As far as invasion as opposed to other options watch every October 1-31 and May given typhoon season issues at other times and optimal ocean conditions for their Naval forces as opposed to the 45,000 paratroopers they also have. They roughly need about 100K to get a toehold as far as invasion option goes and the have about 50,000 Naval infantry

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2535&context=nwc-review

It wasn’t that long ago when people would say stuff like “we could sink China’s navy in one night”.

Is that not true anymore? Was it ever true?

Who has submarine superiority?

Understood, bear in mind what I post is not necessarily endorsed by me but which I consider relevant. Observing Europe’s responses and outlook whether I agree or not is part of understanding the likely direction moving forward.

It’s like observing red flags from a woman I’m on a date with. I take note and respond accordingly

How does the US and China/Russia stack up on space warfare stuff? We used to be dominant. Has that changed too?

We absolutely dominate in submarines on every metric but there’s some outstanding issues unresolved and our submarine force is not considered large enough to the degree necessary for operations against China in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
The question of Chinese ASW capabilities and capacity also remains.
There’s some minor personnel staffing issues worth monitoring but not at a critical stage.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32418/249

According to Space Force testimony to Congress China has made advances that are of significant concern.
Comparatively Russia less so but still of concern.
Our dominance is summarized as no longer assured and Space Force requests more resourcing to meet its mission.
From what I can see, it’s not likely to receive the level of support it desires in the near future.
https://www.defensenews.com/space/2024/08/27/securing-us-space-assets-is-busting-the-air-force-budget-kendall-says/

If the west hasn’t had blaring red lights and a reason to switch to near war footing and manufacturing the last few years they never will. Taiwan, South Korea, Ukraine, and Israel would be better off fleeing their countries.

Help isnt coming.

What assets are we / did we use to observe?

Any global hawks? Rivets? Sneaky subs?

Everything, it’s multi faceted and is undergoing ongoing integration but fundamentally everything available.

Japan is also invested https://japantoday.com/category/national/pm-ishiba-says-japan-will-prepare-for-any-development-over-taiwan

China is launching a ton of stuff to orbit. Not as many launches as Spacex but they are ramping up quickly.

“Japan WILL prepare…”? Japan has years before they can project any real power and will get deadlocked govt squabbling due to their post war constitution….which still has to be wrestled with.

In 2025 Japan will begin deploying the first of 1,000 improved indigenous anti-ship/ground attack GLCMs with enough range to reach most of China's coast, including opposite of Taiwan, and placed an order for 400 Tomahawks last January.  They also intend to make a ship and air launched version of their cruise missile.

The search for Ukraine’s missing soldiers and sailors
The families of missing loved ones are trying to find them, alive or dead


Oct 10th 2024 | Kyiv


In a nondescript office in a nondescript building in Kyiv, with no sign on its door, four middle-aged men are trawling through gruesome films and photos on the internet. Often they are looking at Russian Telegram channels that specialise in parading captured Ukrainian soldiers. In pictures taken in the past few days one man’s face is running with blood; another has his hands tied but a cigarette is in his mouth. A third, seemingly wounded, is being pushed in a wheelbarrow. These Ukrainian policemen are cyber-hunters searching for Ukraine’s missing soldiers, of whom there are tens of thousands.

Oleh zooms in on a face in a video, takes a screenshot, then drops it into facial-recognition software which scours the internet for a match. Within seconds he has seven possibles. Oleh quickly discards most of them and rapidly finds photos of a happy young man with his wife, his friends and his child. With another click he has matched his name against a list of missing soldiers. “Aha! It’s Vytali,” he says, before dispatching his find to the security services, who in turn can inform the family. In one year, says Oleh, his team have found some 600 missing Ukrainians in this way.

As of September 20th Artur Dobroserdov, Ukraine’s commissioner for missing persons under the Ministry of the Interior, had a list of 48,138 people who were still missing. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, some 7,548 people who had earlier been on the missing list have been accounted for. They comprise 3,632 living Ukrainian pows and civilian prisoners who have been exchanged with the Russians; and 3,916 identified bodies, some of which were also returned. Mr Dobroserdov also has custody of 2,552 bodies that have not yet been identified.

