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Quoted: The concept of a matrix-ed organization was to prevent the loss of skills, best practices, and to improve the tools used by that technical discipline (sharpening the axe). It also helped newbs learn the discipline area without having to charge what essentially would be training time to an actual paying customer. As more and more bean counters started taking over, the paying customer ended up paying more and more of the training bills and getting very project specific training rather than a more well-rounded engineer. Sad, really. View Quote @planemaker What exactly do you mean by a "matrixed organization" ? |
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Quoted: @planemaker What exactly do you mean by a "matrixed organization" ? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: The concept of a matrix-ed organization was to prevent the loss of skills, best practices, and to improve the tools used by that technical discipline (sharpening the axe). It also helped newbs learn the discipline area without having to charge what essentially would be training time to an actual paying customer. As more and more bean counters started taking over, the paying customer ended up paying more and more of the training bills and getting very project specific training rather than a more well-rounded engineer. Sad, really. @planemaker What exactly do you mean by a "matrixed organization" ? There would be a "home" group of same-discipline engineers like weights (oh, sorry "mass properties"), structures, controls, aerodynamics, reliability, maintainability, avionics, etc. Junior engineers would start off there and "learn a trade", sometimes more than one until they settled on one. Typically, the home group would also develop analysis tools for that discipline. When a paying project were to come along, a certain number of folks from that discipline would be "matrix-ed" out to that project to work on whatever it was. They wore two hats, they were the discipline specialist but the discipline specialist for that project. When that project was done, they'd rotate back to their home discipline so the lessons learned and future analysis tool needs would come back with them. Generally worked pretty well. |
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Quoted: I think the problem occured several times before the fatal crashes but the US pilots were able to overcome the problem due to training. Not to say there wasn't a problem that needed fixing but the US pilots received different training. View Quote part of the problem is dumbing down airplanes so barely trained third worlders can fly them Then when they need to do pilot shit, they can't. I blame airbus for the trend |
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Quoted: There would be a "home" group of same-discipline engineers like weights (oh, sorry "mass properties"), structures, controls, aerodynamics, reliability, maintainability, avionics, etc. Junior engineers would start off there and "learn a trade", sometimes more than one until they settled on one. Typically, the home group would also develop analysis tools for that discipline. When a paying project were to come along, a certain number of folks from that discipline would be "matrix-ed" out to that project to work on whatever it was. They wore two hats, they were the discipline specialist but the discipline specialist for that project. When that project was done, they'd rotate back to their home discipline so the lessons learned and future analysis tool needs would come back with them. Generally worked pretty well. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: The concept of a matrix-ed organization was to prevent the loss of skills, best practices, and to improve the tools used by that technical discipline (sharpening the axe). It also helped newbs learn the discipline area without having to charge what essentially would be training time to an actual paying customer. As more and more bean counters started taking over, the paying customer ended up paying more and more of the training bills and getting very project specific training rather than a more well-rounded engineer. Sad, really. @planemaker What exactly do you mean by a "matrixed organization" ? There would be a "home" group of same-discipline engineers like weights (oh, sorry "mass properties"), structures, controls, aerodynamics, reliability, maintainability, avionics, etc. Junior engineers would start off there and "learn a trade", sometimes more than one until they settled on one. Typically, the home group would also develop analysis tools for that discipline. When a paying project were to come along, a certain number of folks from that discipline would be "matrix-ed" out to that project to work on whatever it was. They wore two hats, they were the discipline specialist but the discipline specialist for that project. When that project was done, they'd rotate back to their home discipline so the lessons learned and future analysis tool needs would come back with them. Generally worked pretty well. That's maybe the ideal organization. The staff other than the core and methods were always dispersed to projects of one sort or another. The major programs (F-15, etc.) funded by government contracts had the largest staffs, then the advanced design groups, and then other groups working on classified projects or Contracted R&D or Internal R&D. There are a few other details, but those are the major bones. Staffing was generally leveled by hiring contract engineers, i.e., "job shoppers", a term that harkens back to the days of per diem pay and tax rules. As work wound down and the engineer was not needed on a different program, they could be laid off with no tears. Boeing Seattle practiced laying off entire staffs at the end of major programs with little or no effort to fill other programs in need; this bit hard at the end of the 777-300, many of those folks took jobs elsewhere for good. . |
