Posted: 3/4/2012 4:42:13 AM EDT
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Possibly one of the most under-reported military actions of WWII, if not of all time, the Battle off Samar was the result of Halsey's being tricked into thinking the main Japanese force was attacking many miles to the north.
A light screen of destroyers and destroyer escorts was left to protect the landing craft and jeep carriers supporting them. The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships Yamato, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna; heavy cruisers Chōkai, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, Tone; light cruisers Yahagi, and Noshiro; and 11 Kagerō- and Asashio-class destroyers.
The American forces consisted of: 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, 400 aircraft from Taffy 1, 2, 3
Quotes from this Wikipedia article. Makes one proud to be an American! "Don't Tread on Me," indeed! |
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Possibly one of the most under-reported military actions of WWII, if not of all time, the Battle off Samar was the result of Halsey's being tricked into thinking the main Japanese force was attacking many miles to the north. A light screen of destroyers and destroyer escorts was left to protect the landing craft and jeep carriers supporting them. The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships Yamato, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna; heavy cruisers Chōkai, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, Tone; light cruisers Yahagi, and Noshiro; and 11 Kagerō- and Asashio-class destroyers.
The American forces consisted of: 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, 400 aircraft from Taffy 1, 2, 3
Quotes from this Wikipedia article. Makes one proud to be an American! "Don't Tread on Me," indeed! Read, "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors", you will thank me later. 
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CDR Ernie Evans was from just down the road from here. Sadly, there's only a little brick of him in the their courthouse lawn. There should be a huge statue of the guy. The story of Taffy 3 is a story in courage and bravery that all Americans should study. "A large Japanese fleet has been contacted. They are fifteen miles away and headed in our direction. They are believed to have four battleships, eight cruisers, and a number of destroyers. This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected. We will do what damage we can."
-CDR Ernie Evans |
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Our first surface engagement with the Japanese was one no one knows of, The Battle Balikpapan. A force of WW1 four stack destroyers sailed into the Japanese anchorage undetected sank four ships and sailed out. An attack against almost insurmountable odds, none the less successful.
Admiral Scott's actions off Guadalcanal are also epic. |
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Quoted: My grandpa was on the Gambier Bay when it was hit and sunk. He made it off with a schrapnel wound to his leg. He watched his friends and shipmates get eaten by sharks.  He has told me the stories many times. I still see him every weekend.Get a video of his stories ASAP, if you haven't already. The interview I taped with my Dad is priceless now.... |
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My grandpa was on the Gambier Bay when it was hit and sunk. He made it off with a schrapnel wound to his leg. He watched his friends and shipmates get eaten by sharks. He has told me the stories many times. I still see him every weekend.Get a video of his stories ASAP, if you haven't already. The interview I taped with my Dad is priceless now....
Good idea. |
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Possibly one of the most under-reported military actions of WWII, if not of all time, the Battle off Samar was the result of Halsey's being tricked into thinking the main Japanese force was attacking many miles to the north. A light screen of destroyers and destroyer escorts was left to protect the landing craft and jeep carriers supporting them. The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships Yamato, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna; heavy cruisers Chōkai, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, Tone; light cruisers Yahagi, and Noshiro; and 11 Kagerō- and Asashio-class destroyers.
The American forces consisted of: 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, 400 aircraft from Taffy 1, 2, 3
Quotes from this Wikipedia article. Makes one proud to be an American! "Don't Tread on Me," indeed! Read, "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors", you will thank me later.