Thanks to evidence from exchanged pows and from the Red Cross, the Ukrainians know of another 6,000 or so Ukrainians who are being held as prisoners. But that still leaves more than 40,000 unaccounted for. Some are reckoned to be dead but cannot be recorded as such, because no body has been recovered. Mr Dobroserdov says that about 20% of the living pows whom Russia has returned were not on any list and had often been assumed to be dead. He thinks that more than half of those whose fate is unknown are still alive.
The Russians are not sending full lists of the men they have captured to the Red Cross. Mr Dobroserdov believes the main Telegram channels which his colleagues are following are run by Russia’s security services. They are trying to lure desperate families to get in touch. If they do, they demand money or intelligence in exchange for some contact with the prisoner. Some of the sites are simply run by scammers.

Anastasiia Savova runs Always Faithful, an organisation helping the families of missing Ukrainian sailors. Her father was captured when Azovstal, a steel plant that was the last Ukrainian redoubt in the city of Mariupol, fell in May 2022. She had no clue whether he was dead or alive until January this year when he showed up on a Red Cross list. Through the organisation she has sent messages but does not know if he got them. She says she has just had “discouraging news about his health” from newly exchanged prisoners. There have been cases of pows believed to be still alive who have been returned dead.

Solomiya Khoma, a founder of the Ukrainian Security and Co-operation Centre, a think-tank, says the issue of missing persons is “a really sensitive topic” in Ukraine. The Russians deliberately leave families in the dark about whether their loved ones are alive or dead. It is done, she says, to “create social tension”. A Ukrainian Facebook group for people appealing for any information about missing soldiers has almost half a million followers.

Close to parliament in Kyiv a dozen people stand with banners and pictures of their missing ones, all of them sailors who went missing after Mariupol fell. No one knows if they are still alive. Some regiments and units have strong lobbies that work hard to get their missing onto lists for possible exchange; but others, such as Ukraine’s tiny navy, do not. All they can do is stand there in the hope that nobody forgets about them. ■

https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/10/the-search-for-ukraines-missing-soldiers-and-sailors

South Korea microchips https://m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20241014050575

Methheads are inherently less reliable than a loyal Chinese subject who owes the country something. Otherwise, nothing.

... and once they are finally there, they might start discovering that their interests don't always match the US 1:1. Same applies to the rest of the countries hiding under the US umbrella that we resent so much. Trouble is, the umbrella is weathered and frayed and it's not clear it can be kept up at the same surface area.

US Army, circa 2023: holy shit, you mean we need substantial air defense for our allies and ourselves???

Ukrainian mechanized infantry squad and their US-supplied M1126 Stryker ICV. pic.twitter.com/6NizhL2kgO

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) October 16, 2024

Source- https://t.co/EJV2GKJO4M

Images from the Ukrainian 82nd Air Assault Brigade pic.twitter.com/qU73WI9iwq

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) October 16, 2024

Czech-supplied Mi-24V Hind helicopter gunship in Ukrainian service, flying low over a foggy Donetsk Oblast. pic.twitter.com/gYVy6y0tzP

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) October 15, 2024

The Impending Betrayal of Ukraine

Tim Willasey-Wilsey CMG
14 October 2024



Ukraine faces a precarious future amid waning Western support. The immediate peril comes from the 2024 US presidential election, but the fundamental problem has been the failure of Europe to commit to the defeat of Putin’s invasion.

The new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, lost no time in visiting Kyiv after he assumed office, where he ‘pledged continued support for Ukraine in its war with Russia’. Doubtless his words were sincerely intended, but he knows there are serious political headwinds across Europe and the US.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky senses this too as he briefs his ‘Victory Plan’ around European capitals following a mixed reception in Washington.

The forthcoming presidential election in the US represents the point of maximum danger. A win by Donald Trump could see him placing a phone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin as early as 6 November. Any such call would set expectations of a negotiated settlement, with discussions possibly beginning in the early months of 2025.

Nobody should want this war of ‘meat grinder’ savagery to continue a day longer than necessary. However, Zelensky would have much to fear from a deal negotiated by Trump. The 2020 Doha Accords with the Afghan Taliban have been described as the worst diplomatic agreement since Munich in 1938. Fortunately, Trump was prevented from reaching a similarly disastrous deal with Kim Jong-un of North Korea.