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Quoted: [snippage] ... it's impossible to analyze a structure unless we know how it functions. It also meant free body diagrams were required. That stuff is hard work for a young analyst and they generally won't do it unless forced. Part of that is caused the modern use of finite element analysis as a crutch, a crutch they don't understand except to apply some loads and hope it works out. Over constraint is common in order get a stable model with no care about whether the interfaces are remotely similar to the airplane, all that matters is that the deflections are small enough that the model doesn't jump off the screen and the fringe plots are pretty. I always checked NASTRAN models used for analysis for a bail out card, a convenient and unethical method to hide problems in a model. Sizing with von Mises stresses since most of them don't know the difference but they heard somewhere that is the place to start. I mistakenly assumed every ME and AE undergrad was receiving finite element theory training until the last couple of years when I started asking. That means they have no idea what goes on behind the data entry. Analysis looking analysis, but it was (generally) fast. . View Quote THANK you. All of this is golden and should be stapled to every new ME or AE degree. The FEA models can refine everything and get better detail and if used correctly get useful results but it takes experience to interpret everything. I used to tell a joke in some of my presentations to Boeing, LM, etc: "Well, the computer gave this result so that's what we're going with" and wait for customer heads to perk up. That was my test to see who was paying attention and who I could expect to ask good questions. The computers can make pretty FEA pictures but you have to understand the mechanical theory first to interpret the results. |
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Quoted: As a current 320 and former 757/767/777 driver.... 1. That's exactly how all airliners work. What happens in a 767 if one pulls back and the other pushes forward? The controls separate and one yoke gets some controls, the other yoke gets the other half of the controls. The bus electronically does what the boeing mechanically does. But alas, you can see that in the Boeing. That leads me to: 2. It's far from silent. When both sticks are moved from neutral the plane screams "DUAL INPUT" until one is released or the priority button is pushed, locking the other stick out. If that button is held down for 40sec, the other stick is locked out for the remainder of the flight. 3. That's asinine on many levels. A couple being a) what if the left stick is faulty and b) who says the guy in the left seat is doing the right thing? Hell, in many 3 man operations, the relief pilot sitting in the left seat while the CA is on break is the least experienced person on the crew. If they had done nothing when the tubes iced up, the a/c would have stayed at it's 2.5deg pitch and the engines would have stayed at ~80% N1. They barely would have moved save for the turbulence. Those AF pilots flew a perfectly good airplane into the ocean. View Quote "Done nothing" isn't quite right though. They still had to fly level and set the throttles. |
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Quoted: "Done nothing" isn't quite right though. They still had to fly level and set the throttles. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: As a current 320 and former 757/767/777 driver.... 1. That's exactly how all airliners work. What happens in a 767 if one pulls back and the other pushes forward? The controls separate and one yoke gets some controls, the other yoke gets the other half of the controls. The bus electronically does what the boeing mechanically does. But alas, you can see that in the Boeing. That leads me to: 2. It's far from silent. When both sticks are moved from neutral the plane screams "DUAL INPUT" until one is released or the priority button is pushed, locking the other stick out. If that button is held down for 40sec, the other stick is locked out for the remainder of the flight. 3. That's asinine on many levels. A couple being a) what if the left stick is faulty and b) who says the guy in the left seat is doing the right thing? Hell, in many 3 man operations, the relief pilot sitting in the left seat while the CA is on break is the least experienced person on the crew. If they had done nothing when the tubes iced up, the a/c would have stayed at it's 2.5deg pitch and the engines would have stayed at ~80% N1. They barely would have moved save for the turbulence. Those AF pilots flew a perfectly good airplane into the ocean. "Done nothing" isn't quite right though. They still had to fly level and set the throttles. Airbus, even in alternate law, is pitch and roll stable. If they were at 2.5deg nose up (common pitch for level flight), it won’t really go anywhere until the pilots provide input. Same with roll. The engines, if I remember right, went into thrust lock. So they’re at whatever power setting they were at when the malfunction happened. Ie cruise power. As far as the Boeings you highlighted, yes the 757/767 will wander. The 777 not nearly as much though if I recall correctly its FBW logic keeps the aircraft speed stable vs the bus where it maintains pitch when no input is applied. I had a similar failure about 5 years ago in a 777 over Brazil. Initially doing nothing is sometimes the best course of action. |
