Stop spewing lies.  

B737 MAX pilots were told in depth about the MCAS issue after the 1st crash.  That info was sent out two months before the 2nd crash.  The copilot on the 2nd crash knew just enough to disable MCAS after the malfunction, but he ended up re-engaging it.  

They plunged into the ground at takeoff thrust and the mach warning audible going off (they flew into the ground at basically full power, full speed, with the wings getting ready to rip off).  Capt was task saturated telling the copilot what he should be telling ATC, etc.  copilot was a situational awareness sucker, not a situational awareness contributor.  Copilots experience was something like 3 months of operating the 737, and pretty much NOTHING prior to that.  WTF was he doing in that cockpit.  Two well trained and experienced aviators would have handled the situation just fine.

To further add, the information* was sent out by the Indoneisan equivalent to the NTSB (Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi KNKT) based on the investigation by the ICAO and the KNKT and others, to ALL B737 Max pilots (not just US operators) at the end of Nov 2018, approximately one month after the Lion Air crash. This included preliminary findings of the mishap as well as Safety Actions and Recommendations.  

* Click here for full report: https://reports.aviation-safety.net/2018/20181029-0_B38M_PK-LQP_PRELIMINARY.pdf

Notably among these findings/recommendations:
For Lion Air:
-On 29 October 2018, the Safety and Security Directorate issued safety reminder to all Boeing 737 pilots to review several procedures including memory items of airspeed unreliable and runaway stabilizer.
-On 30 October 2018, issued information to all pilots which contained reminder to:
--Be ready for any abnormal or emergency conditions by having Memory Items and maneuvers reviewed and have a good Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) to all counterparts.
--Write on the AFML for any malfunctions that happened during the flight. Brief the engineer on duty comprehensively about the malfunction happened in flight. Please refer to Fault Reporting Manual (FRM) provided in the aircraft.
--Send report to Safety and Security Directorate through all reporting methods that available as soon as practicable.

On 2 November 2018, the Safety and Security Directorate issued safety instruction:
For Operation Directorate:
-To instruct all B737 pilots to use the Fault Reporting Manual (FRM) in all their Aircraft Flight Maintenance Log (AFML) report. This measure shall be enforced by Operations, Training and Standard with immediate effect.
-To reinforce in the current simulator syllabus, the “Unreliable Airspeed” and “Stabilizer Runaway” maneuvers, with immediate effect to all fleets.
-To reinforce the role of Chief Pilot on Duty, in order to raise operational issue to IOCC/MCC should any significant notification has been received. This measure should be applied with immediate effect.
-To reinforce through Notice to Pilots, Ground Recurrent Training, and Simulator Sessions on Decision Making Process when the aircraft has declared and operating in abnormal (PAN-PAN) or emergency (MAYDAY-MAYDAY) condition.

On 3 November 2018, the Chief Pilot issued Notice to Pilot which required all pilots to perform the following:
-Read and study the FRM (Fault Reporting Manual) and know how to utilize it. Any observed faults, status message, or cabin faults must be written down in the AFML, and ATA Number/Tittle of ECAM Shown (Fault) For A330. Should have any doubt, please contact the chief pilot or Quality Assurance Department via Mission Control (MC) – OM-A  .6.8.
-Do not hesitate to describe in details about the defect that has been encountered. This is a good practice especially for the engineers to do the troubleshooting and for the next crew that will fly the aircraft.
-Review the memory item routinely during the briefing, and if applicable, review the course of actions that should be taken if particular situations occur in any phase of flight.

On 5 November 2018, the Training Manager issued Training Notice to Pilot which required all instructor pilots to make additional training of airspeed unreliable and runaway stabilizer.

3.3 Boeing Company
On 6 November 2018, issued Flight Crew Operation Manual Bulletin (OMB) Number TBC-19 with subjected Un-commanded Nose Down Stabilizer Trim Due to Erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA) During Manual Flight Only to emphasize the procedures provided in the runaway stabilizer non-normal checklist (NNC). The detail of the FCOM Bulletin is  vailable on the appendices 5.11. On 11 November 2018, informed all 737NG/MAX Costumers, Regional Directors, Regional Managers and Boeing Field Service Bases via Multi Operator Messages (MOM) with subject Information – Multi Model Stall Warning and Pitch Augmentation Operation. The detail of the MOM is available on the appendices 5.12

3.4 Federal Aviation Administration
On 7 November 2018, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) Number 2018-23-51 for the owners and operators of the Boeing 737-8 and -9 aircraft. The detail of this Emergency AD is available on the appendices 5.13.


Also, SWA sent information out to all SWA pilots regarding the above:
NOVEMBER 28, 2018
Lion Air Flight 610 Investigation

As details continue to become available regarding the path forward following the Lion Air tragedy, we will use this forum to keep the Pilot group up to date on this event and the MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System). This will be a living document that will contain background technical information, designed to add fidelity to the situational awareness of Southwest Pilots.

Q: Will the Runaway Stabilizer non-normal checklist stop this event?

A:  Yes—when followed, the Runaway Stabilizer non-normal checklist found in the QRC and QRH will stop the stabilizer trim movement.

Q: Will the Control Wheel Stabilizer Trim switches stop MCAS stabilizer trim movement?

A: Yes (temporarily)—the nose down stabilizer trim movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim switches but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are released.

Q: Will the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches moved to CUTOUT stop MCAS stabilizer trim movement?

A: Yes—following the Runaway Stabilizer non-normal checklist in the QRC and QRH will ensure that the MCAS is disabled.

Q: Will opposing movement of the control column stop the MCAS stabilizer trim movement?

A: No—the MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual (autopilot off), flaps up flight.

Gotta go, I'll add more later.

Boeing fucked up beyond reason with the MCAS.  They need to pay.

As I'm sure has already been said: their assholes is the last thing that went through their minds.