While Israel's war against Hamas in Gaza is in full swing, Hezbollah seems to be making sure that the conflict on the northern border doesn't escalate to an all out war. In managing the conflict, one of the key tools used by the Lebanese terror organization is its array of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).

Hezbollah entered the scene the day after Hamas’ October 7 attack with a mortar barrage on Har Dov, and its strategy has since centered on firing mortars at IDF border posts and ATGMs at military posts and vehicles. The organization has published videos online depicting its fighters scoping out exposed IDF soldiers – in posts or near tanks – and then firing at them and their facilities. Seven Israeli soldiers and civilians have been killed so far on the northern border.

The anti-tank missiles are short-range, when compared to the vast array of much longer-range missiles that Hezbollah possesses, only about 5 km, and very accurate as they can hit small targets from kilometers away. They can be carried on light vehicles or by small units of fighters, which can easily set up, launch their missiles, and then disappear. The ease of carrying and the relatively low price - tens of thousands of dollars per unit - allow less established forces, such as the Ukrainian army at the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion, to stop larger and better equipped armored forces.

“The exchange of fire is maintaining the framework that Hezbollah has adopted with Israel in the past: eye for an eye,” explains Orna Mizrahi, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies. “The organization has stated in the past that for every Hezbollah operative injured, it will harm an Israeli soldier. Hezbollah and Iran want to keep the conflict in the north simmering without major escalation, so it stays below the threshold of all-out war.”

After heavy fighting in the first week of the war, it seems that in recent days the IDF has in many cases successfully thwarted the Hezbollah squads before they could open fire. According to the organization’s reports, dozens of its fighters have been killed since hostilities began. After the first few days of fighting, the IDF has managed to thwart most anti-tank missile launch attempts, at a very high cost to the Hezbollah fighters

“My impression is that Hezbollah is overwhelmingly aiming its anti-tank missiles at military targets – whether at armored combat vehicles, posits, or surveillance systems,” said Prof. Azar Gat, head of the Security and Diplomacy M.A. program at Tel Aviv University.

Indeed, the videos published by Hezbollah since the beginning of the war show targets such as Israeli military tanks and vehicles, as well as IDF communication facilities – using a variety of anti-tank missiles and recoilless rifles.

As of Sunday, however, it would appear that Hezbollah is expanding its fighting beyond military targets: the organization launched rockets to the longest range since the beginning of the fighting, towards the town of Rosh Pina.

Later, rockets were also fired at Nahariya and the Western Galilee, though it remains unclear whether these were Hezbollah missiles. In addition, for the first time, a house in Kiryat Shmona sustained a direct hit, probably by a rocket aimed at military posts on the border ridge. Israel is responding by attacking Hezbollah’s positions deeper in Lebanese territory.

"Since 2006, a form of deterrence has developed and perhaps even mutual deterrence, which allowed for relative calm; but this quiet ended with this last confrontation,” said Prof. Gat. “Hezbollah is in a dilemma – whether to fully commit to an all out war or not – and in the meantime it is trying to show that it is involved enough without entering total war with Israel.”

"I think what Hezbollah is doing on the border is preparing for an invasion of Israel," Lt. Col. (res.) Sarit Zahavi, Director General of the Alma Research Center, told Haaretz. “They have been planning it for a long time. The organization has tried for the past year and a half to drag Israel into war and since it failed, Hamas has done what it did, and Hezbollah is still attempting to drag Israel into a war.” However, she notes, the organization prefers that Israel take the first big step, for legitimization purposes.

Most of Hezbollah’s videos feature Kornet anti-tank missiles, which took the lives of many IDF soldiers during the 2006 Lebanon War. These are now being fired out of newly-acquired double-barrel launchers, which allows the organization to fire the missiles seconds apart, thus potentially posing a bigger threat even to tanks and armored vehicles equipped with Trophy hard kill systems.

The videos also show TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided) missiles, the Iranian version of which is known as Toophan; and updated, tandem-warhead versions of AT-3 Sagger missiles, the likes of which were used during the 1973 war.

Almost all of the anti-tank missiles in use today are based on hollow warheads, which have been in use since World War II. This warhead creates a jet of molten metal which can penetrate the target's armor relatively easily, and does not require as much kinetic power as more traditional anti-tank equipment.

The war in Gaza is exacting a brutal toll on civilians. The Hamas-run health ministry says that more than 8,000 people have died. The number of children among them, more than 3,000, exceeds the annual death toll for children in all wars in each of the preceding three years. The Economist estimates, from satellite imagery, that over a tenth of Gaza’s housing stock has been destroyed, leaving more than 280,000 people without homes to which they can return. In many ways that fits with the norm of urban warfare, which is unusually destructive. But Israel’s war in Gaza is also distinctive..

War in built-up areas is always bloody. America’s first assault on Fallujah in 2004 killed as many as 600 civilians, or 0.2% of the population, compared with 0.3% in today’s war in Gaza. A second assault later in the year killed around 800 more and left the majority of the city’s buildings damaged. A battle for Sadr City, a suburb of Baghdad, is thought to have killed nearly 1,000 people in March and April 2008, out of a population of around 2m, not dissimilar to that of Gaza.

The largest urban battle in recent years was the assault on the city of Mosul, which had been seized by the Islamic State (is) group, by an American-led coalition including Iraqi and Kurdish ground forces. At least 9,000 civilians were killed in Mosul during 2016-17, according to Airwars, a non-profit organisation that tracks civilian harm. That amounts to 0.6% of the population at the time. Of the buildings that were damaged, more than 80% were residential.

These cases might suggest that the war in Gaza, though destructive, is not unusually so by historical standards—at least not yet. Yet there are also key differences.

The first and biggest is the status of civilians. In Mosul, is attempted to prevent civilians from fleeing, firing at them and mining corridors out of the city. Many left nonetheless. Between October 2016 and June 2017 nearly 900,000 departed—almost half of the pre-war population. Even Russia, during its siege of Mariupol in Ukraine between February and May 2022, negotiated humanitarian pauses in which some civilians were permitted to leave. Israel has thus far rejected calls, by the European Union and others, for such pauses.

Gaza’s geography is less permissive than any of these cases. Israel has told around 1.1m civilians to evacuate from the north of Gaza, but around a third of those have remained in place. Many residents are already refugees from other places and fear that if they leave they might never be allowed to return to their homes. Those who do want to escape cannot go south to Egypt, which does not want to take responsibility for refugees and has so far refused to open its border.

Israel is still striking parts of southern Gaza, albeit in more limited fashion than the north. “Locals can’t really get away, nor can fighting really occur in open areas away from urban centres”, says Amos Fox, an expert on urban warfare who has written extensively about Mosul. “The urban fight [in Gaza] is self-contained and likely far more costly than anything we’ve seen in the past few years.” Even those civilians who have moved south face a growing humanitarian crisis. Gaza’s health-care system has capacity for only 3,500 beds, according to Médecins Sans Frontières, a humanitarian group, far short of what is needed.

In Mosul, by contrast, the World Health Organisation was able to establish trauma stabilisation points to provide urgent medical attention within 10-15 minutes of the front line, with larger field hospitals another hour away. The Israel Defence Forces (idf) have a small number of “humanitarian affairs officers” embedded in its fighting units whose role it is to try and address the needs of the local population, but these are far from sufficient for dealing with the needs and scale of misery resulting from a ground offensive. Israeli politicians have said they will not send aid for civilians until all hostages are released, though officials acknowledge that may change as the offensive develops.

A second difference is the degree to which civilian and military infrastructure is intermingled in Gaza. In Iraq, is had held Mosul for little over two years when the battle to remove them began. Even in that short time period, the group had established impressive multi-layered defences, drawing on Western military doctrine, says Rupert Jones, a retired British major-general who was deputy commander of the anti-is coalition.

Hamas, in contrast, was founded in Gaza in 1987 and has much earlier roots there, dating back to the foundation of the welfare organisation Mujama al-Islamiya (‘Islamic Centre”) by Ahmed Yassin in 1973. For half a century it has been fully integrated into Gaza’s social fabric and has run the strip for 16 years. Its defences have been built around—and under—the territory’s civilian infrastructure. Part of the ease with which Hamas seized Gaza from Palestinian rivals in 2007 was down to the fact that its fighters were recruited from the streets.