The best book I ever read on the subject. American courage displayed at its greatest. |
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Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: My grandpa was on the Gambier Bay when it was hit and sunk. He made it off with a schrapnel wound to his leg. He watched his friends and shipmates get eaten by sharks. He has told me the stories many times. I still see him every weekend.Get a video of his stories ASAP, if you haven't already. The interview I taped with my Dad is priceless now.... Good idea. My Dad was at Leyte Gulf, and this is what happened to his ship (as told by one of his shipmates). |
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Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Possibly one of the most under-reported military actions of WWII, if not of all time, the Battle off Samar was the result of Halsey's being tricked into thinking the main Japanese force was attacking many miles to the north. A light screen of destroyers and destroyer escorts was left to protect the landing craft and jeep carriers supporting them. The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships Yamato, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna; heavy cruisers Chōkai, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, Tone; light cruisers Yahagi, and Noshiro; and 11 Kagerō- and Asashio-class destroyers. The American forces consisted of: 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, 400 aircraft from Taffy 1, 2, 3 Quotes from this Wikipedia article. Makes one proud to be an American! "Don't Tread on Me," indeed! Read, "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors", you will thank me later. The best book I ever read on the subject. American courage displayed at its greatest. +1 |
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Possibly one of the most under-reported military actions of WWII, if not of all time, the Battle off Samar was the result of Halsey's being tricked into thinking the main Japanese force was attacking many miles to the north. A light screen of destroyers and destroyer escorts was left to protect the landing craft and jeep carriers supporting them. The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships Yamato, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna; heavy cruisers Chōkai, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, Tone; light cruisers Yahagi, and Noshiro; and 11 Kagerō- and Asashio-class destroyers.
The American forces consisted of: 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, 400 aircraft from Taffy 1, 2, 3
Quotes from this Wikipedia article. Makes one proud to be an American! "Don't Tread on Me," indeed! Read, "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors", you will thank me later.
"click button to add to cart"
Thanks for the tip my book pile was getting short. |
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Possibly one of the most under-reported military actions of WWII, if not of all time, the Battle off Samar was the result of Halsey's being tricked into thinking the main Japanese force was attacking many miles to the north. A light screen of destroyers and destroyer escorts was left to protect the landing craft and jeep carriers supporting them. The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships Yamato, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna; heavy cruisers Chōkai, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, Tone; light cruisers Yahagi, and Noshiro; and 11 Kagerō- and Asashio-class destroyers.
The American forces consisted of: 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, 400 aircraft from Taffy 1, 2, 3
Quotes from this Wikipedia article. Makes one proud to be an American! "Don't Tread on Me," indeed! Read, "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors", you will thank me later.
"click button to add to cart"
Thanks for the tip my book pile was getting short. Hornficher's latest, "Neptune's Inferno", details the battles around Guadalcanal. Reading about a night engagement in which a US destroyer is within 20 yards of a Japanese battleship, raking the bridge and superstructure with 5" fire. The BB could not depress it's guns low enough to hit the destroyer. Epic As good as "Last Stand". |
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My grandpa was on the Gambier Bay when it was hit and sunk. He made it off with a schrapnel wound to his leg. He watched his friends and shipmates get eaten by sharks. He has told me the stories many times. I still see him every weekend.Get a video of his stories ASAP, if you haven't already. The interview I taped with my Dad is priceless now....
Indeed! I now wish I'd taped some of my own dad's stories. He was on Guam after the Japanese surrender. He has a very, very good reason for hating Spam! My uncle was on a destroyer during the Battle of Saipan. He told of a time when, at battle stations, the ship suddenly started some wild manuvers, then sounded "Collision Alert!" He was in the engine spaces; he could hear a Japanese torpedo as it passed under the hull. The captain had manuvered his destroyer to intercept the torpedo aimed at one of the big ships! The shallow-draft destroyer couldn't intercept it. eta One of the anecdotes from the Samar battle is of the destroyers. Toward the end of the battle, the destroyers kept making torpedo runs at the Japanese ships–– with empty torpedo tubes! How ballsy does that get? |
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Halsey's decision is quite controversial. He knew good and well the three carriers were useless given the state of Japanese pilots. Samar overshadows the bigger picture of what would have happened if Kurita's center force had linked with Nishimura's force and attacked the anchored amphibious forces at Leyte. Halsey read a little more into his orders than there really was. The crews of Taffey 3 and those destroyers and destroyer escorts went through hell though.
