User Panel
Quoted: Then why don't they design the whole plane that way? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Considering how hard it hit, I'd say there is a fairly slim chance of the former. And no chance of the latter. The FDR and CVR are designed to survive those types of impacts. Then why don't they design the whole plane that way? It would be so heavy it would never fly. Was that really a serious question ? |
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Quoted: Having read through this thread I'll swing my purse now . I have a few hours as Captain in the 737-300G/700/800/900ER, along with various other military and commerical aircraft from MD, Boeing and Airbus. I work with our safety division from time to time and had actually given training to China Eastern pilots when they first got 757s over 20 years ago. To say they are bad would be an understatement. I described them as "Beyond Bad". Bad was insufficient in describing how bad they were. In reading one of the posted articles it stated there were 3 pilots and a safety officer? What was going on in that flight deck. Hopefully they find the CVR and FDR and the Chinese government doesn't cover up what is discovered. View Quote I have heard from a Chinese Airline insider that amongst the passengers, there were at least 18 other China Eastern Airline pilots/copilots. They were going to GuangZhou for training. So that may explain the # of pilots present on that flight. Contributing factor? I have no clue. And Chinese airlines do have Air Marshalls like we do post 9/11. |
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Quoted: I appreciate the insight there. As an engineer that does a lot of failure analysis and investigations in a totally unrelated industry, things like that always stand out to me as possible "whoopsie" moments. With so much digital control these day it is really easy to literally fat finger something, put in an extra zero or leave one out that can make a real difference. What is the normal procedure then at top of decent? Assuming it is some changes to inputs to the autopilot to fly the expected approach? View Quote Well, to answer your question properly, it will take a bit of time that I don't have right now, but let me try to hit some high points. On a Boeing, you would dial in a lower altitude on the MCP (Mode Control Panel) which is like the dash board. If you were in VNAV (vertical navigation mode), which they probably were, the jet would begin a descent when it reached Top of D. The "box" ie the computer calculated the Top of D based on winds and conditions. You are basically telling it what you want and it will give that to you if it can. All of the calculations are designed to provide full efficiency and a constant path of descent to the runway. We typically let the jet do all of the work unless we have to intervene. We leave the autopilot hooked up until we are established on the localizer/glide slope. Most guys will disconnect the AP at that point and hand fly the last 1500 feet or so to the landing. At any time you don't like what you see, you should start hand flying the jet. |
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Quoted: I have heard from a Chinese Airline insider that amongst the passengers, there were at least 18 other China Eastern Airline pilots/copilots. They were going to GuangZhou for training. So that may explain the # of pilots present on that flight. Contributing factor? I have no clue. And Chinese airlines do have Air Marshalls like we do post 9/11. View Quote Hmm, what are the odds the flight deck was allowing students up front for a little show-and-tell, and something went wrong? There's a very similar story (from way back...60s) in the AF about an obese woman on a "family day" flight who fell forward onto the pilot's yoke, but I have no idea if it's true. |
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Quoted: Chinese maintenance is my guess. The engineers have more training in arrogance than aeronautics. Bad news and Boeing will get the blame. Fuck China. View Quote It's not arrogance. It's a combo of a superiority complex and the need to save face at all costs. Deadly combination. Fuck the Chinese. |
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Quoted: Well, to answer your question properly, it will take a bit of time that I don't have right now, but let me try to hit some high points. On a Boeing, you would dial in a lower altitude on the MCP (Mode Control Panel) which is like the dash board. If you were in VNAV (vertical navigation mode), which they probably were, the jet would begin a descent when it reached Top of D. The "box" ie the computer calculated the Top of D based on winds and conditions. You are basically telling it what you want and it will give that to you if it can. All of the calculations are designed to provide full efficiency and a constant path of descent to the runway. We typically let the jet do all of the work unless we have to intervene. We leave the autopilot hooked up until we are established on the localizer/glide slope. Most guys will disconnect the AP at that point and hand fly the last 1500 feet or so to the landing. At any time you don't like what you see, you should start hand flying the jet. View Quote Thanks, that will suffice for now! |
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Quoted: The FDR and CVR are designed to survive those types of impacts. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Considering how hard it hit, I'd say there is a fairly slim chance of the former. And no chance of the latter. The FDR and CVR are designed to survive those types of impacts. I got to handle the Valuejet CVR. It was pretty messed up. I can only imagine what's left of this one.. |
