Thanks folks, that makes more sense! 

USS Ponce was crewed by Civmar and had a Navy detachment. Puller will be the same way.

Idiotic article by someone who has no fucking clue about anything.

Huh, small world. We saw y'all when we were pulling in.

First of all it's a strait, not a straight.  Second, looking at the top speed of a DDG-51 class tells you nothing.  Third, being able to do trig and algebra are really not the only skills necessary to pilot a warship.  Third "waiving" things around isn't involved in a straits transit -- one we do hundreds of times a year without incident.  And finally, no, it's not a conspiracy and nobody spoofed anybody's GPS.

I'm drinking tonight, but must say it breaks my heart when servicemen die in service to this country. I've lost many friends in this business, as have many others  here. And the older I get, the harder it gets to swallow. I'm raising a glass tonight to those navy men. God bless America.

I was always surprised that there weren't midair collisions at the Boulevard entry point (while egressing Afghanistan).  All military aircraft (fighters, bombers, refuelers, reconaissance, cargo, etc) would enter basically the same point, same altitude, to get on the exit route leaving Afghanistan to return to their operating base (for those not taking off/landing from a base in AFG).  Huge funnel point, of many types of aircraft at different speeds.  TCAS yelled at us a few times there.  What a cluster.

The Boulevard entry point for ingress to AFG was rarely busy, at least it seemed that way for us.

His post is a runner up for most retarded post in this thread, second only to the guy that compared his video game to navigating a warship.

Just ran the AIS track video. From page 8. Couple of comments.  Had to run it a couple of times to get it load clearly and legibly.  Navy ships don't typically run with AIS enabled for what might be obvious reasons to some readers and incomprehensible to others.  I agree something happens at about the 50 second point.  The timing is that of the video, not sure how it relates to real time.  The video changes scale a couple of times.  I don't know how accurate the course and speed indications are.

In the area ahead of the ships I watched, the  SCF Tomsk enters from the "north" at a sharp angle then turns stbd to track with most of the traffic.  The Le Tong Patriot crosses south to north.  These tracks will be pretty obvious to most of the ships as they seem for at least some time to be clearly crossing the lanes at some points.  (If driving, these would be cars approaching an intersection on the cross street.  I'd think most of us would watch them more than cars driving along with us because of the possibility of blowing a stop sign or light, etc.)

Working up to the 50 sec. point, I spotted and watched several ships with a lot of interest.  The Kota Laris, Guang Zhou Wan, Team Oslo and Hyundai Global.  The Kota Laris is ahead of the pack and being overtaken.  The Guang Zhou Wan, Team Oslo and Hyundai Global are all astern of the Alnic MC and overtaking.  If you watch from about the 40 sec. point, the Team Oslo appears to overtake and be about abeam of the Alnic MC at about the 42-43 second point.  By 50, the Hyundai Global has overetaken on the port side and the Guang Zhou appears to be reacting, as well, perhaps slowing some as has the Alnic MC and also turning some to starboard, apparently maneuvering to miss what's going on ahead  with the Alnic MC.

Since the McCain doesn't show, it's not too clear what she was doing while this was going on.  It does suggest that the area was congested and that the Alnic MC may have had limited options when it came to slowing and/or maneuvering to avoid the McCain.  FWIW, this some of the info on the Hyndai, so it's not going to be capable of much evasive or tactical sorts of maneuvering .  Vessel HYUNDAI GLOBAL (IMO: 9393022, MMSI: 235069415) is a container ship built in 2009 and currently sailing under the flag of United Kingdom. HYUNDAI GLOBAL has 340m length overall and beam of 46m. Her gross tonnage is 94511 tons.  I'd expect the others could be looked up as well.

I haven't looked it up, but the ABC radio 0100 news insert  said that MCCAIN had a steering casualty and that they couldn't get backup systems online.   The report was pretty damn specific for a radio station, sounds like it's an engineering casualty and totally a bridge crew fubar.