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Quoted: THANK you. All of this is golden and should be stapled to every new ME or AE degree. The FEA models can refine everything and get better detail and if used correctly get useful results but it takes experience to interpret everything. I used to tell a joke in some of my presentations to Boeing, LM, etc: "Well, the computer gave this result so that's what we're going with" and wait for customer heads to perk up. That was my test to see who was paying attention and who I could expect to ask good questions. The computers can make pretty FEA pictures but you have to understand the mechanical theory first to interpret the results. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: [snippage] ... it's impossible to analyze a structure unless we know how it functions. It also meant free body diagrams were required. That stuff is hard work for a young analyst and they generally won't do it unless forced. Part of that is caused the modern use of finite element analysis as a crutch, a crutch they don't understand except to apply some loads and hope it works out. Over constraint is common in order get a stable model with no care about whether the interfaces are remotely similar to the airplane, all that matters is that the deflections are small enough that the model doesn't jump off the screen and the fringe plots are pretty. I always checked NASTRAN models used for analysis for a bail out card, a convenient and unethical method to hide problems in a model. Sizing with von Mises stresses since most of them don't know the difference but they heard somewhere that is the place to start. I mistakenly assumed every ME and AE undergrad was receiving finite element theory training until the last couple of years when I started asking. That means they have no idea what goes on behind the data entry. Analysis looking analysis, but it was (generally) fast. . THANK you. All of this is golden and should be stapled to every new ME or AE degree. The FEA models can refine everything and get better detail and if used correctly get useful results but it takes experience to interpret everything. I used to tell a joke in some of my presentations to Boeing, LM, etc: "Well, the computer gave this result so that's what we're going with" and wait for customer heads to perk up. That was my test to see who was paying attention and who I could expect to ask good questions. The computers can make pretty FEA pictures but you have to understand the mechanical theory first to interpret the results. Get a copy of an article titled "Beware the Pretty Pictures" in Machine Design magazine around 1995. The magazine editor at that time had been a strength guy in his first career. . |
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Quoted: That's maybe the ideal organization. The staff other than the core and methods were always dispersed to projects of one sort or another. The major programs (F-15, etc.) funded by government contracts had the largest staffs, then the advanced design groups, and then other groups working on classified projects or Contracted R&D or Internal R&D. There are a few other details, but those are the major bones. Staffing was generally leveled by hiring contract engineers, i.e., "job shoppers", a term that harkens back to the days of per diem pay and tax rules. As work wound down and the engineer was not needed on a different program, they could be laid off with no tears. Boeing Seattle practiced laying off entire staffs at the end of major programs with little or no effort to fill other programs in need; this bit hard at the end of the 777-300, many of those folks took jobs elsewhere for good. . View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: The concept of a matrix-ed organization was to prevent the loss of skills, best practices, and to improve the tools used by that technical discipline (sharpening the axe). It also helped newbs learn the discipline area without having to charge what essentially would be training time to an actual paying customer. As more and more bean counters started taking over, the paying customer ended up paying more and more of the training bills and getting very project specific training rather than a more well-rounded engineer. Sad, really. @planemaker What exactly do you mean by a "matrixed organization" ? There would be a "home" group of same-discipline engineers like weights (oh, sorry "mass properties"), structures, controls, aerodynamics, reliability, maintainability, avionics, etc. Junior engineers would start off there and "learn a trade", sometimes more than one until they settled on one. Typically, the home group would also develop analysis tools for that discipline. When a paying project were to come along, a certain number of folks from that discipline would be "matrix-ed" out to that project to work on whatever it was. They wore two hats, they were the discipline specialist but the discipline specialist for that project. When that project was done, they'd rotate back to their home discipline so the lessons learned and future analysis tool needs would come back with them. Generally worked pretty well. That's maybe the ideal organization. The staff other than the core and methods were always dispersed to projects of one sort or another. The major programs (F-15, etc.) funded by government contracts had the largest staffs, then the advanced design groups, and then other groups working on classified projects or Contracted R&D or Internal R&D. There are a few other details, but those are the major bones. Staffing was generally leveled by hiring contract engineers, i.e., "job shoppers", a term that harkens back to the days of per diem pay and tax rules. As work wound down and the engineer was not needed on a different program, they could be laid off with no tears. Boeing Seattle practiced laying off entire staffs at the end of major programs with little or no effort to fill other programs in need; this bit hard at the end of the 777-300, many of those folks took jobs elsewhere for good. . LockMart got stung doing the dump the whole project team as well after the A12 debacle. Took them a looong time to recover from that idiocy. |
