Actually, no.

Edit:  def not trying to be a denier about this, but it’s hard to believe anything ANYONE is saying right now.

This.

Ukrainian forces should attack immediately.

Attached File

Got this from Arbor a couple minutes ago:


ASERT Threat Summary: DDoS Attack Campaign Targeting Multiple Organizations in Ukraine - February 2022 - v1.1.
ASERT Threat Summary
Date/Time: 16February2022 1945UTC
Title/Number: DDoS Attack Campaign Targeting Multiple Organizations in Ukraine - v1.1.
Severity: Informational.
Distribution: TLP: WHITE (see )
Recipients may share TLP: WHITE information without restriction, subject only to standard copyright rules.
Categories: Availability
Authors: Roland Dobbins & Steinthor Bjarnason.
Contributors: Chris Conrad, Richard Hummel, Hardik Modi, Dan Asher.
Changes from previous version: Added additional details of observed attack targets.
Description:
Beginning on 13 February 2022, multiple governmental, military, and financial organizations within Ukraine reported that their public-facing Web sites, applications, and ancillary supporting infrastructure were being targeted in an orchestrated DDoS attack campaign. Significant direct impact to these organizations and their direct constituents and customers, along with collateral impact to other organizations such as associated Web hosting operators, was noted.
Reports indicate that public access to online governmental services, online Web and mobile banking applications, and automated teller machines (ATMs) was disrupted by these attacks. The use of VPNs to connect ATMs across the public Internet to their affiliated networks is commonplace; when the associated financial network infrastructure is negatively impacted by DDoS attacks, bank patrons are often prevented from accessing funds, checking balance information, and performing other routine operations via ATMs.
Netscout Arbor's ASERT team confirmed these reports, observing multiple direct-path SYN-flooding and UDP-flooding DDoS attacks targeting these organizations, along with a smaller number of ntp reflection/amplification DDoS attacks. Observed SYN-flood attack throughput reached a maximum of ~1.2 million packets-per-second (mpps), while large-packet UDP flooding attacks reached a maximum of ~5.3 gigabits/second (gb/sec). By way of comparison, the largest DDoS attacks reported in 2021 were ~674mpps and 3.47 terabits/second (tb/sec), respectively.
The characteristics of all observed DDoS vectors utilized in these attacks to date were well within established norms; ASERT analysis of the attack dynamics indicates that standard DDoS-capable botnets were likely used in this attack campaign. Both DDoS-for-hire and privately-operated botnets are often used to generate DDoS attacks of the observed scale, scope, and types.
The brief spate of ntp reflection/amplification attacks observed by ASERT at the beginning of the attack campaign, along with the direct-path UDP flooding observed throughout, are out of profile for the targeted networks/servers/services/applications, largely directed towards destination port UDP/443. The observed SYN-floods were primarily targeting destination ports TCP/80 and TCP/443, which is consistent with the targeted Web servers.
ASERT observed botnet nodes ('bots') participating in these attacks were located in Ukraine, Russia, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, and New Zealand. A security research firm reported that the command-and-control (C2) node for the primary botnet used in this attack was located in the Netherlands, and that the botnet in question was a Mirai botnet. ASERT analysis of the DDoS vectors utilized in this attack campaign are consistent with attack capabilities typically exhibited by Mirai botnets.
The number of observed sources utilized in this DDoS attack campaign to date is relatively low. This is consistent with the use of direct-path DDoS vectors of the types utilized in these attacks, along with the reported attack volumes. Observed attack characteristics imply that any spoofing of source IPs involved in the cited direct-path attacks was limited in scope, which is congruent with reports that the botnet in question was a typical Mirai botnet, with most of its constituent bots apparently located on broadband access networks likely to enforce source-address validation (SAV; e.g., anti-spoofing).
Collateral Impact:
Successful DDoS attacks against Web hosting and VPS operators can significantly impact organizations which are not the direct targets of DDoS attacks, but which share the same network/service/application/content-delivery infrastructure.
Disruption of online applications and services provided by governmental organizations can result in the inability to deliver critical services to their constituents.
Disruption of online financial services can result in delays in payroll deposits, bill payments, online and in-person electronic retail payments, ready access to cash, etc.
The collateral impact of reflection/amplification DDoS attacks is potentially quite high for organizations and individuals whose misconfigured servers/services are abused as reflectors/amplifiers. This may include partial or full interruption of mission-critical applications and services, as well as additional service disruption due to transit capacity consumption, state-table exhaustion of stateful firewalls and load-balancers, etc.