A third difference is tactics. Israel’s armed forces say that they place considerable emphasis on civilian protection. Nonetheless, Israel’s bombardment of Gaza has been intense by historical standards. It dropped 6,000 bombs on the territory in the first six days of the war, a rate of ordnance far exceeding American and Western counter-terrorism campaigns. In Mosul, for instance, the American-led coalition dropped 7,000 over two months in the most intense period of bombing. On October 30th a former deputy commander of the idf’s Gaza Division told the Financial Times: “When our soldiers are manoeuvring we are doing this with massive artillery, with 50 aeroplanes overhead destroying anything that moves.”

Tactics are shaped by how an army views the stakes of a war, the nature of the enemy and that of the surrounding civilians. For Israel, the war in Gaza is “existential in a way that even Mosul or Marawi weren’t”, says Anthony King of Exeter University, referring to a battle between the Philippines army and is in 2017. Israeli officials increasingly describe Hamas as akin to is—an enemy with whom compromise is no longer possible. Nor does the idf have the same affinity with Palestinian civilians that Iraqi forces did with the compatriots they were liberating from is rule.

In Mosul, Iraq’s political leadership, from the prime minister down, insisted that great emphasis be placed on civilian protection. Lieutenant-General Basim al-Tai, a senior Iraqi officer, was in charge of the humanitarian operation. “He was carrying the weight of the Mosul population on his shoulders,” says General Jones. “He cared deeply about the civilians.” Caroline Baudot, an adviser in the civilian-protection unit in the International Committee of the Red Cross (icrc) in Geneva, agrees: “the commander’s intent in Mosul was extremely clear.”

Even then, the experience of different parts of Mosul is instructive. The east of the city, viewed as the more intellectual and urbane part, suffered less damage. The old city in the west, where IS made its last stand, was viewed by Iraqi forces as more conservative and is-friendly and emerged far worse. “The mindset in which you fight affects your planning, your conduct, and even the reconstruction,” says Ms Baudot. “If you operate on your own territory [as opposed to] in another territory you might not have the same care for civilians.”

The role of medical facilities is especially contentious. In the previous rounds of warfare, Palestinian hospitals and other civilian relief centres were marked on Israeli military maps as non-strike areas. Some were hit in past wars, but none intentionally, claims Israel. In this war, Israel has ordered the evacuation of northern Gaza, including hospitals—which it says are used as Hamas command posts. Under the laws of war, hospitals lose their special protection if they are used for military purposes. But, even then, armies can only attack them “after due warning” and “a reasonable time limit”.

Mosul, again, provides a point of comparison. is used the city’s hospital as a stronghold. Commanders spent weeks deliberating whether it could be attacked, says General Jones, considering other options such as the use of snipers. “Slowly, over time, it became clear it was no longer a functional hospital.” Ultimately it was struck only with the approval of Iraq’s then prime minister. “I’ve never heard of any case where you have a few days to evacuate and dismantle an entire hospital,” says one veteran expert on wartime civilian harm, reflecting on the Gaza case. “It’s just not possible.”

A fourth and final difference is the nature of battlefield intelligence. At the outset of this war the idf would have had considerable intelligence on Hamas’s infrastructure in Gaza, collected over years. But many of those targets would have been struck in the first week of the campaign. Air forces must then move to “dynamic” targeting—finding and striking targets that were not known at the start of the war and have to be developed in relatively short order.  This is where most cases of civilian harm occur, says the expert.

In Mosul, local civilians, many of whom hated is, provided a wealth of human intelligence, or humint—information passed on by sources on the ground—to Iraqi forces, helping them to target is fighters. In contrast, during the battle for Raqqa, a Syrian city held by is, in 2017, commanders, with fewer infantry forces on the ground, were “starved of local information” and found themselves reliant on aerial surveillance, incapable of seeing inside buildings, according to a report by the rand Corporation, a think-tank.

Israeli intelligence has already suffered one serious intelligence failure in Gaza, having missed sufficient signs of Hamas’s preparations for the attack of October 7th. It will have good electronic intelligence on the strip, aided by the phalanx of American aircraft patrolling in the eastern Mediterranean. But Hamas is likely to have the intelligence advantage on the ground, argues Mr Fox, with locals offering a steady flow of humint to the group as the idf advances. “This flips the humint situation that we saw in Mosul on its head,” he says. “The idf will have to methodically fight through better planned and prepared defences…than they otherwise would.” The result will be more civilians killed. The last three weeks have been hard on civilians in Gaza. The coming weeks could be even harder.

The timing of the murderous Hamas assault on Israel was likely the result of tactical considerations: the depletion of Israel’s Gaza border forces due to the Simchat Torah holiday as well as the diversion of units regularly deployed there to protect West Bank settlers in recent violent escalations. Hamas was also aware that thousands of partygoers would be attending a rave scheduled for that weekend near the border fence.

Looking at the broader context it is clear that the Hamas massacre was also prompted by a perceived Israeli weakness stemming from deep internal divisions, as well as the organization’s desire to enhance its standing in the Palestinian arena given the declining popularity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) headed by its president Mahmoud Abbas.

No less important was the intention of Hamas, backed and encouraged by Iran, to torpedo the fast-moving normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia. US President Joe Biden put it succinctly, saying, “One of the reasons Hamas moved on Israel… [was because] the Saudis wanted to recognize Israel.”

Even before Biden’s explanation, a Hamas spokesman in Lebanon admitted that the goals of the terrorist attack were to destroy Israel, liberate Palestine, and deal a blow to normalization between Israel and the Arab world. Leading Iranian officials repeated this argument as well. Saudi Arabia’s announcement of a freeze in the US-mediated normalization negotiations with Israel appeared to have been a step toward this goal of Hamas.

However, the US and Saudi leaders have now affirmed that, as soon as the war is over, they will work toward a sustainable peace between Israelis and Palestinians and continue the steps towards Israel-Saudi normalization already underway.

Why were Iran and Hamas so determined to torpedo the normalization process?
The Iranian-led “resistance” axis regards the US-sponsored Israeli-Saudi normalization as a strategic move designed to change the regional balance of power by advancing a Saudi defense pact with the United States and strengthening Israel’s standing in the Middle East, by dint of the special Saudi role as custodian of Islam’s holy sites – Mecca and Medina – and its attendant influence on other Arab and Muslim countries regarding ties with Israel.

In these respects, Israeli-Saudi normalization would likely be a game-changer in the Middle East. Normalization was also supposed to bolster the PA, undermining the popularity and legitimacy of rival Hamas. Iran clearly had good reason to fear that these developments threatened its influence and goals in the region.

HAMAS HAS a history of mounting terror attacks intended, among other things, to undermine political moves. Thus, for example, a string of Hamas terror attacks against Israel in 1994-1995 were intended to torpedo the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians and were undoubtedly a major factor in this outcome.

Seven years on, in 2002, on March 27, Hamas sought to sabotage the peace process by targeting the Park Hotel in the city of Netanya, murdering 29 Israeli civilians and wounding hundreds, then too, choosing the date of a major Jewish holiday celebration, Passover, to strike at those seated at the festive meal.

The attack was also intended to torpedo the Arab Peace Initiative scheduled for approval by the Arab League summit in Beirut the following day, March 28, 2002. Four days later, Hamas carried out another terrorist attack, killing 15 civilians in a Haifa restaurant and wounding some 40.

These mass casualty attacks resulted in an Israeli military operation, codenamed Defensive Shield, intended to wipe out Palestinian terrorist organizations in the West Bank. Needless to say, the Israeli government was disinclined to consider the Arab Peace Initiative following these brutal attacks.

The common thread tying together these attacks of the past three decades is the indication of strategic thinking on the part of all the parties involved in planning them. Even if there were other contributing factors to the failures of the peace negotiations, the Hamas attacks succeeded in achieving their goal of derailing peace.

At the end of this war, a supreme effort must be made to renew the US-mediated negotiations on an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement. The war has made clear that such an agreement would have to include a significant Palestinian “component,” offering a political horizon for the Palestinians’ aspirations.

The normalization agreement is of course important in itself, but it is also of paramount interest in order to highlight the failure of Iran and its allies to sabotage it.