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Quoted: part of the problem is dumbing down airplanes so barely trained third worlders can fly them Then when they need to do pilot shit, they can't. I blame airbus for the trend View Quote The reality there is Airbus is responding to customer demand. Lots of places didn't want expat pilots anymore, and Airbus suggested that the pilots could be replaced with low experience systems managers. That said, the Airbus, like any aircraft requires some level of air discipline, experience and airmanship to operate safely. Plenty of Buses have crashed solely due to crew deficiency, most recently that Pak International abortion. |
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Quoted: Indeed. Legacy Boeing guys also hated Harry Stonecipher after he took the reins after Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merged. They hate(d) the man with a passion. View Quote We were constantly either not producing enough or being shut down. It was an exhausting place to work. I was put in some bad positions and chose to be able to sleep at night. It was tough and definitely shortened my time in that company. No excuses for anyone that helped bury MCAS but I can understand the pressure. Making safety decisions in complex situations is a mind fuck, you have such a normalcy bias and it takes a lot of guts to stand your ground when the entire organization is pushing against you. It very easily can cost you your job in a bad organization, which in my experience, is any organization that things GE did anything right in the 2000s. |
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Quoted: There would be a "home" group of same-discipline engineers like weights (oh, sorry "mass properties"), structures, controls, aerodynamics, reliability, maintainability, avionics, etc. Junior engineers would start off there and "learn a trade", sometimes more than one until they settled on one. Typically, the home group would also develop analysis tools for that discipline. When a paying project were to come along, a certain number of folks from that discipline would be "matrix-ed" out to that project to work on whatever it was. They wore two hats, they were the discipline specialist but the discipline specialist for that project. When that project was done, they'd rotate back to their home discipline so the lessons learned and future analysis tool needs would come back with them. Generally worked pretty well. View Quote @planemaker Thanks. |
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Quoted: The reality there is Airbus is responding to customer demand. Lots of places didn't want expat pilots anymore, and Airbus suggested that the pilots could be replaced with low experience systems managers. That said, the Airbus, like any aircraft requires some level of air discipline, experience and airmanship to operate safely. Plenty of Buses have crashed solely due to crew deficiency, most recently that Pak International abortion. View Quote Another reason I avoid certain airlines is because of culture. Not just a lack of understanding of how complex systems work, but a complete lack of interest in how they operate, just that they do. Our reaction upon hearing that you can buy a pilot's license in some countries is , where they would be like, "Well yeah, how else do you expect me to get ahead here? And being a pilot is a good job"! Culture. |
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Quoted: What specific EPA policies are those? Emissions are an engine driven metric, and fuel efficiency is mostly a business driven one. Modern aircraft are far more safe and stable than first generation ones. That's a demonstrated fact. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: How about blaming idiotic EPA policies that make modern commercial airplanes inherently unstable in flight? They are forced to be designed for "low emission and gas mileage" instead of safety and stability in flight. What specific EPA policies are those? Emissions are an engine driven metric, and fuel efficiency is mostly a business driven one. Modern aircraft are far more safe and stable than first generation ones. That's a demonstrated fact. The same dot gov org that changes rules year to year depending on who is The same organization that killed the first commercially viable "Flying Car", in the 70's, for failure to bribe the correct politician/bureaucrat. They did the same thing to airplanes that they did to cars. https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-greenhouse-gas-emissions-aircraft FWIW modern airplanes aren't landed by pilots, they are landed by computer algorythms. The Space Shuttle has only been landed one time by a human, after decades of service. Airline pilots are just trouble shooters. It's all computer numeric controlled by algorithms. |
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Quoted: Watt? View Quote I'm too lazy to math right now, but a commercial jet flying at ~40,000 ft and doing the "cruize" thing at ~550 mph according to the computer that is actually flying the airplane, is only going about 30 knots above stall speed. I know that sounds weird, but, keep in mind, the air is thinner. So more speed is required to maintain stable flight at that altitude. That's why when sensors go out/malfunction, these airplanes fall out the fucking sky. And then it's blamed on "Pilot Error", instead of Engineering Error. Or more like Corporate Profits Error. |
