perhaps even more importantly, the AR variant would have better parts interchangeability with existing stocks and would weight less

The HK416 has quite a few proprietary wear parts

Something missing from the IAR discussion, is whether the M27 is actually good as a full auto weapon.

From the Marine's own video with Gunner Wade, at 80m off the bipod, the M27 is shooting off target by the 3rd round:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18kXkuoA014

This is not exactly inspiring performance, especially when you compare it to a dedicated IAR like the Ultimax 100 and it's constant recoil system:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1zQuWpsYZY

Ideally, we should upgrade the M4A1's to M4A3 (the URG-1 improvements + the Armwest/Surefire developed reduced rate of fire bolt design to drop ROF to 600rpm) and then issue either the KAC LMG or Ultimax 100 to replace the M249.

Tagarooni

This has been an interesting discussion. There really are nuggets of wisdom in GD sometimes. Thanks to all who posted!

I kinda want one now.  The magazine.  Just because.

guy in my squad at RS said the TLs had the SAW.

Don't forget about the reduced hammer spring strength. They were trying to reduce average trigger pull weight and that contributed to needing the disco cage.

Almost certainly. I bought S7 bolts for less than $40 earlier this year. Whole S7 BCG's for $165 last month.

So we can't train a person on a operation of a simple MG but you expect them to have fire discipline and use proper aiming techniques, which are not used by most units in combat (exception being SF)?

What you want will never be realized. The army/marines dont spend enough on training budgets

That's the thing.

Joe doesn't have enough Reps to get used to using his optics under stress. And he will NEVER get enough Reps, because the funding isn't there to give them enough training to do so.

Special Operations? They have very experience guys and no training funding issues. So they will use their Optics while being shot at. Joe-Average-Infantry-guy won't.

We don't have the money to train 50,000 Infantry guys like we can SF, SFOD, SEALs and such. And so we'll always see the results of guys not using their optics, until some new revolutionary tech comes along to overcome that, and it's instinctual and not something you have to overcome with a ton of training.

It's is always greener on the other side.

My unit's SAWs worked great. Soldier's load is just too fucking big to really say we'd move faster if we ditched the SAW. Cause Joe will still have that weight savings put into another form a weight gain. So he'll weight just as much as he did, when he had the SAW.

Main problem with that SAW is that fucking reload time. A magazine fed weapon is light years faster to reload than a SAW.

Absolutely this.  I just don't get the love for their carbines

Wouldn't that be counterproductive? Dude with the SAW should be focusing on laying down fire and keeping his gun running. TL should be focusing on managing his team. Seems like you could do either of those things better than you could do both at the same time. Am I wrong?

There's more than one way to skin a cat. Giving the SAW to the least experienced guy is the dumbest thing you can do, IMO.

"Hey Cherry! Carry this!". But it happens to be the most important gun in the Squad, it is 75% of your Squads firepower. And an experienced guy would be able to reload quicker, diagnose and fix malfunctions quicker, and he'll be able to use it more effectively.

Besides, how well can you communicate under fire, unless you're right on top of your Joes and screaming in their ears. And then you broke rule 101 about troop dispersion. Plus, the TL can use his tracers to mark targets for his guys.

Meh. I aint saying it's right, but it's one way to look at it. Just like there are alot of TTPs for how guys Stack. Some like their Joes in the Stack with their rifles at low ready, high port or whatever. No definite right or wrong.

Lol.  I came to post this.  And the drum still was a belt to begin with in the 34

Would anyone here agree that the M27 in 6.5 Grendel would be able to fill the 240,and 249 roles?

I think something like a titanium PKP in .338 Norma would be interesting, especially if it could be kept around 18-20 lbs.

Twice as expensive as a Mk318 round.  But it's green.

Its all open bolt, not belt fed. And not all the time. But they cannot be counted on to fire as part of their design.

An open bolt weapon means no round is chambered. The round that is supposed to get fired when the trigger is pulled is either still in a magazine or in the link of the belt on the feed tray. When the trigger is depressed it releases the sear catch that holds the bolt to the rear under spring tension. Free to move forward under inertia, the bolt is supposed to move forward, strip the round, feed it, chamber it, lock it, and fire it. That's basically the cycle of operations.

The problem that can happen if that what if that round does not get picked up? It happens all the time, resulting in the "ka-chunk" and the need to perform immediate action, everyone who has ever fired an open bolt machine gun has had the issue before.

Now imagine you're initiating an ambush or clearing a room with an open bolt weapon and a closed bolt. The open bolt might not fire. You're drawing down on someone, you have surprise and timing on your side, and then ka-chunk. Meanwhile, with a closed bolt weapon, while the next round might not chamber, besides a miniscule risk of a defective round or a broken firing pin, the round in the chamber will fire.

