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Quoted: Should we expect to shoot 40 Javelins a day at enemy machineguns and concentrations in buildings? View Quote Given we’re so low on ATGM’s now that they’re looking at getting old TOW missiles from Israel and Egypt to send to the shit show in Ukraine, we won’t have 40 Javelins to shoot at all pretty soon. |
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Quoted: Because as you noted 40 tons is still a very common weight rating for bridges across the globe because that’s what loaded semi trailers weigh, so a 40 ton vehicle isn’t some huge barrier to operations for gaining units, so what are we gaining by dropping 20 tons? It’s not like IBCT don’t have a large number of armored vehicles. A lighter vehicle that is is less survivable, to what is the gain? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: It happened again. My entire post was about the bridge crossing capability of a compact 40 ton vehicle, but somebody quotes it, and turns it into "you're trying to defend it being air droppable." Because as you noted 40 tons is still a very common weight rating for bridges across the globe because that’s what loaded semi trailers weigh, so a 40 ton vehicle isn’t some huge barrier to operations for gaining units, so what are we gaining by dropping 20 tons? It’s not like IBCT don’t have a large number of armored vehicles. A lighter vehicle that is is less survivable, to what is the gain? Sigh. I don't think you understand why a 40 ton vehicle that's 22 feet long is a completely different animal when it comes to crossing bridges than a 70' long 40 ton vehicle. I tried explaining it once, to no avail. Another bite at the apple probably won't matter, but here goes: A very large percentage of bridges in our country were not designed for a 40 ton vehicle. There are even a handful within my small town. Loaded semis are not legally allowed to cross them because the bridges weren't designed to handle that weight. CT alone has 169 towns and each one probably has 5-10 of these bridges. That's about 15,000 bridges in the very small state of CT...that is in a 1st world country. Imagine how many similar bridges exist in 3rd world shitholes that are much, much bigger than Connecticut. On top of that, there are bridges that are designed to carry 40 ton vehicles, but those vehicles need to be 70' long and have up to six axles, spreading the weight out. In some instances, these vehicles (semis) are so long, that only a portion of the vehicle weight is on the bridge at any one time. That certainly would not be the case with a 40 ton tank that's 22' long. Is that a problem? It isn't...until it is. Now, I love me some tanks and enjoy discussing them. I'm neither an expert nor have I slept in a Holiday Inn lately, however, so feel free to get all worked up over what I say or just take it for what it's worth. |
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Quoted: It's not a tank. 'Mobile Protected Firepower' defines its mission within the light divisions. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Also assault gun is the better term for it than light tank. They should've dropped the weight even more by making it 3 man and using a smaller gun and using ATGM's against tanks. It's not a tank. 'Mobile Protected Firepower' defines its mission within the light divisions. There are numerous articles on the 'net right now discussing how the army doesn't want to call it a tank...but everybody sees a tank. This is the Sherman in WWII. It's exactly the same idea: a lighter tank with a lighter gun that's meant to support infantry, not fight other tanks. The discussion surrounding this M10 precisely mirrors every single discussion this site has ever had about the Sherman in WWII. It's a tank. |
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Quoted: Now, I love me some tanks and enjoy discussing them. I'm neither an expert nor have I slept in a Holiday Inn lately, however, so feel free to get all worked up over what I say or just take it for what it's worth. View Quote Maybe you should take that as your sign man. The MPF seems to have ended up with a good vehicle that the IBCT can support and fight with, and your reply is that its too heavy, at 40 tons mind you, shows you arent understanding its mission and role, but instead of saying "huh, I wonder why they went with a heavier vehicle than I imagined." and doing the homework, you immediately began advocating it was a mistake. |
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Quoted: There are numerous articles on the 'net right now discussing how the army doesn't want to call it a tank...but everybody sees a tank. This is the Sherman in WWII. It's exactly the same idea: a lighter tank with a lighter gun that's meant to support infantry, not fight other tanks. The discussion surrounding this M10 precisely mirrors every single discussion this site has ever had about the Sherman in WWII. It's a tank. View Quote You have a very flawed understanding to the Sherman, its design and fielding. Please educate yourself. |
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Drones haven't made armor obsolete anymore than SAMs made aircraft obsolete.