Individuals and organizations whose general-purpose and/or Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices have been subsumed into botnets can be negatively impacted when these compromised systems are utilized to launch outbound DDoS attacks. As with reflection/amplification attacks, this may include partial or full interruption of mission-critical applications and services, as well as additional service disruption due to transit capacity consumption, state-table exhaustion of stateful firewalls and load-balancers, etc.
Mitigating Factors:
DDoS attack traffic can be mitigated via the implementation of industry-standard best current practices (BCPs) such as situationally-appropriate network access control policies; network infrastructure-based reaction mechanisms such as flowspec; and intelligent DDoS mitigation systems (IDMSes) such as Netscout Arbor Sightline/TMS and AED/APS.
Collateral impact to misconfigured, abusable computers/IoT devices/servers/services leveraged as bots or reflectors/amplifiers by attackers in order to launch DDoS attacks can motivate network operators and/or end-customers to remove or remediate affected systems.
Traceback of spoofed DDoS attack traffic to its ingress points by network operators and subsequent implementation of source-address validation (SAV) can prevent attackers from launching both reflection/amplification and spoofed direct-path DDoS attacks.
Recommended Actions:
Organizations with business-critical public-facing Internet properties should ensure that all relevant network infrastructure, architectural and operational Best Current Practices (BCPs) have been implemented, including situationally-specific network access policies which only permit Internet traffic via required IP protocols and ports. Internet access network traffic to/from internal organizational personnel should be deconflated from Internet traffic to/from public-facing Internet properties, and served via separate upstream Internet transit links.
DDoS defenses for all public-facing Internet properties and supporting infrastructure should be implemented in a situationally-appropriate manner, including periodic testing to ensure that any changes to an organization's servers/services/applications are incorporated into its DDoS defense plan. Organic, on-site intelligent DDoS mitigation capabilities should be combined with cloud- or transit-based upstream DDoS mitigation services in order to ensure maximal responsiveness and flexibility during an attack.
It is imperative that organizations operating mission-critical public-facing Internet properties and/or infrastructure ensure that all servers/services/application/datastores/infrastructure elements are protected against DDoS attack, and are included in periodic, realistic tests of the organization's DDoS mitigation plan. In many instances, we have encountered situations in which obvious elements such as public-facing Web servers were adequately protected, but authoritative DNS servers, application servers, and other critical service delivery elements were neglected, thus leaving them vulnerable to attack.
Specifics of countermeasure selection, tuning, and deployment will vary based upon the particulars of individual networks/resources; the relevant Netscout Arbor account teams and/or ATAC may be consulted with regards to optimal countermeasure selection and employment.
flowspec can be used by network operators to mitigate UDP reflection/amplification DDoS attacks; direct-path UDP flooding DDoS attacks; and, in some circumstances, SYN-flood attacks, although intelligent DDoS mitigation systems (IDMSes) such as Netscout Arbor TMS and AED provide a higher degree of mitigation granularity and interactive source evaluation when defending against SYN-floods. It is important to ensure that reaction access-control list (ACL) stanzas propagated via flowspec are configured in such a way to minimize the risk of overblocking.
AIF Templates providing examples DDoS countermeasure provisioning for standard server types are available to AIF-entitled Sightline/TMS operators. AIF Filter Lists of abusable reflectors/amplifiers are also available to AIF-entitled Sightline/TMS customers.
It is imperative that organizations operating mission-critical public-facing Internet properties and/or infrastructure ensure that all servers/services/application/datastores/infrastructure elements are protected against DDoS attack, and are included in periodic, realistic tests of the organization's DDoS mitigation plan. In many instances, we have encountered situations in which obvious elements such as public-facing Web servers were adequately protected, but authoritative DNS servers, application servers, and other critical service delivery elements were neglected, thus leaving them vulnerable to attack.
All potential DDoS attack mitigation measures described in this Summary MUST be tested and customized in a situationally-appropriate manner prior to deployment on production networks.
Applicable Netscout Arbor Solutions: Netscout Arbor Sightline, Netscout Arbor TMS, Netscout Arbor AED/APS.
References:
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/16/europe/ukraine-cyber-attack-denial-service-intl/index.html
https://twitter.com/DougMadory/status/1493680334965297159
https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1493797519725367302
https://www.netscout.com/product/arbor-sightline
https://www.netscout.com/product/arbor-threat-mitigation-system
https://www.netscout.com/product/netscout-aed

