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Posted: 5/9/2019 9:07:28 PM EDT
[#1]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
So was this a bad thing? I guess what I'm trying to say is that it could have been worse. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 9:11:29 PM EDT
[#2]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Well, on the bright side, none of the Chernobyl film footage was filmed in Vertical Video format. I guess what I'm trying to say is that it could have been worse. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
So was this a bad thing? I guess what I'm trying to say is that it could have been worse. 
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Posted: 5/9/2019 9:13:33 PM EDT
[#3]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Well, on the bright side, none of the Chernobyl film footage was filmed in Vertical Video format. I guess what I'm trying to say is that it could have been worse. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
So was this a bad thing? I guess what I'm trying to say is that it could have been worse. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 9:19:24 PM EDT
[#4]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Are you saying that In Soviet Russia, people who filmed vertically were made horizontal? Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
So was this a bad thing? I guess what I'm trying to say is that it could have been worse. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 9:27:48 PM EDT
[#5]
The scene where the guy leaned over the edge and looked at the core and they showed the core freaked me out.
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Posted: 5/9/2019 9:36:56 PM EDT
[#6]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
The scene where the guy leaned over the edge and looked at the core and they showed the core freaked me out. Those two guys in the water, one of them said “we did nothing wrong” and the other one replied “but we did”. What did they do wrong and why were they saying two opposing things? Secondly; how did those two guys “save Europe” by turning the valves and draining the water out? |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 9:51:08 PM EDT
[#7]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
That scene and the guys wading down in the water to turn the valves freaked me out. A couple questions that may have been touched on already, if so I apologize: Those two guys in the water, one of them said “we did nothing wrong” and the other one replied “but we did”. What did they do wrong and why were they saying two opposing things? Secondly; how did those two guys “save Europe” by turning the valves and draining the water out? |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 9:57:57 PM EDT
[#8]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Somehow, somewhere, this has got to be Trump’s fault. 
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:01:37 PM EDT
[#9]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
I'm just reading up on it on World Nuclear Association's site right now, covering the sequence of events. Quote HistoryQuoted:
I'm just reading up on it on World Nuclear Association's site right now, covering the sequence of events. https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurewhy-insag-has-still-got-it-wrong/ written by Anatoly Dyatlov, someone who didn't come across very well in the dramatic television presentation, but who seems to have some insight into the situation. He makes a case for the primary cause of the accident being the graphite-tipped control rods which were inserted into the reactor after the shutdown button was pressed. It is now clear that we had been on the verge of disaster several times before. Following triggering of the emergency protection, operators had on occasions noticed emergency power overshoot (AZM) and fast rate of power rise (AZS) signals. They should not have been there and they were taken as spurious because they could not be explained. But in reality these were power surges caused by the emergency protection, which were not recorded by the SKFRE (power density physical monitoring system) automatic recorder because of the slow response time of the silver transducers used. AZM and AZS signals were possible because these originated from ionisation chambers with a faster response time. But these unfortunately had no automatic recorder to go with them. Compare with 26 April: at 23 minutes 40 seconds the emergency protection was dropped using a button (AZ-5), and three seconds later the AZM and AZS signals appeared. This, however, is just a nonsense, and in violation of all design norms. The designers made an obvious error in rod design when the rods introduce reactivity of differing signs when moving in a single direction. Immediately after the accident the rods were acknowledged by everyone, including the reactor designers, as no good. But amazingly the designers were supported by the INSAG experts. INSAG-7 (para 5.1): “A particular configuration of control and safety rods was necessary for the positive scram to occur. . .” There are a large number of such “particular configurations”, but the reactivity overshoot occurred solely as a result of the erroneous design of the rods. With a normal design there are no “particular configurations” and cannot be any. I would like to state the following, as a witness to the event: the protection button was pressed in calm circumstances. There is also the evidence of G. Metlenko and A. Kukhar’. Annex I of INSAG-7 says that the commission could find no reasons why the emergency protection rods were dropped. There was actually one reason for dropping the protection rods: a wish to shut down the reactor when work was finished. The situation was similar when it was discovered that the protection introduced positive reactivity. In December 1984 a new rod design was even prepared. There were other proposals too.