I'm writing a paper right now over the battle of surigao strait and leyte in general |
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Halsey's decision is quite controversial. He knew good and well the three carriers were useless given the state of Japanese pilots. Samar overshadows the bigger picture of what would have happened if Kurita's center force had linked with Nishimura's force and attacked the anchored amphibious forces at Leyte. Halsey read a little more into his orders than there really was. The crews of Taffey 3 and those destroyers and destroyer escorts went through hell though. I'm writing a paper right now over the battle of surigao strait and leyte in general I'm not a Halsey fan, but you do have to place his decision in context. Spruance, during the Battle of the Phillipine Sea was heavily criticized for not pursuing the Japanese carriers. Instead he stayed behind to protect the landing force. So let's look at the information Halsey had: -He was in a similar position compared to Spruance at Phil Sea. -He was concerned that the Japanese aircraft may use the combination of land bases and carriers to execute "shuttle" attacks where they'd fly from the carriers, attack his forces and land ashore, and then reverse the process greatly complicating his tactical situation. -The information he had about the ships in the Sibuyan Sea had turned around and were heading away from the beach head. He may or may not have known the Center Force had turned around and navigation lights in the channel were turned on. It seems the command climate he created may have stopped that information from getting to him, which may be his greatest failing in all this. -Finally, he was on the New Jersey. The New Jersey would have been left behind to fight as a part of TF34, while Halsey's carriers would have been engaging the Northern Force. This is less than ideal and should be avoided if possible. The commander should be where he believes the decisive action will be. Clearly, he believed the decisive action was going to be to the north. In light of the information he had, not leaving TF34 behind wasn't a huge oversight. Like I said, the biggest failing of the day started years before as he fashioned a command climate where he couldn't be bothered and the information about Center Force was likely not passed to him. It is in the command climate he created and his childish response to Nimitz' where the true criticism lies. |
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Halsey's decision is quite controversial. He knew good and well the three carriers were useless given the state of Japanese pilots. Samar overshadows the bigger picture of what would have happened if Kurita's center force had linked with Nishimura's force and attacked the anchored amphibious forces at Leyte. Halsey read a little more into his orders than there really was. The crews of Taffey 3 and those destroyers and destroyer escorts went through hell though. I'm writing a paper right now over the battle of surigao strait and leyte in general I'm not a Halsey fan, but you do have to place his decision in context. Spruance, during the Battle of the Phillipine Sea was heavily criticized for not pursuing the Japanese carriers. Instead he stayed behind to protect the landing force. So let's look at the information Halsey had: -He was in a similar position compared to Spruance at Phil Sea. -He was concerned that the Japanese aircraft may use the combination of land bases and carriers to execute "shuttle" attacks where they'd fly from the carriers, attack his forces and land ashore, and then reverse the process greatly complicating his tactical situation. -The information he had about the ships in the Sibuyan Sea had turned around and were heading away from the beach head. He may or may not have known the Center Force had turned around and navigation lights in the channel were turned on. It seems the command climate he created may have stopped that information from getting to him, which may be his greatest failing in all this. -Finally, he was on the New Jersey. The New Jersey would have been left behind to fight as a part of TF34, while Halsey's carriers would have been engaging the Northern Force. This is less than ideal and should be avoided if possible. The commander should be where he believes the decisive action will be. Clearly, he believed the decisive action was going to be to the north. In light of the information he had, not leaving TF34 behind wasn't a huge oversight. Like I said, the biggest failing of the day started years before as he fashioned a command climate where he couldn't be bothered and the information about Center Force was likely not passed to him. It is in the command climate he created and his childish response to Nimitz' where the true criticism lies. It was my impression that Halsey was informed the carriers were a decoy and was informed that the center force had turned back around but chose to ignore it. And that when one of his subordinate's staff worriedly told their admiral (might have been Lee, can't remember) that they knew all that and that Halsey was blowing them off the admiral said something like, "if Halsey wants my opinion he'll ask for it" and went back to bed. And I'm not sure if he believed the decisive action was to the North or wanted the decisive action to be to the North. Plus, couldn't he have taken New Jersey north, and detached his other BB's and some other surface units to stay behind (I forget what Lee was aboard but I don't think it was NJ or Iowa)? If it was to be a carrier engagement where he had a lot of planes did he need the big guns at all? It just seemed like a "well, I want my BB's to get to have some fun too" thing. Which they didn't get to do anyway. |
