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AR15.COM
7/31/2009 7:24:32 AM EDT
http://www.h-online.com/security/Bootkit-bypasses-hard-disk-encryption––/news/113884





 
 Bootkit bypasses hard disk encryption







At the Black Hat security conference, Austrian IT security specialist Peter Kleissner presented a bootkit called Stoned
which is capable of bypassing the TrueCrypt partition and system
encryption. A bootkit combines a rootkit with the ability to modify a
PC's Master Boot Record, enabling the malware to be activated even
before the operating system is started.




Available as source code, Kleissner's bootkit can infect any
currently available 32-bit variety of Windows from Windows 2000 to
Windows Vista and the Windows 7 release candidate. Stoned injects
itself into the Master Boot Record (MBR), a record which remains
unencrypted even if the hard disk itself is fully encrypted. During
startup, the BIOS first calls the bootkit, which in turn starts the
TrueCrypt boot loader. Kleissner says that he neither modified any
hooks, nor the boot loader, itself to bypass the TrueCrypt encryption
mechanism. The bootkit rather uses a "double forward" to redirect I/O
interrupt 13h, which allows it to insert itself between the Windows
calls and TrueCrypt. Kleissner tailored the bootkit for TrueCrypt using
the freely available TrueCrypt source code.





















Once the operating system has been loaded, Stoned can get to work and install malware, such as a banking trojan, in the system. Peter Kleissner,
who is only 18 years old, has also included several plug-ins, for
example a boot password cracker and a routine for infecting the BIOS.
The framework layout of Stoned allows other programmers to develop
their own plug-ins for the bootkit. Kleissner thinks that Stoned could
also be of interest to investigation agencies, for example for
developing a federal trojan.




Once installed, Stoned cannot be detected with traditional
anti-virus software because no modifications of Windows components take
place in memory, says Kleissner. Stoned runs in parallel with the
actual Windows kernel. Even an anti-virus function in the BIOS can't
stop the bootkit, as modern Windows versions modify the MBR without
referring to the BIOS.




However, administrator privileges or physical access to a system are
required for an infection. At present, only machines running the
traditional BIOS are vulnerable. The attack is unsuccessful when the
BIOS successor the Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI)
is at work on the motherboard. The most effective protection appears to
be encrypting the entire hard disk with software that is based on the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM).




For instance, using Windows' own BitLocker encryption mechanism is
said to be a reliable antidote, because an infected MBR's hash value no
longer corresponds to the hash value stored in the TPM, prompting the
TPM to abort the boot process. Kleissner didn't have an answer to the
question whether a hardware-encrypted hard disk is capable of
preventing an infection.




(Uli Ries)


7/31/2009 7:29:47 AM EDT
[#1]
WOW just WOW! I knew some one would figure a way around it.. Lets just hope the feds dont get there hands on it..
7/31/2009 7:33:32 AM EDT
[#2]
Quoted:
WOW just WOW! I knew some one would figure a way around it.. Lets just hope the feds dont get there hands on it..


TrueCrypt is OpenSource, so a fix for this will be released *very* soon.

Edit:  Hmm, may be more tricky than that, after re-reading the article.
7/31/2009 7:34:32 AM EDT
[#3]
Quoted:
WOW just WOW! I knew some one would figure a way around it.. Lets just hope the feds dont get there hands on it..


I'm sure the NSA just now heard about this, too!
7/31/2009 7:37:37 AM EDT
[#4]
This was mentioned as a theoretical security threat in Truecrypt's documentation for years. I've always assumed that law enforcement and intelligence agencies have programs that do this already. A way around this is to boot from the TC rescue CD instead of the hard disk's MBR, but if you've got an intelligence agency using malware to spy on you I'd think you have bigger worries.
7/31/2009 7:37:42 AM EDT
[#5]
Quoted:
Quoted:
WOW just WOW! I knew some one would figure a way around it.. Lets just hope the feds dont get there hands on it..


TrueCrypt is OpenSource, so a fix for this will be released *very* soon.

Edit:  Hmm, may be more tricky than that, after re-reading the article.


ya sounds like the only way to fix it using TPM for now..
7/31/2009 7:41:28 AM EDT
[#6]
There's nothing a man can make, that another man can't break.  It just depends on how much time, effort and money that man wants to put into breaking it.
7/31/2009 7:59:44 AM EDT
[#7]
‘administrator privileges or physical access to a system are required for an infection’

If your opponent has these, you’re already compromised.