All this, however, was determinedly ignored by the Soviet administration, including some of the experts recently advising the IAEA: Yu. Cherkashov, V. Sidorenko and A. Abagyan. And this, to answer a point raised by James Varley (Editor of NEI) in his May 1993 article on INSAG-7, is why there has been so little benefit from the inclusion of senior officials among the INSAG experts, despite the fact that they had access to equipment, computers, details of reactor characteristics etc. In view of the fact that the Soviet nuclear administrators chose to ignore obviously hazardous physical characteristics, both built into the design from the start and identified during operation, the RBMK reactor was condemned to explode. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:04:02 PM EDT
[#10]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
The scene where the guy leaned over the edge and looked at the core and they showed the core freaked me out. Quote HistoryQuoted:
The scene where the guy leaned over the edge and looked at the core and they showed the core freaked me out. Quoted:
That scene and the guys wading down in the water to turn the valves freaked me out. A couple questions that may have been touched on already, if so I apologize: Those two guys in the water, one of them said “we did nothing wrong” and the other one replied “but we did”. What did they do wrong and why were they saying two opposing things? From the perspective of a hapless control room operator, it would be confusing for pressing the "off" button to cause an extreme power surge and an explosion. Secondly; how did those two guys “save Europe” by turning the valves and draining the water out? Something else interesting in one of the previous articles... one of the engineering guys makes the statement that nuclear-grade graphite is almost impossible to burn. So as a point of technical curiosity, that would mean that what was on fire in the core was actually the uranium metal which is known to be combustible in certain circumstances. The evidence seems to be that all of the work and radiation exposure of the helicopters dropping stuff on the core basically just made things worse by causing more physical damage to the structure, and by preventing the core materials from cooling off. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:05:12 PM EDT
[#11]
The scene where the kids were playing in the dust particles like snow was infuriating. The Geiger counter sounds during the credits were creepy as hell.
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:27:53 PM EDT
[#12]
Watching it now. The old guy just gave the citizens should "keep their minds on their labor. Leave matters of the State to the State." This shit's horrifying. It confirms the analogy from family trapped behind the Iron Curtain at the time that you should imagine your life and your entire political system taken over by your United Auto Workers or your SEIU with a dose of nosy neighbors reporting back to the unions.
I read several books about the incident a few years back. The frickin' Soviet elite had the Proles running around believing their shitass nuclear cores were nothing more than a coal-fired power plant. The lax attitude toward nuclear incident safety followed what the Moscow elite wanted from the Ukraine underlings. ETA: The people-on-the-bridge scene wasn't fallout per a book that I read. The bridge had a direct line of sight into the nuclear core. I don't know how you like your roentgens and sieverts. But there's nothing like them straight from the source. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:32:06 PM EDT
[#13]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
That scene and the guys wading down in the water to turn the valves freaked me out. A couple questions that may have been touched on already, if so I apologize: Those two guys in the water, one of them said “we did nothing wrong” and the other one replied “but we did”. What did they do wrong and why were they saying two opposing things? Secondly; how did those two guys “save Europe” by turning the valves and draining the water out? |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:36:37 PM EDT
[#14]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
That link led to this interesting article: https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurewhy-insag-has-still-got-it-wrong/ written by Anatoly Dyatlov, someone who didn't come across very well in the dramatic television presentation, but who seems to have some insight into the situation. He makes a case for the primary cause of the accident being the graphite-tipped control rods which were inserted into the reactor after the shutdown button was pressed. The red text is that Soviet culture at work. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