Yemen's Iranian-backed Houthi rebels claim responsibility for drone attack on Eilat ■ Israeli army demolishes the West Bank home of senior Hamas ■ IDF reports it destroyed Hezbollah assets in southern Lebanon ■ Gaza Health Ministry reports over 8,000 Palestinians killed by Israeli forces ■ Palestinian Health Ministry says 70-year-old killed by IDF fire in West Bank ■ Number of hostages held by Hamas stands at 240, with 40 remain missing ■ At least 1,300 killed in Hamas massacre on October 7

Mother of soldier rescued from the Gaza Strip: 'We're praying for the return of the remaining hostages'

AFP: Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen claim responsibility for drone attack on Israel

IDF spokesperson says 240 hostages are being held by Hamas in Gaza

IDF demolishes West Bank home of senior Hamas leader Saleh Arouri

Israel’s UN envoy dons yellow star, compares calls for Gaza ceasefire to ‘calling off D-Day’

Recap: IDF reports of destroying Hezbollah assets in southern Lebanon; Palestinians say settlers torched house in West Bank village

Originally Posted By michigan66:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-NMtPP9lMQ

Hiding in a bunker or tunnel somewhere in Gaza, Mohammed Deif, the secretive commander of Hamas’s military wing, will be wondering if he can cheat death for an eighth time.

Israeli intelligence officials believe that the science graduate, 58, was the main architect of the October 7 massacre, which claimed more than 1,400 lives, and have vowed to take him out once and for all after seven previous assassination attempts.

The near misses may have left him using a wheelchair after losing an arm and a leg, but Deif, whose nom de guerre means “guest” in Arabic, is revered among Palestinian youths after orchestrating the biggest ever terrorist attack on Israel.

However, Dr Matthew Levitt, a former FBI official who now leads on counter- terrorism and intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy think tank, believes this is implausible.“There is no way in hell that the Hamas leadership would not have known about this operation,” he said.

Although Haniyeh and others might not have been made aware of specific operational details, Levitt said the “watershed” massacre “puts to bed the myth that there are distinct wings within the organisation”.

“That’s a western concept that many have come up with, particularly in Europe,” he said.

While Britain proscribed Hamas’s military wing as a terrorist organisation in 2001, it did not outlaw its political wing — and the entity as a whole — until 2021. At least two senior former Hamas officials are still thought to live in London.

• What is Hamas and what does the militant group want?

Since taking over as leader in 2017, Haniyeh has fully restored Hamas’s ties to Iran, its main sponsor, and visited Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader in Tehran, in June.

It followed a previous rift in which Meshaal closed Hamas’s main political office in Damascus in protest at President Bashar al-Assad’s crackdown on Sunni Muslims in Syria — a move which was backed by Shia-led Iran.

Soon after the October 7 atrocity, Meshaal, 67, who is now in charge of Palestinian diaspora affairs at Hamas, called for a day of protest against Israel across the Muslim world and urged neighbouring countries to join the conflict.

“To all the scholars who teach jihad . . . to all who teach and learn, this is a moment for the application [of theories],” he said.

Israel says it has killed a number of less senior Hamas military commanders who were involved in targeting individual kibbutzim in a wave of retaliatory strikes on Gaza.

Although Deif, whose wife and two infant children were killed by an IDF airstrike in 2014, has been Israel’s most wanted man for almost two decades, two other Hamas leaders remain in the crosshairs.

The home of Yahya Sinwar, 60, the group’s political leader in the Gaza Strip, has already reportedly come under fire.

Sinwar is a founding member of Hamas’s military wing and its intelligence service.

In 1988, he was arrested for murdering Palestinian collaborators with Israel and for his role in the capture and killing of two Israeli soldiers. Sinwar was given four life sentences, but was released in 2011 as part of a prisoner swap which saw 1,000 Hamas inmates exchanged for Gilad Shalit, a kidnapped Israeli soldier who had been held for five years.

Meanwhile, Israeli security officials believe that Saleh al-Arouri, Hamas’s deputy leader and a former military commander, was involved alongside Deif in planning the terror attack.

Like several other senior figures in the organisation, Arouri, 57, who comes from the West Bank, lived in Turkey, a Nato country, for a number of years before moving to Beirut in Lebanon, where he now resides.

An architect of Hamas’s kidnapping strategy, Arouri has spent more than 15 years in Israeli jails. Following his release in 2010, he was warned that he would be rearrested if he did not leave the region.

“I find it very difficult to believe that Arouri was not involved in at least the strategic planning [of the attack],” said Levitt. “He is a participant and a leader of what Iran, Hezbollah [Tehran’s proxy in Lebanon] and Hamas call a joint operations room in Beirut.”

As Israel prepares for a ground invasion of Gaza in its effort to stamp out Hamas, some analysts warn that it could breed a new generation of terrorists.

“They can’t eliminate them altogether,” said Dr Hisham Hellyer, a senior associate fellow in international security at the Royal United Services Institute think tank.

“They will cripple them. It will mean that Hamas is on the back foot. But Gaza has a very young population . . . and what comes next could prove to be a fertile recruiting ground.”

Hamas’s armed wing said it would release some of the foreign hostages in its captivity in the coming days, as it vowed to turn Gaza into a graveyard for Israel’s military.

“We have informed intermediaries that we will release a certain number of foreigners in the next few days,” Abu Obeida, a spokesman for Ezzedine Al-Qassam Brigades, said in a televised address.

Five hostages have been released to date, including four after negotiations through a diplomatic backchannel and one following an operation by the Israeli army.

Natalie Raanan, a US teenager released by Hamas, has now returned home to Chicago, the local Israeli consulate said Tuesday. Two Israeli grandmothers were also freed by Hamas last week, while an American mother and daughter were released earlier this month.

Two Israeli soldiers were today killed during combat operations in northern Gaza on Tuesday, the country’s military said, as fighting in the Hamas-controlled enclave continued to intensify.

They were the first confirmed fatalities among the Israel Defense Forces inside the Gaza Strip since the war with Hamas erupted.

The Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen are increasing their threats to Israel and the Middle East. On October 18 they launched drones and missiles targeting Israel, which were intercepted by a US warship in the Red Sea. The incident continued for several hours.

On Friday, October 27, another incident took place in which drones and projectiles landed in Egypt. That same day, Israel’s Foreign Ministry said “Israel condemns the harm caused to Egypt's security forces by the missiles and drones launched by the Houthi terrorist organization with the intention of harming Israel. The Houthis a proxy of the Ayatollah’s terrorist regime in Teheran, which also controls the Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas terrorist organizations.”

The two threats now appear to be part of a growing pattern after sirens sounded in Eilat on Tuesday, October 31. In this incident reports said that an aircraft, likely an unmanned aircraft, had caused the sirens. The pro-Iran media Al-Mayadeen said that a drone had threatened Eilat.

The sirens in Eilat come two days after the Houthis said they had formed a joint operations room to confront Israel. The article at Al-Mayadeen about the Houthi threats said that the Houthis support a Palestinian state. The official slogan of the Houthis is “Death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews.” The movement says they want a Palestinian state over the whole land, and they do not recognize the 1948 or 1967 concepts of two states. As such, they embrace the concept of “From the river to the sea.”  

The Houthis said over the weekend that "There are joint operations rooms and efforts that monitor and work to confront any Zionist foolishness if it invades Gaza by land, and we are monitoring the situation closely."

The Houthis claim that “The war in Palestine has become a war against Islam, in which the West and the United States are mobilizing alongside the Zionist enemy.” This is part of the general attempt by Iran to rally proxies in the region to attack the US and Israel. For instance Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have carried out 25 attacks on US forces since October 7.  

For instance, Reuters said on Tuesday, “two armed drones targeted Iraq’s Ain al-Asad airbase, which hosts U.S forces, but there were no casualties or damage, a security source and a government source told Reuters on Tuesday.”

The Houthis: Iran's weapons test bed
The use of drones by the Houthis and by Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria is all part of the same Iranian octopus nexus. Iran exports drone technology to these groups. It also exports drones to Russia. The Iranian Shahed 136 first showed up in Yemen in 2001. As such, the Houthis are not only a proxy but a test bed for Iranian weapons. The Houthis have carried out drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf since 2015. China helped broker Saudi-Iran reconciliation earlier this year but the Houthis continue to threaten Riyadh from Yemen.  