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Quoted: I got to handle the Valuejet CVR. It was pretty messed up. I can only imagine what's left of this one.. View Quote No shit! I'm impressed. If the FDR from the Air France that crashed into the south Atlantic and then spent all that time at the bottom of the ocean can survive I have some hope there will be some recoverable data. |
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Quoted: No shit! I'm impressed. If the FDR from the Air France that crashed into the south Atlantic and then spent all that time at the bottom of the ocean can survive I have some hope there will be some recoverable data. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: I got to handle the Valuejet CVR. It was pretty messed up. I can only imagine what's left of this one.. No shit! I'm impressed. If the FDR from the Air France that crashed into the south Atlantic and then spent all that time at the bottom of the ocean can survive I have some hope there will be some recoverable data. I have pictures of it somewhere. It was pretty mangled. |
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Quoted: Had a flight on a SWA 737 into MKE back around 2010, we were running about 10 minutes late and were cleared to land 7R with a REALLY cooking tailwind. We were clearly faster across the ground than usual as we crossed the threshold. Plunked it down carrier style, and full brakes/reversers........we pulled in the thrust reversers and rolled off at the very end of the runway onto taxiway November still doing about 20kts. Made up that 10 minutes by not having to fly past the airport out over the lake and come back west to land on 25L lol. View Quote Poor judgment in my world. |
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Quoted: Probably from the back of a Fruit Loops box. Jimm77. I don’t doubt that the so called “documentary” you saw was well produced and convinced a lot of people that the 737 max is dangerous; but I am willing to bet it was a hit piece designed to garnish as many views as possible. My understanding was the pilots of the 737 max were flying it out of the design curve for the aircraft and the software changes were to prevent pilots form not being able do do so. View Quote The Max's issue stems from the newer, bigger engines. Since the 737 airframe has a low ground clearance, it meant they had to move the engines forward and up on the wing to fit. It was the cheaper solution than engineering taller landing gears.This gave it a flight dynamic prone to higher angles of attack. If left unnoticed and uncorrected, it could lead to a stall condition. Boeing's answer was to install an automatic High AOA mitigation system. In theory great! As built, catastrophic. The system was built with only one AOA sensor due to "cost". In a Boeing, there used to be multiple redundant systems and sensors for safety for nearly every system. This single sensor fed an AOA system that had NO off switch. Meaning, if there was a erroneous reading from the stall sensor, the flight control computer would take over and force the nose down to prevent a stall. There was no way to override it. Again, relying on this SINGLE erronious sensor to verify the stall event was corrected.... The final failure of the Max was pilot training. The FAA pretty much let Boeing certify their own 737 Max training, and as I understand the content completely skimmed over the AOA/ Stall mitigation system. Pretty much told pilots that were type rated for the 737 it was the same plane, with a fancier cockpit. Either completely failing to address the new system, or simply telling pilots it was a low probability theyd ever see it used. Lone AOA sensor, no way to turn it off and most pilots had no idea about its existence. 3 points of fuckup lead to the 2 deadly Max crashes. Every failure could have been easy to correct. But due to cost, regulation and time it was simply swept aside by Boeing management to get the Max out to compete with the A320 Neo |
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Quoted: The Max's issue stems from the newer, bigger engines. Since the 737 airframe has a low ground clearance, it meant they had to move the engines forward and up on the wing to fit. It was the cheaper solution than engineering taller landing gears.This gave it a flight dynamic prone to higher angles of attack. If left unnoticed and uncorrected, it could lead to a stall condition. Boeing's answer was to install an automatic High AOA mitigation system. In theory great! As built, catastrophic. The system was built with only AOA sensor due to "cost". In a Boeing, there used to be multiple redundant systems and sensors for safety for nearly every system. This single sensor fed an AOA system that had NO off switch. Meaning, if there was a erroneous reading from the stall sensor, the flight control computer would take over and force the nose down to prevent a stall. There was no way to override it. Again, relying on this SINGLE erronious sensor to verify the stall event was corrected.... The final failure of the Max was pilot training. The FAA pretty much let Boeing certify their own 737 Max training, and as I understand the content completely skimmed over the AOA/ Stall mitigation system. Pretty much told pilots that were type rated for the 737 it was the same plane, with a fancier cockpit. Either completely failing to address the new system, or simply telling pilots it was a low probability theyd ever see it used. Lone AOA sensor, no way to turn it off and most pilots had no idea about its existence. 3 points of fuckup lead to the 2 deadly Max crashes. Every failure could have been easy to correct. But due to cost, regulation and time it was simply swept aside by Boeing management to get the Max out to compete with the A320 Neo View Quote Thank you for providing a nice summary of why I called the 737 Max a major fuck up by Boeing. These design choices were horrendously stupid and eventually proved deadly. |
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The amount of ignorance in aircraft threads here is astounding.