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It was my impression that Halsey was informed the carriers were a decoy That couldn't have been known at the time, and like I said he was concerned about his force being trapped between shore based airfields on one side and carriers on the other, while attack aircraft shuttled between the two. and was informed that the center force had turned back around but chose to ignore it. His staff was informed. Whether or not Halsey was told is debatable. And that when one of his subordinate's staff worriedly told their admiral (might have been Lee, can't remember) that they knew all that and that Halsey was blowing them off the admiral said something like, "if Halsey wants my opinion he'll ask for it" and went back to bed. It was Mitscher, and one of the reasons I can't stand Mitscher. He could and should have gotten Halsey on the radio to discuss the report. If he could have gotten Lee on the line too, all the better. And I'm not sure if he believed the decisive action was to the North or wanted the decisive action to be to the North. One reason I love this battle is that the same people who say the Navy wasn't focused on the aircraft carrier as the decisive force before the war will in the next breath say Halsey should have realized the carrier wasn't the decisive force here and focused on the Center Force, with the benefit of hindsight, of course. The truth is, as always, somewhere in the middle. The carrier had its place throughout the war, but so did surface forces. In this case, the Southern Force was properly prepared for. The Center Force was struck repeatedly, and as with most battle damage assessments, with greatly exaggerated reports as to the effectiveness of those strikes. In other words, Halsey did not get accurate information as to the status of the Center Force. He believed the strikes were more effective than they actually were. Plus, couldn't he have taken New Jersey north, and detached his other BB's and some other surface units to stay behind (I forget what Lee was aboard but I don't think it was NJ or Iowa)? He could have, but then you get into the details. If you seperate one of the battleships, then you have to take away some of the power of the fighting line you left behind, because you need to detail escorts to the battleship, weakening the battleline left behind by more than just one BB. This is an issue when it comes to torpedo warfare. You need those small boys to engage the IJN cruisers and destroyers early to get them to commit their torpedoes at long range where they are not as effective. If it was to be a carrier engagement where he had a lot of planes did he need the big guns at all? It just seemed like a "well, I want my BB's to get to have some fun too" thing. Which they didn't get to do anyway. Every carrier engagement allowed ships to escape. You weren't going to get a total annihilation of the enemy force just using carriers. Halsey was within minutes of being able to orchestrate the first carrier/battle line engagement when he turned TF34 around. They were nearly in gun range of Northern Force when ordered to turn around. |
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One reason I love this battle is that the same people who say the Navy wasn't focused on the aircraft carrier as the decisive force before the war will in the next breath say Halsey should have realized the carrier wasn't the decisive force here and focused on the Center Force, with the benefit of hindsight, of course. The truth is, as always, somewhere in the middle. The carrier had its place throughout the war, but so did surface forces. In this case, the Southern Force was properly prepared for. The Center Force was struck repeatedly, and as with most battle damage assessments, with greatly exaggerated reports as to the effectiveness of those strikes. In other words, Halsey did not get accurate information as to the status of the Center Force. He believed the strikes were more effective than they actually were. I wouldn't say in the next breath that the Northern Force wasn't or couldn't have possibly been decisive, I'd just say that it was way up North. Decisive or not, it wasn't in the fight yet until Halsey went after it. Since they wanted him to come after them and all. He could have, but then you get into the details. If you seperate one of the battleships, then you have to take away some of the power of the fighting line you left behind, because you need to detail escorts to the battleship, weakening the battleline left behind by more than just one BB. This is an issue when it comes to torpedo warfare. You need those small