That would be glorious if they did, fucked Russia's shit up, and ended up taking territory in Mother Russia.

That was 75 years ago. Now the modern response is LOL.

The first casualty of the conflict will be truth.

That wall appears to be several solid brick layers deep.

My guess is smaller artillery point detonated on the wall with most of the frag getting caught in the wall or deposited on the exterior, The bricks blown inward are essentially spall.

122mm projectiles only weigh about 50 lbs, and I think only about 20% of that is explosive charge. Decent odds that wall could stop a single 122 round.

Attached File

The trajectory of that incoming shell suggests whatever fired it was being used in direct fire mode. If I were a betting man, considering the trajectory, the damage to the wall and the relatively mild amount of interior damage, I'd say this was a round from an MT-12 Rapira. It's a 100mm towed anti-tank gun. Ukraine is full of these guns and both sides have them.

I remember learning about WW1 and here we are

An alliance that means attacking Ukraine also now involves NATO countries. This in turn means its a NATO problem

Or Im an idiot and misunderstanding

I assume no live TV coverage if it goes down.right?

Did they pull out all the reporters?

I can't think of a time where a unified Germany or France were ever net positives for our foreign policy, they always hinder us or only half heartedly support us.  A unified Germany has never been a true friend of the USA and France hasn't been our friend since the American revolution despite so much American blood having been spilled defending French soil.

We can't afford an EU Military that would weaken NATO, there is no room for two chefs in the kitchen.   Either France or Germany start to pull their weight and stop working against us or they need to be put into submission through economic actions. Otherwise, in the case of Germany, the Russians will put them into economic submission through Germany's insane dependence on Russia oil and natural gas.  

I'm not even happy with Poland right now.  Poland did not participate in the diplomatic boycott of the Chinese Olympic games.  The Polish sent official representatives and participated in the opening ceremonies.  I find that outrageous considering all the financial assistance and military assistance that the U.S. has provided to Poland. That is completely unacceptable.

The U.K. really is our only one and true friend in all of Europe.  The rest need to be led by a forceful, but benevolent United States or they will be their own ruin and in turn harm our economy and way of life.  

What makes you think that? The downward trajectory on almost all low angle fire is less than 45 degrees. Any low angle artillery fire at less than 2/3 max range hitting a vertical wall is going to have a close-enough-to-normal impact.

European Countries learned nothing from WW2

It'll only be a NATO problem if Poland or UK are attacked directly. From my understanding of Article 5.

So basically a matter of time, really.

I would agree with that if the Ukraine had a functioning military.

The best they can hope to achieve with defense is a stalemate.  The Russian military isn't organized enough to survive chaos and if Ukraine attacked before the Russians had all their duck in a row it would throw them into chaos, disrupt their forces, and could give Ukraine a stronger bargaining position in negotiating a cease fire.

Sadly though, although Ukraine has had SEVEN years to modernize and improve their military they are still a joke and likely wouldn't have the ability to coordinate a conventional attack. From what I understand from inside reports online the Ukraine Army is a joke in terms of its ability to coordinate action, the Ukraine Air Force is nearly non-existent (they've had seven years to get old Soviet Aircraft from throughout Eastern Europe where other nations are upgrading, but haven't done jack shit), the Ukraine Airborne and Marines are hardly any better.   Ukraine has actually made some good tanks, but most of them are strictly made for export since they can't afford their own.  

