Omg 3

I was told years ago by a Navy guy that a WWII battleship could hit the football field in a stadium virtually every time at 20 miles, and never hit the parking lot.  If true, that is pretty freakin' impressive!

Years ago, there was a TV show called "Battle Wagon against Battle Wagon" of WWII that maybe pertinent to this post.  I did a google and came up with zilch.

IIRC, the Musashi fired hers at the aircraft that eventually sunk her.



The pilots were on record commenting that the Japs tended to not lead them enough, and the shells burst behind the attacking formations.



 

About what I'd expect too...



And I'd assume that the Harpoon is a shaped-charge/HEAP type warhead, not blast-frag....



 

I know very little about USN surface to surface missiles, but I'd be very surprised if they had only one warhead for the Harpoon.

Hitting a target was not dumb luck.  Fire control personnel track the target.  They are keeping the target centered either by radar or optical systems.  They develop firing solutions.  These constantly change, and the information is updated and sent to the turrets.  During WWII this information was passed to a series of dials in the turret.  There is a point on the dial which represents where the target is. As the ship pitches and rolls these dials move too.  In the turret there are people who watch these dials.  A concentric ring in the dial show the position of the guns in that turret.  The personnel in the turret are tasked with keeping the two little points facing each other.  A person with his hand on a pistol grip assembly pulls the trigger when ordered and the shell goes on it's way.  Hits are more the result of teamwork than dumb luck.

During the action of 14-15 November 1942 the 5" guns were aimed at the searchlights on the Japanese ships.  This helps explain the hit pattern on the Kirishima.  It was also good very strategy.  5" shell would not really penetrate the armor belt of the Kirishima but could render the ship blind and leaderless.  It was not until shells actually started hitting the Kirishima that the Japanese became aware that the Washington was even there.  The captain of the South Dakota made several errors during the battle.  The biggest being sailing his ship between some burning American destroyers and the Japanese fleet.  The Washington was in front of he South Dakota and steered to the other side but for some reason the South Dakota did not.  Two things happened as a result.  The South Dakota gave away it's presence and the Washington lost track of her.  

The radar on the Washington was incorrectly installed.  Because of this she had no rear looking capabilities.  During installation, this was pointed out to the installation techs and they were shown where the radar could be mounted to provide a full 360 degree sweep.  But the instructions they had told them where to install it and orders were orders.  Because the South Dakota was in this blind spot Admiral Lee would not allow the Washington gunners to open fire on the large target they were tracking until he was absolutely sure it was not the South Dakota.  Only when the Japanese ships turned on their spotlights and started shooting at the South Dakota did he give the order to fire.  The Washington sank a battleship and a destroyer that night.  After losing the Kirishima the admiral of the Japanese fleet became so unnerved that he reversed course.  Their original plan was to land reinforcements while the battleships and cruisers shelled Henderson Field.  The reinforcements were delayed until daylight and were slaughtered by American planes operating out of Henderson Field.  Only something like 2,500 of 12,5000 reached Guadalcanal and these had no arms or supplies with them.

After the Japanese fleet turned, Admiral Lee ordered a withdrawal.   He was keenly aware of how lucky they and been and the Washington now had the only remaining undamaged American capital ship in the South Pacific.  He also knew that the troop transports would not reach Guadalcanal and they could be handled by airplanes from Henderson field.  Many of these pilots were from the Enterprise which was undergoing emergency repairs at that time.  Their airplanes were sent to Henderson Field so they could still be of some use.  As the Washington turned to withdraw some long lance torpedoes exploded in her wake about 200 yards off her bow.  This caused the Japanese to believe that they had actually it the Washington.  

Because of the above mentioned electrical  problems and after taking some battle damage the South Dakota withdrew from the battle leaving the Washington in what we would call today a target rich environment.  Of course these targets were armed to the teeth too.  they still had an undamaged battleship some cruisers and their destroyers.  The Admiral of the Japanese fleet was harshly criticized for not continuing to press the issue.  He was removed from command.   To top it all off when the South Dakota returned to the states for repairs,  the captain of the South Dakota wrote an article for Life magazine where he gave his ship credit for sinking several ships that night including the Kirishima.  The article he wrote was entitled "Battleship X"  and was very popular in the states.   After this became known on the Washington there was such bad blood between the crews that if both ships were in port at the same time they could not allow their crews liberty at the same time.  