In any such deal, Zelensky would be unlikely to secure the recovery of Crimea and the Donbas, reparations for the massive damage to his country, war crimes trials or membership of NATO. He might be able to bargain the Kursk salient in return for control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. But, without NATO membership and its Article 5 guarantee, there would be nothing to stop Putin from continuing the war after a couple of years of recovery and rearmament.

Events since 7 October 2023 have done untold damage to Ukraine’s prospects and to the West’s much-vaunted rules-based international order

For Europe, too, there would be peril. Both Georgia and Moldova look particularly fragile and vulnerable to Russian active measures or hybrid warfare. Even the Baltics would be justifiably nervous, in spite of their NATO status.

However, it would be misleading to blame everything on Trump. There have been plenty of prior indications of trouble ahead.

US support has always been too little, too late. Given the sheer scale of Washington’s military support this might sound absurd, but President Joe Biden’s hesitancy in allowing Storm Shadow missiles to be used against targets inside Russia is indicative of a general trend. As the head of a global superpower, Biden has always had one eye on ensuring that the war does not get out of hand and become nuclear. The result has been that Ukraine feels it has been given enough not to lose but not enough to win.

In Europe the support has been varied. Some countries, such as the Baltics, the Scandinavian states, the UK and Poland, have done better than others. Hungary has been hostile, and may soon be joined by Slovakia and Austria. Germany has provided the most weapons but has been politically unreliable. Its refusal to supply Taurus missiles and its public debate about reducing its defence budget have sent all the wrong messages. German companies continue to retain significant interests in Russia, and the advance of Alternative for Germany in elections in Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg reminded Chancellor Olaf Scholz that there is little support for the war in Eastern Germany. President Emmanuel Macron of France, having been mercurial about Ukraine from the outset, received a similar jolt from the far left and far right in legislative elections in July.

The most visible sign of a failure of collective determination to defeat Russia was the decision not to seize Russian financial assets frozen in Western banks, but instead to use them as collateral to raise a much smaller loan. Yes, there would have been a theoretical risk of undermining faith in the Western-dominated financial system, but few countries are yet ready to entrust their savings to Chinese or Indian banks. Furthermore, it would have sent a message to Putin not to invade other countries.

Meanwhile, the crisis in the Middle East has diverted foreign policy and public attention. In Iraq and Afghanistan 20 years ago, the West demonstrated that it does not have the policy bandwidth to cope with two simultaneous campaigns. The events since 7 October 2023 have done untold damage to Ukraine’s prospects and to the West’s much-vaunted rules-based international order.

A newly elected President Trump would rightly claim that, once again, the US has shouldered the main burden of Western interests with inadequate support from its NATO allies. He would point (correctly again) to the mounting military pressure on Ukraine, its difficulties in replacing front-line soldiers, and the effects on global food and fuel prices. With the war raging in the Levant, he would refer to the US being over-extended once again in ‘forever wars’.

A newly elected President Kamala Harris could be expected to follow the path trodden by Biden. She would inherit his caution at unduly provoking Putin and his reticence about Ukraine joining NATO. Furthermore, her freedom to supply Ukraine with additional weaponry could be restricted by the make-up of the two houses of Congress.

This should have been Europe’s war to manage. In spite of decades of discussion about European defence, it proved too convenient to rely on US largesse

There could be a third outcome to the election: a Harris victory that is contested by Trump. In such circumstances, we could see an absence of US foreign policy for a period of weeks or months.

Barring a mutiny by Russian forces or a crisis in Moscow, the prospects for Ukraine (and therefore Europe) look grim. The irony is that Putin would claim victory in spite of his campaign having been a costly disaster.

What would a betrayed Ukraine look like? At least it would retain some 82% of its territory. A guilty West would doubtless provide aid to rebuild infrastructure. It might be given a pathway to eventual EU membership (unless that option had been bargained away at the negotiating table), but joining the Western club may have lost its appeal at that point. Ukraine’s corrupt oligarchs would re-emerge from hibernation. The old post-Soviet cynicism would replace the youthful enthusiasm of the Maidan generation. There would be antagonism towards those returning from abroad after avoiding the fight, and – of course – thousands of grieving families.