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Quoted: The Max's issue stems from the newer, bigger engines. Since the 737 airframe has a low ground clearance, it meant they had to move the engines forward and up on the wing to fit. It was the cheaper solution than engineering taller landing gears.This gave it a flight dynamic prone to higher angles of attack. If left unnoticed and uncorrected, it could lead to a stall condition. Boeing's answer was to install an automatic High AOA mitigation system. In theory great! As built, catastrophic. The system was built with only one AOA sensor due to "cost". In a Boeing, there used to be multiple redundant systems and sensors for safety for nearly every system. This single sensor fed an AOA system that had NO off switch. Meaning, if there was a erroneous reading from the stall sensor, the flight control computer would take over and force the nose down to prevent a stall. There was no way to override it. Again, relying on this SINGLE erronious sensor to verify the stall event was corrected.... The final failure of the Max was pilot training. The FAA pretty much let Boeing certify their own 737 Max training, and as I understand the content completely skimmed over the AOA/ Stall mitigation system. Pretty much told pilots that were type rated for the 737 it was the same plane, with a fancier cockpit. Either completely failing to address the new system, or simply telling pilots it was a low probability theyd ever see it used. Lone AOA sensor, no way to turn it off and most pilots had no idea about its existence. 3 points of fuckup lead to the 2 deadly Max crashes. Every failure could have been easy to correct. But due to cost, regulation and time it was simply swept aside by Boeing management to get the Max out to compete with the A320 Neo View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Probably from the back of a Fruit Loops box. Jimm77. I don’t doubt that the so called “documentary” you saw was well produced and convinced a lot of people that the 737 max is dangerous; but I am willing to bet it was a hit piece designed to garnish as many views as possible. My understanding was the pilots of the 737 max were flying it out of the design curve for the aircraft and the software changes were to prevent pilots form not being able do do so. The Max's issue stems from the newer, bigger engines. Since the 737 airframe has a low ground clearance, it meant they had to move the engines forward and up on the wing to fit. It was the cheaper solution than engineering taller landing gears.This gave it a flight dynamic prone to higher angles of attack. If left unnoticed and uncorrected, it could lead to a stall condition. Boeing's answer was to install an automatic High AOA mitigation system. In theory great! As built, catastrophic. The system was built with only one AOA sensor due to "cost". In a Boeing, there used to be multiple redundant systems and sensors for safety for nearly every system. This single sensor fed an AOA system that had NO off switch. Meaning, if there was a erroneous reading from the stall sensor, the flight control computer would take over and force the nose down to prevent a stall. There was no way to override it. Again, relying on this SINGLE erronious sensor to verify the stall event was corrected.... The final failure of the Max was pilot training. The FAA pretty much let Boeing certify their own 737 Max training, and as I understand the content completely skimmed over the AOA/ Stall mitigation system. Pretty much told pilots that were type rated for the 737 it was the same plane, with a fancier cockpit. Either completely failing to address the new system, or simply telling pilots it was a low probability theyd ever see it used. Lone AOA sensor, no way to turn it off and most pilots had no idea about its existence. 3 points of fuckup lead to the 2 deadly Max crashes. Every failure could have been easy to correct. But due to cost, regulation and time it was simply swept aside by Boeing management to get the Max out to compete with the A320 Neo The irony is that the 737 MAX doesn’t need the MCAS to fly safely. It was only added to meet customer expectations that their 737 pilots not need additional training for a new type rating. But once Boeing decided to use the MCAS on the MAX to mimic the handling characteristics of the previous 737 models, yeah, they had a responsibility to implement it correctly and safely. They should have known better. The real shame in this is that that asshole Jim McNerney just skates away after his management of the company basically caused this but he retired before the shit hit the fan. At any rate, the 737 MAX is now probably the most thoroughly vetted and safest commercial aircraft in service and will be around for decades to come. |
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Quoted: I got to handle the Valuejet CVR. It was pretty messed up. I can only imagine what's left of this one.. View Quote 5-600 kts into clay->hard soil.... I hope it was data chips and nothing more fragile. ....and the slight chance that whatever initiated this whole thing didn't sever the communication circuit. |