The Houthis are part of the Iranian desire to globalize and regionalize the October 7 massacre by Hamas. Iran has used its media to spread claims that the US is involved in Israel’s war on Hamas and therefore try to make this a regional conflict with the US. Turkey has also sought to slam the US as well as Israel. China and Russia have refused to condemn Hamas. This illustrates that this is a much larger war than just Israel fighting Hamas. Iran and Russia see it as a way to challenge the US. Russia believes this is about a multi-polar world order, they see the Hamas war as a kind of larger symbolic proxy war against the West.  

“The Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood has begun and will destroy everything that the occupation forces and global imperialism have built," the Houthi official Mashdi al-Mashat said, noting that “there is no such thing in the Arab region as Israel." Aqsa “flood” is the Hamas name for its October 7 attack. Israel expanded ground operations in Gaza over the last few days and Hezbollah has increased threats against Israel, as well as terrorists in Syria and the Houthis. This is Iran’s plan to “unify” fronts against Israel.  

The Houthi official claimed that "the West escaped from its problems and wars by exporting the Jews to the Arab world, and created an entity for them outside the topography of the region.” This is tradition Iran-backed Houthi antisemitic rhetoric. Jews have lived in the Middle East for thousands of years, including in Yemen. The Jewish presence in Yemen predates the modern Houthi movement.  

The October 18 attack by the Houthis included numerous drones and missiles, some with large warheads. The October 27 attempted attack was thwarted but the projectiles landed in Egypt, showing the growing Houthi threat to the region. There was also another incident reported by Maariv overnight from October 29 to 30. The October 31 incident is still under review.

Saudi Arabia also put its forces on alert after a recent clash, according to Bloomberg on October 30. The Saudis have intercepted Houthi missiles in the past. Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman was in Washington on Monday and he discussed the Kingdom’s support for a ceasefire in Gaza. According to Arab News, “on Yemen, Prince Khalid wrote: ‘We also discussed the Kingdom’s efforts in Yemen to end the crisis and achieve peace.’ The White House said: ‘[Jake] Sullivan welcomed the significant de-escalation of the conflict over the past year and a half and endorsed Saudi-led efforts to bring the war to a close altogether.’”

Oct. 31, 2023

At least a quarter of buildings in northern Gaza are damaged, analysis estimates
Tens of thousands of buildings in Gaza, including at least a quarter of all buildings in northern Gaza, appear damaged or destroyed, according to an analysis of satellite imagery. The assessment offers a newly detailed picture of the widespread devastation caused by the Israeli bombardment of Gaza in the past several weeks.

For 20 years Iran has been harming Israel and Western interests in the Middle East – as well as other regions – with absolute impunity. It does this by means of proxies that include Hezbollah members, Houthis and Iraqi Shi’ite Muslims. And if there is an Israeli or Western response, it is the proxies that pay the price, not Iran or the Iranians.

There is an opportunity now to put an end to this.

The timing will never be better than it is now; Joe Biden is the most pro-Israel U.S. president since Bill Clinton. It is possible that such an attack, especially if it succeeds, would even please Washington.

As far as is known, Iran does not have advanced missile and aircraft interception capabilities, while Israel does. It is possible that in the near future the Iranians will be able to reach parity in these capabilities, and if Israel does not act in the coming months it will miss the current moment of superiority.

Western diplomacy and the use of economic sanctions in recent decades to stop Iran’s nuclear program have not succeeded, and the only way remaining to stop Tehran’s advance to nuclear bombs is a military strike. If this opportunity is missed, in the not too distant future Israel will have to live with a nuclear Iran, and “may Allah have mercy.”

For 20 years Iran has been harming Israel and Western interests in the Middle East – as well as other regions – with absolute impunity. It does this by means of proxies that include Hezbollah members, Houthis and Iraqi Shi’ite Muslims. And if there is an Israeli or Western response, it is the proxies that pay the price, not Iran or the Iranians.

There is an opportunity now to put an end to this.

For example, it’s possible to destroy Iranian planes that land at the Aleppo and Damascus airports, loaded with weapons (something Israel has refrained from doing, in favor of destroying the arms shipments after they are unloaded from the planes), or to strike Iranian cargo ships carrying arms before they enter the port of Beirut, Latakia or Tartus.

On the Lebanese border, Israel has made do for now with localized strikes on Hezbollah when the organization fires on communities and army positions on the northern border. Hezbollah is clearly using this tactic on the orders, or the advice, of Iran. Israel has for now decided to show restraint while at the same time deploying divisions along the border in the event of an escalation.

Israel must state publicly that if the Shi’ite organization shifts to an all-out war, Israel will bomb Iran itself, first and foremost Tehran and its nuclear installations. Such an announcement may deter Iran and Hezbollah from intervening with full force in Israel’s war with Hamas. But if Iran does choose to join the campaign, either directly or through Hezbollah, Israel must take advantage of the opportunity to destroy, to the best of its ability, the Iranian nuclear enterprise and undermine the Iranian regime and its military units, above all the Revolutionary Guards (which is responsible for attacks on Israel and on Jewish communities around the world in recent decades).

Israel has stores of ballistic missiles that can reach targets in Iran and submarines carrying precision-guided cruise missiles. It also has an air force with mid-air refueling planes (advanced models of which the United States should be pressured to supply to Israel, immediately) capable of operating in the skies of Iran, if Israel receives tacit or official overflight permission from the intervening countries (Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia).

It is possible – there is no certainty about this – that Washington would oppose a future Israeli action against Iran on Iranian territory, fearing that such an attack will drag the United States into the military maelstrom that would result. But for Israel, destroying Iran’s nuclear program is a supreme interest; an American veto must be rejected. (Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should have acted back in 2010-12, but he desisted out of fear, just as he was afraid to launch a preemptive attack on Hamas before the organization was able to reach its current capabilities.)

The timing will never be better than it is now; Joe Biden is the most pro-Israel U.S. president since Bill Clinton. It is possible that such an attack, especially if it succeeds, would even please Washington.

As far as is known, Iran does not have advanced missile and aircraft interception capabilities, while Israel does. It is possible that in the near future the Iranians will be able to reach parity in these capabilities, and if Israel does not act in the coming months it will miss the current moment of superiority.

Western diplomacy and the use of economic sanctions in recent decades to stop Iran’s nuclear program have not succeeded, and the only way remaining to stop Tehran’s advance to nuclear bombs is a military strike. If this opportunity is missed, in the not too distant future Israel will have to live with a nuclear Iran, and “may Allah have mercy.”

Prof. Benny Morris is a historian.

The leader of Yemen’s Houthis, Abdul-Malek al-Houthi, delivered an incendiary speech on October 10, three days after the Hamas-Israel war began. He was dressed, as usual, in a gray suit and a white shirt with the collar open, just like former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad used to wear during his public appearances. Instead of a tie, Al-Houthi wore an ornate Yemenite sword.

“We are continuously monitoring what is happening in Gaza, and we coordinate regularly with our brothers in the Axis of Resistance,” he said, referring to Hezbollah, Shi’ite militias in Iraq, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

“God willing, we’ll be ready to participate in the context of this coordination, based on the different levels planned for it… We condemn and blame everything done by the countries that normalized relations with Israel – acts that harmed the Palestinian people with the goal of dismantling the unified Arab position.”

So far, the Houthis’ launches of ballistic missiles and drones – their contribution to the Axis of Resistance and a show of solidarity with Hamas – haven’t posed a direct strategic threat to Israel. But they could have consequences on other fronts, and no less so on diplomatic moves in the region.

The violent show of solidarity that Iran initiated to prove the existence of the “united front” has included Hezbollah’s controlled but escalating clashes with Israel, attacks by Shi’ite militias on American targets in Iraq and the sporadic missile and drone launches from Yemen. But the Houthis’ attacks are also meant to send a diplomatic message to Saudi Arabia, and through it, to Washington.

For the past year and a half, there has been a ceasefire in the war in Yemen that Saudi Arabia started in 2015. Under American pressure, intensive talks aimed at ending the conflict began this year between Riyadh and the Houthi government.

