Posted: 4/1/2009 9:46:31 AM EDT
|
Did we leave bodies there?
|
|
Yes.
The fall of 1979 was a turbulent period in Iran. The Shah had been deposed by Islamic fundamentalists under the Ayatollah Khomeini, and although diplomatic relations still existed between the United States and Iran, these relations were strained. On November 4, 1979, hundreds of Iranians seized the U.S. embassy and took 66 Americans hostage. For days nothing was known of the hostages' condition until their captors finally released all female and black hostages. Later, one other man was released for medical reasons, leaving 53 Americans captives of the Iranian Moslem fundamentalists. By spring of 1980, the situation had reached a virtual standstill, with all diplomatic channels apparently exhausted. In the absence of diplomatic options, President Jimmy Carter authorized a secret military operation on April 25, 1980, designed to rescue those remaining American hostages. The plan called for a rendezvous of helicopters and cargo planes at a remote desert site in Iran before attempting the actually rescue of the hostages. However, the mission was aborted when a freak accident caused two of the aircraft to collide. The ensuing explosion and fire claimed the lives of eight American service personnel. Their bodies could not be recovered before the surviving aircraft had to abandon the desert staging area. Shortly thereafter the eight bodies were returned to the United States, but the remaining 53 hostages were not freed until January 20, 1981, 444 days after they had been captured. A monument dedicated to the memory of those gallant servicemen, who died in the valiant effort to rescue the American hostages, has been erected near the Memorial Amphitheater at Arlington National Cemetery. The white stone marker bears a bronze plaque listing the names and ranks of the three Marines and the five airmen. Three of those men –– Maj. Richard Bakke, Maj. Harold Lewis, Jr. and Sgt. Joel Mayo ––are now buried at Arlington in a grave marked by a common headstone located about 25 feet from the group memorial. link |
|
Yes. The bodies of several of the aircrew of both the C-130 and the RH-53 were unable to be recovered. Several usable aircraft, a lot of equipment, and most of the classified documents relating to the mission were also abandoned. That whole operation was a clusterfuck, from planning to execution to the aftermath. |
| Delta Force and more importantly their Commander Charlie Beckwith, did their part. Beckwith and Delta were at the mercy of Pentagon armchair commando's, they are ones who are resposible for Desert One. I read Beckwith's book, he got fucked. If you read Marchinko's book, he watched Charlie get fucked, and did his best to never let ST-6 fall into the same bureaucratic deathtrap. |
|
seems like a smart thing to do. they were all about showing Carter who was in charge - of the hostages, of Iran as a whole, of the US/Iran relationship. Giving them back advanced that....
Am I wrong? I was an infant then, not so well versed on the saga other than whats in the textbooks. |
|
Eight bodies were left behind.
I remember, in high school, seeing one of their religious leaders picking at the charred corpses with an icepick. They pulled the dog tags out of the bodies and held them up before their media. Goatfuck, because of inter-service rivalries, everybody wanted a part in this. Eagle Claw expanded into an un-manageable nightmare. |
|
Quoted:
As I watched those Iranian "Holy Men" picking & poking at the charred bodies, I realized at age 25 that freedom isn't free & to re-think My World View. I would never have joined the USAF & done My Sacred Duty if it weren't for those images. The Ol' Crew Chief i joined the Marine Corps in May,1980 for the same reason....Was in boot camp by July |
|
Quoted:
What did the bereaucrats do?  Insisted that Navy helo pilots, who's prior experience and training was in naval minesweeping operations, be used for this long range special operations mission, instead of available Air Force pilots who had extensive Vietnam combat experience in long range missions for search and rescue and special operations. All of the bodies were abandoned in the burning aircraft, as there was simply no way to recover them on scene. They had no firefighting capability and were desperately short on fuel & darkness to exfil as it was. Helos were abandoned by the Navy crews, sitting in place with their engines running. The helo crews unfortunately also brought along all their classified mission documents and briefing materials as they claimed that they didn't have a secure place on the launch carrier to store them, all that info which included detailed information on intelligence sources (like Delta's on the ground pre-raid recon and support team and local contacts) within Iran fell into Iranian hands as it was just left in the helos when the crews abandoned them. I would recommend the book The Guts to Try by Colonel James Kyle who was an AF planner for the operation as well as the AF on-scene commander for lots of good info on Operation Eagle Claw. The helicopter problems with this operation were the genesis of the 160th SOAR. |
|
Quoted:
Quoted:
What did the bereaucrats do? Insisted that Navy helo pilots, who's prior experience and training was in naval minesweeping operations, be used for this long range special operations mission, instead of available Air Force pilots who had extensive Vietnam combat experience in long range missions for search and rescue and special operations. All of the bodies were abandoned in the burning aircraft, as there was simply no way to recover them on scene. They had no firefighting capability and were desperately short on fuel & darkness to exfil as it was. Helos were abandoned by the Navy crews, sitting in place with their engines running. The helo crews unfortunately also brought along all their classified mission documents and briefing materials as they claimed that they didn't have a secure place on the launch carrier to store them, all that info which included detailed information on intelligence sources (like Delta's on the ground pre-raid recon and support team and local contacts) within Iran fell into Iranian hands as it was just left in the helos when the crews abandoned them. I would recommend the book The Guts to Try by Colonel James Kyle who was an AF planner for the operation as well as the AF on-scene commander for lots of good info on Operation Eagle Claw. The helicopter problems with this operation were the genesis of the 160th SOAR. IIRC, the Navy (and Marine ?) pilots had very limited experience flying with NODs. |
|
Here's a brief recap: http://www.af.mil/news/airman/0401/hostage.html
Cluster Fuck comes to mind. |
|
USN RH-53s were flown off the Nimitz because the Iranians were being supplied by the USSR with intel that could have tipped the Iranians off that a rescue mission was in the making-moving different helos around would have signaled clear intent to rescue the hostages (ETA: one of the biggest fears U.S. planners had was the Iranians shifting the hostages into seperate, dispersed locations making any hostage rescue op immpossibly complicated). The RH-53s were used to sweep for mines, and not set up for over-land ops in the event of a dust storm. The RH-53s were flown by USMC pilots (who were qualified CH53 pilots), and two extra aircraft were added to the flight in the event of a breakdown. Well, two had to return to the Nimitz due to problems, and one was inop at Desert One when they landed. Beckwith was down one helo and called off the mission (he blamed the Marine pilots for calling the critical bird deadlined-basically called them cowards and blew up at them. He later recanted). DC wanted him to go anyway, but he said no.
Then, one of the Rangers shot a LAW rocket at a fuel tanker as it drove by, and started it burning (this is at night, mind you). Desert One's "secret" location wasn't so secret anymore. He called endex, and people got in a hurry. A C130 collided with a helo, and the rest is history. The decision to use RH-53 helos was done for opsec reasons, not to give everyone a "piece of the pie", IIRC. The pilots were Marines as they were accustomed to low level NOE flying with NVDs. Somebody fix me if I'm wrong. |
|
Quoted:
Jimmy Carter's fault. Seriously. He micro-managed the whole operation. He failed to neutralize Iranian military assest (like the F14s and F4s) when the Joint Chiefs waved their hands in the air and said "Sir, this might be a good idea". Carter, however didn't want to upset the Iranians, so he left the hardware intact. Smart guy, Carter. |
|
Quoted:
USN RH-53s were flown off the Nimitz because the Iranians were being supplied by the USSR with intel that could have tipped the Iranians off that a rescue mission was in the making-moving different helos around would have signaled clear intent to rescue the hostages (ETA: one of the biggest fears U.S. planners had was the Iranians shifting the hostages into seperate, dispersed locations making any hostage rescue op immpossibly complicated). The RH-53s were used to sweep for mines, and not set up for over-land ops in the event of a dust storm. The RH-53s were flown by USMC pilots (who were qualified CH53 pilots), and two extra aircraft were added to the flight in the event of a breakdown. Well, two had to return to the Nimitz due to problems, and one was inop at Desert One when they landed. Beckwith was down one helo and called off the mission (he blamed the Marine pilots for calling the critical bird deadlined-basically called them cowards and blew up at them. He later recanted). DC wanted him to go anyway, but he said no. Then, one of the Rangers shot a LAW rocket at a fuel tanker as it drove by, and started the bus burning (this is at night, mind you). Desert One's "secret" location wasn't so secret anymore. He called endex, and people got in a hurry. A C130 collided with a helo, and the rest is history. The decision to use RH-53 helos was done for opsec reasons, not to give everyone a "piece of the pie", IIRC. The pilots were Marines as they were accustomed to low level NOE flying with NVDs. Somebody fix me if I'm wrong. They detained the bus. I don't think they set it on fire or anything. The helo hit the C-130. |
|
Quoted:
Quoted:
What did the bereaucrats do? Insisted that Navy helo pilots, who's prior experience and training was in naval minesweeping operations, be used for this long range special operations mission, instead of available Air Force pilots who had extensive Vietnam combat experience in long range missions for search and rescue and special operations. All of the bodies were abandoned in the burning aircraft, as there was simply no way to recover them on scene. They had no firefighting capability and were desperately short on fuel & darkness to exfil as it was. Helos were abandoned by the Navy crews, sitting in place with their engines running. The helo crews unfortunately also brought along all their classified mission documents and briefing materials as they claimed that they didn't have a secure place on the launch carrier to store them, all that info which included detailed information on intelligence sources (like Delta's on the ground pre-raid recon and support team and local contacts) within Iran fell into Iranian hands as it was just left in the helos when the crews abandoned them. I would recommend the book The Guts to Try by Colonel James Kyle who was an AF planner for the operation as well as the AF on-scene commander for lots of good info on Operation Eagle Claw. The helicopter problems with this operation were the genesis of the 160th SOAR. Leaving - even bringing - the CMI was inexcusable, but I am not sure if you can blame the bureaucrats for the skill of the pilots. Our country simply did not maintain the type of aviation capacity required for such missions. Possibly some salty Army Vietnam vet pilots could have done better, but there was no guarantee. As you mention, 160th SOAR was a product of that fuckup, as was a lot of current joint special ops doctrine / capacity. |
|
Quoted:
Quoted:
USN RH-53s were flown off the Nimitz because the Iranians were being supplied by the USSR with intel that could have tipped the Iranians off that a rescue mission was in the making-moving different helos around would have signaled clear intent to rescue the hostages (ETA: one of the biggest fears U.S. planners had was the Iranians shifting the hostages into seperate, dispersed locations making any hostage rescue op immpossibly complicated). The RH-53s were used to sweep for mines, and not set up for over-land ops in the event of a dust storm. The RH-53s were flown by USMC pilots (who were qualified CH53 pilots), and two extra aircraft were added to the flight in the event of a breakdown. Well, two had to return to the Nimitz due to problems, and one was inop at Desert One when they landed. Beckwith was down one helo and called off the mission (he blamed the Marine pilots for calling the critical bird deadlined-basically called them cowards and blew up at them. He later recanted). DC wanted him to go anyway, but he said no. Then, one of the Rangers shot a LAW rocket at a fuel tanker as it drove by, and started the bus burning (this is at night, mind you). Desert One's "secret" location wasn't so secret anymore. He called endex, and people got in a hurry. A C130 collided with a helo, and the rest is history. The decision to use RH-53 helos was done for opsec reasons, not to give everyone a "piece of the pie", IIRC. The pilots were Marines as they were accustomed to low level NOE flying with NVDs. Somebody fix me if I'm wrong. They detained the bus. I don't think they set it on fire or anything. The helo hit the C-130. I was incorrect about the bus. It was a fuel truck. The bus was detained, as were the passengers. I read the book "Inside Delta" by Beckwith over 20 years ago, and may have forgotten some details. I'm pretty sure I remember a LAW rocket setting fire to something, which was one of the reasons everybody got nervous about being detected. Again, I may be wrong. |
|
Quoted:
USN RH-53s were flown off the Nimitz because the Iranians were being supplied by the USSR with intel that could have tipped the Iranians off that a rescue mission was in the making-moving different helos around would have signaled clear intent to rescue the hostages (ETA: one of the biggest fears U.S. planners had was the Iranians shifting the hostages into seperate, dispersed locations making any hostage rescue op immpossibly complicated). The RH-53s were used to sweep for mines, and not set up for over-land ops in the event of a dust storm. The RH-53s were flown by USMC pilots (who were qualified CH53 pilots), and two extra aircraft were added to the flight in the event of a breakdown. Well, two had to return to the Nimitz due to problems, and one was inop at Desert One when they landed. Beckwith was down one helo and called off the mission (he blamed the Marine pilots for calling the critical bird deadlined-basically called them cowards and blew up at them. He later recanted). DC wanted him to go anyway, but he said no. Then, one of the Rangers shot a LAW rocket at a bus full of people as it drove by, and started the bus burning (this is at night, mind you). Desert One's "secret" location wasn't so secret anymore. He called endex, and people got in a hurry. A C130 collided with a helo, and the rest is history. The decision to use RH-53 helos was done for opsec reasons, not to give everyone a "piece of the pie", IIRC. The pilots were Marines as they were accustomed to low level NOE flying with NVDs. Somebody fix me if I'm wrong. You're wrong. The RH-53 was really the only