I'm not in those circles anymore but I suspect a lot of the work we did to counter RCIEDs is getting turned towards neutralizing drones, particularly the cheap commercial ones. |
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Quoted: There are numerous articles on the 'net right now discussing how the army doesn't want to call it a tank...but everybody sees a tank. This is the Sherman in WWII. It's exactly the same idea: a lighter tank with a lighter gun that's meant to support infantry, not fight other tanks. The discussion surrounding this M10 precisely mirrors every single discussion this site has ever had about the Sherman in WWII. It's a tank. View Quote What does a tank do? In WW1 it could survive machine gun fire and shell splinters while breaking open the line which solved trench warfare. The same abilities are still valuable. Even the JLTV changes the rules of a firefight in this way. You need more than a machine gun to deal with it. Another thing is that the Booker can kill absolutely anything on the ground EXCEPT for MBTs and probably can kill those from the right angle. So it owns the ground it sits on for the most part, not that killing vehicles is necessarily it's role but you know it's gonna have to do that at least sometimes. If you have one of these the other guys need to target it with a drone or ATGM or they need an actual tank. And since we are going to have to ship it over the ocean presumably you can build and ship more of these faster than you can the Abrams. Between this thing and the JLTV we will be able to field a lot of light armor if push comes to shove. |
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Quoted: What does a tank do? In WW1 it could survive machine gun fire and shell splinters while breaking open the line which solved trench warfare. The same abilities are still valuable. Even the JLTV changes the rules of a firefight in this way. You need more than a machine gun to deal with it. Another thing is that the Booker can kill absolutely anything on the ground EXCEPT for MBTs and probably can kill those from the right angle. So it owns the ground it sits on for the most part, not that killing vehicles is necessarily it's role but you know it's gonna have to do that at least sometimes. If you have one of these the other guys need to target it with a drone or ATGM or they need an actual tank. And since we are going to have to ship it over the ocean presumably you can build and ship more of these faster than you can the Abrams. Between this thing and the JLTV we will be able to field a lot of light armor if push comes to shove. View Quote This might be related, but I remember reading about Brads engaging Iraqi armor and even taking some of the tanks out. That's with a 23mm gun. |
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Quoted: There are numerous articles on the 'net right now discussing how the army doesn't want to call it a tank...but everybody sees a tank. This is the Sherman in WWII. It's exactly the same idea: a lighter tank with a lighter gun that's meant to support infantry, not fight other tanks. The discussion surrounding this M10 precisely mirrors every single discussion this site has ever had about the Sherman in WWII. It's a tank. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Also assault gun is the better term for it than light tank. They should've dropped the weight even more by making it 3 man and using a smaller gun and using ATGM's against tanks. It's not a tank. 'Mobile Protected Firepower' defines its mission within the light divisions. There are numerous articles on the 'net right now discussing how the army doesn't want to call it a tank...but everybody sees a tank. This is the Sherman in WWII. It's exactly the same idea: a lighter tank with a lighter gun that's meant to support infantry, not fight other tanks. The discussion surrounding this M10 precisely mirrors every single discussion this site has ever had about the Sherman in WWII. It's a tank. As has been said before. Sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly. It is not a tank. It is direct fire support for IBCTs. I get this, many others get this, why doesn't GeeDee get this. |
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Quoted: Tell me more about how you’re going to get an M1 to 38t. View Quote Easy. Take off the armor. After all, it's not a tank, so why does it need tank armor? If it's main job is infantry support, why does it need a cannon at all? Why not a 25mm chain gun? Mk-19? Hell, Bushmaster gun with dual mk-19s in the corners, like the M-4 Sherman. Or the old 76mm cannons. Sure it's a dumb idea but it would probably work. Seems like this idea is trying to be too much tank but not enough tank. |
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Quoted: As has been said before. Sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly. It is not a tank. It is direct fire support for IBCTs. I get this, many others get this, why doesn't GeeDee get this. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Also assault gun is the better term for it than light tank. They should've dropped the weight even more by making it 3 man and using a smaller gun and using ATGM's against tanks. It's not a tank. 'Mobile Protected Firepower' defines its mission within the light divisions. There are numerous articles on the 'net right now discussing how the army doesn't want to call it a tank...but everybody sees a tank. This is the Sherman in WWII. It's exactly the same idea: a lighter tank with a lighter gun that's meant to support infantry, not fight other tanks. The discussion surrounding this M10 precisely mirrors every single discussion this site has ever had about the Sherman in WWII. It's a tank. As has been said before. Sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly. It is not a tank. It is direct fire support for IBCTs. I get this, many others get this, why doesn't GeeDee get this. https://www.militarytimes.com/off-duty/military-culture/2023/06/21/the-armys-m10-booker-is-a-tank-prove-us-wrong/ There are high-ranking officials in the army who are calling it a tank. |