In September, a high-level Houthi delegation visited Riyadh for the first time, and the parties have already reached a draft agreement that includes massive Saudi aid to the Houthis and the reopening of the port of Hodeida, which has been blockaded since the war began.

But the war in the Gaza Strip and the Houthi threat create a serious dilemma for both Riyadh and Washington. In a violent clash between Houthi and Saudi forces that took place this week in the Jizan region, which is on the Saudi-Yemeni border, four Saudi soldiers were killed.

Saudi Arabia also intercepted five missiles fired at Israel when they crossed Saudi airspace. These events made it clear to Riyadh that not only might the peace talks collapse, but it may have to take an unequivocal position on the war in Gaza.

As Al-Houthi made clear, in his view, Israel isn’t the only legitimate target. So are the Arab states that have diplomatic relations with Israel and those, like Saudi Arabia, that are planning to normalize relations. And of course, America is also in the Houthis’ sights.

If Saudi Arabia is dragged back into war with the Houthis, this might well endanger its new relationship with Iran. But when the Houthis are justifying these attacks as part of the “united front” of the Axis of Resistance against Israel, Riyadh is forced to leave its comfort zone – in which it has so far made do with condemning Israel’s actions and demanding that it allow humanitarian aid – and position itself demonstratively beside America, and thereby implicitly beside Israel.

These dilemmas took center stage in the talks held by Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, Crown Prince Mohammed’s brother, in Washington, where he landed on Monday for meetings with U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.

Nor is this just a local Saudi concern. In a situation where the war in Gaza threatens to open additional fronts, the prevailing assumption is that the clashes in Lebanon could also develop into a full-fledged war.

U.S. President Joe Biden has already made it clear that if Hezbollah launches missiles at Israel, America won’t be part of the war. It is saving its heavy artillery for a situation in which Iran decides to actively join the fighting, in defiance of Washington’s warnings.

But the big surprise could come from a less predictable front, if the match lit by the Houthis requires Washington not only to intercept missiles aimed at Israel, but to use greater force in a theater where it has managed to avoid direct involvement ever since it stopped attacking Al-Qaida bases in Yemen.

More importantly, Washington might well decide to sign a defense pact with Saudi Arabia to show its commitment to defending the region against Iran’s satellites, without conditioning this on normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem.

Like other substate organizations, including Hezbollah and the Shi’ite militias in Iraq, the Houthis also have strategic goals completely disconnected from the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestinian problem.

All three of these organizations serve Iran’s regional interests and are funded by it, and they maintain various levels of military coordination. But at the same time, they conduct independent policies aimed at ensuring their own status and their control over the countries in which they operate.

The Houthis began as a large tribe centered in the Saada region in northern Yemen. Most of its members belong to the Zaydi sect of Shi’ite Islam. Their war in Yemen was originally against the Yemeni government, and also against the Saudis, due to the friction along the border between Saudi Arabia and northern Yemen.

Thus, unlike Hezbollah or the militias in Iraq, the Houthis aren’t an Iranian “creation.” Only in 2012, when Yemen was already mired in its Arab Spring revolution, did Iran become interested in the Houthis as a potential vehicle for exerting influence over the country. A year after that, Tehran had already begun sending the Houthis arms.

When the Houthis began conquering parts of Yemen, the Iranians advised them not to capture the capital, Sanaa. But the Houthis had their own agenda. Capturing the Yemenite capital wasn’t just an act of seizing power; it also completed the settling of a historical account that began in the 1960s, when, with the help of Egyptian forces, the Yemenite king – a member of the Zaydi sect – was toppled and Yemen became a republic.

Even if the attacks from Yemen result in no far-reaching regional developments, they once again show the power of substate proxies to instigate geopolitical moves that go far beyond the radius of the local conflicts that normally nourish them.

The war in Gaza has already thrust America into the heart of our local conflict – not just to protect Israel, but to prevent a multi-country war. Yemen may well become the next focal point in the development of such a war.

11 Israeli soldiers killed on Tuesday in Gaza ground op, bringing total Israel deaths in Gaza to 13 ■ Israeli warships were deployed in the Red Sea on as reinforcements following long-range missile and drone attacks claimed by Yemen's Houthis ■ An Israeli airstrike killed Ibrahim Biari, commander of Hamas' Jabalya Brigade and one of the leaders of the October 7 massacre ■ Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry reports over 8,000 Palestinians killed ■ Number of hostages held in Gaza stands at 240, with 40 remain missing ■ At least 1,300 civilians and soldiers killed in Hamas massacre on October 7

IDF names Roi Saragosti as 11th soldier killed in combat on Tuesday

8,796 Palestinians killed in Israeli strikes on Gaza since war began, Hamas-run health ministry in Gaza reports

Pdaya Mark, named as 10th soldier killed in Gaza on Tuesday

Up to 500 foreign passport holders will pass Rafah crossing from Gaza into Egypt on Wednesday, Egyptian source says

Palestinian communications company: Internet and cell connection in Gaza is being restored

IDF: Nine Israeli soldiers killed Tuesday after anti-tank missile hits vehicle in northern Gaza

Qatar brokers deal between Egypt, Hamas and Israel for limited Gaza evacuations

IDF missile warship arrived in the Red Sea Tuesday to reinforce defensive efforts following attacks from Yemen

IDF attacked terrorists entrenched in a building in Jabalya; more than 11,000 targets were struck since the beginning of the war

Palestinian reports IDF surrounded house of Fatah Secretary General in Jenin

Palestinian Health Ministry: Number of dead from IDF fire in the West Bank overnight rises to four

The movement of IDF forces into the northern Gaza Strip was more rapid than could have been expected at first. Four days after the start of the ground maneuver, it is already escalating into a full-blown war, between IDF large infantry and armored forces, and the Hamas defensive array, which includes several concentric circles surrounding the organization’s security center in downtown Gaza. There is tough, persistent fighting deep in urban areas, much of them devastated in the air force’s preliminary bombings.

As a result, there are apparently hundreds of Hamas fighters dead, but Israel is also paying a price. Tuesday brought news of two soldiers from the Givati Brigade reconnaissance battalions killed in the battles.

As the days go by, the challenge facing the troops becomes more complex. Hamas is a terror group, but in defense it fights using guerrilla tactics. There is no benefit, from its point of view, in a frontal clash with an enemy that enjoys an immense advantage in technology and firepower. It seeks weak spots, where it can exact a heavy toll from the Israeli military. IDF Spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari, admitted that “intense battles in Gaza” are taking place, and that “there is a price.”

For 20 years, the IDF deliberated and argued about the ground maneuver. The prevailing opinions held that the ground forces, and particularly the reserves, are not sufficiently fit and trained for such a complex mission, and that the Israeli public would struggle to deal with the scope of casualties it might entail. This time, the government and IDF have decided in favor of deploying the forces for hard fighting in the Gaza Strip, in light of the severity of Hamas’ attack. The question of whether the move will prove as effective as they hope has yet to be decided. This will become clear only later on, although there have already been operational achievements.

The IDF’s ground operations are focused at this point on the northern part of the Strip, which is bisected by Gaza River. The distances are not large. The width of the Strip, at its narrowest, is barely six kilometers. There is a point at which the blue arrow, denoting the movement of IDF forces on the map, must stop and seek other missions: Destroying tunnels, sweeping for armed militants and munitions (and optimistically, for hostages as well). The more Israel tightens the noose, the more it encounters the risk that its forces will be too static and thus exposed to harm.

The question of time is also a factor: The IDF is preparing for long months of continuous operation within the Strip. The American administration prefers that Israel refrain from a permanent presence, and that from a certain stage – perhaps within weeks – that it begin focusing on military raids (entering and then leaving) against specifically defined targets. International patience is not infinite, especially since the images of devastation caused by Israel in the Strip are already turning public opinion in some Western countries against the operation. To mitigate some of the damage, Israel has agreed to increase humanitarian aid to the south of the Strip. Now the option of allowing many dozens of trucks in from Egypt on a daily basis is also being discussed. Israel conditions this upon a strict security check. The humanitarian crisis in the Strip is significant. This may impact the IDF’s latitude, over time.