helo available that could meet the mission requirements for payload and range. The fact that they could stage that model helo out on a carrier without drawing undue attention was a bonus. The encounter with local civilians was right after the first MC130 landed, none of the helos were even there yet. The LAW was fired at a fuel tanker truck, not a bus, although there was a busload of passengers that was stopped and detained. The helo that was called inoperative was due to a rotor warning that was not correctly interpreted for that particular model of helicopter, and was later understood to have been ok to continue. The main problem with the helos was that they did not correctly understand or interpret the mission parameters, flew at far too low an altitude, then due to the low altitude encountered severe and unforcasted dust storms. They had removed their onboard secure aircraft-to-aircraft comms so were unable to communicate between themselves or to the MC130s; the two helos that turned back did so essentially out of fear or inability to continue in the dust conditions and uncertainty as to what they should do as they had lost sight of the other helos and had no way to communicate with them. If they had been flying at the correct higher altitude they would have had much less severe dust conditions and this would have changed the situation dramatically. In Kyle's book he states that the helo pilots that arrived at Desert One were so shaken by the flight that he doubted their ability to continue on the mission. In Haney's book, he states that Delta believed among themselves that they would lose some portion of the helos in the exfil after the rescue and planned for that eventuality, so it's no surprise that being three short on helos they chose not to proceed. Col. Beckwith had scrubbed the mission and the helos were in the process of being refueled to return to the carrier when the accident occurred. The helos were completely blacked out on incoming or outgoing communications during their flight from the carrier to Desert One due to their decision to remove their secure radios; this turned out to be a real problem and probably doomed the operation. The MC130s had no way to warn them of the weather situation or correct their altitude misconception. Quoted:
I always understood that a C-130 taking off hit a helo on the ground, not the other way around like the above article states... Incorrect, the MC130 was stationary, the helo was maneuvering either into or out of position (I can't remember) for refueling behind the MC130. Quoted:
IIRC, the Navy (and Marine ?) pilots had very limited experience flying with NODs. NODs were not common at that time and all of the aircraft operations had to develop NOD techniques and train with them. In Kyle's book he recounts the tremendous difficulty in just obtaining enough NODs to equip the actual operation, in training they only had a few and had to switch off. Quoted:
Leaving - even bringing - the CMI was inexcusable, but I am not sure if you can blame the bureaucrats for the skill of the pilots. Our country simply did not maintain the type of aviation capacity required for such missions. Possibly some salty Army Vietnam vet pilots could have done better, but there was no guarantee. As you mention, 160th SOAR was a product of that fuckup, as was a lot of current joint special ops doctrine / capacity. There were Vietnam vet Air Force search and rescue helo pilots available for the mission. A JCS level decision was made to keep the Navy pilots in the mission, despite uncertainty about their performance in rehearsals. They did make a late change to include some Marine pilots and IIRC they were flying as one Navy, one Marine pilot per helo. The helo aircrews were just too far out of their element in a special operations environment, and made too many bad decisions. |
|
Quoted:
Eagle Claw expanded into an un-manageable nightmare. all 3 authors who were actually present: beckwith (assault force commander), haney (delta assaulter), and especially kyle (desert one site commander) vociferously disagree with this. while haney's view was operationally limited, both beckwith and kyle were directly involved in planning from day 1. according to kyle, the problem was not management, but the helicopter element. beckwith agrees. due to bad procurement and low maintenance budgets, suitable airframes were rare and difficult to keep airworthy under operational strictures (disguising the helo deployment as a carrierborne minelaying exercise). the "jointness" issue also created problems––it was decreed early on that navy/marine pilots would fly the mission even though they were not trained for it, as opposed to AF veterans who were highly experienced in specwar and low level night operations. finally, there was the problem of the haboob––the helos flew a nap-of-the-earth profile to avoid radar, even though it had been determined that there was little if any threat of detection along the ingress corridor (the 130s flew at 4000-5000' AGL). according to kyle, the 130s at higher altitude had no problem whatsoever with the dust storm, while the helo pilots (operating on faulty assumptions), had a miserable experience that would have been prevented had