My father served on the Washington as a gun captain and my father-in-law was a Marine on Guadalcanal at the time.  He actually watched the battle as did several Marines.  To them they hardest part was after the battles were over.  They had no idea who won and did not want to think what a loss would mean for them.

It is the same blast-frag warhead used in orginal ATACMs unitary.   The warhead was designed to detonate from the inside of the target, so no need for a shaped charge.

The Big Mo:



http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

That is a valid point. When we look at the Kirov, we must look at the Mo that would be its refitted contemporary. It does change the paradigm. Chief, did you ever get a chance to play the NAVTAG wargaming system back in the day?  We simulated a lot of conflicts like this when I was a mid.

Didn't the Japanese battleship have bigger guns and more armor?

I voted the Jap ship, but at that level of excellence I think it would depend on the crew.

fucking harpoons couldn't even sink an old DDG. they had to put scuttling charges on her to sink her.



http://www.timjacobs.com/navy_worden.htm



you guys that think a few harpoons are gonna fuck up a battleship are fucking crack heads. seriously. do you guys know what it took to sink Yamato and it sister ship?



a fucking shitload of American airplanes with alot of bombs and torpedos. 12 bombs and 7 torpedoes. and compared to her sister ship Musashi she went down like a little bitch. Musashi took 17 bombs and 19 torpedos!



i swear every battleship thread is always filled with "the a couple of harpoons will sink it" tards.
 

USS Missouri.

When I think blast-frag, I think Surface to Air missile. I don't think delayed detonation, like the Harpoon.

So ATACMs stole Harpoon's warhead?

First and foremost, we're talking about Harpoons vs the Kirov, not the Yamato. The Kirov is a nuclear powered cruiser, not a battleship. Not only that he is a Russian ship with poor damage control and missile launchers everywhere. A couple of Harpoons can easily mission kill a Kirov. That's all that's needed.

Further, I'm not a "crack head" i'm a TAO qualified Surface Warfare Officer (look it up).

So while every battleship thread may have a "harpoon will sink it tard" this thread has its own type of special poster.

Yes it was an available warhead that could handle the shock required to allow somewhat deep earth penetration.

That is pretty funny.    

I had to google the name in order to jog my memory.  

vmax84

Are you talking to me or joshki?

Joshki, but the same question goes for you. I really enjoyed those NAVTAG exercises.
Edit: I looked up in the thread and I seed whut I deed there. Sorry.  Got wrapped around the quote tree.

What's TAO?





 

For reference, South Dakota was engaged by at least 1 battleship and 2 cruisers...while dead in the water....on 14 Nov 1942.   She took 42 hits.   She steamed to New York City under her own power, arriving on 18 Dec.   She was repaired and back at sea on 25 Feb 1943.

The South Dakotas could take a beat down.

Loss of power in the battle with Kirishima and the cruisers was due to an engine room switchboard error....not battle damage.

I'll take the faster, more manuverable Missouri with good fire control any day over the Yamato.

But:

Murphy is a bitch, and anything can happen.

That's like saying I"m giong into a deul with a .22 and my opposition has a .357 but I have an extra pint of blood in my pocket so I'll come out on top.  

Whoever sighted the other one first and got the first shot in.  Normally that would favor the Missouri with radar, but it's not a given.

More like "And I'm an experienced combat vet and master IDPA shooter".
 

It would be an awesome scrap

Missouri in that conflict was not being utilized so much as a surface combatant but as a credible nuclear delivery vehicle. Its goal would be to survive long enough to deliver a nuclear payload. It would however soak up a lot of ASM fire in the process, fire which would otherwise go towards more credible surface combatants. I also dare say that she would fare ASM hits far better then the surface combatants that would otherise be getting them. Missouri in that fight exists only to disrupt the N-Force law dynamic by presenting a target that absolutely must be dealt with as quickly as possible.

Is this the picture in question???

Missouri

This is an excellent website––biggest advantage being fire control.  Ih have nothing to do with it but find it fascinating.


http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm


'Composite Score' is the sum of the weighted scores for each category. The individual category scores equal (Overall Rating * Weighting Factor). In other words, a score of '10' in a category with a weight of '4' is worth 40 points towards the composite score.