I'm just reading up on it on World Nuclear Association's site right now, covering the sequence of events. https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurewhy-insag-has-still-got-it-wrong/ written by Anatoly Dyatlov, someone who didn't come across very well in the dramatic television presentation, but who seems to have some insight into the situation. He makes a case for the primary cause of the accident being the graphite-tipped control rods which were inserted into the reactor after the shutdown button was pressed. It is now clear that we had been on the verge of disaster several times before. Following triggering of the emergency protection, operators had on occasions noticed emergency power overshoot (AZM) and fast rate of power rise (AZS) signals. They should not have been there and they were taken as spurious because they could not be explained. But in reality these were power surges caused by the emergency protection, which were not recorded by the SKFRE (power density physical monitoring system) automatic recorder because of the slow response time of the silver transducers used. AZM and AZS signals were possible because these originated from ionisation chambers with a faster response time. But these unfortunately had no automatic recorder to go with them. Compare with 26 April: at 23 minutes 40 seconds the emergency protection was dropped using a button (AZ-5), and three seconds later the AZM and AZS signals appeared. This, however, is just a nonsense, and in violation of all design norms. The designers made an obvious error in rod design when the rods introduce reactivity of differing signs when moving in a single direction. Immediately after the accident the rods were acknowledged by everyone, including the reactor designers, as no good. But amazingly the designers were supported by the INSAG experts. INSAG-7 (para 5.1): “A particular configuration of control and safety rods was necessary for the positive scram to occur. . .” There are a large number of such “particular configurations”, but the reactivity overshoot occurred solely as a result of the erroneous design of the rods. With a normal design there are no “particular configurations” and cannot be any. I would like to state the following, as a witness to the event: the protection button was pressed in calm circumstances. There is also the evidence of G. Metlenko and A. Kukhar’. Annex I of INSAG-7 says that the commission could find no reasons why the emergency protection rods were dropped. There was actually one reason for dropping the protection rods: a wish to shut down the reactor when work was finished. The situation was similar when it was discovered that the protection introduced positive reactivity. In December 1984 a new rod design was even prepared. There were other proposals too.
All this, however, was determinedly ignored by the Soviet administration, including some of the experts recently advising the IAEA: Yu. Cherkashov, V. Sidorenko and A. Abagyan. And this, to answer a point raised by James Varley (Editor of NEI) in his May 1993 article on INSAG-7, is why there has been so little benefit from the inclusion of senior officials among the INSAG experts, despite the fact that they had access to equipment, computers, details of reactor characteristics etc. In view of the fact that the Soviet nuclear administrators chose to ignore obviously hazardous physical characteristics, both built into the design from the start and identified during operation, the RBMK reactor was condemned to explode. Jesus. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:40:03 PM EDT
[#15]
I'm just listening to the show runner podcast. He's talking about the accents. Says they didn't want to do Boris & Natascha, because it can go comic.
Then he says they tried vague east European accents, and said actors act their accents. So they decided they wanted to remove the actors affectations, and so they had everyone use their regular accents. They wanted you to hear them, as they'd hear themselves. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:40:18 PM EDT
[#16]
Poll question:
Which is the biggest disaster you can watch on HBO: -USSR's handling of RBMK shutdown test procedure: or -D&D's handling of Game of Thrones Season 8? 