In its first days, the ground operation took place in a rather orderly fashion. In recent years, all units taking part in the operation have undergone detailed training and practice for the event of war in Gaza under the Southern Command. Previous operational plans were less ambitious, and required adjustment following the October 7 terror attack. But the IDF is not unprepared for such a challenge. There is also the impact of other factors, such as fighting spirit and belief in the rightness of the cause. Despite the enormous anger at the government and security establishment brass, who share in the blame of the surprise attack and failure, it seems that troops and commanders alike are focused mainly on the effort to cripple Hamas.

Hamas’ staying power
On Tuesday morning Houthi rebels in Yemen, allied with Iran, fired ballistic missiles and launched drones from Yemen toward the city of Eilat in southern Israel, which were successfully intercepted over the Red Sea. This is part of the planned Iranian effort to back Hamas in its war against Israel. But the main focus of danger remains the Lebanese front. Hezbollah’s dilemma there sharpens more and more as the IDF’s incursion into the city of Gaza deepens, and Beirut and Tehran have concerns as to Hamas’ staying power.

On this, as well, Israel had best err on the side of caution. In the 51 days of fighting during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Military Intelligence predicted more than 10 times that Hamas would agree to a cease-fire, only to be proven wrong. Willingness to agree to a cease-fire only crystallized at the end of the military campaign, after the IDF greatly intensified aerial attacks in Gaza (a level far exceeded this time, in light of the circumstances).

In the coming days Hezbollah may intensify its reactions, and try to gradually stretch its rocket line southward. This also depends on Israeli moves: The IDF is hitting a large part of the squads firing anti-tank missiles and mortars, gradually pushing Hezbollah’s Radwan Force positions from the border area.

Arab media has reported that the commander of the al-Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, General Esmail Qaani, came to Beirut after October 7 to consolidate Iran and Hezbollah’s response policy. And yet, the prevailing argument is that the final decision rests with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, and that Iranian leadership highly respects Nasrallah’s understanding of developments on the Israeli side. Meanwhile, polls are published in Lebanon, even in Hezbollah-affiliated media, showing most of the public opposed to Hezbollah’s involvement in the war, for fear that it will lead to the destruction of Lebanon, already suffering from a particularly severe economic crisis.

Jordanian think tank al-Quds, whose senior staff are retired Jordanian generals, held a discussion on the war in Gaza. The institute’s members write that “the ground war in Gaza is an existential necessity for Israel, following the earthquake of October 7.” They estimate that “Iran will not intervene in the war directly, and Hezbollah will do so only if forced by Israel. The current situation in Arab countries does not indicate a widening of the war, and Washington shows a disinclination for such.” However, the Jordanian experts believe that “Israel may wipe out Hamas’ capabilities, but the resistance is an ideology, a doctrine and a never ending project. It will grow more popular and take on new forms.”

Hysterical hyperbole
Israel’s international difficulties are not limited to a lack of sympathy among Western liberals. The statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin have become more and more extreme, now bordering on antisemitism. Putin describes the war as part of a global struggle between good and evil. In his eyes, Russia and the Palestinians are on the same side, whereas Israel is part of an axis of evil with the U.S. and Ukraine, which all decent people should oppose. These things again shed the light of ridicule upon the claims by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, just a few short years ago, alleging that he had managed to make Russia pro-Israel.

The shortsightedness of Israel’s foreign policy stood out again on Tuesday night, at the unsuccessful speech by Israel’s ambassador to the UN, Gilad Erdan. Israel’s arguments are strong enough. They need no bolstering via a theatrical display in which the ambassador and his staff affixed yellow stars to their lapels. The massacre committed by the Hamas terrorists in the Gaza border area may have been reminiscent in its brutality of images from the Holocaust, but Israel is not helpless. It is a regional military power, enjoying unprecedented security backing from the United States.

This hysterical hyperbole does nothing but feed self-pity and panic. Dani Dayan, chairman of Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Memorial Museum (and as always, a voice of sanity and reason) rightly said that the ambassador’s choice desecrates both the victims of the Holocaust and the State of Israel. But somehow, one gets the sneaking suspicion that Erdan is not interested in the reactions of Dayan and his ilk. He’s already preparing for the Likud race for Netanyahu’s mantle.

A powder keg
Amidst all the terrible commotion, we mustn’t for a moment ignore what is happening in the West Bank. Security personnel following the developments there describe a deliberate effort by settlers – and not just the most extreme and violent ones – to take over territories, chase Palestinians away, and terrorize the residents of the West Bank, in a manner which may ignite a more severe conflict there as well.

The sources say this is a broad, planned and organized operation, in which residents of illegal outposts also participate with sporadic and independent operations. The Civil Administration does not sufficiently document and report events, raising suspicions about a conspiracy of silence on the matter among IDF brass. Some actively collaborate in this effort, and others turn a blind eye and refrain from confrontations.

Among the actions done are the paving of roads around settlements, connecting them to outposts and relatively new ranches. Some of the routes are paved by the IDF, though most are paved independently by the settlers. There is an organized move to run Palestinians off their lands through threats and violence, in the Susya area of the South Hebron Hills, among other areas. There is a noticeable uptick in displays of violence: The uprooting of hundreds of olive trees (in the Tulkarm area), arson, vandalism, and shootings (in the Yitzhar area). Concurrently, new illegal outposts have been established: Two near Peduel in the Ariel area, one in the Shiloh Valley north of Ramallah and one in the Jordan Valley. All these may seem like minuscule matters compared to the horrific massacre in the Gaza border area or the hard fighting in Gaza. But these incident have the potential to cause a deterioration in the West Bank, turning into another front that will pin down resources and troops the IDF needs in more urgent and critical theaters.

The security establishment says that they plan to issue more administrative detention orders for extreme operatives (one has already been issued). Border Police troops are being beefed up in areas of friction between Palestinians and settlers, and the Shin Bet has entered the picture more actively. And yet, there is a powder keg here, threatening to explode. The state must respond more harshly, despite the presence of the hilltop youth’s delegates in the government and security cabinet.

Every target in Gaza struck by Israeli jets has been assessed in advance to minimise civilian deaths, the chief of staff of the air force has said in its highest-level defence of the scale of Palestinian casualties.

Brigadier General Eyal Greenbaum said every strike went through 11 or 12 stages of approval before it was authorised. He insisted that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) were closely following rules of war that demand the rate of civilian deaths be proportional to the importance of the military target being struck.

Brigadier General Eyal Greenbaum said Israel stuck to rules of war

More than 8,000 people, more than half of them women and children, have been killed in Gaza so far, Hamas officials claim. Hamas regularly accuses Israel of committing “genocide”.

Greenbaum blamed Hamas for the civilian losses, saying it was making civilians part of its war machine.

“It’s not a campaign, it’s a war in Israel right now,” he said. “We insist on keeping the process of how we select targets. These are our values. Unfortunately, there are a lot of casualties. We try to avoid these casualties. But Hamas-Isis uses civilians to be part of this war. Despite this decision we try to avoid civilian casualties, but unfortunately sometimes in this war it happens.”

However, he admitted that this campaign “used more ammunition and struck more targets” than previous rounds of conflict between the two sides, and an IDF legal adviser said that the greater importance of the war changed how these calculations were made.

“The way that the IDF manages this very difficult consideration, this very tragic loss of civilian life, has not been changed. The mechanism has not changed,” the adviser said, but the need to confront the “greater threat” that resulted from the scale of Hamas’s attack — which struck deep into Israel for the first time — changed the balance.

“This war is fundamentally different from the rounds of hostilities we had with Hamas in the past,” he said. “The military advantage that arises from the imperatives of defending Israel is much clearer.”

Israel has pointed to the thousands of civilians killed in Mosul and other cities in Syria and Iraq as the United States, UK and other allied air forces helped Iraq drive out Islamic State.

Greenbaum said target lists in Gaza prepared before the conflict had been updated and re-checked before strikes were approved.

However, it is clear that the determination to go after Hamas’s tunnel network has created a greater danger to civilian buildings that sit on top of them.

The number of dead, especially when bodies still unaccounted for under the rubble are added in, is greater than in all previous rounds of fighting in Gaza put together.

That reflects the greater ambition for the military campaign laid down by the Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu — the complete eradication of Hamas.