This should have been Europe’s war to manage. In spite of decades of discussion about European defence, it proved too convenient to rely on US largesse. This made Europe a prisoner of US electoral factors. It also caused Europe to shirk the difficult decisions that helping win the war entailed: the big increases in defence expenditure, the 24-hour working in ammunition factories, the hikes in food and energy costs and the political risks such as seizing frozen assets. What remains now for Europe is to secure a place at the negotiating table and to argue for NATO membership for Ukraine as part of any settlement.

Failing that, the West will have years to repent the betrayal of the courageous Ukrainians, whose only crime was their wish to join the Western democratic order.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/impending-betrayal-ukraine

Also note that the CCG ships deployed in this exercise are only a small fraction of vessels active in WestPac for CCG. They can afford to lose 100% of the ships they deployed in this exercise and just rotate new vessels in to replace them, and do that a bunch more times before they get close to running out. PLAN by itself is greater than all USN available for Pacific deployment. PLAN + CCG dwarfs what USN can bring to Taiwan.

Interesting change of position for 28th Mech https://t.co/87VNR1emoE

Ukraine Control Map  (@UAControlMap) October 16, 2024

[UA] 28th Brigade BMP-2 Firing on Russian-controlled treeline southwest of Pischane, Kharkiv Oblast.
BMP Firing Position: 49.524971, 37.762117
Russian positions:  49.531676, 37.761637@GeoConfirmed @UAControlMap pic.twitter.com/Q8cknpHCxI

ORBATenjoyer  (@ORBATenjoyer) October 16, 2024

https://www.politico.eu/article/g7-ukraine-loan-50-billion-pledge-central-banks-war/

If it’s any consolation everyone is on that train

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/trump-wants-nato-to-hit-3-percent-gdp-on-defense-the-us-could-fall-short/



https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.amp.asp?newsIdx=384337

Negotiated settlement, snort. Again, why would Putin accept any negotiations? He's WINNING. If Trump or anybody else thinks they can pick up the phone and get Putin to talk settlement terms, they're in for a rude awakening. Zelensky can offer surrender. Anybody else that wants to negotiate is going to get humiliated. How do people not know this?

I’m going to make a very unpopular prediction that it’s closer to 25% than 18% by the time a new US President is sworn in

https://kyivindependent.com/governor-orders-mandatory-evacuation-from-kupiansk/


https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-10-16/governor-orders-evacuation-of-ukraines-kupiansk-city/104479726?future=true&




https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/16/ukraine-war-briefing-authorities-order-evacuation-of-previously-liberated-kupiansk



https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-updates-map-putin-north-korea-soldiers-b2629954.html

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/10/15/russia-could-attack-nato-by-end-of-decade-german-intelligence-chief-warns

On one hand, I can see the argument that Russia is unlikely to attack NATO in the near future. On the other, I can see the argument that it actually might. In many respects, it's essentially now or never for Russia as far as re-establishing its empire is concerned. The demographic and economic situation for Russia in the mid to long term is pretty bleak. I also think that played a pretty big role in the Kremlin's decision to invade when it did: they essentially came to the conclusion that they had to act NOW. If they waited too long to solve the "Ukrainian Question," they ran the risk of never being able to do so due to demographic, economic, and political factors (I also think that Putin nearly losing his grip on Belarus in 2020 played a significantly undermentioned role).

Grim thread / article

I am back in Ukraine and the mood is pitch black. Ukraine feels betrayed.

"Failing that, the West will have years to repent the betrayal of the courageous Ukrainians, whose only crime was their wish to join the Western democratic order" 1/https://t.co/BvXHXdfdWN

Tymofiy Mylovanov  (@Mylovanov) October 15, 2024

More alarm bells:

I'll say what many might think but hesitate to voice: Ukraine is currently losing the war, and the trend is negative unless drastic measures are taken.

Debates over what constitutes loss or victory can be had, and yes, Ukraine’s survival so far is a big win. But even if Russia…

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) October 15, 2024

I'll say what many might think but hesitate to voice: Ukraine is currently losing the war, and the trend is negative unless drastic measures are taken.

