Until they get a green card, then they tell Vlad it's cool to come over.

great thread




+  

Da. I'm MTC, and I'll be conducting the interviews for the Master of Pubic -er- I mean Public Relations and cultural exchange program.

Can anyone verify this?:



englishrussia.com

I've read this stuff before and I understand that the Russians were trying to eliminate this sort of behavior.  Of course, they've also been trying to rid themselves of organized crime, too.

Sounds like a college fraternity.

This is the Russian Bear in the woods that Reagan warned us about. “There is a bear in the woods. For some people, the bear is easy to see. Others don’t see it at all.”



This is from a Russian Army recruiting poster.  Da Tovarich these are the kinds of people that will be in your unit in beautiful Chechnya. . .

Don't forget my future wife.

Would your little private stand at attention and fire a salute for her?

It's quite true....they have quite the problem with draft-dodging because everyone knows being a first year recruit in the Russian Army is a nightmare of beatings and ass-rape and the officers and NCOs will not do shit about it. It is widely talked about in emigre and defector literature, and occasionally it even makes it in to the Russian press.  It would be interesting to see what would happen if they face someone they cannot overwhelm with sheer numbers like Georgia....like thier Chinese "friends" who consider Siberia to have been stolen from them and are waiting to the time is right to take it back.  

My friend who is russian and now lives here won't go back to visit family because they will most likley arrest  him. He uncle was a general and defferd his service obligations however he has since retired so all bets are off.

For real?

Id munch it.

HOMO....   Please explain

What the guys making fun of these fine ass women are.

Anyone else notice the uglier ones are sent to the back?

And more



NICE

I don't know about the others, but the last one is Israeli.

Dear Santa please give me for Christmas

The pic is reversed.  In real life it's OMOH and it's some kind of internal security/special forces unit IIRC.  Americans like to reverse those photos because "HOMO" on your uni is funny to some folks.  It's stupid and childish.  Those OMOH folks are not fucking around.



ETA - Russian Riot Police.





 

Off duty...

It's OMON (OMOH in Cyrillic), Отряд милиции особого назначения, a military police force.

-k

That because she has a light limited duty chit, lmao!!

Im kinda likin' it....

We supply the uniforms, you supply the shoes

Some of those women are spectacular.

It wasn't always this way....

Why is it funny to make fun of another country's soldiers?  I'm curious why this would be funny.  I could understand a thread talking about problems in their modern military, personnel, equipment, etc. But I don't "get" a thread that just makes fun of the regular ivans who are serving. Even the lowest-level, most supposedly "unattractive" (for the men pictured) or "ditzy" (for the women pictured) have done a small part to serve their country. Are the men being mocked just to make you feel better? You are all Americans only through fortune and chance. Your ancestors –– whether as recently as a decade ago, or earlier –– did what it took to get to this country so that YOU could have the privilege and rare good luck of being born in this country and not subjected to the brutality of a military draft such as the one currently in place in Russia.

Not for nothing, but you're in the wrong chunk of the interweb if you you don't have a sense of humor.

"Different from me equals funny", by the way, to answer your question.

Spacibo.  Nikogda ne snal shto eta snachet.

Off duty?  I'm speechless....

 oh damn.....i want that redheaded chick in the 5th picture

like a retard with a new drum set

Off duty my ass!
thats them working their "night job"

They have some really relaxed uniform standards, for the women at least. They must not be expecting to go anywhere for a while.

Пожалуйста.

-k

That's pretty much how they roll.  My Russian friends tell me that basic training is the same time every year and during the time the police are out in force and will stop and question anyone who looks to be between the age of 18 and 22.





 

Это должно было ожидаться.

From this thread

In Russia, no one is safe from the HOMO police.

Cyrillic alphabet...............NO-mah?

Edit:

Omon

If they did a remake of Red Dawn with those soldiers invading it would be a porn flick.









If there was snatch like that in Uncle Sugar's club I would sign up tomorrow.

lol

 Front row... Dark  haired brunette .   With all the force and impact " like an ANGRY fist from GOD....... I need a cigarette now.. Excuse me please..  WarDawg

[Jerry Lee Lewis] "Goodness gracious, great balls o' fire!" [/Jerry Lee Lewis]

BTT

Per request.

Commies! GTFO of my GD fap-fest!

The Russian army is aware of the problems and is taking steps to deal with it.

They are commited to translating to being a professional rather than conscript army.  Paratroops are pretty much there and their standards are high and would bare comparison with an equivalent Western force.



And for all their faults, no one can knock your Russian grunt for his toughness and ability to endure the sort of hardships that would render a western soldier combat innifective.