From a CNN report
The warship suffered a steering failure as the warship was beginning its approach into the Strait of Malacca, causing it to collide with a commercial tanker Monday, a US Navy official told CNN. The official said it was unclear why the crew couldn't utilize the ship's backup steering systems to maintain control of ship.


derpNavy says it could have been a cyber attack. Link
In addressing the accident, Chief of Naval Operations US Admiral John Richardson accepted the possibility the ship may have been the target of a cyber attack.

Interesting stuff here.

Question for the Navy guys...

I am guessing that steering inputs can be electronically controlled from the bridge on newer ships, but there's an older way that involves voice commands to crew below decks that can control it mechanically. Would this be correct, or is there some kind of other system in place?

What would a backup steering system consist of?

There's backup steering available, in fact on my merchant vessel I had at least 4 different systems I could use to control steering at different locations on the vessel; including in the rudder room.

We had manual planes/rudder control on my boat but they were considered too dangerous to train with. In retrospect I imagine it was mostly the planes.

I'd expect multiple redundant systems.  Both to operate the system (probably hydraulic) and to communicate steering orders.  I was on an FF and IIRC, there were three helms - bridge, flying bridge, and on deck aft of the mack (mast/stack structure) and one in after steering, which could be cut in for direct control.  Each station had a magnetic compass and a gyro compass repeater.  There were redundant voice/telephone hook-ups, and even a way to manually pump the system.  After steering would be manned at GQ and when at Sea and Anchor Detail - the augmented watch team set for entering/leaving ports.  We periodically worked from all positions using all of the different systems and communications methods.

I couldn't/wouldn't comment on what kind of failure might have occurred.  We never had a catastrophic steering failure.  Having looked at the AIS tracking, I have trouble imagining a worse place to have one.

I once had a complete steering failure in a crowded channel...it was ugly. It was an absolute miracle no damage resulted. I also had a tanker have a steering failure and almost run me over going into Galveston, that was pretty hairy as well.

Ha! Bullshit. That is the most honest description of the SWO community i have ever read.. It echoes my input a few years ago when asked to provide community insight on a rash of collisions and groundings; we as a community do not put being a truly professional mariner first. Not much has changed.
20 year SWO who still works directly with the fleet, daily at a numbered fleet.

The vessel could be maneuvered with no rudder what so ever by changing from froward to reverse on either the port or starboard propeller and varying speed. However, maneuvering a ship that size with only gear, thruster or prop pitch changes would be slow to react and could get out of hand pretty quick.
For instance. Emergency movement to STBD with no rudder- STBD propeller full reverse and Port prop full ahead. Ship would start to alter to STBD but depending on several variables the person giving the commands or directing the input to controls could potentially make things worse if their timing is off on the duration and speed of those maneuvers.
The input to control surfaces and engine, transmission or pitch changes is not instantly apparent on large ships.
There is a mental and physical dissconect from input to reaction.
The high performance Sport boats I normally run are (example) 72' x 21' but I have 3600-4000 HP available and the input to controls is almost instantaneous.
I crashed the shit out of a 900' cruise ship on the simulator. You are making judgement calls and control surface decisions minutes ahead of time and waiting and watching to see the reaction. It is easy to make a minor mistake that has large concquences 20 minutes later.

Gas turbine powered warships with controllable, reversible pitch props are very responsive. Might well have been an option unless rudder was stuck hard over, then all bets are off.

I've never set foot on a DDG, but I was on a turbine/diesel powered cutter for a few years, and did experience a few steering casualties.

Backups would involve switching to a second pump, then locally operating a trick wheel or helm locally on the steering gear itself, and finally rigging a manually cranked pump. Assuming system intact we could switch pumps instantly, utilize the trick wheel as fast as we could get the BMOW to aft steering to man the sound powered phones, or switch to manually crank in about 15 minutes then start making rudder changes to the tune of 2 degrees per minute.

BUT. When we experienced our steering casualty on turbines (lost steering pump) the rudders went hard over 35 degrees and we got thrown against the bulkhead. I've also had the bridge crew simply bump into the steering selector switch, kill steering, get no response, and declare a steering casualty. That's always fun. My chief loved getting out of bed at 2am to inspect the steering system just because SN Timmy has bony knees.

I feel certain that TheFringe's comment was political humor.