Ukraine's government is a corrupt mess filled with inefficient and ineffective leaders. Sadly, I think the most effective Ukraine fighting force is their Azov Battalion, which is by the reports I've seen a Neo-Nazi type organization so their best fighters have been denied good Western hardware for political reasons.  

The USA should have never become directly involved diplomatically with this effort. Concessions should NOT be made to the Russians to secure Ukrainian security.  The USA should have stood back, condemned Russian actions, and left the diplomatic effort to the United Nations while using this as a way to re-establish our influence over NATO members by allowing NATO to be in fear of Russia.  Perhaps if the citizens of NATO nations actually believed they were in deep shit with an imminent Russian invasion they'd actually get in line.

Absolutely all of this.

In effect, they want a 1997 NATO, with NATO troops out of eastern and central Europe https://t.co/NdE6vS9nmf pic.twitter.com/Z10bypoq4A

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) February 17, 2022

The Norwegian Minister of Defence will not participate in the Munich Security Conference as planned, but will return to Norway from Brussels later today:

"To be available for decision-making, due to the current situation"

My translationhttps://t.co/5RUlkqf8BA

— The Lookout (@The_Lookout_N) February 17, 2022

Excluding the UK, that's correct.  

Like Margaret Thatcher said "they're a weak lot some of them in Europe you know, weak, feeble."

Unfortunately we need them since they're too important of a economic trading partner. Otherwise I'd be happy to let Europeans deal with the consequences of their own inactions.

There's a few videos of people filming the sky with sounds of explosions going on in the background in the alleged areas where the shelling is taking place.

Brits got a rivet up over Ukraine right now.

A military camp was apparently set up in the same area where the Black Hawk landed.

Local media report : https://t.co/cI101OBXIx

H/t @MarQs__ https://t.co/L8pENhGj2e pic.twitter.com/n8FhqTzp3B

C O U P S U R E  (@COUPSURE) February 17, 2022

This is supposedly Siret, Romania, where the UH-60 mysteriously landed yesterday and picked up 4 individuals from the field. I guess they were some sort of survey team.

All those nations were free to join CSTO. Wonder why they chose NATO instead, and if that decision was based from previous experience in some type of pact they used to have with one of the members of CSTO.

They are overdue for one of their traditional bouts of bloodletting.

I guess it depends if they actually send troops right? Even if UK or Poland wasnt attacked directly how does that come in to effect if they send troops to the battlefield?

Admittedly my knowledge of the details on how NATO actually works in practice is pretty low

UKRAINIAN NEWS FROM UKRAINIAN NEWS SOURCES FOR 2/17/22

https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-and-rebel-region-trade-shelling-allegations.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/eastern-europe/breaking-news-belarus-says-could-host-nuclear-weapons-if-faces-western-threat.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics-2/unity-train-carries-ukrainian-state-flag-through-12-regions.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/world/nato-deadly-serious-in-response-to-russia-threat-uk-minister.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/russian-war-engine-failure-whats-going-on-in-ukraine.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/world/nato-deadly-serious-in-response-to-russia-threat-uk-minister.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/world/uk-speaker-urges-respect-amid-dangerous-ukraine-tensions.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/fake-news-about-odesa-at-war.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/uk-says-russia-could-drag-out-ukraine-crisis-for-months.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/putin-has-seriously-wounded-ukraines-economy-without-firing-a-single-shot.html

https://www.kyivpost.com/eastern-europe/ukraine-defies-invasion-threat-as-nato-sees-no-russian-pullback.html

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3406184-ukraine-britain-poland-set-up-trilateral-alliance.html

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/3406143-stoltenberg-on-escalation-in-donbas-russia-trying-to-stage-pretext-to-attack-ukraine.html

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3406104-united-states-russias-claim-of-genocide-in-ukraine-is-reprehensible-falsehood.html

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3406055-verkhovna-rada-ratifies-ukraineeu-agreement-on-common-aviation-area.html

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/3406024-zelensky-informs-michel-about-escalation-in-jfo-area.html

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/3405997-occupiers-fire-on-vrubivka-hitting-school-damaging-houses-and-gas-pipeline.html

\https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3406003-ukraine-ready-for-any-format-of-talks-with-russia-to-achieve-peace-zelensky.html