boys to engage the IJN cruisers and destroyers early to get them to commit their torpedoes at long range where they are not as effective. But that's what happened anyway. The fast ships got detached and went charging back south with the slow BB's following. And everybody else seemed to assume that that's what Halsey had done in the first place. Every carrier engagement allowed ships to escape. You weren't going to get a total annihilation of the enemy force just using carriers. Halsey was within minutes of being able to orchestrate the first carrier/battle line engagement when he turned TF34 around. They were nearly in gun range of Northern Force when ordered to turn around. Was total annihilation required? If the Navy's job at this point was to keep the IJN off the landing force, then all that was needed was to make the force ineffective. And when Halsey left to go North he didn't think the Center Force had been wiped out totally either. |
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Halsey's choice was controversial then as it is now. He had sufficient air power to counter any airpower the Japanese could throw at him as it was already obvious that Japanese pilots were useless at that point. The realistic likelyhood of Japan pulling off shuttle attacks was remote. He made his choice over weak intel regarding damage to the Japanese center force. Detaching Mcain's group alone shows he was over confident. Halsey was not a fool in any stretch, but I think the glorious prospect of dealing the historic decisive strategic blow to the ijn got the best of him.
Frankly Kurita's withdrawl was pretty sketchy itself. To get out of range of allied air attack when your mission is part of a coordinated all or nothing surface attack was a bit odd. He left Nishimura and Shima hanging out to dry. Even though the Japanese intel regarding what protected Surigao was wrong, it still left the remaining two groups with too little power to accomplish their goal even with what the Japanese believed was there. Kurita saved his remaining ships for nothing as the rest of the war showed. It all worked out, but if Kurita had pushed on and linked up with the other two groups with even half his force remaining then Surigao might have been a different battle. Mind you it would have only bought a delay, even the Japanese naval command knew their strategic playbook was used up at that point. Nishimura showed himself to be the sort of asset the Japanese threw away too willingly. He knew his mission was a longshot at best, but he carried out his orders and understood that the navy really did have all or nothing left. He was quoted something to the effect of what good was saving the navy if the empire is lost. |
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I wouldn't say in the next breath that the Northern Force wasn't or couldn't have possibly been decisive, I'd just say that it was way up North. Decisive or not, it wasn't in the fight yet until Halsey went after it. Since they wanted him to come after them and all. The best defense is a good offense. He was right to go after it, before they dictated the terms of the engagement. Again, based on the information he had at the time. But that's what happened anyway. The fast ships got detached and went charging back south with the slow BB's following. And everybody else seemed to assume that that's what Halsey had done in the first place. Sending the fast battleships charging south was a mistake. It was part of his childish response to Nimitz' message. It was tactically unsound and totally out of character for Halsey, who was a firm believer in concentration of force, which goes to show just how affected he was by the message. TF34 needed to stay together as a group. Just as was proposed for them to stay behind or when Halsey sent them ahead of the carriers to engage Northern Force. As for what 7th Fleet assumed, that's the problem when you're reading someone else's mail when you're not supposed to. Was total annihilation required? If the Navy's job at this point was to keep the IJN off the landing force, then all that was needed was to make the force ineffective. And when Halsey left to go North he didn't think the Center Force had been wiped out totally either. Again, place the action in the context at the time. Spruance was just lambasted for letting the Japanese carriers go after Phil Sea. Center Force had no carriers. Halsey wasn't going to be heavily criticized for letting what he believed at the time was a heavily damaged surface group go. His belief, based on what happened to Spruance, is that he would be criticized for letting the Japanese carriers go. So he chased them down the carriers. I'm no Halsey fan, but one must consider the environment (political and professional) before the battle, the information he had at the time, and the information he was knowingly communicating to the Commander of the Seventh Fleet. |
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This Naval thread needs a few Devil Dogs in it. There was also a famous battle in U.S. Marine Corps history on the island of Samar. http://www.scuttlebuttsmallchow.com/samar.html 
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