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:41:36 PM EDT
[#17]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
The scene where the kids were playing in the dust particles like snow was infuriating. The Geiger counter sounds during the credits were creepy as hell. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:43:29 PM EDT
[#18]
Quote HistoryQuoted: The safety control tank..or control safety tank..it seemed to matter. I don't know..you wouldn't use hydrogen in a pressurizer would you? I read somewhere that hydrogen was used as a coolant of some sort..in the turbine? Given that the entire steam loop was exposed to the core would hydrogen provide some benefit over other types of coolant...less susceptible to activation/contamination or something. Yeah...you got me. In a pressurized water reactor, the pressurizer has a steam bubble which is how pressure is controlled in the system. There are heaters and spray (basically a shower head) that are used to either heat up the water in the pressurizer to create or maintain the steam bubble, or spray is used to condense the steam bubble back into water. When shutdown, a nitrogen over-pressure is often maintained. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:47:25 PM EDT
[#19]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
I'm just having a hard time wrapping my mind around the "calm conditions" of the test Dyatlov was supervising: jerking the core through wild power swings, non-equilibrium xenon, triggering a turbine trip, maintaining (or thinking they were maintaining) reactor power during this loss of load / Qout, failing to maintain quasi-equilibrium conditions in the core even based on the very few parameters they were able to monitor in real time … and then "calmly" scramming the reactor thinking this was a job well done, and achieving usable data for engineering based upon the record interval of their data collection units and wild swings of core conditions? Jesus. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
I'm just reading up on it on World Nuclear Association's site right now, covering the sequence of events. https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurewhy-insag-has-still-got-it-wrong/ written by Anatoly Dyatlov, someone who didn't come across very well in the dramatic television presentation, but who seems to have some insight into the situation. He makes a case for the primary cause of the accident being the graphite-tipped control rods which were inserted into the reactor after the shutdown button was pressed. It is now clear that we had been on the verge of disaster several times before. Following triggering of the emergency protection, operators had on occasions noticed emergency power overshoot (AZM) and fast rate of power rise (AZS) signals. They should not have been there and they were taken as spurious because they could not be explained. But in reality these were power surges caused by the emergency protection, which were not recorded by the SKFRE (power density physical monitoring system) automatic recorder because of the slow response time of the silver transducers used. AZM and AZS signals were possible because these originated from ionisation chambers with a faster response time. But these unfortunately had no automatic recorder to go with them. Compare with 26 April: at 23 minutes 40 seconds the emergency protection was dropped using a button (AZ-5), and three seconds later the AZM and AZS signals appeared. This, however, is just a nonsense, and in violation of all design norms. The designers made an obvious error in rod design when the rods introduce reactivity of differing signs when moving in a single direction. Immediately after the accident the rods were acknowledged by everyone, including the reactor designers, as no good. But amazingly the designers were supported by the INSAG experts. INSAG-7 (para 5.1): “A particular configuration of control and safety rods was necessary for the positive scram to occur. . .” There are a large number of such “particular configurations”, but the reactivity overshoot occurred solely as a result of the erroneous design of the rods. With a normal design there are no “particular configurations” and cannot be any. I would like to state the following, as a witness to the event: the protection button was pressed in calm circumstances. There is also the evidence of G. Metlenko and A. Kukhar’. Annex I of INSAG-7 says that the commission could find no reasons why the emergency protection rods were dropped. There was actually one reason for dropping the protection rods: a wish to shut down the reactor when work was finished. The situation was similar when it was discovered that the protection introduced positive reactivity. In December 1984 a new rod design was even prepared. There were other proposals too.
All this, however, was determinedly ignored by the Soviet administration, including some of the experts recently advising the IAEA: Yu. Cherkashov, V. Sidorenko and A. Abagyan. And this, to answer a point raised by James Varley (Editor of NEI) in his May 1993 article on INSAG-7, is why there has been so little benefit from the inclusion of senior officials among the INSAG experts, despite the fact that they had access to equipment, computers, details of reactor characteristics etc. In view of the fact that the Soviet nuclear administrators chose to ignore obviously hazardous physical characteristics, both built into the design from the start and identified during operation, the RBMK reactor was condemned to explode. Jesus. The conditions of the core didn't matter much to the test as they were testing a voltage regulator from the turbine or something. They just needed the turbine to run and then shut down the reactor. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:48:26 PM EDT
[#20]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
That scene and the guys wading down in the water to turn the valves freaked me out. A couple questions that may have been touched on already, if so I apologize: Those two guys in the water, one of them said "we did nothing wrong" and the other one replied "but we did". What did they do wrong and why were they saying two opposing things? Secondly; how did those two guys "save Europe" by turning the valves and draining the water out? But there were men at the controls that day that knew what they were doing was wrong. They could have stopped, but in reality they probably would have just been threatened and intimidated into performing, dismissed from their positions until Dyaltov found someone who would follow his orders, or hell he probably would have done it himself if he had to. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 10:49:14 PM EDT
[#21]
watched it a few nights ago and I enjoyed it.