Some discussion is obviously in order here, because my scoring runs counter to some of the established and accepted 'battleship lore' out there. For instance, my scoring indicates that King George V was a pretty close match for Bismarck in a stand-up fight. So, if this was such an even fight, why did Prince of Wales break off her action with Bismarck, instead of just duking it out in a manly fashion? There are a few things to remember in this regard. First; this comparison shows a King George V-class battleship in a late-war configuration equipped with Type 274 radar; a luxury the Prince of Wales did not enjoy in 1940, but which would have been a huge equalizer later in the war. If one assumes British fire control to be equal or slightly inferior to the Germans in 1940, Bismarck starts looking better again. Second; the British had little idea that Bismarck was as tough a low-angle target as she was, and thus closed the range to come to grips with her (which, had she made it that far, also would have reduced Hood's exposure to high-angle deck hits - a vulnerability the British were acutely aware of, and another reason why they tried to close the range with Bismarck as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, they cut their intercept course too fine, and couldn't run the gauntlet before Hood was fatally hit). In retrospect, a ship like King George V is better off fighting Bismarck at long range, where the German ship's own vulnerability to high-angle fire would be heightened. Third, of course, is the fact that Prince of Wales was suffering from teething problems in her main mounts, to put it mildly, and was not getting nearly the output of shells she might have enjoyed in a late-war engagement when all the bugs with the British 14"/45 mount had been worked out. Late-war, at long range, with blindfire radar fire-control, and turrets working, I believe King George V was a decent match for the Bismarck.

Second, I'm saying that South Dakota would have usually whipped the Bismarck. Not only that, but if handled correctly, she ought to have had a better-than-even shot against Yamato, a statement that on the face of it seems absurd! Yamato was fully 27,000+ tons heavier, had much thicker armor, and possessed the largest naval rifles ever mounted afloat. However, the American ship had the world's best fire-control system, a fantastic armor belt, and guns which delivered very large projectiles at high-angle trajectories which could go through thicker deck plates than Yamato's 18.1" shells. Again, fire-control and the ship's fighting instructions become crucial. If the American stays at range (30,000-35,000 yards), she should be able to deliver many more hits to Yamato than she receives in return, because she can both shoot and maneuver (due to her much better stable vertical fire-control system elements). Further, Yamato's internal subdivision is not as good as SoDak's, and American hits are therefore likely to be more damaging than the Japanese. On the other hand, historically the Americans had little idea of Yamato's capabilities, and were likely to have attempted to close the range with her, not knowing the extent of her armoring, or that she was, in fact, armed with truly enormous 18.1" guns, rather than the 16" guns everyone on the American side of the lake assumed was the case. Closing the range with Yamato would likely have resulted in the American ship learning a painful lesson in gunfire supremacy. South Dakota's belt is better than Yamato's (barely), but at close range Yamato's guns have much better penetration. Further, Yamato's secondaries are very powerful, and would have begun to take a possible toll on SoDak's exposed radars and fire-control equipment, which would reduce her advantage in fire-control substantially if disabled. The bottom line is that South Dakota is a boxer, and should maintain her distance from a slugger like Yamato. Under the right circumstances, however, she was perfectly capable of dishing out critical damage to her hulking opponent.

GENERAL COMMENTS: The bottom line is that, after 1943 or so, having the world's best optical fire-control systems was largely irrelevant. The night battle between Washington and Kirishima near Savo pretty much settled the point; good radar usually beats good optics in a stand-up fight. And the radar used by Washington off of Guadalcanal was not as good as the sets fitted aboard Iowa.6

Then there's the fact that all radar fire-control is not created equal. Radar operating at meter or decimeter wavelengths is useful for ranging, but lacks the angular accuracy necessary for training. In practical terms, this means that a decimetric set can develop a range solution via radar, but must rely on an optical director to supply training information for the battery. This hybrid fire-control solution is, of course, limited by the quality of the optics available, and also by the visual horizon (which is closer than the radar horizon), and weather conditions. Only with the advent of 10cm and (later) 3cm wavelength sets was true 'blindfire' radar fire-control achievable, wherein the firing ship need never come into visual range of the opposing vessel. The Germans, Japanese, and Italians never developed sets of this capability (both the Japanese (despite its 10cm wavelength) and German sets were usable for fire control against a battleship-sized target only out to a range of about 27,000 yards.) The bottom line is, then, that the Allied vessels, and particularly Iowa and South Dakota, would enjoy an enormous advantage in gunfire control over their adversaries. She would have the ability to lob shells over the visual horizon, and would also perform better in complete darkness or adverse weather conditions.