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Quoted: Like all things statistics and averages don't really tell the whole story. When you are strapped to a plane nose diving, you have 0% chance of influencing the outcome. In a car, you have a little more control over the situation. Also a car accident doesn't equal everybody dying automatically like most plane crashes do. On average driving is more deadly, but the modes of death aren't the same. View Quote According to statistics, I should have probably died already while driving. Yet, I've never even had a fender bender. I wonder why that is... I don't care if the odds are low of dying in a plane crash. I don't like flying and never will. If you do get unlucky playing the odds, you have 0% chance of survival and have way too much time to regret your decision as you plummet to certain death. Fuck all that. Fun story: I once flew to a job interview in North Carolina on a 737, and on the return flight home, I thought we were all going to die. In the middle of the flight, way the fuck up in the air, there was a huge BANG noise and a corresponding JOLT as if we struck something. Pilot came on the intercom and mumbled something about what he "thought" it was, but "not totally sure." Later on the same flight, we hit an "unexpected storm that saw 70mph gusts" (pilot's words) that caused the plane to pitch and dive like crazy. Like for 5 to 10 seconds at a time, the plane was straight up dropping from the sky. It was the same feeling you get when dropping on a rollercoaster and I could feel the lap belt digging into my thighs and preventing my head from smashing into the storage bins above. Side to side pitching was just as bad. Everyone was letting out short cries and yelps of fear each time it happened. Also heard, "Oh my God what is happening right now?!?!" a few times. Things eventually settled down, and the landing was fine. I think I also remember the pilot explaining that he had to take manual control of the plane. Still don't know what happened to us, but it was so far beyond "bad turbulence" that it scared me for life. I remember thinking to myself as it was happening, "Fuckin' A... I just nailed my job interview and about to get a 6-figure salary right out of college... of course I'm gonna die now right as I'm about to graduate." Haha.. it was totally surreal. I don't fly domestic anymore under any circumstances as I'd rather drive 20 straight hours than spend 12 hours doing the early morning airport rush, waiting for delays, flight time, rental car bullshit, etc. What's another 8-10 hours if it means being in control and in the comfort of my own car the entire time? No big deal. As for international travel, I live in the USA. Don't need to go anywhere else. Still dreading the next time my wife will bring up another family vacation to Greece. It's an amazing place... but... been there done that. 10 hour flights suck so bad. Also, all the COVID/vaccination bullshit and ongoing conflict in Ukraine make a trip to Europe that much less appealing. Go for the beach tan, come back glowing. |
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so...
it's been several days... Where are the pictures of the impact site? |
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I hope the CCP doesn't try to blame it on Taiwanese 'separatists' some how.
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Quoted: There's a very similar story (from way back...60s) in the AF about an obese woman on a "family day" flight who fell forward onto the pilot's yoke, but I have no idea if it's true. View Quote I think you're referring to an Aeroflot A310 crash: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593 |
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Quoted: so... it's been several days... Where are the pictures of the impact site? View Quote There's this fantastic invention called Google.... https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-60830395 |
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Chinese searchers found on Wednesday one of two black boxes from a China Eastern Airlines (600115.SS) plane that crashed this week in forest-clad mountains with 132 people onboard, the aviation regulator said.
The device was severely damaged, and it was not immediately clear if it was the flight data recorder or the cockpit voice recorder, an official of the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) told a media briefing. |
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Quoted: Is this the same Chinese spy Fang Fang? https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/327183/5AFE4FD5-2886-416A-93CC-A0EC4E611EE9_jpe-2323133.JPGhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/state-media-report-crash-of-chinese-airliner-with-133-aboard/2022/03/21/1c920ba4-a8f1-11ec-8a8e-9c6e9fc7a0de_story.html View Quote I simply cannot read that out loud with a straight face. Not sure why. |
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Quoted: Then why don't they design the whole plane that way? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: The FDR and CVR are designed to survive those types of impacts. Be cool if the plane slammed into the ground, bounced a few times and came to a sliding stop without a scratch on it. Then you open the hatch, and the whole inside is coated in chunky salsa. |
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Quoted: One of my favorites as far as being a passenger goes. They just seem sporty. One trip in 2019 to Anaheim I knew we were coming in a bit high and hot, touched down about half way down the runway. Found out how good the brakes were. Had to turn around on the threshold to get back to the taxiway. We were last to exit as the Mrs is disabled and needs assistance while flying. Pilot was standing at the cabin door as we were finally deplaning and I said "Came in a bit hot Skipper ?" He just pulled a big grin and gave a wink. LOL View Quote Cabin crew gets on the speaker and says "welcome to the USS Baton Rouge, the captain likes to take the first taxi way" Walking off the plane, crew standing there, I look at the captain and ask "navy?" He just laughed. |
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Were they using chinese made counterfeit parts to keep that bird in the air?