I have always been fascinated with the Chernobyl disaster. As others have said, It kind of shocked me that they portrayed communism in such a bad way. Also, the accents didn't bother me one bit. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 11:02:18 PM EDT
[#22]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Poll question: Which is the biggest disaster you can watch on HBO: -USSR's handling of RBMK shutdown test procedure: or -D&D's handling of Game of Thrones Season 8? |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 11:05:18 PM EDT
[#23]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
They should have added the ionization glow to the special effects. They followed the test protocol that they were given, and did what seemed like normal control of the reactor. In the normal process of finishing up the test they pressed the shutdown button to shut down the reactor. The temporary increased reactivity caused by the rod design pushed the reactor from its unstable state into a self-destructive power excursion. From the perspective of a hapless control room operator, it would be confusing for pressing the "off" button to cause an extreme power surge and an explosion. The hypothesis at the time was that if the hot core material reached the big pools of water, that it would trigger a massive steam explosion sending even more radioactive material into the air. The threat seems a bit overstated, I mean, they had a massive release of radioactive material, but if it was 2 or 3 times as large, wouldn't have made much difference in the grand scheme of things. Something else interesting in one of the previous articles... one of the engineering guys makes the statement that nuclear-grade graphite is almost impossible to burn. So as a point of technical curiosity, that would mean that what was on fire in the core was actually the uranium metal which is known to be combustible in certain circumstances. The evidence seems to be that all of the work and radiation exposure of the helicopters dropping stuff on the core basically just made things worse by causing more physical damage to the structure, and by preventing the core materials from cooling off. Think about it this way: they could BARELY contain the current situation of one fucked up reactor in order to prevent hundred's of miles of western Europe to the North/Northwest from becoming a radioactive wasteland. Literally. I mean, if you could even consider what they did "containing the situation". The area was a radioactive cesspool limiting most subsequent liquidators' total actual exposure and work time on the site to 2 minutes or so. It took the cumulative efforts of thousands (many of which eventually still died) to "contain" the one reactor. Now pretend there's a groundwater explosion that ruptures the other reactors and only makes it 2-3 times worse... at that point would they be able to extinguish those burning exposed cores too? Can humans even get close anymore? Or is it likely they're unable to even physically bring people into the area to contain anything? So instead of one poorly contained fucked up reactor, you get 3-4 uncontained burning reactors with no alternative but to let them burn themselves out over the course of 2-3 months until all the graphite is consumed and thousands of tons of high-level nuclear ash is distributed across the region. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 11:07:35 PM EDT
[#24]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Hydrogen is used as coolant for the electrical generator. It is also used in volume control tanks as an over-pressure on the water that is being injected into the reactor coolant system. It's used to scavenge oxygen since it combines with oxygen, thus minimizing oxidation (rust). Hydrogen fires are something the site fire brigade trains for. In a pressurized water reactor, the pressurizer has a steam bubble which is how pressure is controlled in the system. There are heaters and spray (basically a shower head) that are used to either heat up the water in the pressurizer to create or maintain the steam bubble, or spray is used to condense the steam bubble back into water. When shutdown, a nitrogen over-pressure is often maintained. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 11:30:03 PM EDT
[#25]
Anyone want an unused graphite block for an RBMK-1000 core?
