I think it's a combination of soft, muddy, ground, sometimes snow and also all the winter clothing absorbing some of the blast and frag. Although I am sure they suffered more wounds then the vids indicate.

Before this war, I assumes that a grenade going off within 5-6' would kill or severely wound. But "it depends"...

Interesting.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 10, 2024

…

The Kremlin may be instructing actors in the Russian-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria to set information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria as part of wider Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova. The Transnistrian Ministry of State Security (MGB) issued a press release on January 10 claiming that an “incident” occurred on January 7 during which “two Transnistrian citizens were transferred to the territory of Ukraine” but that authorities are clarifying the circumstances of the “incident.”[18] The MGB is a Russian-dominated organization that is commonly understood to be a “department of the Russian FSB (Federal Security Service)” that likely takes orders directly from Moscow.[19] Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky on January 9 wherein he claimed that Moldova’s “militarization” threatens Transnistria, blamed Moldova for halting negotiations with Transnistria, and emphasized Transnistria’s “extensive” cooperation agreements with Russia.[20] Krasnoselsky’s interview was likely part of efforts to set information conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova and justifying any future Russian campaigns in the region.[21] The MGB’s January 10 press release is likely also part of such Kremlin efforts.

The Kremlin likely attempted to set information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria in April 2022 and February 2023 but failed in part for economic reasons.[25] CTP previously assessed that the Kremlin was unable to draw Transnistria into its war in Ukraine at the time because Transnistrian businesses – notably those of Moldovan-Russian businessman Viktor Gushan, who effectively controls Transnistria’s government and a large part of its economy – benefited from ties with the West and Ukraine.[26] The EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement with Moldova allowed Transnistrian businesses registered in Moldova to enjoy tariff-free access to EU markets as long as they followed Moldovan custom checks.[27] Recent changes to the Moldovan Customs Code that require Transnistrian businesses to pay import customs duties to Moldova may have disrupted these benefits.[28] Moldova has also indicated in recent months its willingness to initially join the EU without Transnistria, which would further deprive Transnistrian businesses of special access to EU markets.[29]

The Kremlin may also be reviving its efforts to leverage Transnistria to create instability in Moldova in order to undermine Ukrainian grain exports along the western coast of the Black Sea. Reuters reported on January 10 that Romania’s Black Sea port of Constanta recorded 36 million metric tons of shipped grain in 2023 – a record high - and that about 40 percent of these shipments consisted of Ukrainian grain.[30] ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian strikes against Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets forced Russian naval operating patterns to change and forced the BSF to move some ships away from its main base in occupied Sevastopol in western Crimea.[31] Ukrainian strikes against BSF assets have also successfully facilitated the civilian use of Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor as international support for the corridor continues to increase despite Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and military threats against it. The Kremlin may view a false flag operation in Transnistria as an alternative way to deter countries from participating in Ukraine’s grain corridor despite Russia’s weakened presence in the western Black Sea.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2024

It may be interesting and useful if the UA posted enemy surrenders in their daily kill tally. I would think it would be much easier to get an accurate number of EPW's than KIA.

How many tanks are left in Russia?



How many tanks are left in Russia? A question that comes up very often in discussions, and to which it is simply impossible to find an exact answer - probably even Shoigu and Gerasimov do not know it. However, attempts to count tanks do not stop. Today we will analyze one of them - the report of the French OSINT cell ARI, published on August 31, 2023.

The French tried to figure out how many tanks the Russians have at storage bases. It must be said that the numbers here are very "jumping" - for example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated this number in 2022 at as many as 17.5 thousand tanks, including 200 T-90, 3 thousand T-80, 7 thousand T- 72, 2 thousand T-64, 2.5 thousand T-62 and 2.8 thousand T-55. However, these calculations are very inaccurate, because they are based on an estimate of the number of tanks produced during the USSR.

Estimates from last year's Military Balance yearbook are much more modest: approximately 2,000 tanks in service and up to 5,000 in storage. However, its authors take into account models from the T-62 and higher - but in reality, the grasshoppers not only have hundreds of T-54/55 in their warehouses, but are already using them at the front! It is interesting that in 2022, Military Balance wrote about as many as 13.7 thousand Russian tanks, but even in this case it did not count the T-54/55.

In their calculations, ARI specialists used satellite images taken between April and September 2021. They were supplemented with information from social networks. Calculations were made for ten central storage bases out of 22 available in the Russian Federation - they are the ones where, according to estimates, 95% of tanks are concentrated.