Debates over what constitutes loss or victory can be had, and yes, Ukraine’s survival so far is a big win. But even if Russia halts advances and goes on the defensive, we lack the resources to reclaim territories to the 2022 borders, let alone the 1991 borders. This is due to many factors: delayed mobilization, insufficient aid, weak sanctions enforcement, a lack of political will in the West, poor military decisions, delayed aid due to de-escalation concerns, and the sheer reality of fighting a country with four times our population, with superior numbers in almost all domains and one of the largest military industries, supported by regimes like North Korea, which contribute more than some European countries with far larger GDPs.

Manpower shortages are another issue, but that's a separate discussion. Ukrainian leadership bears a good part of the responsibility for these problems. Still, if the West can’t supply the 14 brigades Zelensky requested, why discuss drafting hundreds of thousands more? We need to completely re-arm way more existing brigades. Who’s going to pay for them? Let’s be honest - there’s little enthusiasm in the U.S. or Europe to fund this.

If Russia retains its occupied territories, it will undermine one of Europe’s core security principles: that borders cannot be redrawn by invading force. In 2014, Russia violated this order, leading to the 2022 invasion. This time, it’s not just Ukraine that will have failed - it’s Ukraine, the U.S., and Western Europe’s failure to defeat Russia.

Some might cite Finland's Winter War, as an example of what Ukraine should have done, but that war lasted three months and ended with Finland ceding territory, paying reparations in the form of machinery, and renting a port to the Soviets. Ukraine's demographics today are also very different: the 18-25 age group is among the smallest, a reality across modern Europe.

Unless Ukraine and the West create a serious plan to radically increase aid to support mobilization - where Ukraine commits to mobilizing more people on the condition that they are properly armed and trained, and the West provides robust air defense to intercept missiles as decisively as the U.S. does for Israel - Ukraine will lose the war of attrition. This will force unfavorable peace, and mass migration from Ukraine to other countries, setting a dangerous precedent, and making it look like the West lost to Russia in the eyes of the world, especially among the enemies of the West

...

The worst-case scenario:

Ukraine and Russia freeze the current front line, turning the war into a low-intensity conflict. This forces Ukraine to maintain large forces along an extended "new border" with Russia. Socio-economic problems deepen, as Western aid is insufficient. Mass migration accelerates as people flee the possibility of another war. Political instability, weakening of the state, and a second Russian invasion

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-wants-nato-invite-before-biden-leaves-office-envoy-says-2024-10-16/



https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-victory-plan/

A pair of Marder 1A3 of the mechanized company of the 225th OSHB goes out to haunt the Russians in a forest strip in Kurshchyna. During the battle, the machines try to hit with RPG-7 and FPV, but fail, because EW devices are installed on them.

1:45 video.

Here are losses I could identify for yesterday. pic.twitter.com/ZJjVxk1QWy

Andrew Perpetua  (@AndrewPerpetua) October 16, 2024

Of course Xi MIGHT take over Taiwan, that is always a possibility.  The question is what will happen if he does (or even attack)?

China gets hit with even more sanctions, TSMC sabotages their factories (would take 10 minutes with a hammer), China would NEVER get semi equipment again, their tech manufacturing would collapse, the US would sink most of their fleet, and SK and Japan would have nukes within a year or two.  Meanwhile, Chang would start rebuilding TSMC in SK or Singapore.

Xi is trying to saber rattle because China is failing and he desperately needs a scapegoat/distraction.  It has ever been thus with dictators.  

The US (and most of the world) could go five years without a new iPhone or laptop or server.  Most of the dang compute power is wasted now and most new computers are going into datacenters to do what?  Collect data to sell ads for GOOG and MSFT.  They could easily be repurposed for more important use for a few years.

And as soon as China invades, we will all get a chance to buy NVDA at $10 again...

It will match the Taiwan interests.  If China invades Taiwan, Japan knows that they would be on the short list of next targets.

It would be a motivating experience.

Yeah...next to Taiwan, I would think their is some deep seeded resentment for the Japanese for what they did during WW2.

But do our subs have enough diversity?

Japan needs to come to terms with 2 things: They must get over their guilt of atrocities in the 30's and 40's AND get over the promise of the USA keeping the peace and protecting them.