https://www.ebay.com/itm/original-Soviet-USSR-Chernobyl-nuclear-reactor-RBMK-1000-core-graphite-block-/233117411654 |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 11:35:24 PM EDT
[#26]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
I understand your point, but I think his point is just that despite the challenges of running the test, that there was no obvious emergency or situation of distress before the shutdown button was pressed. I don't believe SCRAMing is a usual practice with most reactors, but apparently it was a usual way to affect a shutdown for them. The conditions of the core didn't matter much to the test as they were testing a voltage regulator from the turbine or something. They just needed the turbine to run and then shut down the reactor. This wasn't the first time the test was run. It was actually conducted during the startup of the reactor..and it didn't work. So they made further upgrades and tested again. I'm thinking the condition of the reactor would be critical to evaluating the success of the test, power level dictates water flow I would guess. Water flow dictates how much power you need for that 50 seconds, and how much steam you can make. In order to get valid data I would want that reactor as stable as possible. Dyatlov isn't wrong about the control rods but he isn't telling the whole story. Graphite tipped control rods were a factor, maybe a huge factor but they didn't make a reactor rated at 1000MW thermal spike to 30000 or 100000MW all by themselves. The only RBMK in history to explode was the one dyatlov was operating. That doesn't strike me as inevitable. As far as I have read RBMK reactors still have a graphite tipped section. This is one of those situations where so many things had to be just a certain way. Remove any of the 5 or 6 major factors involved and Chernobyl is still just some town in Ukraine that most of us have never heard of. |
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Posted: 5/9/2019 11:58:14 PM EDT
[#27]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
watched it a few nights ago and I enjoyed it. I have always been fascinated with the Chernobyl disaster. As others have said, It kind of shocked me that they portrayed communism in such a bad way. Also, the accents didn't bother me one bit. Splitting hairs socialism/communism |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 12:39:58 AM EDT
[#28]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Anyone want an unused graphite block for an RBMK-1000 core? https://www.ebay.com/itm/original-Soviet-USSR-Chernobyl-nuclear-reactor-RBMK-1000-core-graphite-block-/233117411654  Translation: Click To View Spoiler |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 12:43:30 AM EDT
[#29]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
THATS CALLED NUT GRAPHITE, RBMK REACTORS USE BIG GRAPHITE BLOCKS. THATS THE SIZE YOU USE IN A KITCHEN REACTOR. I USE BIGGER GRAPHITE MODERATOR BLOCKS THEN THAT IN OUR PARLOR REACTOR. OF COURSE THEY MIGHT HAVE HAD BIG GRAPHITE BLOCKS AND CRACKED THEM INTO 4 PIECES FOR PROFIT. THE RBMK REACTORS USE EGG (BIG) GRAPHITE. GRAPHITE BLOCKS ARE SOLD BY THE SIZE RICE,BUCK,PEA,NUT,STOVE, AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST EGG. I LIVE RIGHT IN THE HEART OF THE PRIPYAT EXCLUSION ZONE AND ALWAYS HAVE. IF I WASNT SO TIRED I WOULD GO TAKE PICTURES OF BUCK BLOCKS (I USE THOSE IN A BREEDER) AND SOME STOVE GRAPHITE (FOR THE PARLOR REACTOR). Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Anyone want an unused graphite block for an RBMK-1000 core? https://www.ebay.com/itm/original-Soviet-USSR-Chernobyl-nuclear-reactor-RBMK-1000-core-graphite-block-/233117411654 https://i.ebayimg.com/images/g/VLsAAOSwWI5cRfOC/s-l1600.jpg
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Posted: 5/10/2019 12:55:44 AM EDT
[#30]
Great show so far.
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Posted: 5/10/2019 1:03:42 AM EDT
[#31]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Did you notice that the political officer called it “Socialism”? Splitting hairs socialism/communism |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 2:45:27 AM EDT
[#32]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
How many of you were stationed in Europe when it happened? I was in Northern Germany and things were fucked up for a while. First we went on the highest level of alert, we had all the Bradleys, M1's, Howitzers, everything was loaded for war and lined up at the front gate of our base. I don't remember how long we were on alert but it was a long time. We took turns cycling through the chow hall and sleeping in our vehicles. Rumors were flying that there had been a nuke. Finally when things calmed down and we came off of alert then we had to go through the bullshit of no fresh milk, eggs, veggies, etc. The commissary and local stores had bare shelves except for boxed and canned goods. Several days later we went fishing and got caught in a strong rain storm. We had no rain coats nor umbrellas and got drenched. The next morning we got very sick, high fever, throwing up etc. It lasted for several days but we fully recovered. My friend recovered much faster but he took some iodine, as his mom told him (few drops of iodine tincture of a small sugar cube). I didn't take any. We assumed it was a flu but who knows. There were rumors that radiation meters were maxing out at the Tula Arms Factory during that storm. The place we went fishing to, was less than a mile from that factory. Everything was kept in secrecy. There were rumors (later confirmed) that some fallout covered a large area, about 15 miles south of where we lived. All milk and produce from that area was banned for consumption. It was probably stolen and sold anyway, No one had radiation meters back then. I managed to buy a low range, Gamma only meter, several years later. I still have it here with me. It still works very well but it does bring some bad memories. BTW, you can have a guided tour of Pripyat and the vicinity of the power station. They won't take you anywhere near the hot spots but you can find an illegal guide who will smuggle you into the area and show you anything you want to see. There are tons of Youtube videos about it. |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 3:16:06 AM EDT
[#33]
The core shot was lovecraftian.