they simply climbed to what had already been determined to be a safe altitude. in addition, the helo pilots chose not to install secure UHF on their aircraft, so they could not coordinate once visibility fell to almost zero. according to the commanders, the problem was simply a lack of flyable helicopters. both kyle and beckwith felt that, had more helicopters been available, the mission would have been successful even given the shortcomings of the navy/marine pilots. (not a shot at either service––the pilots themselves simply did not have the skillset required for that kind of mission). i wasn't there, but the guys who were said that management was not a problem. incidentally, anyone who is interested in eagle claw should read "the guts to try" by james kyle. it deals strictly with the air operations (so no cool delta stuff), and is purely reportage. kyle only offers his opinions in the appendix/afterword. a really fascinating read. and to the OP, i believe 8 bodies were left. |
|
Quoted:
in addition, the helo pilots chose not to install secure UHF on their aircraft, so they could not coordinate once visibility fell to almost zero. According to Kyle's book, they removed the radios that were already installed on the aircraft - an active decision to forgo communications capability. |
|
Quoted:
Quoted:
I always understood that a C-130 taking off hit a helo on the ground, not the other way around like the above article states... Incorrect, the MC130 was stationary, the helo was maneuvering either into or out of position (I can't remember) for refueling behind the MC130. lol––i should have read the whole thread––your post was more comprehensive than mine. the helo was ground taxiing out of position behind (IIRC) 130 #4, in preperation for egress after the abort. can't remember if it was an EC or MC (both were used as refuellers). |
|
Quoted:
Quoted:
in addition, the helo pilots chose not to install secure UHF on their aircraft, so they could not coordinate once visibility fell to almost zero. According to Kyle's book, they removed the radios that were already installed on the aircraft - an active decision to forgo communications capability. wow! i had forgotten that. |
|
Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
What did the bereaucrats do? Insisted that Navy helo pilots, who's prior experience and training was in naval minesweeping operations, be used for this long range special operations mission, instead of available Air Force pilots who had extensive Vietnam combat experience in long range missions for search and rescue and special operations. All of the bodies were abandoned in the burning aircraft, as there was simply no way to recover them on scene. They had no firefighting capability and were desperately short on fuel & darkness to exfil as it was. Helos were abandoned by the Navy crews, sitting in place with their engines running. The helo crews unfortunately also brought along all their classified mission documents and briefing materials as they claimed that they didn't have a secure place on the launch carrier to store them, all that info which included detailed information on intelligence sources (like Delta's on the ground pre-raid recon and support team and local contacts) within Iran fell into Iranian hands as it was just left in the helos when the crews abandoned them. I would recommend the book The Guts to Try by Colonel James Kyle who was an AF planner for the operation as well as the AF on-scene commander for lots of good info on Operation Eagle Claw. The helicopter problems with this operation were the genesis of the 160th SOAR. Leaving - even bringing - the CMI was inexcusable, but I am not sure if you can blame the bureaucrats for the skill of the pilots. Our country simply did not maintain the type of aviation capacity required for such missions. Possibly some salty Army Vietnam vet pilots could have done better, but there was no guarantee. As you mention, 160th SOAR was a product of that fuckup, as was a lot of current joint special ops doctrine / capacity. kyle does offer some commentary on this––he had an extensive network of army/AF pilots who had enormous amounts of experience in exactly these kinds of missions, but was denied permission to use them due to OPSEC issues. he does note that they were not trained in the naval variant of the -53, but one would think that learning a sister aircraft would be easier than learning a completely new and extremely difficult mission. |
|
Quoted:
What did the bereaucrats do? They stayed at a Holiday Express and woke up with the belief that they knew Special Operations tactics better then those who actually did. Simple. For all that went wrong....a lot of good came from it. It truly opened the eyes of those in charge and allowed a full scope development and funding of USSOCOM. |
|
Quoted: They blew up the truck fairly early in the mission.Then, one of the Rangers shot a LAW rocket at a fuel tanker as it drove by, and started it burning (this is at night, mind you). Desert One's "secret" location wasn't so secret anymore. He called endex, and people got in a hurry. A C130 collided with a helo, and the rest is history. Somebody fix me if I'm wrong. Here's a good narrative by Mark Bowden. |