BSW
7/31/2009 8:02:24 AM EDT
[#8]


I encrypt a logical volume on my primary disk. Would this bootkit defeat that as well, or is it just another rootkit at that point?
7/31/2009 8:04:36 AM EDT
[#9]



Quoted:


‘administrator privileges or physical access to a system are required for an infection’



If your opponent has these, you’re already compromised.



BSW



I was going to say. If someone already has those, it doesn't matter if you are using encryption or not. The person most likely to have both of those is the administrator installing TrueCrypt




 
7/31/2009 8:10:08 AM EDT
[#10]
This is just an exploit that lets you boot a protected system partition, correct?

If I have a thumbdrive or USB hard drive that's not a boot device, but I do have full disk encryption, I assume this does not make it vulnerable to someone getting at the data without knowing my decryption password.
7/31/2009 8:12:15 AM EDT
[#11]
PGP
7/31/2009 8:22:23 AM EDT
[#12]




Quoted:

PGP




That's pretty cryptic....
7/31/2009 8:25:08 AM EDT
[#13]
Quoted:
This is just an exploit that lets you boot a protected system partition, correct?

If I have a thumbdrive or USB hard drive that's not a boot device, but I do have full disk encryption, I assume this does not make it vulnerable to someone getting at the data without knowing my decryption password.


I'd also appreciate an answer, as only my data drives are encrypted.  I don't care if folks know I'm running SolidWorks, Quickbooks, TurboTax, etc.  I do care if they can access the files generated by these applications.
7/31/2009 8:31:57 AM EDT
[#14]




Quoted:





Quoted:

PGP




That's pretty cryptic....


They make pretty good stuff.

7/31/2009 8:34:12 AM EDT
[#15]
Whole disk encryption is to keep people who don't have any business using the drive from using the drive in the case it gets stolen or subpoenaed.  TrueCrypt never has had nor claims to have had the ability to protect against a compromised or easily compromise operating system.

Though interesting, this "hack" isn't any more sophisticated than any other keylogger or security problem with the OS (which TrueCrypt doesn't protect against in the first place) AND it requires physical access.  (And any IT guy worth his salt knows physical access = fucked)  

If you cannot trust the OS or hardware, do not mount your encrypted volumes.  If someone has had physical access, you cannot trust the OS or the hardware.

Non story.
7/31/2009 8:36:58 AM EDT
[#16]
Quoted:
This is just an exploit that lets you boot a protected system partition, correct?

If I have a thumbdrive or USB hard drive that's not a boot device, but I do have full disk encryption, I assume this does not make it vulnerable to someone getting at the data without knowing my decryption password.


I believe this is the case, as you'd only need the MBR available unencrypted on your boot device.  

This really isn't anything new, MBR virii have been around forever, this is just one that targets truecrypt directly.

Any decent anti-virus software will detect and prevent unauthorized changes to the MBR.

7/31/2009 8:37:02 AM EDT
[#17]
Quoted:
This is just an exploit that lets you boot a protected system partition, correct?

No.  It loads and runs in memory before the user starts TrueCrypt and then watches from there.

If I have a thumbdrive or USB hard drive that's not a boot device, but I do have full disk encryption, I assume this does not make it vulnerable to someone getting at the data without knowing my decryption password.

This won't do anything to that, and wouldn't be useful in that case, they would just install a root kit in the unencrypted partition, wait for you to boot and mount the encrypted drive and get data from there.



7/31/2009 8:46:56 AM EDT
[#18]
How does it decrypt the data without the key?
7/31/2009 8:49:01 AM EDT
[#19]
meh,

just use TC containers instead if you are worried
7/31/2009 8:50:21 AM EDT
[#20]
tag for later reading
7/31/2009 8:53:15 AM EDT
[#21]
screw truecrypt

I have a container that I can no longer open because it somehow fucked up the password.

Yes I have the password right, I've been using it for a year. It just quit working.
7/31/2009 8:56:10 AM EDT
[#22]



Quoted:


This is just an exploit that lets you boot a protected system partition, correct?



If I have a thumbdrive or USB hard drive that's not a boot device, but I do have full disk encryption, I assume this does not make it vulnerable to someone getting at the data without knowing my decryption password.


Yes, you must boot for the exploit to work.



 
7/31/2009 9:00:55 AM EDT
[#23]
Quoted:
screw truecrypt

I have a container that I can no longer open because it somehow fucked up the password.

Yes I have the password right, I've been using it for a year. It just quit working.


you probably have a bad block on that sector, try and copy the container to another drive. I bet it will error out.  If thats the case then you have to run a program like spinrite to fix the bad block