So, what did you manage to calculate? 5,538 tanks, of which 4,347 are identified by type. It is clear that we are talking about tanks that are stored under the open sky. There are also canopies and boxes at the researched bases, the capacity of which is estimated at 1,950 cars. However, part of these premises must be allocated for repairs, and part is probably occupied not by tanks, but by other machines. Taking into account the above, the number of tanks in storage can be estimated at a maximum of 7,000, but probably around 6,000.



What types have been identified? These are 750 T-80 tanks (mainly BV and UD versions), 1,945 T-72 (mostly non-modernized T-72B, as well as T-72A and T-72), 1,239 T-62 (including many T -62M) and 413 T-54/55. Three quarters of them are tanks produced before 1980. The situation with the T-64 is a bit unclear - the French write that they did not count them, because due to a lack of spare parts, these tanks will not be able to be returned to service. There are no T-90s either - although there should be some amount of them at the storage bases, after all. Maybe they were counted together with the T-72?

The breakdown of types of tanks by district is also interesting. In the Western Military District, these are T-80U/UE-1, T-80BV, T-80UD and T-72. In Central - older T-72 and remnants of T-64. In the East - some T-80, the bulk of T-62, as well as T-54/55.

Attention was also drawn to the tank repair capabilities of the Russian Federation. Currently, 10 large military equipment repair factories are operating across the country, two of which are deployed from repair bases. Three of them repair tanks. To this should be added "Omsktransmash", which used to manufacture T-80 tanks, and now repairs them and modernizes them to the level of T-80BVM.

The pace of work, according to ARI , is significantly lower than Russian propaganda says. For example, the 103rd Armored Tank Repair Plant in Transbaikalia is able to restore an average of 8 T-62 tanks every month: at the beginning of March 2023, the army handed over about 40 such tanks, the repair of which began in October 2022. At the same time, Russian publications talk about the monthly repair of 22-23 tanks here.

The 61st armored personnel carrier in St. Leninburg repairs 30-60 tanks a year. The 163rd armored personnel carrier (Krasnodar Territory), implementing previously concluded contracts, repaired 24 T-72 tanks and 100 BMP-2 tanks in one year (apparently 2021?). The situation at Omsktransmash is illustrated by satellite photos: in November 2022, there were about 100 tanks awaiting repair; in May 2023, the queue almost doubled. The recovery time of one tank raised from the storage base is very dependent on its preservation. For cars in worse condition, it reaches three to four months. Often, for recovery, you have to resort to cannibalizing other machines.

"Uralvagonzavod" in 2011-2021 modernized about 1,240 T-72B tanks to the T-72B3M standard (and derivatives). However, in 2021, the pace of modernization has significantly decreased - ARI considers this to be a consequence of the depletion of T-72B tanks that are subject to renewal. In the peak period, up to 300 tanks were modernized per year, then this number decreased to 120, and now it has dropped to zero. Instead, "Uralvagonzavod" focused on the production of T-90M, and to a large extent not new, but modernized from previous modifications of T-90.

According to ARI estimates, the Russian industry is able to produce about 390 tanks a year, including new, modernized and restored from storage bases. Russian sources call the numbers 700-800 tanks in 2022 and even 1,500 in 2023. At the same time, due to the sanctions, the quality of products is falling: those tanks that return to service must be equipped with thermal imagers, the parameters of which are close to those of the Cold War era devices.

At the time of the start of the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the Russians had 2,987 tanks in service. According to data from Oryx, losses as of the beginning of 2024 amount to 2,619 tanks - 1,725 ​​destroyed, 145 damaged, 205 abandoned and 544 lost. In fact, this number is even higher, because not all losses fall on the oryx. In this situation, according to ARI experts, the only option for the development of events in 2024 for the Russian Federation is only prolonged stagnation at the front. This will make it possible to form a powerful tank fist - taking into account the prospects of increasing the annual output of T-90M at Uralvagonzavod to 250-300 machines and plans to resume production of T-80 at Omsktransmash. Other scenarios – the preservation of the current nature of hostilities or a successful Ukrainian offensive – will lead to further "shredding" of the aggressor's tank fleet.

https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/skilky-tankiv-zalyshylos-u-rosiyi/#google_vignette

So those giant concrete slabs stacked on top are just to show it's strength? I think such capsules or "safe rooms" are ubiquitous in some parts of Israel. And for good reason! I would like one too in my house but mostly for severe weather.

*The typical wood frame houses in my AO provide only concealment but no cover...