Hamas has built a global operation to funnel funds to support its activities – using shell companies, physically moving cash, transferring via cryptocurrencies, syphoning support from charities, and receiving infusions from friendly nations such as Iran, which supports several militant groups in countries that border Israel.

Turkey, one of the countries where Hamas has investments through firms like Trend GYO, is coming under fire for failing to take a stronger stance toward Hamas. Unlike the US, UK and EU, Turkey does not consider Hamas a terrorist organisation.

Ankara has even granted citizenship to people linked to Hamas, including individuals later sanctioned by the US. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was also reportedly in Turkey when the group’s gunmen attacked Israel earlier this month.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s president, last week called Hamas “a liberation group, ‘mujahideen’ waging a battle to protect its lands and people,” using an Arabic word to refer to those who fight for their faith.

Wally Adeyemo, the US deputy treasury secretary, said his government’s sanctions were aimed at “dismantling Hamas’s funding networks… to deny Hamas the ability to exploit the international financial system.

The most recent sanctions named Trend GYO’s three top shareholders: Alaeddin Şengüler, board chairman; board member Gülşah Yiğidoğlu; and Arwa Mangoush.

Other alleged Hamas front companies based in Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also previously been slapped with US sanctions for boosting the wealth of Hamas leaders and funding the group’s activities.

Haaretz | Israel News
Israel-Hamas War Day 27 | Bahrain Parliament Recalls Envoy to Israel, First Abraham Accords Signatory to 'Halt' Ties

18 Israeli soldiers and officers killed during Gaza ground offensive ■ Hamas: 195 Palestinians killed in Israeli attacks on Jabalya refugee camp ■ IDF strikes in Lebanon following missile launches ■ Israeli airstrike kills Ibrahim Biari, commander of Hamas' Jabalya Brigade and one of the leaders of the October 7 massacre ■ Hamas-run Health Ministry: Over 9,000 Palestinians killed ■ 242 hostages held in Gaza, 40 remain missing ■ At least 1,300 civilians and soldiers killed in Hamas massacre

IDF confirms battalion commander killed in Gaza fighting

IDF confirms 242 hostages held by Hamas in Gaza

Bahrain recalls ambassador to Israel, freezes economic ties

German Interior Minister announces complete ban on Hamas activities

Israeli man in his 30s killed in suspected West Bank shooting attack

Palestinian Health Ministry: Three Palestinians killed, three seriously wounded by IDF fire in the West Bank

Gaza hospitals chief: main hospital in northern Strip on verge of shutting down due to lack of fuel

IDF: Our troops killed dozens of terrorists in fierce battles

Israeli reserve officer Yuval Zilber, 25, was killed in fighting in the northern Gaza Strip

Fierce battles continued to rage in the Gaza Strip Thursday, with troops fighting off a vicious overnight Hamas ambush, and the military saying it was using artificial intelligence to identify thousands of new targets belonging to the Palestinian terror group.

The Israel Defense Forces on Thursday afternoon announced the death of a senior officer during fighting in Gaza, bringing the military’s death toll to 18 since Tuesday, and 333 since the beginning of the war.

The army said ground forces and tanks clashed with Hamas terror cells in the northern Gaza Strip overnight, killing dozens of operatives, in what The Times of Israel has learned was an intense and chaotic midnight battle that raged on for over three hours following an ambush targeting soldiers from Golani’s 13th Battalion.

In a statement Thursday morning, the IDF troops of the Golani Infantry Brigade had taken part in “prolonged battles” against Hamas terrorists who had fired missiles, set off explosive devices, and hurled grenades at the forces.

The Hamas gunmen tried to ambush the Israeli force at midnight, emerging from tunnels and attacking them with anti-tank missiles, mortars, and drones. They tried to enter the armored personnel carriers and take control of them. More than 20 terrorists were believed to have been killed and several managed to escape, while there were no Israeli fatalities in that fight.

The military said the Golani troops fought back, assisted by artillery and tank shelling, and calling in an airstrike and missile strikes by the Navy.

“At the end of the fighting, dozens of terrorists were killed,” the IDF said.

The military said that troops of the Nahal Infantry Brigade also encountered a group of Hamas gunmen who opened fire at them, and directed an aircraft to strike and kill the terror cell.

Reservist forces, meanwhile, directed an aircraft to strike an anti-tank squad, with navy support, according to the IDF.

The IDF said it has continued to strike Hamas sites in the Gaza Strip, including weapons manufacturing and storage facilities, anti-tank missile launching positions, and drone launching positions.

Later Thursday, the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate said its so-called “targets center” had identified some 1,200 new Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip amid the ongoing ground offensive that began last week.

The Military Intelligence Directorate is using artificial intelligence and automated tools to “produce reliable targets quickly and accurately,” the IDF said.

A senior intelligence officer said that “in war, the enemy behaves differently and creates new opportunities.”

The senior officer said other new tools were being used for the first time to immediately provide ground forces in Gaza with updated information on targets to strike.

So far, the IDF said it has struck more than 12,000 targets in the Strip.

The operations haven’t come without losses to Israeli forces. The army has previously confirmed the deaths of 17 soldiers in or near the Strip since Tuesday morning, and on Thursday afternoon announced that Lt. Col. Salman Habaka, 33, the commander of the 188th Armored Brigade’s 53rd Battalion, from Yanuh-Jat, was killed battling Hamas terrorists in the northern part of Gaza.

Habaka is the most senior officer to have been killed during the IDF’s ground operation in the Gaza Strip. No further details were given on the circumstances of his death.

Separately, a reservist of the 679th Yiftah Brigade, a Givati soldier, and a Combat Engineering soldier, were seriously wounded in overnight operations in the northern part of Gaza.

Additionally, a soldier of the Border Defense Corps’ Caracal Battalion was seriously wounded in an incident on the Egyptian border. No further details were given on the circumstances.

Previously, 11 troops were killed when a Namer armored personnel carrier they were in was hit by an anti-tank missile. Two others died when an RPG was fired at a building they were in. Two were killed when their tank drove over an explosive device, another was killed by mortar fire on the border, and one died during clashes with Hamas gunmen.

The casualties underlined the threats soldiers are facing as the army shifts to fraught urban combat in Gaza’s crowded streets after weeks of a punishing air campaign. The urban combat zone is thought to be awash with bombs and booby traps and undercut by a vast network of tunnels used by terrorists to ambush or surprise troops.

Some of the fatalities came during a major IDF assault Tuesday on Hamas’s Central Jabaliya Battalion compound, located in the Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza. Israel is battling to destroy Hamas and end its rule over the Strip after the group’s devastating terror attack earlier this month that killed over 1,400 people in Israel, mostly civilians.

According to a report Thursday by the Ynet news site, Hamas sent a group of 100 women and children to act as human shields to protect the compound.

“We are prepared for more incidents of such cynical and blatant use of the population,” said an unnamed IDF officer who apparently witnessed the incident.

The report did not say how troops dealt with the situation, but the compound was captured by the IDF.

Meanwhile, rocket fire by Palestinian terrorists appeared to taper off slightly, as terror groups presumably prepare for a long battle.

Among the targets on Thursday were Ashdod and largely evacuated Gaza border towns. There were no reports of direct impacts or injuries.

Also on Thursday, IDF spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said the military had notified the families of 242 hostages that their loved ones were being held in the Gaza Strip, up by two from the previous tally.

He said the number was not final as the military investigates new information.

The number does not include four released hostages — mother and daughter Judith and Natalie Ra’anan, and elderly women Yocheved Lifshitz and Nurit Cooper — or Pvt. Ori Megidish, who was rescued by the IDF on Sunday night, meaning at least 247 people were taken hostage on October 7.

There are still dozens more missing people whose fates are currently unknown. Out of the confirmed captives, it isn’t clear how many are alive. Hamas is also believed to be holding two Israeli civilians who entered the Strip in 2015, as well as the bodies of two IDF soldiers killed in 2014.

Israel declared war, with the aim of eradicating Hamas, following the terror group’s devastating October 7 onslaught, in which civilians were brutally murdered or abducted from their homes and from the site of a music festival. A top Hamas official has said that given the chance, the Palestinian terror group would repeat such massacres again and again.

