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Its easier to get a DFC flying day missions.

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I wouldn't call a Cesena clone a fast mover, more like a slow easy target. A-10s have done the job fantastically and proven to take a beating and still get the job done. Stick with what works best.

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I gotta say, from my perspective as an outsider looking in, Rooster seems to have a good point here. 1) How did we fill so many fighter slots in WWI and WWII, when it was more dangerous? Was the difference due to draft? 2) If we can get all those volunteers to walk around on the street with possible enemy poking out from every corner, or bombs planted in the dirt all around you in random locations, why can't we get dudes to pilot planes to blow shit up? 3) If the standard is too high, can we separate the standards? We have a super high standard for the "next-generation" aircraft or whatever, the F35 type pilots who are there to defend us against theoretical super power enemies, and then we have a secondary lower standard for the rest of us retards who want to fly in low and blow things up

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It cost very little to train pilots back in WWI. Teach them how to fly and land with about 40 flying hours or less and let Darwin take over. WWII was barely an improvement in comparison to today's pilots. Today it can cost millions to get a pilot ready for combat. After spending that kind of money and the time/expense it takes to replace one it is just darn smart to keep them alive and fighting. Even A-10 pilots aren't cheap to train. I've met quite a few A-10 pilots and have immense respect for them. They are the best, most courageous, ground attack pilots in the world bar none. Even with that you don't waste them.


You want to fight a war of attrition then the Army and Marine ground pounders are your go to sacrificial lambs. You can train a whole infantry company for far less than it cost for one fighter pilot.

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Thank you, now we are getting somwhere. I agree 100% with this. Im not sure the AF would say no, but if they did it wouldnt surprise me. On the initial push there were some meager joint ops, but on the whole they dont happen. They need to happen stateside, this shit doesnt just come together in combat for the first time. For instance, I had a "talkon" from a guy who was getting frustrated with me because I cant find the house with the red roof, with no grid/coordinates etc...at night, with no other helpful information. Clearly, he had no training whatsoever in calling in air, or even in determining the coordinates of a target. What does it say that one hundred years after the invention of the aircraft that the Air Force has to have a enlisted career field to imbed guys with CAS training with army units because they apparently have little desire to train their own men? It isnt rocket science. The Marines do it, the Army can too.

However, thats not the point, lack of proficiency on their end or ours isnt the main issue. Despite that abortion of an org chart, I can tell you that everyday we ended up over some unit, that many of those days something came up we could help with, targets were ID despite the lack previous joint training (this always went much smoother with Marines, many of whom clearly had experience calling in air effectively) and yet, the entire operation, from that org chart on down to even the most painful talk on, was rendered moot because nine times out of ten, literally, the poor guy could not get his boss to clear us hot.

Im not saying there arent acquisition problems, training problems, structural org problems or whatever. Im saying is that despite that, despite big army and big af bureaucracy throwing wrenches in the works, we were still there, together we made it work, all previous obstacles and hurdles surmounted, except for the main one...two words, cleared hot.

We can and should fix the charts, do the joint training, streamline the process, and employ the best weapons, but none of that will mean a thing until ground commanders feel more free to use the assets available to them. I just cannot stress this enough, and I dont know what the official reports say or what the discussions were at the staff and dont really care. What I can say, as someone who did this day in day out, the vast majority of non effective CAS is not from a failure of the guy on the radio or a pilot like me...it is the roe ground commanders are using. Me and the guy on the radio have our end doped out, and then he gets denied.

Look, I get fired up about this because I have literally seen men die with my own eyes (maybe you have too) in attacks from enemy positions on which I have eyes on, not even danger close, and yet because it is too close to a freakin highway or some other BS they deny the guy and I get watch this crap unfold over and over as a high speed cheerleader. Sometimes they let me do a flyby at least. A "show of force" they call it, thats anything but.  Yeah thatll show em, but I do what im asked.

Until the national command authority decides to let the Army FIGHT, the Army's commanders are not going to allow much CAS. It is what it is. I doubt it will ever happen unless we take a truly catastrophic hit to the homeland or face in open combat some entity senior leadership perceives is a true existential threat to the nation.

Instead, like we do in many other areas of national policy, we will "fix" this problem by throwing money at it or buying something instead of simply letting our people do their jobs.

Im tired of these threads really. I keep telling myself not to mess with it but those events are still very real to me. In the end, it just evolves into an heated argument with people in which I probably share 99% common values with.

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Damn.  The inter-service iteration of "go be poor somewhere else!".

No wonder so many people want to replace pilots with drones.

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Damn.  The inter-service iteration of "go be poor somewhere else!".

No wonder so many people want to replace pilots with drones.

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AF don't want to replace pilots with drones, AF wants to replace infantry with Pilots.