\uD83C\uDF0A Russia: Central heating pipe laid down in 1974 ruptured and flooded Novosibirsk. Multiple districts without heating nor hot water in -25°C (-13°F) night temperature. pic.twitter.com/6FSN0nTHBQ

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) January 11, 2024

https://m.vk.com/wall-189159357_31655

I was going to add the influence of "imperfect" accuracy, especially against skinny targets who are often under the influence of something resulted in unsatisfying terminal performance.

In the past 2 years (almost) I/we have seen more people shot, blown up, and set on fire than I would like. Probably many of the squirters running around after impact were in fact dead, living off of adrenaline.

Looks like Caesar spoke too freely.

Official statement by the command of the Legion "Freedom of Russia".

The Legion "Freedom of Russia", as a military structure in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has never allowed itself to express value judgments about our partners and brothers in arms. We concentrate on carrying out combat missions and shaping the vision of a future free Russia, but not on discrediting our brothers-in-arms. Therefore, we sharply condemn and suppress any public or non-public manifestation of emotions or negative statements towards other Russian volunteer formations.

In connection with the conversation published online, Maximilian “Caesar” Andronikov is temporarily suspended from his duties as deputy commander for civil-military cooperation for the period of investigation into the situation and cannot publicly represent the Legion’s position. The decision comes into force from the moment of its publication until the proceedings continue.

Separately, we would like to say that this situation additionally demonstrates the sincerity and honesty of individual Russian “opposition” politicians who turn out to be moles in the service of Putin’s special services. We have a short conversation with them and wish them never to cross paths with the armed opposition personally.

https://t.me/legionoffreedom/1062

lol, that's how you know that you are moving in the right direction then.

Girkin

While I’m sitting, waiting for the end of the next court hearing in Strelkov’s case, I want to quote a fragment of his letter, which I received the day before, in which he expresses his opinion about the trial against him:

“I have a situation without. I'm sitting, sir.
The trial will begin at 2:20 p.m. It’s not a fact that it will end before N.G.
And, moreover, it is not a fact that I will be “released after serving time.” I don't think so, to be honest. Judge Vyrysheva is “glorious” for giving “horse” sentences in precisely such “deeply customized” and dubious (from the point of view of the guilt of the defendants) cases.

And, in any case, one cannot count on an acquittal “from the word at all.”

But it is necessary to “finish the job”, since we have “undertaken to complete it.” So that we don’t have anything to reproach ourselves with: we honestly tried.

Hugs, thank you for your help and faithful friendship.
I.V. Girkin /I.I. Strelkov/
12/8/2023
"Lefortovo"

NotaBe

Did you know that judges do not have a funeral service after their death?
https://t.me/soldat_prav/2611
https://t.me/i_strelkov_2023/764(repost)



Dear friends and comrades!

   Today, January 11, 2024, the next court hearing in Strelkov’s case took place in the Moscow City Court behind closed doors.
Some written materials from the case were read out, and so-called prosecution witnesses were also questioned, who, according to the defense, do not support the accusation in any way and deserve the honorary title of “Captain Obviousness.”
In turn, the former Pskov governor Evgeny Mikhailov, whose information was retold by Igor Ivanovich in his “criminal” posts, completely refuted the investigation’s version that Strelkov called on anyone to extremist actions.
The next court hearing will take place tomorrow, January 12, 2024. It is expected that defense witnesses will be questioned, as well as experts in the field of psychological and linguistic examination, who consider the opinion of FSB experts that there is “extremism” in Strelkov’s texts as ridiculous and does not stand up to any criticism.
At the request of the accused, we continue to collect funds to pay for the services of lawyer Alexander Vladimirovich Molokhov in the court of first instance.
We are sincerely grateful to all participants of the Movement and supporters of Igor Ivanovich Strelkov for their responsiveness and support!!!
Every ruble you have is accounted for and will go into business.
   As of January 11, 2024, 370,000 rubles have been collected for defense in court (and a total of 667 thousand rubles since the start of collection)
PAYMENT DETAILS:
On the website of the ICA Bar Association "Last Watch", which is headed by lawyer A.V. Molokhov -
http://lastpatrol.ru/
By clicking on the banner “quick payment for lawyer services on the website”, a payment form opens.
In the full name column, along with the payer's surname, it is necessary to indicate - "payment under agreement SU-23M/47 on the defense of I.V. Girkin."

https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/465

‼️ The occupation forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine number 462 thousand people

☝️ In addition, 35 thousand members of the "Rosguard" are stationed on temporarily enslaved Ukrainian lands, which ensure the occupation regime.

