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As somebody stationed here at Minot AFB, a Minuteman III and BUFF base, I'm interested in knowing more.
I know the Titan II had a much larger warhead where as the Minuteman had smaller MIRVs. Also the Minuteman used solid fuel as its propellant.
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I know Lima X-Ray could chime in this thread with far more insight on the operational side of the system, but what the documentary showed was a glimpse of what I could relate to, even though I worked Minuteman (1986-1988), not Titan. Some observations all these year later:
Checklist, checklist, checklist. On the security side, everything went by checklist. Any time we set foot on a Launch Facility, we not only went by the checklist, we called out the step(s) we were doing to our Flight Security Controller via radio. This was 30 years ago, and I can still recite the beginning of a Sit-7 from memory. SAC missile duty did not encourage independent thought, it wanted strict adherence to performance or task protocols. The Damascus incident appears to be the result of systems being prime for an accident, but none the less it happened due to a maintenance team that chose to use the wrong tool out of convenience. It appears that by the time the incident was actually made known to the Missile Crew (disclosed by the maintenance team) and ran up the chain, they were in a situation that there was no checklist for. I can only imagine the reams of checklists that Missile Crews had. For example we (Security Response Teams) were occasionally sent to sites for a site support system problem that was causing alarms in a Launch Support Building. Once inside, I would get on the PTT phone and the crew would walk us through the checklist they were provided with to relay to us to re-start or test a generator for example. We were only one spoke in the wheel so to speak, but the MCC owned that flight area. It was their overall responsibility, their baby.
In the program, the squadron commander had been there for a few months and had no prior hands on experience with the system he commanded. I believe he commented about the incident being beyond their checklists at the command level. Some squadrons were prime for getting officers command experience. My last squadron commander was a tanker navigator. Not sure how often it happened, but promotions should not just reflect leadership, but prior relevant operational experience as well.
When I look back, it's amazing how much the daily operations of these weapons systems were carried out on the security, maintenance and crew side by A1C's through SSgt's and Lieutenants and Captains that were 19 to probably 25 or 26 years old.