There is no place for infantry in wars that are existential in nature, and there is no reason other then romantacism for us NOT to make any war (no matter how small) an existential threat for our enemies.

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AF don't want to replace pilots with drones, AF wants to replace infantry with Pilots.

There is no place for infantry in wars that are existential in nature, and there is no reason other then romantacism for us NOT to make any war (no matter how small) an existential threat for our enemies.

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AF don't want to replace pilots with drones, AF wants to replace infantry with Pilots.

There is no place for infantry in wars that are existential in nature, and there is no reason other then romantacism for us NOT to make any war (no matter how small) an existential threat for our enemies.

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and, by that argument, there is no need for pilots, either.

In the words of Hap Arnold, "I foresee a manless AF"

I will be kind and not suggest we might already be there.

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Wasn't it your idea to give ICBMs, space stuff, and cyber warfare to the USAF?  All the "technical" shit.  We could call it TechCom, like from the Terminator movies.  They'd fucking love it.

Then take everything else the USAF is tasked with doing and fold it back into the Army from whence it came?

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and, by that argument, there is no need for pilots, either.

In the words of Hap Arnold, "I foresee a manless AF"

I will be kind and not suggest we might already be there.

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That is a fair point, but that method has baggage.

I'd posit that we are eminently capable of waging an existential conflict with conventional Air Forces. Heck, we could do it with ground forces if we really wanted to, but what do you see us as a society being more able to stomach emulating... Dresden or Nanking.

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Would be great if we got Super Tucnos and opened piloting back up to Enlisted Ranks. 

https://rhk111smilitaryandarmspage.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/a-29_super_tucano_thru_flickr1.jpg

https://i1.wp.com/www.defensemedianetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/lr-Super-Tucano.jpg

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I'd posit that we are eminently capable of waging an existential conflict with conventional Air Forces.

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And people say I'm the asshole.
Hell of a service motto, isn't it?
"My personal safety is my primary mission"

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At this point we are debating the most cost effective means of existential warfare, are we not?

If we are going to go down the rabbit hole of graduated response, infantry is on that list as much as tactical air.

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History and physics say otherwise.

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Wasn't it your idea to give ICBMs, space stuff, and cyber warfare to the USAF?  All the "technical" shit.  We could call it TechCom, like from the Terminator movies.  They'd fucking love it.

Then take everything else the USAF is tasked with doing and fold it back into the Army from whence it came?

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Which of those ended their respective conflicts?  I forget.

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Like I said, there is baggage for the MOST cost effective means of doing it. So we can settle on the second most cost effective and far more palatable to international relations.

Trust me, if big Army were willing and able to implement Nishapur 2.0 then by all means but I don't think your going to win the cost argument of doing that. Especially when you add in the PTSD nut and VA psychological expenses.

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One of these is not like the other..

“No Mission Too Difficult, No Sacrifice Too Great—Duty First!” 1st Infantry Division United States Army

"Damn the Torpedos" United States Navy Battle of Mobile

"Come on, you sons of bitches, do you want to live forever?" USMC Battle of Bella Woods

"You want to fight a war of attrition then the Army and Marine ground pounders are your go to sacrificial lambs. You can train a whole infantry company for far less than it cost for one fighter pilot." USAF

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The most valuable conventional munition dropped from an aircraft in the Pacific Theater was a naval mine.

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     “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.”
     
 ?    Upton Sinclair


That qoute isn't arguing for using the Army in attrition warfare. It is arguing against attrition warfare.

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The most valuable conventional munition dropped from an aircraft in the Pacific Theater was a naval mine.

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At this point we are debating the most cost effective means of existential warfare, are we not?

If we are going to go down the rabbit hole of graduated response, infantry is on that list as much as tactical air.

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Blockade is a legitimate application of Airpower, and this still isn't an argument for infantry.

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Which of those ended their respective conflicts?  I forget.

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And, if you go more than brainwashing deep, arguing against manned aircraft.

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"Airpower" you keep using that word....

The Air Force does for Airpower.  Therefore Airpower is what the Air Force does is a tautology.

why blockaide when you can just kill the people you are starving to death from the outset?

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     “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.”
     
 ?    Upton Sinclair


That qoute isn't arguing for using the Army in attrition warfare. It is arguing against attrition warfare.

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Humans are tenacious creatures, you need more then one tool in the toolbox.

Blockade is a pretty efficient means to that end if we are being honest with ourselves. To be blunt, its better then strategic nuclear weapons once the population density of an area drops beneath a certain threshold.

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why not have two standards of training and let the cheaper pilots and airframes conduct cas? There's no shortage of red blooded rednecks wanting to blow shit up

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How cheap of training should we have for pilots that are dropping bombs in the vicinity of friendly troops?

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So we should be spending a few million dollars each turning every mortar operator or artillery officer into demigods as well?

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Those privates on the tube have a much less elevated view of the battlefield.