Moscow

\uD83D\uDD25 A fire broke out, reportedly at the Chkalovsky military airfield near Moscow, engulfing an administrative building. The fire has been classified as 2nd degree in complexity and spans 800 square meters. pic.twitter.com/cegREGA0Aj

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) October 16, 2024

At the Chkalovsky military airfield in Shchelkovo, an administrative building is on fire.
The fire broke out on the roof of the L-shaped building. The employees managed to evacuate in time and no one was injured.
Crews from the Ministry of Emergency Situations are working on the spot; the fire has been assigned a rank of complexity.

https://t.me/ENews112/18908



The area of ​​the fire at the military airfield in Shchelkovo is 800 square meters.
Extinguishing continues, but the fire has not yet been localized.

https://t.me/ENews112/18909

Tanks from Australia going to Ukraine https://amp.abc.net.au/article/104480368

Yes.

And also like what the Norks are doing along the DMZ right now......



CMOS

⚡️ PLUS 17 ATTACK UAVS DOWN, 4 MORE LOST IN LOCATION
➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖
As of 1:00 p.m., no attack UAVs have been observed in the airspace. According to updated information today, the Defense Forces of Ukraine shot down 17 more enemy drones, in addition, four were lost in location.

So, in general, on the night of October 16, 2024, out of 136 strike UAVs, 68 were shot down, 64 were lost in location, 2 returned to Russia, and 2 were hit.
🇺🇦 Together - to victory!








Corvette "Hetman Ivan Mazepa" went on sea trials.
Together to victory!

#UaNavy#ВМС #ЗСУ#Ukraine #славаукраїні
https://x.com/UA_NAVY/status/1846463068319977976

Pow wow in Pakistan https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-shanghai-cooperation-organization-meeting-0a70adcb1ae1af41f7c73adf3a6db426

I am seriously beginning to think Europe WANTS to be conquered, again.



CMOS

1/2 Guerre d'Ukraine | 15/10/24

Secteurs :
\uD83C\uDF10 Niu-York-Toretsk-Pivnichne\uD83D\uDD39U241015-1034
\uD83C\uDF10 Pokrovsk-Selydove\uD83D\uDD39U241015-1046
\uD83C\uDF10 Selydove-Krasnohorivka\uD83D\uDD39U241015-1053
\uD83C\uDF10 Velyka novosilka\uD83D\uDD39U241015-1057#UkraineRussianWar #GuerreEnUkraine pic.twitter.com/ofLBCYkoFt

Poulet volant  (@Pouletvolant3) October 16, 2024

Guerre d'Ukraine | 15/10/24 Partie II

Secteurs :
\uD83C\uDF10 Makiivka-Nevske\uD83D\uDD39U241015-1426
?? Update Niu-York-Toretsk-Pivnichne\uD83D\uDD39U241015-1420#UkraineRussianWar #GuerreEnUkraine pic.twitter.com/qNNKzD2wLv

Poulet volant  (@Pouletvolant3) October 16, 2024

In the Kursk region, a Russian APC drove straight into the path of a Ukrainian tank from the 17th Separate Tank Brigade. The tank opened fire at point-blank range. pic.twitter.com/SgpLZaVe4Y

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) October 16, 2024

Additional footage. pic.twitter.com/fV4bDENseC

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) October 16, 2024

Another drone strike at Kyiv https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-drone-attack-kyiv-mayor-says-2024-10-15/

Yeah with Putin all Trump has is "stick" and for Ukraine it's mostly "carrot" (not the Steven Seagal type). Even the dimmest observer should be able to see and conclude that so far, the USA has been helping BOTH SIDES of this conflict and there is opportunity to pick a side and go all in.

Most of the opportunities to give Ukraine some parity or overmatch has been intentionally blown by Xiden. And I'm not sure what the US has left that could really change the direction. Maybe a bunch of those expired ATACMS with loose ROE, a few hundred spare F16's arriving a dozen per month and maybe 500 Abrams and Bradleys certainly wouldn't hurt but they would not have the same impact they would have in 2022 or '23. At best, doubling US aid should be able to halt the Russian advances and maybe putting Putin into a position to negotiate. I don't think Ukraine has the manpower strength left to start a grinding crawl retaking territory regardless of US aid but who knows.

Maybe more...