In MOUT, a squad cannot maintain any semblance of order in the stack after the first room gets cleared. At that point it becomes chaotic, some Soldiers or Marines stay in the room they cleared to control pax, others leave the room to stack up on other doors, cover hallways, etc. Every one of these individuals has the chance they will need to shoot someone inside that room. With an open bolt, the likelihood that weapon not firing is exponentially higher than with any sort of closed bolt weapon. Which makes the M249 and other open bolt weapons a hindrance because they should never be one or two man in the stack, which seriously limits their effectiveness in the squad.

It's not twice as expensive.

On just one half-day range session, I put 1100+rds through my M4.  Every single round was within the 9 ring or head on the FBI B27 targets we were shooting.

The Army puts a lot of focus on its tankers, artillerymen, and aviators, and they have generally received world-class training culminating in NTC, with Desert Storm results measured in a few days.

The Light Infantry budget is small compared to any requirements involving vehicles.  The US Army as a whole was allocated 31.8% of the overall DoD budget in 2010.  $3.2 billion of that went to the Brigade Combat Team modernization program.  There is tons of ammo available to shoot, but we just don't have the leadership with the initiative or even awareness of what available resources there are within the system, so the default waste of time falls back to BS duties, post police call, barracks maintenance, SHARP, and maybe some mandatory pre-deployment finger drill shenanigans labeled "training".

Biggest problems the Army in particular has lost sight of are:

Build basic dismounted combat units from the ground up, starting from the elementary sub-units (they seem to have no problem doing this in Special Operations, Armor, Artillery, or Aviation).

Battle-focused training.  It used to be its own manual, but is now buried in the new leadership manual that aspiring young LTs and NCOs of the 3rd ADD generation will never read.

You'd be surprised what resources any given Army post has at its disposal that would support awesome training for dismounted soldiers.  It just rarely gets used.

A magazine-fed AR chambered in anything will not fill the role of the M240 GPMG, especially since it has no means for barrel change.

A belt-fed LMG chambered in something like 6mm SAW or 6.5mm with low working pressure would be an optimum addition to dismounted infantry units, as long as the cartridges are smaller than 7.62 NATO, but have projectiles with a high BC in the .5 or great region for G1, and a constant-recoil method of operation.

The battle pack of the Ford XM248 LMG would be very interesting, as there is no messing with the belt.

In all the Infantry, Airborne, and Airmobile units I was in, we specifically never let SAW gunners be the 1 man.

I don't recall a lot of FTFire with the SAW, but I did with the M60.

I would also point out that a century of use of the open bolt SMGs indicates very reliable weapons, with examples of the M1928, MP38, MP40, Kp31, M3,PPSh-41, Cz 25, M12S, Uzi, etc.

A solution to the desire for closed-bolt operation for a Squad LSW is the dual-mode FCG, but that adds a lot of complication to the Fire Control parts.  There is a legitimate use for them, especially looking at the DM role, as well as close combat concerns you bring up with enter and clear a room battle drill.

I think if we asked someone from Ranger Regiment who grew up from the 1970s or early 80s what they thought of all this, after having gone through Grenada, Panama, Mogadishu, Afghanistan, and Iraq, they would respond that they always task organize for the mission, with superbly-trained sub units who have spent every hour of every working day together doing battle-focused training on realistic objectives, with regular simulated casualties and original plans out the window on contact.

Some specific type of clean solution to the problems in the form of this or that weapon, this or that MTO&E makes a nice paper written by some chairborne officer, but has very little to do with how an effective unit actually does their business.

Cases in point:  Several highly successful and combat-proven units dating back to WWII build their sub-units from the ground-up, usually 4-man teams who do everything together, then integrate into however the ground tactical commander needs them to be structured.

Like an NFL team, they have some basic plays for different scenarios that they rehearse as building blocks for getting specific tasks done, then further develop those plays in every kind of weather and terrain possible, taking important after-action notes during review sessions and refining again.  This process never ends.

In contrast, the big Army, regimented military thinker looks for that single answer, cookie-cutter solution to all his problems in the form of either/or premises, which fail every time.  As he rises through the ranks, he usually reinforces his bias towards the particular tool or technique he heard from someone he respected, then seeks to validate that tool or technique.  That's how you end up with things like the 7.62 NATO ISCR, while every experienced NCO in SOCOM screamed "NOoooooooo".