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Quoted: https://www.militarytimes.com/off-duty/military-culture/2023/06/21/the-armys-m10-booker-is-a-tank-prove-us-wrong/ There are high-ranking officials in the army who are calling it a tank. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Also assault gun is the better term for it than light tank. They should've dropped the weight even more by making it 3 man and using a smaller gun and using ATGM's against tanks. It's not a tank. 'Mobile Protected Firepower' defines its mission within the light divisions. There are numerous articles on the 'net right now discussing how the army doesn't want to call it a tank...but everybody sees a tank. This is the Sherman in WWII. It's exactly the same idea: a lighter tank with a lighter gun that's meant to support infantry, not fight other tanks. The discussion surrounding this M10 precisely mirrors every single discussion this site has ever had about the Sherman in WWII. It's a tank. As has been said before. Sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly. It is not a tank. It is direct fire support for IBCTs. I get this, many others get this, why doesn't GeeDee get this. https://www.militarytimes.com/off-duty/military-culture/2023/06/21/the-armys-m10-booker-is-a-tank-prove-us-wrong/ There are high-ranking officials in the army who are calling it a tank. I read that a week or so ago. Winkie is a redittard who directly copies bullshit off of r/army onto army crimes. |
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Quoted: I wonder if it wouldn't be better to design it like an assault gun. No moving turret saves on weight and simplifies the design. Let's more weight go to armor and defensive systems. Or go the other way and keep it light to increase mobility. It would also bring the cost down on production and maintenance as well. Being able to field more of them and keep them serviceable cheaply should be a consideration. If you try to design a vehicle to handle too many roles, you end up with something like a Bradley. Stug IV (WWII assault gun) as an example https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/23/Sturmgeschutz_iv_Muzeum_Broni_Pancernej_CSWL_2.JPG/300px-Sturmgeschutz_iv_Muzeum_Broni_Pancernej_CSWL_2.JPG View Quote It is a Bradley chassis with a tank turret, is it not? |
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Quoted: I don't know where this vehicle will really fit in. Direct fire is nice, but it is still 40 tons heavy. I'm not sure how much armor they can put on that thing to make it survivable at that weight. I think a lighter platform with more mobility, a smaller gun, and a simpler design would provide more bang for your taxpayer dollar. The ability to reasonably survive artillery and threats like a RPG would be enough if you can get it under 30 tons. Make it simple enough that it is cheaper to produce, maintain, and provide logistics for. Just my two cents. View Quote |
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Quoted: What does a tank do? In WW1 it could survive machine gun fire and shell splinters while breaking open the line which solved trench warfare. The same abilities are still valuable. Even the JLTV changes the rules of a firefight in this way. You need more than a machine gun to deal with it. Another thing is that the Booker can kill absolutely anything on the ground EXCEPT for MBTs and probably can kill those from the right angle. So it owns the ground it sits on for the most part, not that killing vehicles is necessarily it's role but you know it's gonna have to do that at least sometimes. If you have one of these the other guys need to target it with a drone or ATGM or they need an actual tank. And since we are going to have to ship it over the ocean presumably you can build and ship more of these faster than you can the Abrams. Between this thing and the JLTV we will be able to field a lot of light armor if push comes to shove. View Quote |
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Quoted: Easy. Take off the armor. After all, it's not a tank, so why does it need tank armor? If it's main job is infantry support, why does it need a cannon at all? Why not a 25mm chain gun? Mk-19? Hell, Bushmaster gun with dual mk-19s in the corners, like the M-4 Sherman. Or the old 76mm cannons. Sure it's a dumb idea but it would probably work. Seems like this idea is trying to be too much tank but not enough tank. View Quote Making it lighter and not run on turbines makes the logistics tail easier, and allows there to be more of them on the field where they're needed, rather than only in places that can support M1 level weight. |
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Quoted: As has been said before. Sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly. It is not a tank. It is direct fire support for IBCTs. I get this, many others get this, why doesn't GeeDee get this. View Quote With the greatest respect, it is NOT about "not getting it." You essentially demand that the rest of us ignore the very clear evidence that we can see with our own eyes. Call it whatever you want, when the rest of us, including those of us who have some combat arms service, see a tank, we're going to call it a tank. Furthermore, it really doesn't matter what its intended job is supposed to be. Everybody here knows that in a peer-on-peer fight this vehicle WILL face massed heavy enemy armor; on the Korean peninsula this is guaranteed. I do not see how it can reasonably be expected to survive in that environment without overwhelming close air support or . . . wait for it . . . the presence of our own heavy armor in the immediate vicinity, both of which defeat this vehicle's entire raison d'être. |
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Quoted: 26 Javelins or equivs = $258m loss plus another 100m burnt on maintenance and logistics. Lol USG winning… View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: 26 Javelins or equivs = $258m loss plus another 100m burnt on maintenance and logistics. Lol USG winning… That's why the Russian gov keeps building more and more BMPs and T90 tanks, right? Because the concept is obsolete? Quoted: If it’s for the 82nd, the comparable vehicle to reference would be the ASU-85 http://vignette3.wikia.nocookie.net/firearmcentral/images/1/1c/ASU-85.jpg/revision/latest?cb=20160604124541 https://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ASU-85_at_the_Muzeum_Polskiej_Techniki_Wojskowej_in_Warsaw.jpg Or the Sprut-SD Quoted: So a Bradley is what you're describing. Maybe we can buy some from Ukraine. We have thousands of them here, no need to buy them from Ukraine. |
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Quoted: Should we expect to shoot 40 Javelins a day at enemy machineguns and concentrations in buildings? Does the Javelin work as well on buildings as HEP? How does it do through heavy tree cover? How well is it armored so you can stand there looking for your target while they shoot at you? The US could buy a shitload of 155mm HE arty shells, Carl Gustav rounds and Hellfire rockets for 10 million bucks but one $2500 RPG-7V2 launcher with a $400 HEAT round, could jack up a 10+ million dollar clusterfuck. View Quote You are quoting yourself |
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I'm glad GD has saved us from the military industrial complex by watching a few Ukraine drone videos and has declared armor obsolete.
