aye.



Con.............what was your last.



Combat .....CPA 10 feet!!



Con......Port or Starboard?



crunch, screech, oh shit............Sound the collision alarm...Captain to the Bridge


 

Short answer:  those ships are designed to have a low radar signature, not drain water.  Running rust is a big problem, especially in the breaks.  The other factor is budget issues.  When I got out, engineering officers were buying rags with their own money.  We only had enough money to paint the pier-facing side of the ship before we returned from deployment.

No flames here. There are valid points there.

Some things merchants don't seem to understand.
1. Many of our best radars for surface work are just like yours. In fact, we often buy systems off the shelf and put them on ships without permission. Which do you think gets more use the radar that has superb sensitivity (MILSPEC) or the one that allows auto-tracking and correlates tracks to AIS inputs(COTS)? A radar good for fighting isn't necessarily the best for seamanship.
2. How little sea time we actually get. Remember that SWOs drive ships and manage a lot of tactical operations at the same time. Guess who drives the ships? It's our least experienced officers. If we have trouble communicating on the radio it's often because we don't have experience at it. For every watch officer on the bridge that is "qualified" during normal steaming, there are at least two more who are under instruction. We are constantly having to train new people. We don't have the job stability to get really good at one thing. I think the Commonwealth navies do a better job in that they keep ship drivers driving ships, engineers in the plant, and watch officers in combat, all getting better at their own area of expertise.
3. That most of our SWOs have never served or even been on a merchant ship. Most have never met a merchant sailor. The closest most get to a merchant is when they room with someone who went to MMA or KP.
4. That our operations, by their very nature, have us maneuvering all the time. You guys set up the autopilot and go when you can. We hardly ever operate in a straight line. We're constantly cutting holes in the water.
5. That no radar is perfect. I've conversed with enough merchants, mostly foreign, that seem to think their radars and aids like AIS are all knowing. I can't count the number of times we've had to convince a merchant that we are out there even though we're not showing up on AIS.

I'm not sure any of that applies in this case. I think there has to be more to the story here.

1.  Most bridge teams rely on a Furuno for navigation, just like you'd find on any commercial vessel.  Height of eye is likely less as well.
2.  Sure, but we'll still harass you on BTB if you get within 10nm of us.  
3.  I get it, but some JO who just got qual'd might not.  You guys are lucky - your watch teams just have to stand watch.  Our watch teams have to run a division, learn how to operate weapons systems, the engineering plant, give briefs, etc. etc.  Obviously there's an experience gap, I don't think anyone would deny that.

I'm guilty as sin on that one, 3rd mates coming out the maritime academies have spent the past 4 years learning to run ships, and only that. I'm reminded often that many (most) junior SWO's have a few months at most even on a ship before their first assignment. and that their duties extend much beyond just running ships.

Holy shit.  You mean ST:TNG got that one right!?!







 

1. utterly didn't realize that you guys were using off the shelf radars more or less similar to ours.

2. yeah, i've noticed

3. not just stand watch but way less than what you navy guys have to deal with.

On item 3, well yes and no. After all, for all the seamanship work that gets done by many people on a warship, doesn't that all fall on the shoulders of the merchant officer? Is there a Quartermaster, for instance, on the merchant plotting the course, getting the nav fixes, or does the merchant officer do that?

On other similar things; I was shocked (but since I was long since out, I just shrugged it) when I heard they had done away with the Surface Warfare School. Is that actually true? Three months of training that included simulators and YP's and they chucked it?

That merchant officers are "lucky" because they just stand watch. I wouldn't necessarily say that because essentially, there's a Big Brother out there that can yank their license, their meal ticket for various offenses. If a USN officer makes a similar mistake, they still have a job and even if they are on their way out of the Navy, they still have a degree and a reasonably clear resume in order to make a living. The degree that comes with a merchant license, in the past, really wasn't much and their resume won't be that great to convince someone else to hire them.

About most SWO's not appreciating how  unmaneuverable a big merchant is. That's possible, I suppose. Both A and B of where A: I come from a different era that didn't have CP props or gas turbines galore and B: while it is not in my family, there is a lot of ship data in my background......even if I am from Texas. If all you have really been around is the "sports car" and you are out of some NROTC unit, one may not appreciate the other side of the ocean (though hopefully those with YP experience would).

About the most inexperienced being the conning officers, that's not surprising. Jump from JOOD to OOD as quickly as you can, and jump higher and higher. After all, one of the things the JOOD has to do is be the Boat Officer after watch when that call goes out and "who wants that additional work"?.

Been there, done that, had to take a very small boat in a very big sea to pick up a Commodore who was shifting his flag. At the time, I probably detested it, more work, miserable conditions (being in a trough, the other ship on a crest, it looked like a massive castle on a mountain).....but looking back, I rather liked that kind of life. Just like when I would come off early morning bridge watch, pick up my breakfast on a paper plate from the wardroom galley, and eat it on my way back for morning flight quarters as the HCO (no control booth on my ships, we stood out on the deck!). Given many of the officers I was around, it might have been, "It's good that Traci is around to do things like that because I sure as heck don't want to do it.............................would like the hazardous duty pay, though.".

It was similar in port, jump from OOD to being CDO. If you are only OOD qual'd, if you are "lucky", you will only pick up that watch once, maybe twice a day. But if "they really didn't like you", you'd be shore patrol.

Hence the comment I got from a Chief one time of "LIEUTENANT! What did you do? I see you on shore patrol all the time!". Which is a pity that it is so often used as punishment (in my case, I couldn't be qual'd as CDO) because one really doesn't want a screwball in that job. The SP officer, among other things, is the one who will hold it together on the beach if things go ugly or the balloon goes up or whatever.



That was one thing about being seen as an intel/counterintel type. They kept me, even thought I was still an 1100, to those type of jobs.........and those other kind of jobs. You know, the Shi**Y Little Jobs Officer?

Back out to sea. About being cryptic....yeah, we like to do that. I was once part of a USCG task force and we operating lights out when a Pacific Princess type liner entered our area. We turned on our running lights while the ship was in sight, then turned them back off, and went back to what we were doing.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
("Emissions from a Knox Class destroyer."––Sinclair, WSO, (w,stte), "Airwolf")

Update

I wonder how much it is gonna cost for all the repairs. Do we have any other f-up'd Burkes that we can take parts off of?

How many Burkes have BMD capability?