Meanwhile in Gaza, the Hamas-run health ministry has claimed that more than 9,000 Palestinians have been killed in the war, and more than 22,000 people have been wounded. The figure, which could not be confirmed, would be without precedent in decades of Israeli-Palestinian violence. Hamas has been accused of artificially inflating the death toll, and does not distinguish between civilians and terror operatives. Some of the dead are believed to be victims of Palestinian terrorists’ own misfired rockets.

An estimated 800,000 Palestinians have fled south from Gaza City and other northern areas following repeated Israeli calls to evacuate, but hundreds of thousands remain in the north, including many who left and later returned because Israel is also carrying out airstrikes in the south.

Foreigners and dual nationals started exiting Gaza via the Rafah border crossing with Egypt on Wednesday and this continued on Thursday, with Egypt’s foreign ministry saying it will help evacuate “about 7,000″ people representing “more than 60” nationalities.

Hamas authorities claimed Thursday morning that the power generator of the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip had gone out of service.

Gaza health officials have been warning that hospitals were in imminent danger of closing since the first days of the war.

Health ministry spokesperson Ashraf Al-Qudra said in a televised statement that the Indonesian Hospital was running on a smaller backup generator but had to turn off lights in most rooms, shut down oxygen generators and resort to oxygen cylinders, and turn off mortuary refrigerators.

“These exceptional measures will allow the Indonesian Hospital to work for a matter of days,” Al-Qudra said. “However, if we cannot secure electricity or fuel then we will face a disaster.”

While some aid trucks have entered the blockaded Gaza Strip since the war began last month, Israel has not allowed trucks to bring fuel, which Hamas needs to run the ventilation and electricity in its vast tunnel network.

Israel says that Hamas has hundreds of thousands of liters of fuel that it could supply to hospitals and other civilians. The IDF on Wednesday released a recording of an intelligence intercept of a conversation in which a Hamas commander repeatedly alludes to Hamas taking fuel from Indonesian Hospital’s stocks.

Hezbollah is too important to Iran's interests to destroy in an attempt to save Hamas.  It would be trading a rook for a pawn.

Opening a full front against Israel, and a large-scale response from Israel and possibly the United States, might return Lebanon to the Stone Age..This would be a strategic disaster from Iran’s perspective, far more serious and disruptive than the damage to the axis of resistance concept.

(Chief among) Iranian considerations is the fear of a full military confrontation with the United States as a result of its direct involvement in the war between Israel and Hamas...despite (Iran) being a Shi’ite country, it is not suicidal.

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian has been one of the busiest people in the regional diplomatic arena this month. On Wednesday, in Doha, he met with Qatar’s ruling emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, as well as with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh before flying to Ankara, where he met with his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, his second with the Turk in a short span.

In between, Amirabdollahian held talks with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, and reviewed the U.S. warnings that reached him via the Saudis and the Turks, demanding that Iran not interfere in the war in the Gaza Strip by opening one or more additional fronts. He also managed a few domestic wars between the hawkish politicians pushing for a wider conflict to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinians to “strike the haughty arrogance of the Zionists and the United States” on one side and those concerned about moves that could adversely affect Iran’s position in the region, or its geopolitical assets. Amirabdollahian’s complex assignment now is to create the conditions that will allow Iran to have its cake and eat it too – to take part in the Palestinian struggle without paying a price.

Israel doesn’t have a monopoly on “the day after” dilemma in regard to the current war. Iran, and as a derivative of it, Hezbollah, are walking on the edge for now: On one side, threats and peripheral military involvement; on the other, diplomatic efforts toward calm so that the “day after” from Iran’s perspective will be as similar as possible to the day before.

The trailer for Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s “speech to the nation,” set for Friday afternoon, is all over Arab and Israeli media outlets, alongside the predictions, guesses and assessments of what is will contain. Will Nasrallah announce an all-out war against Israel, or will he present the organization’s victories and achievements so far and frame them as a substantial contribution to and participation in the Palestinian struggle?

He will surely enumerate Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli targets, military and civilian; the evacuation of thousands of Israelis from their homes in dozens of communities near the border with Lebanon and his audacity in breaking the rules of the confrontation with Israel that were established after the 2006 Second Lebanon War. But Hezbollah is also very attentive to the criticism hurled at it by the leaders of Hamas, who openly tell it they expected more from their partner, a senior member of the “unification of the arenas” alliance on which the campaign in Gaza was based, and a full partner in the war room established by Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Iran.

From the perspective of Iran and Hezbollah, however, the question is not only one of keeping promises or demonstrating military solidarity with Hamas. Their web of considerations is built from at least three circles. In the nearest, the fear is that the collapse of Hamas could deal a heavy blow to the idea and strategy underlying the concept of the “axis of resistance.” Alongside Hezbollah, this axis includes the Palestinian organizations, the Shi’ite Muslim militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. Each of these organizations has a local agenda in the countries where they operate, but they are also committed, at least ideologically, to united action against their common enemies, chief among them Israel, the United States and pro-Western governments, especially those that have normalized their relations with Israel.

An asymmetric axis

These organizations are not equal in weight and status, neither in terms of their military capabilities nor their strategic value. For example, the Houthis in Yemen are a fairly new addition to the axis, having joined only in 2012. While they have proved their effectiveness in attacking strategic targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (until the latter withdrew its forces from Yemen at the end of 2019 and reached an agreement with Iran) and recently by launching missiles and attack drones at Israel, Iran and Hezbollah (which trains the Houthi forces) did not mobilize the “axis of resistance” to rescue the Houthis in the war that Saudi Arabia has led against them since 2015.

The Shi’ite militias in Iraq are not monolithic. Some actually object to Iranian influence in Iraq and are subordinate to the country’s top Shi’ite Muslim cleric, Ali al-Sistani. But the militias that are defined as pro-Iranian also do not act as one body. They are formally subordinate to Iraq’s Defense Ministry, which pays their members’ salaries, but their loyalty is divided between local patronages of pro-Iranian Iraqi politicians, and their commanders have displayed independence even from their bosses in Iran.

It was recently reported in Iraq that the militias have not yet decided whether to participate in the war in Gaza – that is, to open a front in Iraq as part of the axis of resistance. For now, some are content with launching missiles and drones at U.S. targets within Iraq and Syria.

Since the beginning of the war in Gaza, dozens of such attacks have been reported, that were met with measured U.S. airstrikes. But this week U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made it clear at a congressional hearing that if the attacks continue, the United States will respond forcefully. That could mean significant damage to Iran’s militia bases and outposts in Syria and Iraq. Damage to the Sh’iite militias is damage to Iran’s military arm in Iraq, through which it can largely dictate the policy of the Iraqi government.

Completing the “near” circle of the axis of resistance is Hezbollah, Iran’s most important asset in the Middle East and the main element in the strategy of spreading its influence in the region. Iran’s “problem” is that Hezbollah is the leader of a country, in the sense that no political, economic or military decision can be made in Lebanon without its approval. The Shi’ite militias in Iraq also have significant say in running the country, and the Houthis control half of Yemen, but these organizations are just one component, however significant, in a complex matrix.

The Lebanese question

In Lebanon, even when there is a functioning government, and even more so when the government exists more in theory than in practice, Hezbollah is the state. Herein lies the second circle of the Iranian dilemma, that requires it to preserve Lebanon as a state so that Hezbollah does not go back to having to compete with other organizations and movements in Lebanon.

Opening a full front against Israel, and a large-scale response from Israel and possibly the United States, might return Lebanon to the Stone Age, as Israeli politicians have threatened, but it could rekindle a civil war; this time Hezbollah, instead of running the country, would become another organization or movement fighting for its existence. This would be a strategic disaster from Iran’s perspective, far more serious and disruptive than the damage to the axis of resistance concept.

In the third circle of the map of Iranian considerations is the fear of a full military confrontation with the United States as a result of its direct involvement in the war between Israel and Hamas. There is no point in expanding on the consequences of such a confrontation on Iran at the moment; it can only be stated with certainty that despite being a Shi’ite country, it is not suicidal. Now Iran is directing Nasrallah to inform the public of Tehran’s decision. He doesn’t need a flashlight to find his way through the tangle of Iran’s strategic considerations. He is a full partner in building its regional strategy. It will be fascinating to hear Friday how he maneuvers among them.