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That must have been the longest 2 minutes ever. Literally the stuff of nightmares.
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Quoted: Hopping from ATL to Baton Rouge, weather in ATL connections got missed...ended up on a flight with maybe 3 pax. Very relaxed flight, cabin crew was just hanging out with us in between doing the required things. Get to BR, everybody gets set for landing, normal final and touchdown...then reversers, engines spool up, all the brakes...honest to God I didn't know planes could stop that hard. If not for the belt I'd have come out of the seat. Cabin crew gets on the speaker and says "welcome to the USS Baton Rouge, the captain likes to take the first taxi way" Walking off the plane, crew standing there, I look at the captain and ask "navy?" He just laughed. View Quote Years ago we flew into Anchorage the day after the 747 had a engine fall off do to turbulence. It was still rough going in and out. |
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Quoted: The irony is that the 737 MAX doesn't need the MCAS to fly safely. It was only added to meet customer expectations that their 737 pilots not need additional training for a new type rating. But once Boeing decided to use the MCAS on the MAX to mimic the handling characteristics of the previous 737 models, yeah, they had a responsibility to implement it correctly and safely. They should have known better. The real shame in this is that that asshole Jim McNerney just skates away after his management of the company basically caused this but he retired before the shit hit the fan. At any rate, the 737 MAX is now probably the most thoroughly vetted and safest commercial aircraft in service and will be around for decades to come. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Probably from the back of a Fruit Loops box. Jimm77. I don't doubt that the so called "documentary" you saw was well produced and convinced a lot of people that the 737 max is dangerous; but I am willing to bet it was a hit piece designed to garnish as many views as possible. My understanding was the pilots of the 737 max were flying it out of the design curve for the aircraft and the software changes were to prevent pilots form not being able do do so. The Max's issue stems from the newer, bigger engines. Since the 737 airframe has a low ground clearance, it meant they had to move the engines forward and up on the wing to fit. It was the cheaper solution than engineering taller landing gears.This gave it a flight dynamic prone to higher angles of attack. If left unnoticed and uncorrected, it could lead to a stall condition. Boeing's answer was to install an automatic High AOA mitigation system. In theory great! As built, catastrophic. The system was built with only one AOA sensor due to "cost". In a Boeing, there used to be multiple redundant systems and sensors for safety for nearly every system. This single sensor fed an AOA system that had NO off switch. Meaning, if there was a erroneous reading from the stall sensor, the flight control computer would take over and force the nose down to prevent a stall. There was no way to override it. Again, relying on this SINGLE erronious sensor to verify the stall event was corrected.... The final failure of the Max was pilot training. The FAA pretty much let Boeing certify their own 737 Max training, and as I understand the content completely skimmed over the AOA/ Stall mitigation system. Pretty much told pilots that were type rated for the 737 it was the same plane, with a fancier cockpit. Either completely failing to address the new system, or simply telling pilots it was a low probability theyd ever see it used. Lone AOA sensor, no way to turn it off and most pilots had no idea about its existence. 3 points of fuckup lead to the 2 deadly Max crashes. Every failure could have been easy to correct. But due to cost, regulation and time it was simply swept aside by Boeing management to get the Max out to compete with the A320 Neo The irony is that the 737 MAX doesn't need the MCAS to fly safely. It was only added to meet customer expectations that their 737 pilots not need additional training for a new type rating. But once Boeing decided to use the MCAS on the MAX to mimic the handling characteristics of the previous 737 models, yeah, they had a responsibility to implement it correctly and safely. They should have known better. The real shame in this is that that asshole Jim McNerney just skates away after his management of the company basically caused this but he retired before the shit hit the fan. At any rate, the 737 MAX is now probably the most thoroughly vetted and safest commercial aircraft in service and will be around for decades to come. |
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China Eastern Airlines #5735 UPDATE! 23 March |
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View Quote Thanks for posting that. This is the first time that I have seen the altitude plotted. Obvious questions are what caused the first near vertical descent. Then what happened at the point where a recovery may have been attempted and did any structural separation occur at that point or earlier. |