As an organization, and humans in general, the military sucks at internalizing lessons-learned, and quickly purges its ranks of critical thinkers who learned these lessons, then allows the box-thinkers to rise to the top of the floating turd punchbowl.  These men then pass on the same failed practices of generations prior, the lessons get re-learned the hard way, when all someone had to do was read or retain their AAR comments within the unit in a black book.

Again, your history is as fucked up as a football bat. 1st Battle of Fallujah was April 04, that is four months before the Army cleared Najaf in the operation you're referring to, which was in August 04. Al Sadr uprising started in the exact same month of Vigilante Resolve, the reason Fallujah got called off was partially because of the Sunni and Shi'a uprising that started then too. And I MEF casualties for 1st Fallujah were 27 KIA and 90 WIA, most occurred during the siege portion, they sure as shit weren't the reason the battle got called off.  And Najaf was 8 Marines and Soldiers killed, 30 wounded. (Yep, I MEF participated in that one too). And just to further squash your bullshit claim that casualties shut down operations, 2nd battle of Fallujah, digging those fuckers out after they had months to prepare, cost 82 Marine and Soldiers KIA, +800 WIA.

Both of them were already in Al Anbar. Both of them were already part of I MEF command. Both of them were under operational control of I MEF for the duration of their deployments. How many other ways do I need to explain this to you? They got sent to Fallujah because there was a limited number of battalions, USMC or Army in the whole of Anbar, MNF-W. Those two belonged to I MEF. I MEF ran Fallujah, they ran MNF-W. They used whichever fucking units they wanted, USMC or Army.

Here is the Army not leading from the tip of the spear in Phantom Fury

Fallujah had nothing to do with Thunder Run (which was literally a reconnaissance in force), it was a clearing operation. Like police-calling a range, everyone gets on line and moves forward until all the brass gets picked up. Army didn't come up with it pre-Fallujah, its how clearing operations have always been done since Vietnam. The infantry armor techniques the Army uses had no bearing on the Marines, they had less armor present (1st Marine Tank Battalion splint up), they didn't have APCs for every squad, their squads are literally over twice as large as Army mech and cav squads are so they had much more infantry compared to the Army present. The techniques the rifle companies used to clear blocks didn't come from the Army, Anbar was the center of balance in Iraq at that point, most tactics came from them. TTPs from previous Najaf operations weren't used because Najaf hadn't happened yet, which wasn't cleared anywhere similarly to how Fallujah was cleared in Apr or Nov 04. Those two Army battalions, one infantry, one cav, were simply two of six battalions, the other four Marine battalions each being nearly twice as large as the Army battalions, each had its own sector and avenue of advance to move south through Fallujah. Army battalion did their shit, Marines did their's, they tied up flanks and stayed on line trying to hit their phase lines in a timely order, etc. Nothing unique about it, nor were the TTPs the Marines used, learned and established in Anbar by Marines fighting in Hit, Haditha, Fallujah, Ramadi, at that time the worst hellholes in Iraq, worse even then Baghdad was until the Madhi Uprising that happened at the same time 1st Fallujah kicked off.

I don't blame you, just like I didn't blame my PL when he got us lost. Officers do that. They don't know how to use weapons, they don't know small unit tactics unless they're trying to talk about "This one time in IOBC or Ranger School", which don't apply to how we fight overseas. So I really am not surprised you have no clue what I'm talking about, especially considering your disdain for the micro you clearly think war is won in TOC.

Fallujah proved that ACOGs ruled in urban warfare. After that everyone Marine got an ACOG, even the pogues and officers. Fallujah proved that commanders need to be able to task organize their units how they see fit to make the mission work, which is something the USMC has never had a problem with (I wish from my own service with the Army they believed similarly in such initiative). Fallujah proved to countless Gunners who'd previously been talking about IAR concept had a point.

After all, same Gunners from 1st Marine Division that served in those operations, they all worked tirelessly to get the IAR, largely because of operations like those in Fallujah, Ramadi, etc. That's called a hint. While you might discount an infantry weapons officer chief warrant officer as somebody who only focuses on the micro, they are the true subject matter experts because they focus on the micro, and those subject matter experts were the ones who identified the need to scrap M249s, largely because of issues they'd had in Fallujah and elsewhere in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I got multiple book shelf of primary sources I could share, but you wouldn't read them to verify anyway, just like you wont read about Fallujah. Too micro I guess.

MG34/42 in the LMG role were intended to be fired offhand by shoving the stock under the armpit and grasping the bipod, and letting rip with the 50 round drum mag attached to the gun. It was not only in the manual that way, it was part of their training at machine gunners school. Meanwhile an IAR can be fired accurately from the shoulder with a 60 round drum, so match goes to the IAR. And a Bren gun could not be fired by most mortal men from the standing, too heavy and too poorly balanced, it too was intended to be fired by stock in armpit, offhand grasping either the carrying handle or the foreend. It was fed by a 30 round mag, hip fired, so once again, point goes to the IAR.