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Posted: 5/10/2019 4:45:38 AM EDT
[#34]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
The scene where the guy leaned over the edge and looked at the core and they showed the core freaked me out.  Attached FileYeah that gave me chills. 
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Posted: 5/10/2019 4:52:38 AM EDT
[#35]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
That link led to this interesting article: https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurewhy-insag-has-still-got-it-wrong/ written by Anatoly Dyatlov, someone who didn't come across very well in the dramatic television presentation, but who seems to have some insight into the situation. He makes a case for the primary cause of the accident being the graphite-tipped control rods which were inserted into the reactor after the shutdown button was pressed. The red text is that Soviet culture at work. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
I'm just reading up on it on World Nuclear Association's site right now, covering the sequence of events. https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurewhy-insag-has-still-got-it-wrong/ written by Anatoly Dyatlov, someone who didn't come across very well in the dramatic television presentation, but who seems to have some insight into the situation. He makes a case for the primary cause of the accident being the graphite-tipped control rods which were inserted into the reactor after the shutdown button was pressed. It is now clear that we had been on the verge of disaster several times before. Following triggering of the emergency protection, operators had on occasions noticed emergency power overshoot (AZM) and fast rate of power rise (AZS) signals. They should not have been there and they were taken as spurious because they could not be explained. But in reality these were power surges caused by the emergency protection, which were not recorded by the SKFRE (power density physical monitoring system) automatic recorder because of the slow response time of the silver transducers used. AZM and AZS signals were possible because these originated from ionisation chambers with a faster response time. But these unfortunately had no automatic recorder to go with them. Compare with 26 April: at 23 minutes 40 seconds the emergency protection was dropped using a button (AZ-5), and three seconds later the AZM and AZS signals appeared. This, however, is just a nonsense, and in violation of all design norms. The designers made an obvious error in rod design when the rods introduce reactivity of differing signs when moving in a single direction. Immediately after the accident the rods were acknowledged by everyone, including the reactor designers, as no good. But amazingly the designers were supported by the INSAG experts. INSAG-7 (para 5.1): “A particular configuration of control and safety rods was necessary for the positive scram to occur. . .” There are a large number of such “particular configurations”, but the reactivity overshoot occurred solely as a result of the erroneous design of the rods. With a normal design there are no “particular configurations” and cannot be any. I would like to state the following, as a witness to the event: the protection button was pressed in calm circumstances. There is also the evidence of G. Metlenko and A. Kukhar’. Annex I of INSAG-7 says that the commission could find no reasons why the emergency protection rods were dropped. There was actually one reason for dropping the protection rods: a wish to shut down the reactor when work was finished. The situation was similar when it was discovered that the protection introduced positive reactivity. In December 1984 a new rod design was even prepared. There were other proposals too.
All this, however, was determinedly ignored by the Soviet administration, including some of the experts recently advising the IAEA: Yu. Cherkashov, V. Sidorenko and A. Abagyan. And this, to answer a point raised by James Varley (Editor of NEI) in his May 1993 article on INSAG-7, is why there has been so little benefit from the inclusion of senior officials among the INSAG experts, despite the fact that they had access to equipment, computers, details of reactor characteristics etc. In view of the fact that the Soviet nuclear administrators chose to ignore obviously hazardous physical characteristics, both built into the design from the start and identified during operation, the RBMK reactor was condemned to explode. He still ran the test at 200Mw when he shouldn’t have gone below 700Mw It was a poor design but he exceeded limits. |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 6:19:45 AM EDT
[#36]
A question for those who are hip with the nuclear stuff.