📌 This was reported by the representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Vadym Skibitsky, in an interview for the "(Un)Safe Country" podcast on Ukrainian Pravda.

"Such a number of troops in our territories allows the Russians to carry out rotation: to withdraw those units and units that have lost their combat capability - where the number of personnel is less than 50% - to the rear areas. And after recovery and replenishment, they go to the front line again," said Vadym Skibitsky.

👉 He also provided data on the amount of Russian ammunition and the capabilities of the Russian military-industrial complex.

📌 Main theses:

▪️ The defense industry of the Russian Federation is capable of producing 2 million munitions per year. These are 122 and 152 mm projectiles.

▪️ In 2023, Russian industry could not fully meet the needs of the Russian army. The deficit amounted to about half a million shells.

▪️ At first, the Russians brought shells from Belarus, then they bought them in Iran, and then large shipments of ammunition went from North Korea.

▪️ We know by which routes they were transported, in which warehouses they are stored and how they are further delivered to the front.

❗️ In 2024, Russia plans to increase the production of ammunition, but has a number of problems related to the lack of components, qualified personnel and production capacity.

"Our assessment is that the Russian Federation will have a shortage of 500,000 ammunition at the same level, and it will try to find them somewhere," concluded Vadym Skibitsky.

https://t.me/DIUkraine/3294

Wagnerites continue to train the explosives and armed forces of the Republic of Belarus: How many of them are left in Belarus?

In December, mercenaries of the Wagner PMC continued to conduct systematic training with military personnel and occasional training with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. We have recorded classes in:

⚫️Grodno. In military unit 5522, they conducted training with the Typhoon special forces detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus (storming trenches, providing first aid to the wounded and their evacuation).

⚫️Brest. At the Brest training ground, the special forces detachment “Storm” of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus (tactical and special training) was trained.

⚫️Minsk. At the training center of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus "Volovshchina" we completed the 5th course of tactical and special training with military personnel of the special forces of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus.

⚫️Borisov. At the "White Puddle" training ground, we trained with cadets of the Military Academy's Infantry Faculty (tactical and special training).

⚫️Osipovichi. At the Osipovichsky training ground in the 51st artillery. The brigade was given classes on organizing training in fire and tactical training.

⚫️Gomel. In the vicinity of the village of Novaya Buda (Gomel district), we trained with military personnel of the special forces detachment “Buran” of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus (assault in an urban environment).

It is worth noting that the number of cars in the main camp of the Wagner PMC in the village of Tzel continues to decrease. During November-December, the number of equipment in the camp could have decreased by 30%. It is possible that the equipment could have been taken back to the Russian Federation and handed over to the Russian military.

Speaking about the number of mercenaries in Belarus, we currently estimate it at several hundred people.

The entire review of military activity for December can be found here (in English)

https://t.me/Hajun_BY/7642

Thats definitely a factor.

The other issue was the "Fleet Yaw Effect" discovered only after high speed footage.

Basically all rifle bullets in all calibers leave the barrel kind of flopping up and down as until they stabilize properly after ~50yd. With M855 Green Tip, depending on the 'flop' angle on impact, it would either tumble rapidly and work spectacularly, or it would penetrate straight through 10" before tumbling; a thin combatant would just get a .22lr sized hole in these instances.

The new M855A1 EPR projectile solved this, as do CONUS use of JSP projectiles, both of which are 'Yaw Independent'.

https://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2014/07/28/weekly-dtic-fleet-yaw-problem-improving-rifle-effectiveness/

I’m not an air power SME but my understanding is yes. Unfortunately the timeline and number of pilots and aircraft that should become available are limited. I believe Norway recently contributed 2 additional F-16s for the training last week.

Long term, keep an eye on German politics and economy. It may not become a problem but there are some potential concerns to keep an eye on to see if they become problems or fade and aren’t anything at all. For now that’s good news

Please note that even Russian Telegram uses “Ukrainian” sources for OSINT.


Russian sources:

✍️⚡️On the situation in the Novomikhailovka area on January 9 - analysis from @Multi_XAM and @z_arhiv

This post is a response to a request from subscribers from a specific department. In recent days, many resources - both ours and the enemy's - have written that Russian military formations have retreated south of Novomikhailovka. In many ways, the situation around this settlement now resembles the battles for Kleshcheevka last summer, when the line of contact between the parties changed daily. Despite the fact that on the approaches to Novomikhailovka from the southern side most of the plantings are under us, it is premature to talk about complete control of the site.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces stronghold, which covered the entrance to the settlement from the south-eastern side (📍47.850057, 37.514291), was taken, which allowed us to gain a foothold. However, to the south of the route on the flank the enemy bunker has not yet been knocked out, which prevents reserves from being brought up to this area. On the southern front - in the area of ​​the cemetery, the Sintezprodservice enterprise and the MTF - there are enemy firing positions, the distance from which to our front end is from half a kilometer to two. The area is mostly open, and only to the south, about 2.5-3 km below, the elevation difference provides shelter.