Physical fitness of SAW gunners? You mean if I give someone a gun that weighs 3x as much as everyone elses, and ammo that weighs 4-5x what everyone elses, they might have issues staying up with the others? How very odd...

Not every belt fed. Just most of those that are in rifle squads. They had their place. But that time has ended. I'd rather have everyone carrying IAR's with quality optics, IR lasers, NODs, and more HE delivering weapons, than carrying 20 lb bullet hoses that jam constantly, are hard to use and are usually poorly maintained by armorers.

Want to talk suppression? Your squad is the current config and you actually think they're suppressing urban areas with bullets, when nearly everyone is behind cover that stops bullets, hiding in dead space. My hypothethical squad has everyone capable of precise semi fire or auto, as well as 2-3x the HE weapons, that can target the dead space. So my squad buttfucks your squad and then marries their sweethearts.

I spent two years in Iraq doing little else but kicking in doors and clearing houses. I did high intensity, I did low, I did COIN and hearts and minds and then instantly went balls to wall again when someone blew up an SVIED. I lived Krulack's Three Block War in the real life. I know well what the infantry mission is for a rifle company. You clearly don't. But just because you had the misfortune to spend most of your time as a staff officer please don't act like I didn't do the job, or that it wasn't important. Powerpoint Ranger might be necessary for success, might not be. But door kickers definitely are and I was a rather good door kicker.

And NOWHERE will you ever see me mention 4 man stack, that's Big Army garrison training bullshit and never happens in real life. We didn't do them. Not only because clearing didn't need that many bodies, but we didn't even have enough bodies, we deployed understrength, we took casualties, we had injuries, we had R&R leave pax gone all the time, so teams were never 4, squads were never 9, and we rarely used more than two people to clear a room. One man covered on a door, held it, stated regularly "I need a two man" and when that two man joined him, whomever in the squad it was, they breached and cleared. And I'm sure every other infantry unit, Army or Marine, experienced the same shit. We were even doing one man clears by pieing 75% of the room and then clearing the rest with a buttonhook. Which is why in real life it fucking sucks when one of two men, or the only man clearing a possibly hostile room is a has an open bolt weapon that can't be reliably guaranteed to fire, and who has to ready ups and room clearing in the same manner as I did with my 8 lb M4 and 7-10 lbs of ammo with their  20 lb M249 and 20-35 lbs worth of ammo.

Is that macro enough?

Many of our NATO allies tried the box magazine fed LMGs.

They went back to Belt feds. The Russians are even going to Belt feds as well.

What I want is simply a focus on something that nobody in Big Army and most Marine units ever contemplates. Make combat marksmanship and fire discipline, once again, something NCOs are supposed to supervise. Funny, as an NCO I see others call out poor positioning, poor use of cover, even comment regularly of "Why aren't you wearing your eye pro and where they fuck are your gloves?"

But I've NEVER seen any NCO give a proper fire command as the manual teaches it, nor attempt to control the fires of his team, squad, or platoon as his responsibilities require, right out of the 7-8 and FM 3-21.8. Not in combat anyway. Not when I was in it, not from videos, not from conversations and books I've read. Why? Because nobody actually expects him to, nobody gives a shit. But as soon as they give a shit we can address the problem in the same way a battalion CSM will call an battalion NCO call to discuss the problem of everyone not wearing their knee pads at the proper position, and not around their ankles. If we can easily address that simply by holding NCOs responsible, we can just as simply fix the fire discipline problem. Because that's what NCOs specialize in, right? Discipline.

And what I'm talking about with training comes down to how many different weapon systems and radios and vehicles, and missiles, and Blue Force Trackers we expect a 19-21 year old who barely passed high school to learn and be proficient on. I'd rather teach them one weapon system that they get good on then two where they suck at both.

I'll try the oil approach, maybe that might work.

I think you will find out it helps alot. I think that the instruction for it even mentioned it....Robert at Micro MOA and I talked about it one day.

You're referring to the UK. They went to the Minimi because SAS and Royal Marines refused to use the L86A1 because it was just as fucked up mechanically as the L85A1. The rest of the British Army got the Minimi too for the same reason, and when HK finally fixed the L85/6 the British Army stuck with the Minimi because that's what they were issued and they don't have the funding to requip the entire force if they wanted to.

Germans and French never went from box to belt fed. Austrias and Aussies both used AUG variants but for both the SAW version never caught on so they both too went with FN since everyone was going with FN already.