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Quoted: They tried that with the Stryker. It failed too. View Quote yeah to me the Stryker is a funny beast for awhile when it was being envisioned the US Army had done a bunch of 'not really war' missions that they needed a modern vehicle for. called it OOTW -- Military Operations Other Than War Panama. Haiti. Somalia. Kosovo / IFOR. etc so they wanted an 'armored' vehicle -- mobile -- but without the 'signature' of a hulking tank or Bradley. IMO it was fine for that -- but then reality came and kicked it in the ass. |
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Quoted: With the greatest respect, it is NOT about "not getting it." You essentially demand that the rest of us ignore the very clear evidence that we can see with our own eyes. Call it whatever you want, when the rest of us, including those of us who have some combat arms service, see a tank, we're going to call it a tank. Furthermore, it really doesn't matter what its intended job is supposed to be. Everybody here knows that in a peer-on-peer fight this vehicle WILL face heavy enemy armor; on the Korean peninsula this is guaranteed. I do not see how it can reasonably be expected to survive in that environment without overwhelming close air support or . . . wait for it . . . the presence of our own heavy armor in the immediate vicinity, both of which defeat this vehicle's entire raison d'être. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: As has been said before. Sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly. It is not a tank. It is direct fire support for IBCTs. I get this, many others get this, why doesn't GeeDee get this. With the greatest respect, it is NOT about "not getting it." You essentially demand that the rest of us ignore the very clear evidence that we can see with our own eyes. Call it whatever you want, when the rest of us, including those of us who have some combat arms service, see a tank, we're going to call it a tank. Furthermore, it really doesn't matter what its intended job is supposed to be. Everybody here knows that in a peer-on-peer fight this vehicle WILL face heavy enemy armor; on the Korean peninsula this is guaranteed. I do not see how it can reasonably be expected to survive in that environment without overwhelming close air support or . . . wait for it . . . the presence of our own heavy armor in the immediate vicinity, both of which defeat this vehicle's entire raison d'être. These will be resident within infantry divisions(AKA light divisions). Not mech/armor divisions. Nobody is sending 3 BCT, 25ID against an armored force when 1 BCT, 1CD is right there. If an IBCT is in a defense, I'm certainly using something like this to kill armored anything so as to augment the already raped MRTs in the Cav and then the D Cos. Sure call it a tank or call it whatever-a gun truck will do-maybe sally or lord help us jesus too. It's not a tank. It is fire support for light infantry. Lead with armor, large caliber bullets, and high explosives instead of little pink bodies. The reason it is given to light divisions is because the heavy units with armor are still on the boat or incapable(as a whole) of operating where a light unit can. I call it a tank or baby tank elsewhere as a joke. It is not a fucking tank and does not have that mission. |
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Quoted: Sigh. I don't think you understand why a 40 ton vehicle that's 22 feet long is a completely different animal when it comes to crossing bridges than a 70' long 40 ton vehicle. I tried explaining it once, to no avail. Another bite at the apple probably won't matter, but here goes: View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Sigh. I don't think you understand why a 40 ton vehicle that's 22 feet long is a completely different animal when it comes to crossing bridges than a 70' long 40 ton vehicle. I tried explaining it once, to no avail. Another bite at the apple probably won't matter, but here goes: Here is how the Japanese think about bridges and why they bought a 48 tonne tank: The predecessor of the Type 10, the Type 90 main battle tank, was deployed only in Hokkaido due to the weight limit of roads and bridges in other parts of Japan. One of the primary purposes of Type 10 is to be able to deploy anywhere in Japan. Size and weight reductions have made the Type 10 six tonnes lighter than the Type 90, weighing only 44 tonnes. 84% of Japan's 17,920 bridges are passable for the Type 10, compared to only 65% for the Type 90 and 40% for mainstream western main battle tanks. |
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Quoted: yeah to me the Stryker is a funny beast View Quote Stryker was an interim vehicle that was supposed to be replaced by a lightweight tracked vehicle with a continuous rubber track, the M777 in the SBCT was an interim weapon to be replaced by a tracked SPH. FCS failed and here we are. They are useful, though, they can drive distances that require rails or HETs for tracked vehicles, and they can get there ready to fight. |
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Bet those marine ex-tankers are looking at this..
"Well shit why didn't we swap for those" |
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Quoted: With the greatest respect, it is NOT about "not getting it." You essentially demand that the rest of us ignore the very clear evidence that we can see with our own eyes. Call it whatever you want, when the rest of us, including those of us who have some combat arms service, see a tank, we're going to call it a tank. Furthermore, it really doesn't matter what its intended job is supposed to be. Everybody here knows that in a peer-on-peer fight this vehicle WILL face massed heavy enemy armor; on the Korean peninsula this is guaranteed. I do not see how it can reasonably be expected to survive in that environment without overwhelming close air support or . . . wait for it . . . the presence of our own heavy armor in the immediate vicinity, both of which defeat this vehicle's entire raison d'être. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: As has been said before. Sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly. It is not a tank. It is direct fire support for IBCTs. I get this, many others get this, why doesn't GeeDee get this. With the greatest respect, it is NOT about "not getting it." You essentially demand that the rest of us ignore the very clear evidence that we can see with our own eyes. Call it whatever you want, when the rest of us, including those of us who have some combat arms service, see a tank, we're going to call it a tank. Furthermore, it really doesn't matter what its intended job is supposed to be. Everybody here knows that in a peer-on-peer fight this vehicle WILL face massed heavy enemy armor; on the Korean peninsula this is guaranteed. I do not see how it can reasonably be expected to survive in that environment without overwhelming close air support or . . . wait for it . . . the presence of our own heavy armor in the immediate vicinity, both of which defeat this vehicle's entire raison d'être. I'm sorry, are you saying China is going to invade South Korea via North Korea? That's the only way what you just said makes any sense |