The situation is really difficult. In the central part of the village, enemy surveillance equipment is still functioning, which have not yet been knocked out, despite the intensity of the attacks, incl. with the involvement of the Russian Aerospace Forces. The enemy holds the defense here with the 145th and 146th battalions of the 116th separate air defense brigade, as well as the 2nd air assault battalion of the 79th separate air assault brigade. To the north-west, a large enemy supporter at the point with coordinates 📍47.84214442, 37.44791990, as well as the height (📍47.83821899, 37.45452260), make it difficult to carry out coverage.

✅ To compare assessments of the situation, we draw maps of our “colleagues” and like-minded people from the @z_arhiv channel, as well as Ukrainian resources: 📩 DeepstateUA, Ukraine Control Map and the French OSINT project 👥 Pouletvolant.
https://t.me/z_arhiv/25763
https://t.me/multi_XAM/1211

Ukrainians seem to have a lot of FPV drones to fly into Russian hard points in the trench systems as well.

NSFW

FPV drones operated by the 47th Mechanized Brigade terrorizing Russians in their trenches.

At 02:07 an FPV drone flushes out the enemy only for a second nearby drone to strike them as they flee. pic.twitter.com/wmeuTsgYQs

— bigSAC™ (@bigSAC10) January 11, 2024

“Join the army, they said…” pic.twitter.com/qyX1RWgHVf

— bigSAC™ (@bigSAC10) January 11, 2024

People cheering over McCarthy's ouster did not understand, and still don't. The party has an obligation to govern. Failing to do that, which they are now, is going to result in Dem victories in November. Calling people 'RINO' for passing bills the fringe doesn't want is dumb and counterproductive. Governing matters.

end off-topic

Paul Ryan started the destruction of the party by disavowing the party candidate and then working vigorously against him. Mitch fueled it with funding of the likes of Dem aligned Murkowski as a spoiler to the more popular R candidate. Trump would have been much better for the party to go all in support of a younger candidate this time around. But Gaetz has delivered the final rupture with his tantrum to use the Dem minority and his seven cohorts to remove an R speaker to drive a minority position.

The Republicans have torn their party to shreds. Many other factors at play but too much me me me individual maneuvering and too little party unity.

Here are the losses I could identify today. (sorry I made a typo in the one I shared before) https://t.co/lZLivxUud6 pic.twitter.com/zES6Df0RzW

Andrew Perpetua  (@AndrewPerpetua) January 11, 2024

2024 will be an intense year, even worldwide, Taiwan has its election too but I think multiple nations are also holding their elections in 2024. Hopefully my pessimistic nature is wrong and it’s not the shitshow I’m expecting and people unfuck themselves but I guess we’ll see soon enough how this unfolds.

Keep in mind this is mostly if not completely just 155mm rounds.

ISW
EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated that the EU will be able to supply Ukraine with one million shells by spring 2024. Breton stated that the EU will need to reduce its ammunition exports to non-EU countries and ensure that EU countries pressure their… pic.twitter.com/Rgl3v8N83z

— Paul Healey \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDF40\uD83E\uDDD9 (@Ukraine_Oracle) January 11, 2024

People ask me how many vehicles we miss as a result of relying so much on drone footage, and I keep saying "a lot".  Here is an example. The blue are vehicles we identified and mapped from drone footage. The purple are ones I just found on a high res sat image. pic.twitter.com/mHM9mFz8NI

Andrew Perpetua  (@AndrewPerpetua) January 11, 2024

Guess we’ll find out if an attempt to oust Johnson happens or not. That Congress can’t get a full year federal budget authorized and an agreement on immigration / border after 3+ months doesn’t bode well for the rest of the year. But maybe they pull a rabbit out of the hat. McConnel staff claim he’s very close on Senate Republican immigration agreement but House Freedom Caucus and Schumer seem like the Dr. Seuss north going Zax and south going Zax childhood books. So I’m not sure how that gap is bridged but an article out today claims McConnell is personaly involving himself to speed up Senate negotiations in hopes of speeding up national security supplemental which includes aid for Ukraine.