Russians went to magazine fed closed bolt because simplicity and because the squad's firepower was not essential during the last hundred meters of closing with NATO in Western Germany, they'd have BMP, BTR, tank, and tube artillery and rockets assisting with suppression fire, per doctrine. For Spetsnaz and VDV airborne in Afghanistan and Chechnya, their squads didn't have the firepower assistance of vehicles or other supporting arms, they didn't have night vision issued to most, they didn't have scopes on their AKs to increase their effectiveness, so they made up the firepower by emphasizing volume. But I bet money that as time goes on and more Russians get NODs and optics on their AKs, they start losing the PKP in their squads because they simply will no longer need them as much for most missions.

IIRC, The Aussies and the other guys with the AUG. The AUG had a extra long barrel with a bipod, it was meant as a support gun. That went of the way of the Dodo too.

True

but for years and years the Commonwealth nations were fielding Lee-Enfields and Brens

later using FN FALs as SAWs/LMGs

Ruskies don't have SCHV-caliber LMGs fielded though (yes they're developing the Tokar(?), and yes they used to issue the RPD)

Blowback from the L86's failure? which is odd, because they (the AUG)  have QCB, 42rnd mags and were open-bolt...

Doesn't mean the AUG-LMG wouldn't have worked/been effective though.

Source on price?

There's a proprietary reason for it, and it would change performance.

But the internet tells me the M4 has to be cleaned after 300 rounds and is a 4moa gun on it's best of days.

The Bundeswehr did go to MG4 in 2001, which is an HK answer to the Minimi:







French have been using the M52 LMG for a long time now, as well as the Minimi in Para Configuration.

M52 configured at Platoon Support GPMG on Tripod:



French M52 Small Arms Review





They're also actively pushing modern sensors, without concern for size or snag hazard it seems.

How much does a gen3 Pmag (30rnd and 40rnd) loaded with M855(A1) weigh?

How much does a D60 loaded with M855(A1) weigh?

then: (loaded mass)/(mass of 30,40,60 rnds)

Wasn't one of the new HK machine guns a total lemon? Whichever one the Bundeswehr bought, I read they were all jacked up.

Magpul PMAG GEN M3 30-round: 17.2 oz loaded
Magpul PMAG GEN M3 40-round: 22.6 oz loaded
SureFire High Capacity Magazine, 60-round: 32.1 oz loaded
Magpul PMAG D-60: 44.4 oz loaded

Magpul PMAG D-60 Comparison – Updated

HK Machine-guns tend to be some of the best in the world in my experience.

They made an answer to the FN MAG/M240 with the HK121, which can function as an LMG or a GPMG depending on how it's configured.

We should be focusing on a Tokar type SCHV LMG, the Tokar will weight 6.3kg empty, that's around 13lbs. We need to dump the 26lb M249 for something like the 12lb KAC X-LMG imo.

IIRC, it was the MG5, but to be fair though, it wasn't their fault, Bundeswehr fucked up

i think there was a thread on Williams' Autogun forum

even derpier...Puma IFV uses the MG4 as coax, a fucking 5.56 coax

Interesting. Considering the D-60 weighs more than 2 Pmags in weight and is around 4 pmags in thickness. Personally I would rather carry Pmags than the D-60 given its bulk

XM248 weighed 11.7lb empty despite having a 24" barrel

bit of an exaggeration, I think they've gotten the weight down closer to 18lbs or so with a 18" barrel and all the new stuff that came from the Mk46.

Spain was looking at a mini-MG42 in 5.56, but apparently production QC was so horrible they never became general issue.

I'm of the mind that they should be single issue item. My understanding is that they would fit in a SAW pouch or a four mag pouch, so everyone in the squad gets a pouch that they either use for storing copenhagen, smoke grenades, frags, extra 40mm eggs, four extra P-mags, or one Magpul drum. The drum would be nice to use if the shooter was set up in a position where they don't want to be fucking around too much on reloads, just blaze away and not break position.

Another possibility is to issue out the new generation of aluminum redimags. I have one, its awesome and so much better the gen 1 steel version I used in Iraq. With that you can only carry 30 or 40 rd mags and reloads are super fast.

That's funny, I never remember reading anything about problems with any of the .30 caliber rounds the military has tested and fielded in our history.

They really need to abandon the .22 and go with something substantial and quit trying to make something do what it cannot do.

Russians have had the RPK-74 for decades as an Automatic Rifle, not technically an LMG by many people's definition, but serving the same Squad Fire Support Role.

What I've seen with them the most is regular riflemen taking RPK mags to increase their firepower.

They've been doing that for a long time, even in Afghanistan in the 1980s.