The final adjusted rating also reflects the fact that American FC systems employed by far the most advanced stable vertical elements in the world. In practical terms, this meant that American vessels could keep a solution on a target even when performing radical maneuvers. In 1945 test, an American battleship (the North Carolina) was able to maintain a constant solution even when performing back to back high-speed 450-degree turns, followed by back-to-back 100-degree turns.7 This was a much better performance than other contemporary systems, and gave U.S. battleships a major tactical advantage, in that they could both shoot and maneuver, whereas their opponents could only do one or the other.

Fire Control: Optical                     YamatoIowaSouth Dakota
Main Rangefinder Base Length15 meters13.5 meters13.5
Turret Rangefinder Base Length15 meters13.5 meters13.5 meters
Quality of Optics                     107?7?
RPC (training,elevation)                   No, NoYes, YesYes, Yes
Night-Fighting Optics                   107?7?
Overall Optics Rating                   1077
Fire Control: Radar                YamatoIowaSouth Dakota
Gun-Control Radar                  Mk 2, Mod 2Mk 13Mk 13
Wavelength                                     10cm3cm3cm
Power Output                   2kW50kW50kW
Capability                                       Limited FCBlindfireBlindfire
Raw Radar FC Rating                 5                     1010
Overall Fire Control Rating551010

Thanks, that is it.

tactical action officer. I think the TAO has authority to act on his own when it comes to the ship's self defense aka doesn't need to get the CO's permission(i think...)

I have heard they referred to the South Dakota as the "Shitty Dick" because of that.

My Grandfather was on the USS Pensacola, NEVER heard him say a good thing about the USS South Dakota, it was always expletives.  He told me when I was a kid that he saw one of it's double 5" gun turrets shot right off in one battle.   He said that ship was bad luck to be around!!!

Now ask him about the USS Washington, nothing but praise for the ship and its crew.  He loved the fact it shot the living shit out of the Japs, any ship good at killing Japs was good in his book.

I read that also in Ivan Musicant's Battleship at War. Several interesting parts of the book stand out in my mind. One was the surpise of the crew when talking to their counterparts from HMS King Goerge V that the brits felt closing the range as soon as possible and trade broadsides as a effective tactic in battleship combat. The amount of effort and practice the Washington's crew put into gunnery. This should not be a surprise considering the purpose of a battleship but of all the books I have read on naval warfare the crew of the Washington seemed to mention and stress it's importance more than any other I have read about.  

I met a vet who was aboard South Dakota the night she was hit by Kirishima and the cruisers.
When I asked him if he felt the hits he said "Hell yeah, one sounded like a gong and all the lights went out". He told me the scariest part was not knowing what was happening while setting in the dark.

Admiral Lee who used Washington as his flagship was a Gold Medal winner in the Olympics for shooting sports . 5 Gold, 1 Silver and 1 Bronze..http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willis_Augustus_Lee



CW

It's my understanding that when the battle was over, the press was allowed to mention the SD because it was headed back for repairs and the other ships weren't named due to OPSEC.  Which meant the SD got all the press and won the battle all by itself.  I've read that the Navy wouldn't allow the Washington & SD's crews on shore leave at the same time due to the fights that would break out.