Absolutely.  If the Ruskies complain, then you know you are doing God's work.

In Chechnya, the headquarters of the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment caught fire for unknown reasons in the city of Shaly 🔥

The headquarters building was completely burned down along with all personal affairs, documents and other things, Moscow media reports.
There is currently no official comment from the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs.
https://t.me/The3rdForceUA/22318
Video:

\uD83D\uDEA8 \uD83D\uDD25 It appears Russian soldiers recently transferred to 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment in Shali, Russia-occupied Chechnya, burned down the base headquarters with all the paperwork. pic.twitter.com/uTs6U2pJXa

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) January 11, 2024

That seems to confirm the satellite counting estimates before they reduce their estimate by 1/3 for likely unusable tanks in storage based on how many remain unmoved while older ones are taken out. Bottom line is that Russia is losing more per week than they can replace with new production and refurbished in a month.

Various reports from both Russia and Ukraine put that new/refurb number at 20-30/month. Their losses are at least averaging 120/month. For a net loss of 90/month or 1,000+/year.

By late summer/fall this year that should start to substantially impact the number of tanks they have in the field at any one time which was around 3,000-3,500 and now is dropping to 2,500-2,800. By this summer it could drop closer to 2,000 in the field. And by summer 2025 drop to 1,000.

That is unimaginable based on their past usage and overwhelming armor. But the numbers don’t lie. Russia has been coasting on massive Soviet stockpiles and Ukraine has been attrition them much faster than they can be replaced. Putin hopes the West will give up before his stockpiles red line.

Russian military personnel ensured the safe conduct of the next rotation of observers of the IAEA mission at Zaporizhzhya NPP

▫️ On January 11, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ensured the safe conduct of the next rotation of observers from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission at the Zaporozhye NPP.

▫️ For this purpose, a ceasefire was declared on the route from the designated crossing point of observers - a destroyed bridge near the village of Kamenskoye from 6.00 to 18.00, which was strictly observed by Russian military personnel.

▫️ During an inspection of the road in the crossing areas, Russian military personnel recorded unexploded ordnance remaining as a result of new systematic shelling from the Ukrainian side in the immediate vicinity of the Zaporizhia NPP.

▫️ Despite the presence of non-cleared mines, Russian military personnel ensured the safe passage of mission observers and their delivery to the station.

▫️ The mission includes four inspectors, their task is to monitor and assess the safety status of the Zaporozhye NPP. IAEA experts have been present at Zaporizhia NPP since September 1, 2022, following the first visit of the agency’s Director General Rafael Grossi to the plant.

🔹 Russian Ministry of Defense

https://t.me/mod_russia/34585


💯 Energoatom paid 100% of the volume of tariff compensation for the population for 2023 in the amount of almost UAH 128 billion, - Petro Kotin
 
Energoatom continues to perform special duties to ensure the availability of electricity for household consumers (PSO). This service is designed to reduce the financial burden on Ukrainian families so that the price of electricity for citizens is lower.

In 2023, NAEK completely fulfilled its obligations within the scope of the PSO - to provide the population with affordable electricity. Thanks to the quick and high-quality repair campaign, it was possible to increase the production of electricity at the NPP. Therefore, Energoatom had the opportunity to make payments for PSO.

"We conducted a repair campaign at each of the nine power units, completed it ahead of schedule and without reducing the quality of work. The pace of this campaign made it possible to earn 4 billion hryvnias, which, in particular, were aimed at the implementation of PSO. Currently, all power units are overloaded with fresh nuclear fuel and have been providing heat and light to millions of Ukrainians for almost half of the winter," said Petro Kotin, Acting Chairman of the Board of JSC NAEC "Energoatom".

From the beginning of 2023, for the service of PSO Energoatom, SE "Guaranteed Buyer" paid 127 billion 994 million UAH, while the expected cost was more than 7 billion less. Thanks to this, last year the Company managed to reduce the total debt for the payment of PSO services by almost UAH 4 billion.

It will be recalled that Energoatom NAEC covers about 85% of the financial burden necessary for the performance of special duties to ensure public interests.

The PSO in Ukraine was extended until April 30, 2024. This decision was made in order to reduce the financial burden on household consumers due to the difficult economic situation due to the full-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the price of electricity for the population will continue to be UAH 2.64 per kWh.

https://t.me/energoatom_ua/16393

Well, here is to hoping that typical Russian corruption and political suppression win out over facts and merit!!