Hard to tell, but it looked to my unexperienced eye that, assuming McCain was going right to left in comparison to those ships direction of travel, that Guang Zhou made a turn to starboard to pass aft of McCain.

It should also be noted that, unlike Fitz, McCain was hit on the red light side.

Experience as an A Ganger on a Spru-can and a Tico here:


If the bridge lost steering control, I'd haul ass to aft steering along with an electrician and a couple of Boatswain's Mates. We could steer the ship from there in several ways. First choice was the ASCU, then the trickwheels, then hand pumps. If all else failed we'd lock the rudders with the ratchets and steer with the CRPs.

Aft steering should probably have been manned already.

Was the ship at restricted maneuvering when this happened?

Should have been at sea and anchor.

Than I can't see a steering casualty cause this.

Depends on the type of casualty and expertise of the watchstander in aft steering.  There are casualties that could be very difficult to control there, especially if the watchstander is in experienced.

But who knows, we're speculating and don't really know anything yet.

You're not just tracking 50 or 60 surface contacts in your immediate vicinity; you're also tracking every single surface that you can see some of which might be many miles away. In addition you're also tracking every single aircraft that you can see out to several hundred miles. You're also maintaining a data link(s) as well as a SONAR picture. All of these things take up system resources. The biggest bottleneck in all this information isn't the software or hardware it's the humans.

Human beings have to interpret all of this data and make decisions; they're not always right. What the merchant seamen, and the armchair captains don't understand and realize is that the SWO has to pay attention to a lot more and be a lot more versed in things other than just seamanship. It's called a warship for a reason; the Navy's primary purpose is war fighting on the high seas. In the civilian world they don't need to know things like anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, over the horizon targeting, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical warfare, naval gun fire support, anti-piracy, mine and counter mine operations, air operations, steaming in formation, etc....

When transiting something like this OOD/JOOD/TAO etc... aren't just paying attention to all the surface contacts, they are paying attention to the air picture, the sub surface picture, the MK-1 eyeball picture, as well as navigation data from AIS, GPS, RADAR and Compass Bearing navigation, the last two assume that you're close enough to land to make them work. It's a lot of information to absorb and process especially if they lack experience that normally comes with being a JO. In the midst of all of this each and every one of them are all thinking the same thing over and over: "Please not on my watch, please not on my watch, please not on my watch."

Your typical mariner who spends a lot of time on the high seas might be better at seamanship than your typical SWO but warships aren't just about moving goods/people from point A to B; they're about fighting. When it comes to training and experience there's only so much time and something has to give. In the past decade nearly 1,200 civilian merchant vessels have been lost; in the same time frame zero US Naval warships have been lost. In fact you have to go back to the year 2000 when the USS La Moure County ran aground in Chile to find a US Naval warship that has been lost at sea.

I'm not defending the McCain or its crew, and I'm not criticizing because we still don't know what happened. It's possible they screwed the pooch and it's possible they did everything right; the sea is a fickle mistress in that regard.

A better video game analogy is Frogger.

https://www.yahoo.com/gma/navy-bodies-found-uss-mccain-collision-115004059--abc-news-topstories.html

Looks like they located some of the remains of the missing sailors.

There are a few electronic links to the steering engines, but final emergency control involves having a guy physically standing at the hydraulic engine with a six inch diameter steering wheel. As emergency after steering helmsman you have said wheel, a rudder angle indicator, a gyro compass repeater, and a headset. A guy on the other end of the headset will tell you which direction to drive and you kinda just hope he can see where we're going cause you sure can't, standing in an enclosed box, below the waterline, facing backwards.

Thank you for typing all that out, and for your perspective.  I suspect you've hit upon the root of the problem, and it's hard for most to understand the information overload people in these roles experience.

Throttle steering is not always an option. Did your simulator ever portray your steering engine malfunctioning and jamming the rudders (plural) against the stops so now you're stuck with 40 degrees left rudder?

And you're spot on, anticipation of even your own ship's movements, let alone everyone else, is a major training point. I was instructing a Lt. JG on the helm for his conning qual. His previous ship was a 3k ton FFG and he was initially confused at the lack of responsiveness from the 40k ton LHD.