How does the fallout from Chernobyl compare to the fallout from a Nuclear Weapon? Was the contamination better or worse then if the same area had been hit by say 475kt W88? |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 7:12:44 AM EDT
[#37]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Was the contamination better or worse then if the same area had been hit by say 475kt W88? |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 7:35:14 AM EDT
[#38]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
A question for those who are hip with the nuclear stuff. How does the fallout from Chernobyl compare to the fallout from a Nuclear Weapon? Was the contamination better or worse then if the same area had been hit by say 475kt W88? |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 8:51:19 AM EDT
[#39]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
A question for those who are hip with the nuclear stuff. How does the fallout from Chernobyl compare to the fallout from a Nuclear Weapon? Was the contamination better or worse then if the same area had been hit by say 475kt W88? With a nuclear weapon, the only fallout that stays "hot" long term are the particles of radioactive material from the weapon. The idea that an area that is "nuked" being radioactive for a thousand years is liberal bullshit. 99+ percent of the fallout from a nuclear weapon is from the dirt, buildings, plant and animal matter etc. that is vaporized during the detonation, the stuff that forms the mushroom cloud. This material will initially be highly radioactive, but the level of radioactivity quickly falls to half, then half again, and again, and so on. Evidence of this is the fact that Hiroshima and Nagasaki are livable today. And in fact that there are people alive today who were "nuked" at these sites 70+ years ago. The nasty stuff is the particles of the fissile material, the radioactive element that makes the bomb a nuke. In the Fat Man and Little Boy bombs the radioactive element was about the size of a softball. This is the material that will stay "hot" for a thousand years. In the Chernobyl or Fukushima reactors, a very large amount of radioactive material was released, and this is the thousand years bad stuff. |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 9:44:39 AM EDT
[#40]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
The scene where the kids were playing in the dust particles like snow was infuriating. The Geiger counter sounds during the credits were creepy as hell. |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 10:16:26 AM EDT
[#41]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
A question for those who are hip with the nuclear stuff. How does the fallout from Chernobyl compare to the fallout from a Nuclear Weapon? Was the contamination better or worse then if the same area had been hit by say 475kt W88? |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 10:21:05 AM EDT
[#42]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Chernobyl was by far worse. You had an open core, on fire, pumping out tons and tons of contaminants in the air. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
A question for those who are hip with the nuclear stuff. How does the fallout from Chernobyl compare to the fallout from a Nuclear Weapon? Was the contamination better or worse then if the same area had been hit by say 475kt W88? And 3 reactors at Chernobyl Power plant were operated 14 years after the incident until 2000 |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 10:24:46 AM EDT
[#43]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
It was sand because they were in a park Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
The scene where the kids were playing in the dust particles like snow was infuriating. The Geiger counter sounds during the credits were creepy as hell. 
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Posted: 5/10/2019 10:28:47 AM EDT
[#44]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
It was sand falling from the sky? Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
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The scene where the kids were playing in the dust particles like snow was infuriating. The Geiger counter sounds during the credits were creepy as hell. They even said so |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 10:41:41 AM EDT
[#45]
I watched it last night after seeing the first page of this thread, I really liked it. The wind blew the door open toward the end and I almost had a heart attack.
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Posted: 5/10/2019 11:06:07 AM EDT
[#46]
Before:
 Diagram after: 
Model after: 
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Posted: 5/10/2019 12:46:32 PM EDT
[#47]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Before: https://graphene.limited/_Media/rbmk-1000_at-_chernobyl_med_hr.jpeg Diagram after: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D5_gZ9fXsAARycG.jpg Model after: http://i.imgur.com/k3NfnWm.jpg Where were the guys cranking the water valve by hand? |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 12:52:46 PM EDT
[#48]
is all the spaghetti the control rods?
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Posted: 5/10/2019 12:59:01 PM EDT
[#49]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Very Cool!! Where were the guys cranking the water valve by hand? |
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Posted: 5/10/2019 1:00:25 PM EDT
[#50]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
is all the spaghetti the control rods? 
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