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Quoted: These will be resident within infantry divisions(AKA light divisions). Not mech/armor divisions. Nobody is sending 3 BCT, 25ID against an armored force when 1 BCT, 1CD is right there. View Quote Do you seriously believe that with our backs against the wall, we won't send light troops to fight an all-mechanized enemy? Do you remember which Army division was the first to deploy to Saudi in August, 1990? Hint: it was the one for which these vehicles are primarily intended, and the enemy, on that occasion, appeared to be coming, with lots of t-72s. The fact that he stopped was probably only due to what he perceived as the very credible Anglo-American nuclear threat. |
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Quoted: I'm sorry, are you saying China is going to invade South Korea via North Korea? That's the only way what you just said makes any sense View Quote No. I am saying that when China does decide to kick off the next war it won't be limited to Taiwan (their involvement in Korea from 1950-53 would seem at least to suggest this). |
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Quoted: One less crewman to pull security or conduct preventative or emergency maintenance. View Quote The trend is to smaller crews, MICV will have a two man crew, M270/M142 have a three man crew, M88 has a 3 man crew, and so on. The autoloader saves 42 billets per DIV, or roughly an infantry platoon worth of Soldiers. I don't think the Army is going to continue to be able to field a million troops indefinitely, that number is very likely to shrink. Who will pay the bill? AR, FA or IN? |
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Quoted: No. I am saying that when China does decide to kick off the next war it won't be limited to Taiwan (their involvement in Korea from 1950-53 would seem at least to suggest this). View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: I'm sorry, are you saying China is going to invade South Korea via North Korea? That's the only way what you just said makes any sense No. I am saying that when China does decide to kick off the next war it won't be limited to Taiwan (their involvement in Korea from 1950-53 would seem at least to suggest this). So then yes, that's exactly what you're saying. |
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I'm going to withhold judgement because if I made the decisions the M1A would have afterburners and constantly and randomly toss MICLICs all over the battlefield and the main gun would be from the Iowa Class
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Pvt Booker
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at risk of life above and beyond the call of duty in action. On 9 April 1943 in the vicinity of Fondouk, Tunisia, Pvt. Booker, while engaged in action against the enemy, carried a light machinegun and a box of ammunition over 200 yards of open ground. He continued to advance despite the fact that 2 enemy machineguns and several mortars were using him as an individual target. Although enemy artillery also began to register on him, upon reaching his objective he immediately commenced firing. After being wounded he silenced 1 enemy machinegun and was beginning to fire at the other when he received a second mortal wound. With his last remaining strength he encouraged the members of his squad and directed their fire. Pvt. Booker acted without regard for his own safety. His initiative and courage against insurmountable odds are an example of the highest standard of self-sacrifice and fidelity to duty. |
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Quoted: There are numerous articles on the 'net right now discussing how the army doesn't want to call it a tank...but everybody sees a tank. This is the Sherman in WWII. It's exactly the same idea: a lighter tank with a lighter gun that's meant to support infantry, not fight other tanks. The discussion surrounding this M10 precisely mirrors every single discussion this site has ever had about the Sherman in WWII. It's a tank. View Quote You have a very flawed grasp of WW2 tank tactics. |
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Quoted: The M10 Booker is a tracked vehicle built by General Dynamics that provides a mobile, direct offensive fire capability to the US Army’s Infantry Brigade Combat Teams. Although it has similarities with the M1 Abrams main battle tank, the service clarified that it has decided against classifying it as a tank for several undisclosed reasons. Like the Abrams, the M10 is manned by four crew and boasts a heavy 105-millimeter direct-fire cannon. It also features an enhanced thermal viewer, a lightweight hull and turret, and a modern diesel engine for improved performance. However, the army revealed that the Booker is much lighter and less expensive than the well-known main battle tank. While the vehicle cannot be air-dropped, two can fit inside a C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft to support missions abroad. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/06/14/us-army-booker-vehicle/ I'm not an expert on the US Army, but my limited understanding is that the M10 will actually be owned and operated by the brigade combat teams -- I don't think they have M1s and would need to receive armor support from armored units. View Quote Can't call it a tank for same reasons we could not call the Sheridan a tank. Call them tanks and some numb nuts O6 11B will want to have them duke it out toe to toe with enemy MBTs. |
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Quoted: Pvt Booker For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at risk of life above and beyond the call of duty in action. On 9 April 1943 in the vicinity of Fondouk, Tunisia, Pvt. Booker, while engaged in action against the enemy, carried a light machinegun and a box of ammunition over 200 yards of open ground. He continued to advance despite the fact that 2 enemy machineguns and several mortars were using him as an individual target. Although enemy artillery also began to register on him, upon reaching his objective he immediately commenced firing. After being wounded he silenced 1 enemy machinegun and was beginning to fire at the other when he received a second mortal wound. With his last remaining strength he encouraged the members of his squad and directed their fire. Pvt. Booker acted without regard for his own safety. His initiative and courage against insurmountable odds are an example of the highest standard of self-sacrifice and fidelity to duty. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Pvt Booker For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at risk of life above and beyond the call of duty in action. On 9 April 1943 in the vicinity of Fondouk, Tunisia, Pvt. Booker, while engaged in action against the enemy, carried a light machinegun and a box of ammunition over 200 yards of open ground. He continued to advance despite the fact that 2 enemy machineguns and several mortars were using him as an individual target. Although enemy artillery also began to register on him, upon reaching his objective he immediately commenced firing. After being wounded he silenced 1 enemy machinegun and was beginning to fire at the other when he received a second mortal wound. With his last remaining strength he encouraged the members of his squad and directed their fire. Pvt. Booker acted without regard for his own safety. His initiative and courage against insurmountable odds are an example of the highest standard of self-sacrifice and fidelity to duty. Named after this guy too. I googled it. https://valor.militarytimes.com/hero/69218 The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress July 9, 1918, takes pride in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross (Posthumously) to Staff Sergeant Stevon A. Booker, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States while serving as a Tank Commander with Company A, 1st Battalion, 64th Armored Regiment, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) on 5 April 2003 in Iraq. On this date, Staff Sergeant Booker's platoon led a task force in a movement to contact along Highway 8 towards Baghdad International Airport. Two kilometers after the line of departure, the platoon came under heavy small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire from an enemy element. He immediately communicated the situation to his chain of command, encouraged his crew, and returned fire with his tank mounted machinegun. When both his and his crew's machineguns malfunctioned, Staff Sergeant Booker, with total disregard for his personal safety, exposed himself by lying in a prone position on top of the tank's turret and accurately engaged the enemy forces with his personal weapon. While exposed he effectively protected his platoon's flank and delivered accurate information to his command during a critical and vulnerable point of the battle. Staff Sergeant Booker's fearless attitude and excitement over the communications network inspired his platoon to continue the attack and assured them and leadership that they would defeat the enemy and reach their objective safely. As he remained exposed, Staff Sergeant Booker identified an enemy troop carrier which was attempting to bypass his tank, but within seconds engaged the enemy vehicle and destroyed it prior to the enemy troops dismounting. Along the eight kilometer route he remained exposed and continued to engage the enemy with accurate rifle fire until he was mortally wounded. Staff Sergeant Booker's actions are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the United States Army. |
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Quoted: I wonder if it wouldn't be better to design it like an assault gun. No moving turret saves on weight and simplifies the design. Let's more weight go to armor and defensive systems. Or go the other way and keep it light to increase mobility. It would also bring the cost down on production and maintenance as well. Being able to field more of them and keep them serviceable cheaply should be a consideration. If you try to design a vehicle to handle too many roles, you end up with something like a Bradley. Stug IV (WWII assault gun) as an example https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/23/Sturmgeschutz_iv_Muzeum_Broni_Pancernej_CSWL_2.JPG/300px-Sturmgeschutz_iv_Muzeum_Broni_Pancernej_CSWL_2.JPG View Quote |
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Quoted: With the greatest respect, it is NOT about "not getting it." You essentially demand that the rest of us ignore the very clear evidence that we can see with our own eyes. Call it whatever you want, when the rest of us, including those of us who have some combat arms service, see a tank, we're going to call it a tank. Furthermore, it really doesn't matter what its intended job is supposed to be. Everybody here knows that in a peer-on-peer fight this vehicle WILL face heavy enemy armor; on the Korean peninsula this is guaranteed. I do not see how it can reasonably be expected to survive in that environment without overwhelming close air support or . . . wait for it . . . the presence of our own heavy armor in the immediate vicinity, both of which defeat this vehicle's entire raison d'être. View Quote While I will use the term “tank” in discussion myself when referring to the vehicle, it is a matter of habit or convenience. “Fight your tank” as it were. However, I am well aware that that is not its function. You look at the vehicle and see a “tank”. I consider it imprecise at best. Even from its very beginnings in WW1, the doctrinaires were envisioning a range of roles for the vehicle far beyond mere infantry support, not least exploitation. The first light tanks (Whippets) were designed primarily with exploitation in mind. The M10 can do most of these roles, even if it’s not particularly well suited for them from a design perspective. I look at the M10, and I see a role which has historically existed for decades, which is a much more focused set of tasks. That of infantry support only, the term we give to such vehicles normally is “assault gun”. Though we tend to associate the term with Sturmgeschutz, (itself a vehicle found performing the tank role, even though it wasn’t the design intent), the position could also be found in the US TO&E of WW2 and later, filled by the T30, M8 HMC, the M4(105) and finally the M45. There is nothing wrong with calling it an assault gun if that suits its intended role better than “tank”. I argue it does two ways. 1) Doctrinally: True, the Army has not yet published a doctrinal manual on the subject, However, some conclusions are obvious. With one battalion in a division, it is evident from both public statements and a historical look of similarly distributed assets (eg independent tank battalions and TD battalions) that the battalion staff are purely administrative and the subordinate units will be distributed. Further, the various non-infantry support roles cannot be well conducted by the M10 units. Even back in WW2, armored divisions used armored infantry to accompany the tanks, today of course it’s mech infantry. Light divisions are not equipped to accompany a unit of M10s as they go marauding around the enemy’s rear in exploitation at tank speeds. 