Not quite accurate...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Battle_of_Guadalcanal
"...Washington passed through the area still occupied by the damaged and sinking U.S. destroyers and fired on Ayanami with her secondary batteries, setting her afire. Following close behind, South Dakota suddenly suffered a series of electrical failures, ...making her radar, radios, and most of her gun batteries inoperable. However, she continued to follow Washington towards the western side of Savo Island until 23:35, when Washington changed course left to pass to the southward behind the burning destroyers. South Dakota tried to follow but had to turn to right to avoid Benham which resulted in the ship being silhouetted by the fires of the burning destroyers and made her a closer and easier target for the Japanese.[99]... ... Almost blind and unable to effectively fire her main and secondary armament, South Dakota was illuminated by searchlights and targeted by gunfire and torpedoes by most of the ships of the Japanese force, including Kirishima, beginning about 00:00 on November 15 ....The Japanese ships continued to concentrate their fire on South Dakota and none detected Washington approaching to within 9,000 yards (8.2 km). Washington was tracking a large target (Kirishima) for some time but refrained from firing since there was a chance it could be South Dakota. ... When the Japanese illuminated and fired on South Dakota, all doubts were removed as to which ships were friend or foe. From this close range, Washington opened fire and quickly hit Kirishima with at least nine main battery shells and almost forty secondary ones, causing heavy damage and setting her aflame.""

The crews reportedly did hate each other.  

Casualties on the South Dakota were 39 killed and 59 wounded.  There was no reportable damage to the Washington.  

In fact, the Washington ended the war with no casualties due to enemy action, although several sailors on Washington were later killed when she rammed the USS Indiana during underway replenishment (Indiana's captain admitted responsibility).

There was a feeling on the part of the South Dakota crew that they would have suffered fewer casualties if Washington had engaged the Kirishima and the cruisers before South Dakota was surrounded and jacklighted while dead in the water.   There was also a belief, unjustified, that Washington  was held back because she was serving as Lee's flagship.  

Reports at the time were that Washington was unable to aid South Dakota sooner because she was unsure which radar contact was South Dakota and which were Japanese.  Given that South Dakota was surrounded and had no electrical power to communicate her position, the story is believable.    

Tough to explain that to the crews though.

Yeah, primitive computers that compensated for pitch, roll and yaw of the firing platform, speed and bearing of both ships, and several other factors. (IIRC)

I have more capability in my phone now, but it's still amazing accuracy.

It did not "Damn near sink" the South Dakota.

Doc, et al.  I played that NAVTAG game every chance we had.  When I was serving in Goldsborough, I was a TAO.  Damn fine one too...especially since I was the LDO (Loud-Dumb-&-Obnoxious).





Missouri in a walk.



TAO is that officer, assigned in writing by the CO who has, in the absence of the CO, weapons release authority.  He directs the actions of the ship from CIC.  He orders course changes, coordinate sensors and weapons, and oversees the battle by working with the Ships Weapons Coordinator (SWC).  Like the CO, he usually controls by negation.  We used to be required to memorize the TAO (battle intel) handbook.  For example, we had to be able to recognize a threat emitter, the associated platform and its tactical capabilities and limitations, the associated weapons and their details, and which of our own assets could be used to greatest effect against the threats.  The TAO is on watch during condition 3 steaming or during GQ.

I think they call him the TIC on the BMDS ships now.





 

The IJN Kirishima was mostly loaded down with High Capacity aka bombardment ammo, so she didn't have the optimal ammo for a ship-to-ship slug fest.

Beat me to the photo's from the Navy yard.
Yes guys, two inches don't matter if you can hit the target.

IIRC correctly from the tour, it was like 17 or 27 different factors. Including rotation of the planet.

Google "Kirishima scuttled". I remember reading it many years ago as I was into this stuff (still am). Accounts vary as to HOW she was scuttled (i.e. torpedoed or opening flood valves) but almost all concur she was indeed scuttled. Now, I'm not saying it wouldn't have gone down from the damage sustained but just that the Japs DID order the scuttling.



Also, I looked at the one link here of the specific hit areas of the various shells on the Kirishima. Did the U.S. Navy specifically target the waterline or was it "luck"? Were the distances of that night considered "point blank" range for battleships?  

The japanese 18.1 inch AP shell only penetrated a little better than the 16" American Super-heavy AP shell.

The Kirov isn't equipped with anything capable of penetrating an Iowa class - all its weaposn are designed to attack carriers.  Carriers have much less armor.

Its Dave_A - he has a near perfect record for being wrong about stuff he thinks he knows....

IronBack is thinking of the Shinano - the third monster BB that the Japanese finished as a carrier, and was torpedoed on its maiden voyage.

Google "Kirishima's battle damage", NAVWEAPONS website has the Sep 2010 US Navy assessment on the engagement in .pdf.