Part 2: Challenges to Russian Military Reform
February 10, 2009 | 1227 GMT

Summary
During the time of the Soviet Union, the Soviet armed forces were privileged institutions. As the primary beneficiary of the entire Soviet economic and political system, the military became a key foundation of Soviet power around the world. Not surprisingly, much of today’s Russian military remains a legacy of the Soviet armed forces, although it is a shadow of its former self. Although the Kremlin intends to implement broad military reform, profound challenges remain, such as a top-heavy officer corps as well as difficult cultural, demographic and financial conditions.

Editor’s Note: This is part two of a four-part series on the reformation of the Russian military.

Analysis
The Russian military will always be a product of Russian history, Russian geopolitical imperatives and Russian thinking. It will never be measurable entirely by Western military standards. At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the realities of the 21st century demand some of the most radical military reform in Russia’s modern history. And this reform is not simply a matter of getting a fresh start. In order to build a new military, Moscow must also deconstruct what remains of Soviet military structure and organization. It must push past much of the Soviet-era thinking that has governed the Russian military for the better part of a century. And it must do so while working against the grain of profound institutional inertia.


Officers

This inertia is embodied in the upper echelons of the officer corps, something we pointed out nearly 10 years ago in our 2000-2010 decade forecast. STRATFOR also indicated that only the very top rung of Russian leadership had been replaced since the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving much of the old Soviet mindset still firmly entrenched. Not only is this cadre of senior officers the intellectual product of Soviet military education, but the upper echelons in which they reside were both incidentally and deliberately overloaded.

Incidentally, because Moscow held tightly to the reins of the Soviet military in the days of the Soviet Union, the majority of officers were Russian. When the union collapsed, a disproportionate number of enlisted personnel — conscripts and volunteers alike — from the western Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet republics were lost while the vast majority of the officers remained part of the Russian military. The result was that the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel in the Russian military became extremely high.

Deliberately, because every Russian or Soviet leader before Vladimir Putin was concerned about the military consolidating against the Kremlin, even though Russia has not faced a successful military coup in over two centuries. As a result of this paranoia, various inefficiencies have been deliberately and systematically built into the military by many leaders in order to keep the officers too numerous and disorganized to ever achieve such consolidation.

Indeed, future President Boris Yeltsin helped turn the tide against a 1991 coup supported by rogue elements of the military against former President Mikhail Gorbachev. Upon becoming president, Yeltsin greatly increased the number of officers both to keep the military in disarray and to insert political allies into the military.


In large part due to Yeltsin’s efforts, the officer corps today remains immense, with over 300,000 members, tipping the scales at more than 30 percent of the total force (including conscripts). As a point of comparison, commissioned officers in the U.S. Army amount to 15 percent of its personnel, a percentage far more commensurate with modern, Western models. Although the Russian military cannot be judged or understood entirely through the prism of Western military thought, it is a bloated, top-heavy and ultimately unsustainable force structure — even for Russia.

So far, progress in reducing the number of officers has been stop-and-go. But the transition of presidential power from Putin to Dmitri Medvedev has now been completed, which could position the Kremlin to challenge the entrenched interests of more than 1,100 generals and admirals. These general officers have also been an expensive financial burden, since they occupy the most senior and well-paid positions with the most assistants and perks. Efforts are underway to shrink their ranks by some 200, bringing the figure closer to, though still greater than, the U.S. military’s general-officer ranks (fewer than 900).

The current goal of reductions to 150,000 officers by 2012 — a cut of more than 50 percent — is nothing if not ambitious, but even getting in that range would be an enormous step for Russia’s military because it would free up resources and help increase the institutional agility of the armed forces as a whole. Indeed, the reduction in the senior officer ranks is even more dramatic than the 50 percent cut suggests, since the Kremlin hopes to dramatically expand the ranks of junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).


But concerns about job security in the midst of the global financial crisis and a tumbling ruble have already led Prime Minister Putin to make public assurances that cuts to the ranks of the military will not be precipitous and that only those near retirement will be let go — with pension and (a tradition in Russia) housing. No matter how the Kremlin manages it, significant rises in entitlement spending are in the cards for the military budget, and questions remain about just how quickly Russia will be able to push forward with major reductions in the senior officer ranks.

Culture

For the remainder of the Russian military, there are two broad issues: culture and demographics. The new “permanent readiness forces,” poised and prepared for quick deployment in a crisis, will be smaller and more agile, with different chains of command. This will necessarily increase reliance on junior officers and NCOs. By pushing command down to the lower levels, the demand for initiative and small-unit leadership will rise accordingly. But there is little tradition in the Russian military for either, and it is not clear how well young officers and NCOs will cope, even though an expanded training pipeline is in the works.