2) Physically. There was a set of design and performance requirements that the vehicle was designed to meet. If this set of parameters better suits “assault gun” than “tank”, then that probably can be an indicator. I asked the program manager if it was a fair statement that some of the tonnage and space was used to allow the vehicle to better fit the infantry support role, he affirmed it was (They are being very cagey about what is actually under there, I’ve only been allowed see the crew compartment with power off). I have suspicions, but even from just the proliferation of close quarter cameras and the answer to the question of target handoff with infantry, such consideration is evident. Why the thing is officially designated “combat vehicle” and not “assault gun”, I don’t know. But I would observe that the vehicles in what were officially termed the “assault gun platoons” of WW2 battalions were not officially termed “assault guns” either, and I would also observe that MG Dean has also described its role as an assault gun even as he affirmed the official designation as “combat vehicle”. As for the concern of facing heavy enemy armor, I have two further observations on this point. Firstly, the IBCTs (and Light Divisions) as they are currently configured are expected to deal with any heavy armor which may happen to show up. Unlike their WW2 counterparts, however, they are well equipped to do so. In WW2, it was anti-tank guns and very short range bazookas. Anything more required additional assets from outside the division. Today, the Light Division integrally has Apache gunships, TOW missiles, and, oh yeah, Javelins liberally scattered around every section. In this, the anti-tank capability provided by MPF is an addition or bonus, not something to be relied upon at large. Secondly, if the “at large” issue does come to hand, such as being expected to engage the 7th Guards Tank Army or some such, one would hope that the guys at Corps might notice this and dispatch one of the heavy divisions. It’s kindof their thing. |
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Quoted: You have a very flawed grasp of WW2 tank tactics. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: There are numerous articles on the 'net right now discussing how the army doesn't want to call it a tank...but everybody sees a tank. This is the Sherman in WWII. It's exactly the same idea: a lighter tank with a lighter gun that's meant to support infantry, not fight other tanks. The discussion surrounding this M10 precisely mirrors every single discussion this site has ever had about the Sherman in WWII. It's a tank. You have a very flawed grasp of WW2 tank tactics. I'll remember your post when we have another thread about WWII tanks and 87% of people post how army doctrine didn't intend for the Sherman to engage enemy tanks, but instead be used in conjunction with infantry and how the 75mm HE round was so effective in that role. Further, that tank destroyers were intended to engage enemy tanks per doctrine. We're almost due for the next thread on the subject, so it won't be a long wait. |
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Quoted: While I will use the term “tank” in discussion myself when referring to the vehicle, it is a matter of habit or convenience. “Fight your tank” as it were. However, I am well aware that that is not its function. You look at the vehicle and see a “tank”. I consider it imprecise at best. Even from its very beginnings in WW1, the doctrinaires were envisioning a range of roles for the vehicle far beyond mere infantry support, not least exploitation. The first light tanks (Whippets) were designed primarily with exploitation in mind. The M10 can do most of these roles, even if it’s not particularly well suited for them from a design perspective. I look at the M10, and I see a role which has historically existed for decades, which is a much more focused set of tasks. That of infantry support only, the term we give to such vehicles normally is “assault gun”. Though we tend to associate the term with Sturmgeschutz, (itself a vehicle found performing the tank role, even though it wasn’t the design intent), the position could also be found in the US TO&E of WW2 and later, filled by the T30, M8 HMC, the M4(105) and finally the M45. There is nothing wrong with calling it an assault gun if that suits its intended role better than “tank”. I argue it does two ways. 1) Doctrinally: True, the Army has not yet published a doctrinal manual on the subject, However, some conclusions are obvious. With one battalion in a division, it is evident from both public statements and a historical look of similarly distributed assets (eg independent tank battalions and TD battalions) that the battalion staff are purely administrative and the subordinate units will be distributed. Further, the various non-infantry support roles cannot be well conducted by the M10 units. Even back in WW2, armored divisions used armored infantry to accompany the tanks, today of course it’s mech infantry. Light divisions are not equipped to accompany a unit of M10s as they go marauding around the enemy’s rear in exploitation at tank speeds. 2) Physically. There was a set of design and performance requirements that the vehicle was designed to meet. If this set of parameters better suits “assault gun” than “tank”, then that probably can be an indicator. I asked the program manager if it was a fair statement that some of the tonnage and space was used to allow the vehicle to better fit the infantry support role, he affirmed it was (They are being very cagey about what is actually under there, I’ve only been allowed see the crew compartment with power off). I have suspicions, but even from just the proliferation of close quarter cameras and the answer to the question of target handoff with infantry, such consideration is evident. Why the thing is officially designated “combat vehicle” and not “assault gun”, I don’t know. But I would observe that the vehicles in what were officially termed the “assault gun platoons” of WW2 battalions were not officially termed “assault guns” either, and I would also observe that MG Dean has also described its role as an assault gun even as he affirmed the official designation as “combat vehicle”. As for the concern of facing heavy enemy armor, I have two further observations on this point. Firstly, the IBCTs (and Light Divisions) as they are currently configured are expected to deal with any heavy armor which may happen to show up. Unlike their WW2 counterparts, however, they are well equipped to do so. In WW2, it was anti-tank guns and very short range bazookas. Anything more required additional assets from outside the division. Today, the Light Division integrally has Apache gunships, TOW missiles, and, oh yeah, Javelins liberally scattered around every section. In this, the anti-tank capability provided by MPF is an addition or bonus, not something to be relied upon at large. Secondly, if the “at large” issue does come to hand, such as being expected to engage the 7th Guards Tank Army or some such, one would hope that the guys at Corps might notice this and dispatch one of the heavy divisions. It’s kindof their thing. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: With the greatest respect, it is NOT about "not getting it." You essentially demand that the rest of us ignore the very clear evidence that we can see with our own eyes. Call it whatever you want, when the rest of us, including those of us who have some combat arms service, see a tank, we're going to call it a tank. Furthermore, it really doesn't matter what its intended job is supposed to be. Everybody here knows that in a peer-on-peer fight this vehicle WILL face heavy enemy armor; on the Korean peninsula this is guaranteed. I do not see how it can reasonably be expected to survive in that environment without overwhelming close air support or . . . wait for it . . . the presence of our own heavy armor in the immediate vicinity, both of which defeat this vehicle's entire raison d'être. While I will use the term “tank” in discussion myself when referring to the vehicle, it is a matter of habit or convenience. “Fight your tank” as it were. However, I am well aware that that is not its function. You look at the vehicle and see a “tank”. I consider it imprecise at best. Even from its very beginnings in WW1, the doctrinaires were envisioning a range of roles for the vehicle far beyond mere infantry support, not least exploitation. The first light tanks (Whippets) were designed primarily with exploitation in mind. The M10 can do most of these roles, even if it’s not particularly well suited for them from a design perspective. I look at the M10, and I see a role which has historically existed for decades, which is a much more focused set of tasks. That of infantry support only, the term we give to such vehicles normally is “assault gun”. Though we tend to associate the term with Sturmgeschutz, (itself a vehicle found performing the tank role, even though it wasn’t the design intent), the position could also be found in the US TO&E of WW2 and later, filled by the T30, M8 HMC, the M4(105) and finally the M45. There is nothing wrong with calling it an assault gun if that suits its intended role better than “tank”. I argue it does two ways. 1) Doctrinally: True, the Army has not yet published a doctrinal manual on the subject, However, some conclusions are obvious. With one battalion in a division, it is evident from both public statements and a historical look of similarly distributed assets (eg independent tank battalions and TD battalions) that the battalion staff are purely administrative and the subordinate units will be distributed. Further, the various non-infantry support roles cannot be well conducted by the M10 units. Even back in WW2, armored divisions used armored infantry to accompany the tanks, today of course it’s mech infantry. Light divisions are not equipped to accompany a unit of M10s as they go marauding around the enemy’s rear in exploitation at tank speeds. 2) Physically. There was a set of design and performance requirements that the vehicle was designed to meet. If this set of parameters better suits “assault gun” than “tank”, then that probably can be an indicator. I asked the program manager if it was a fair statement that some of the tonnage and space was used to allow the vehicle to better fit the infantry support role, he affirmed it was (They are being very cagey about what is actually under there, I’ve only been allowed see the crew compartment with power off). I have suspicions, but even from just the proliferation of close quarter cameras and the answer to the question of target handoff with infantry, such consideration is evident. Why the thing is officially designated “combat vehicle” and not “assault gun”, I don’t know. But I would observe that the vehicles in what were officially termed the “assault gun platoons” of WW2 battalions were not officially termed “assault guns” either, and I would also observe that MG Dean has also described its role as an assault gun even as he affirmed the official designation as “combat vehicle”. As for the concern of facing heavy enemy armor, I have two further observations on this point. Firstly, the IBCTs (and Light Divisions) as they are currently configured are expected to deal with any heavy armor which may happen to show up. Unlike their WW2 counterparts, however, they are well equipped to do so. In WW2, it was anti-tank guns and very short range bazookas. Anything more required additional assets from outside the division. Today, the Light Division integrally has Apache gunships, TOW missiles, and, oh yeah, Javelins liberally scattered around every section. In this, the anti-tank capability provided by MPF is an addition or bonus, not something to be relied upon at large. Secondly, if the “at large” issue does come to hand, such as being expected to engage the 7th Guards Tank Army or some such, one would hope that the guys at Corps might notice this and dispatch one of the heavy divisions. It’s kindof their thing. I read this post and then scrolled up thinking "who the hell is this guy". Then I saw who it was. I read your post in a European accent by the way. |
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Quoted: I'll remember your post when we have another thread about WWII tanks and 87% of people post how army doctrine didn't intend for the Sherman to engage enemy tanks, but instead be used in conjunction with infantry and how the 75mm HE round was so effective in that role. Further, that tank destroyers were intended to engage enemy tanks per doctrine. We're almost due for the next thread on the subject, so it won't be a long wait. View Quote In which case 87% of the people posting will be demonstrably wrong by reference to the publications of the time. And yet again, we shall have to show them their error. It certainly is a recurring problem, I agree with you there. |
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Quoted: I read this post and then scrolled up thinking "who the hell is this guy". Then I saw who it was. I read your post in a European accent by the way. View Quote You are far from the only person to have reported reading my posts or comments in my voice. Nothing for it but to accept it… :) |
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Quoted: One less crewman to pull security or conduct preventative or emergency maintenance. No armor, so we're back to leading with little pink bodies again and this thing is just a mobile unprotected/easily targeted SBF. View Quote Well, they are assigned to Infantry companies so if I had to guess someone can drag up some manpower somewhere… |
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Quoted: Maybe you should take that as your sign man. The MPF seems to have ended up with a good vehicle that the IBCT can support and fight with, and your reply is that its too heavy, at 40 tons mind you, shows you arent understanding its mission and role, but instead of saying "huh, I wonder why they went with a heavier vehicle than I imagined." and doing the homework, you immediately began advocating it was a mistake. View Quote He’s not wrong that the weight limits the bridges it can cross. The Army will have weighed what they value and has decided that what their extra tonnage bought them, was worth more than the ability to cross a higher percentage of bridges. It’s likely that in the next war they’ll wonder if they weighted the variables right, but that’s always the case. |
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