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3405799-nato-pledges-to-continue-political-and-practical-support-to-ukraine-and-georgia.html

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/3405937-slovakia-to-send-mine-clearance-systems-medical-supplies-to-ukraine.html

https://ukranews.com/en/news/834682-shell-of-militants-hit-courtyard-of-vrubivskyi-lyceum-in-luhansk-region-where-30-pupils-and-14

https://ukranews.com/en/news/834669-subway-will-operate-6-hours-a-day-and-transport-only-workers-of-critical-infrastructure-facilities

https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/02/17/russia-sentences-ukrainian-journalist-yesypenko-to-six-years-in-occupied-crimea/

https://english.nv.ua/nation/escalation-in-donbas-as-russian-proxy-forces-fire-on-ukrainian-positions-with-tanks-artillery-50217660.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/biden-and-scholz-no-significant-withdrawal-of-russian-troops-from-the-borders-of-ukraine-50217574.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/putin-expected-capitulation-but-miscalculated-says-ex-us-presidential-advisor-50217545.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/russian-proxy-forces-escalate-tensions-in-donbas-by-shelling-civilian-areas-50217569.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukraine-s-defense-minister-says-intelligence-shows-no-proof-of-russian-troop-withdrawal-50217549.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/pontoon-bridge-set-up-across-pripyat-river-near-border-with-ukraine-the-insider-50217551.html

https://english.nv.ua/opinion/will-russia-wage-war-some-thoughts-on-the-current-developments-50217321.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukrainian-guerillas-would-stop-russia-winning-war-in-ukraine-russian-experts-conclude-50217311.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukrainian-forces-report-mortar-shelling-use-of-uavs-by-russian-proxy-forces-50217502.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/us-state-department-russia-s-claims-of-genocide-in-donbas-are-a-false-pretext-for-invasion-50217494.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/sbu-identifies-phony-prosecutor-in-russia-controlled-donbas-50217471.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/uk-ukraine-foreign-ministers-to-meet-in-kyiv-to-discuss-measures-to-deter-further-russian-aggressio-50217451.html

https://english.nv.ua/nation/how-are-ukraine-s-99-percent-coping-with-the-threat-of-war-50217186.html

https://english.nv.ua/opinion/what-to-make-of-the-putin-lavrov-shoigu-recent-sessions-uk-economist-s-opinion-50217144.html

Kyiv Independent - news links to many news sources (no exclusive content from KI for today)

 Previous podcast Ep. № 68 - Ukraine in early 2022: living under the threat of Russian invasion Ep. № 69 - When War Makes You Stronger: How Ukrainian Society Has Changed Since 2014 - Ukraine World

What to Read on Ukraine and Current Russia-Ukraine Tensions? : A brief collection of online sources helps you to have access to information in English about Ukraine and current Ukraine-Russia tensions. - Ukraine World

Recognition of 'L/DPR' to be almost amount to Russia's wholesale rejection of its commitments under Minsk agreements - InterFax Ukraine

Biden, Scholz discuss issue of strengthening eastern flank of NATO in event of Russian attack on Ukraine - InterFax Ukraine

100 Russian tanks, howitzers kept outside designated storage sites in Donbas, OSCE - UATV

Cyberattacks knock out Ukrainian websites - Ukrainian Journal

Britain considers major NATO deployment to strengthen Europe's borders - Ukrainian Journal

President visited the frontline positions of the military in the Donetsk region -Official website of the President of Ukraine

Volodymyr Zelenskyy had an urgent phone conversation with the President of the European Council -Official website of the President of Ukraine

President observed the procedure of service of the Marine Guard of the State Border Guard Service in the waters of the Sea of Azov -Official website of the President of Ukraine

Ukraine is welcome to NATO, yet not by all members of the Alliance - Volodymyr Zelenskyy -Official website of the President of Ukraine

This was exactly the same statement word for word that the Russians used prior to invading Georgia on 2008 https://t.co/D1XZyQ505X

Bill Browder  (@Billbrowder) February 17, 2022

I can't seem to get any of the Twitter pages I normally follow to load. Are the Ruskies now turning their cyber warriors loose on Twitter?