There is also a culture of violence and leadership through brutality in the Russian military. The heart of this problem is the conscription program, which remains an enormous embarrassment for the Kremlin. Rampant brutality and hazing known as dedovshchina (formerly practiced by those in their second year of conscription before the two-year term of service was reduced to one year) often results in serious injury and death, including suicide. (Dedovshchina reportedly resulted in the loss of several hundred conscripts in 2007, several years after the problem had been identified and reforms had begun to be implemented.)

Not unrelated is a culture of drunkenness, drug abuse and desertion — not only among conscripts but also in the ranks of professional contract soldiers. As the U.S. military found after Vietnam, this sort of cultural affliction can take a decade or more to remedy, and unlike the U.S. military in Vietnam, Russia hosts major heroin smuggling routes from Afghanistan. Black-market alcohol, as well as illicit drugs, are coursing through Russia’s veins, making the reduction of alcoholism, drug abuse and corruption even more complicated for the Russian military.


Demographics

A far more concrete problem is demographics. Junior officers, NCOs, professional soldiers and conscripts are all going to come from essentially the same pool (even with some variation in age and educational achievement). By cutting the conscripted service period in half, Russia has effectively doubled the number of youth it must conscript each year. While eligibility for the draft runs for nearly a decade, technically, the vast majority of youth are conscripted at age 18, and Russia is now attempting to conscript young men who never knew the Soviet Union. The 1990s were not a particularly buoyant time for Russia in terms of the birth rate, and the number of Russian men turning 18 each year is declining, just when the Kremlin needs to press more and more of them into service. Although there will be a small rebound starting in 2017, according to birth-rate projections, nearly a decade of dramatic population decline will occur before then, and long-term prospects are much worse.



The declining youth population is a reminder that Russia is approaching a much more problematic demographic crisis beyond 2025 — namely, the decline of Russian society as a whole. Birth rates are not sufficient to sustain the population, infertility, AIDS and alcoholism are rampant and the Russian people are growing increasingly unhealthy with diminishing life spans.

Finances

The other major problem is money. Awash in cash during Putin’s presidency due in large part to high commodity prices, Russia was able to sock away some US$750 billion in total currency reserves. This sum has begun to erode because of the invasion of Georgia and the ongoing financial crisis and is already down to around US$400 billion. Russia still enjoys vast reserves, but the ruble continues to tumble as the financial crisis works it way through the Russian economy. Russia may be able to sustain some planned increases in military spending by tapping its reserves, but the implications of the financial crisis on Russian military reform remain to be seen.

Actual spending on Russian national defense — around US$40 billion in 2008 — has continued to rise steadily in real rubles, but as a portion of gross domestic product and the overall budget it has remained relatively constant. What this means is that the Kremlin has not been excessively lavish with national defense even when its monetary resources were expanding dramatically. Instead it has exercised the power of the purse — now embodied in the appointment of a tax man, Anatoly Serdyukov, as defense minister. The Kremlin is all too aware of how much money is being lost through corruption, inefficiency and waste (Moscow is willing to acknowledge some US$75 million in 2007, but the real figure is almost certainly much higher).


The global financial crisis comes at a particularly difficult point in Russian military modernization. Increases in defense spending and procurement had been talked about before, but the confluence of a flood of petrodollars and the successful transition of power to President Medvedev in 2008 held the promise, at last, of actual implementation. Then came the onslaught of the worldwide recession. While the Kremlin may continue to sustain military spending out of its reserves, its budgets will undoubtedly be tighter than anticipated for the duration of the crisis.

Further complicating financial matters is an ongoing clan war in the Kremlin between the two main factions working under Prime Minister Putin. The faction led by Vladislav Surkov controls both the country’s finances and the GRU, Russia’s shadowy military intelligence agency, while the defense establishment (both ministerial and industrial) is controlled by the other faction, led by Igor Sechin. This conflict has likely played a role in impeding the implementation of military reform.

But even if the clan war subsides and Moscow’s coffers stabilize, money cannot solve everything. The myriad obstacles in the way of genuine military reform are daunting ones, difficult to overcome even in the best of times. And these are not the best of times. Russia has devised ambitious military reform plans and revised time and again to accommodate the realities of the moment, often departing from the plans’ original goals. This time around, as Russia tries to reassert itself as a regional power, broad military reform is a critical priority for the Kremlin. Some progress is certainly in the cards, and although it will not likely conform to previously articulated plans, it could lead to limited successes that are sufficient for Moscow’s needs, such as the Georgian operation in August 2008.

http://www.stratfor.com