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Quoted: Like all things statistics and averages don't really tell the whole story. When you are strapped to a plane nose diving, you have 0% chance of influencing the outcome. In a car, you have a little more control over the situation. Also a car accident doesn't equal everybody dying automatically like most plane crashes do. On average driving is more deadly, but the modes of death aren't the same. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: engineer here (not the train kind). you are confusing your emotions with statistics. if you are at a US airport flying domestically, and concerned about the risk of dying -- whatever you do, do not drive home. On average driving is more deadly, but the modes of death aren't the same. you are still confused. just because you feel like you are in control doesn't mean the risk is mitigated. in the last full year of available records --2020 -- nearly 39,000(*) people thought they "had more control over the situation". they died. the accounting is still being done on 2021 and the number is projected to be higher. (btw about 10x that number were seriously injured.) if the domestic airline industry killed ~35,000-40,000 people every year, no one would fly, correct? and yet people drive, because we accept that level of risk. so the question is, why don't you accept a lower level of risk when flying? (*) https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2020-traffic-crash-data-fatalities |
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Quoted: China operated? Someone didn’t do maintenance and checks. But then again Boeing has been on a trajectory of subpar post-American exceptionalism. View Quote @mochaTX there must be data to support your assessment of china eastern airlines and boeing. let's find some, perhaps here: https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/china-eastern-5735s-sudden-sharp-dive-put-in-context/ |
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Quoted: It was bad. Not because Netflix said so but because it was a fucked up design. Seems like Boeing is continuing that tradition with Starliner but Starliner has not killed anyone yet. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: 737 MAX bad! Because Netflix say so! It was bad. Not because Netflix said so but because it was a fucked up design. Seems like Boeing is continuing that tradition with Starliner but Starliner has not killed anyone yet. Only reason Starliner hasn't killed anyone yet is because they can't manage to get it to complete a successful unmanned mission. Give it time, and they'll hit their goals eventually. |
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Where does the Coffin Corner plot out at on the 737?
I know obviously it's way higher than 30 grand, but just curious. |
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Quoted: The Max's issue stems from the newer, bigger engines. Since the 737 airframe has a low ground clearance, it meant they had to move the engines forward and up on the wing to fit. It was the cheaper solution than engineering taller landing gears.This gave it a flight dynamic prone to higher angles of attack. If left unnoticed and uncorrected, it could lead to a stall condition. Boeing's answer was to install an automatic High AOA mitigation system. In theory great! As built, catastrophic. The system was built with only one AOA sensor due to "cost". In a Boeing, there used to be multiple redundant systems and sensors for safety for nearly every system. This single sensor fed an AOA system that had NO off switch. Meaning, if there was a erroneous reading from the stall sensor, the flight control computer would take over and force the nose down to prevent a stall. There was no way to override it. Again, relying on this SINGLE erronious sensor to verify the stall event was corrected.... The final failure of the Max was pilot training. The FAA pretty much let Boeing certify their own 737 Max training, and as I understand the content completely skimmed over the AOA/ Stall mitigation system. Pretty much told pilots that were type rated for the 737 it was the same plane, with a fancier cockpit. Either completely failing to address the new system, or simply telling pilots it was a low probability theyd ever see it used. Lone AOA sensor, no way to turn it off and most pilots had no idea about its existence. 3 points of fuckup lead to the 2 deadly Max crashes. Every failure could have been easy to correct. But due to cost, regulation and time it was simply swept aside by Boeing management to get the Max out to compete with the A320 Neo View Quote Great overview… few questions.. By no off switch do you mean for MCAS alone? Vs the runway trim procedure which I guess turns off the whole automatic trim system including MCAS? |
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Boeing 737 Crashes in China Mid-Flight | Here's What Happened On Board (With Real Video) |
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Quoted: There's this fantastic invention called Google.... https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-60830395 https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/cpsprodpb/1DD0/production/_123823670_af6847b0-36a7-4eaf-b71d-5df95f8c51e6.jpg https://nypost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/03/china-crash-002.jpg?quality=90&strip=all View Quote It’s amazing. There’s nothing left of the aircraft. It looks like it just vaporized. |
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Will the chinese allow a finding that doesn't fit in the government narrative?
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