"in the past decade nearly 1,200 civilian merchant vessels have been lost; in the same time frame zero US Naval warships have been lost. In fact you have to go back to the year 2000 when the USS La Moure County ran aground in Chile to find a US Naval warship that has been lost at sea."

Not so fast.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Guardian_(MCM-5)

Chainsawed to bits and hauled to the dump.

With variable pitch twin screws I wouldn't think a steering casualty would ever be much of an event? I'll defer to the surface guys to correct my ignorance if need be.

There are steering casualties that can drive a rudder all the way to the stops and hold it there, and take a bit of work to recover from.  Depends on the expertise level of the after steering watch.

I know a lot of SWOs who want to be at sea.

I don't know many who consider themselves tactical experts outside Aegis core tactics / Air Warfare - maybe TLAM, not because they don't want to do that, but because they don't have time to do that.

The surface community has gutted its accession training over the past 15 years.  They sacrificed SWOS in Newport and replaced it with computer-based training to be completed on one's first ship.  The community ignored lessons learned 40 years before when it became clear that the increasing pace of technology made training only by OJT ineffective.  The surface community junior officers (and department heads and XOs) spend way too much time on material readiness - fighting the 'battle of Norfolk' - and not enough on seamanship and tactics.  

Material condition matters a lot, but senior enlisted should be running that program, training their JOs how to spot check and inspect.  In the late 90s and early 00s, the Navy made a big deal about ships getting underway with all-enlisted bridge and CIC watch teams, cool for those who got to qualify, but a fundamental mis-prioritization of resources IMO, because at the same time the Navy pushed the micromanagement of the battle of Norfolk further into the officer ranks.  Advanced tactical training?  Sure, the Navy stood up SMWDC back in 2014 and it's stil not fully staffed.  The quality of instruction is uneven across mission areas, but at least it's headed somewhere...until we cannibalize the manpower for some other emergent initiative.

Finally, the surface community's career path has an unofficial mantra of "At Sea or DC", where hot running mid-grade officers are shuttled into lower risk command tours with an eye towards getting them back onto the OPNAV staff as junior O6s as quickly as possible.  Tactical proficiency is not valued at any level and a command tour is something you survive in order to do 'greater things' on a major staff somewhere.  It's sad.

Let me know when you're back this way. I'll make a fruit plate.

Very responsive is relative.

I'll be interested to read the report if it's ever publicly available.  I've little doubt that some questionable decisions were made during the incident, but I have a feeling that they're the kind of decisions that I'd have a hard time crucifying someone over.  Sometimes you have mere moments to make a decision with less than full input/data and once you've made that choice, you're committed fully.  In a crowded strait like that I can see how making a move (e.g. speed) to avoid one contact puts you afoul of a 2nd that you weren't able to fully consider when the decision had to be made.  The bridge could well have made a speed change/choice under the belief that manual maneuvering control was imminent when it wasn't.

I stand corrected. A 1:1200 ratio is still pretty good all things considered.

From the enlisted perspective, can't say I really blame them. Seaman (or Ensign) Timmy can get you on the cover of navy times.

Divers find bodies during search for ten missing sailors aboard the flooded compartments of USS John S. McCain

Link

lol no kidding

i worked on systems for Unisiys and GE at Moorestown.  Might be uncool to cook sea birds out there....

eta

God bless the deceased...

That is a statistic that means nothing.  How many civilian merchant vessels are there compared to US Navy ships?  How many cumulative steaming days for each type?  In peacetime the absence of a profit motive typically biases military operations much more towards safety than civilian counterparts - for example, guy who fly oil rig support fly in weather that would shut down flight ops for just about anyone but the Coast Guard on an actual rescue mission.

Fuck

Having come from the aviation side of the Navy, that sounds like a terribly designed failure mode and instrument control placement. A switch like that on an airplane would have some kind of flip up cover on it.

On F-18 rudders, stabilators and ailerons would feather if hydraulics were lost.

Flaps and slats would stick though because they were rotary driven.

I guess the Chief of Naval Operations US Admiral John Richardson has no clue.

1st it was a steering gear issue, then it was an electronic problem, now its hacking possibility.