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Quoted: @CherokeeRose Your posts make me imagine a blindfolded man who, with one finger, briefly touches the tail of an elephant and then goes around yelling about how elephants are in fact just leather ropes. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: You can't make up for outsourcing code to idiots for $9/hr with "oversight" either, when the "oversight" allows it. Not to mention the other idiots that designed and approved how the controls were setup, how they interacted with the software, and designed the pilot training and procedures. Boeing could have saved a lot of time, money, and terror by just lining all those passengers up and shooting them. Modern airliners fly on the edge of falling out of the sky. Literally. They are inherently unsafe. No passenger airplane should require 87 sensors to maintain a stable flight profile. Your posts make me imagine a blindfolded man who, with one finger, briefly touches the tail of an elephant and then goes around yelling about how elephants are in fact just leather ropes. What makes you think I have never designed, built, and flown my own aircraft? FWIW I have the same opinion about computerization of automobiles... up to and including the "self driving" kind. But don't let me stop you, I'll be happy when most smart phone addicted morons are replaced by computer algorithms. I almost got killed 4 times last year by some idiot at a stop light who never looked up from their cell phone. |
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Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: How about blaming idiotic EPA policies that make modern commercial airplanes inherently unstable in flight? They are forced to be designed for "low emission and gas mileage" instead of safety and stability in flight. What specific EPA policies are those? Emissions are an engine driven metric, and fuel efficiency is mostly a business driven one. Modern aircraft are far more safe and stable than first generation ones. That's a demonstrated fact. Safer than pine wood covered in glue impregnated fabric? You don't say... It doesn't have to be either/or though. We can have airplanes where you can deviate by 30 knots and not drop out of the sky like a brick. It is possible. But it might cost a bit more fuel, and maybe a few less passengers. Might even be cheaper in the long run, not replacing sensors.... I love when you post. Easily the greatest entertainment of the thread. Everything you say is so over-the-top retarded, I couldn't invent such quality material for trolling purposes if I tried. Keep up the good work, sir, and never doubt yourself! You know what's up and it's your duty to educate everyone here! Sensors are bad!! Efficiency is dangerous!! It's MA'AM! It's only dangerous if some random Made in China part breaks mid flight #amiright? |
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Quoted: I'm saying safer than a Convair 880, that turned fuel into noise like it was the last ICE on the planet and was about 2 generations of technology past a DC-3. If you're routinely deviating airspeeds by 10 knots, to say nothing of 30, maybe flying as a job isn't for you. Sure, you can crash a 737 or A320 or 777 or a A350. Its possible. But, its more than "sensors." Now, in this specific instance, there was plenty that could have done, by Boeing, the FAA and the pilots in the seats. Boeing is the OEM, it was their design, and via regulatory capture and having the deepest pockets, its going to get the vast majority of blame. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Safer than pine wood covered in glue impregnated fabric? You don't say... It doesn't have to be either/or though. We can have airplanes where you can deviate by 30 knots and not drop out of the sky like a brick. It is possible. But it might cost a bit more fuel, and maybe a few less passengers. Might even be cheaper in the long run, not replacing sensors.... I'm saying safer than a Convair 880, that turned fuel into noise like it was the last ICE on the planet and was about 2 generations of technology past a DC-3. If you're routinely deviating airspeeds by 10 knots, to say nothing of 30, maybe flying as a job isn't for you. Sure, you can crash a 737 or A320 or 777 or a A350. Its possible. But, its more than "sensors." Now, in this specific instance, there was plenty that could have done, by Boeing, the FAA and the pilots in the seats. Boeing is the OEM, it was their design, and via regulatory capture and having the deepest pockets, its going to get the vast majority of blame. Sensors are all you have at 35,000 feet, at night, in a storm. Did you read about the French flight I posted? A design not balanced on the edge of falling out of the fucking sky would have done fine. "in the old days we just increased power to the engines and maintained altitude and bearing". There was a time when you didn't have to fly within such a narrow flight profile. Why not make airplanes safer? I guess that lady in the old Clint Eastwood film "The Gauntlet" was right, people DID become be cattle, shuttled around in airplanes. Scanned and searched and violated just for the privilege of flying on an (unsafe) commercial jet. It's sad, really. |
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Quoted: This is complete bollocks. The planes want to fly. The Max had a special design flaw - that doesn't mean all the other planes do as well. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Modern airliners fly on the edge of falling out of the sky. Literally. They are inherently unsafe. No passenger airplane should require 87 sensors to maintain a stable flight profile. This is complete bollocks. The planes want to fly. The Max had a special design flaw - that doesn't mean all the other planes do as well. ALL airplanes have design flaws. Most especially ones that rely on computers to keep them from falling out of the fucking sky, or lawn darting. It's like on Star Trek where they rely on "Time Travel" to fix the horrible writing. Dues Ex Machina. |
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Quoted: That was a design fault. 1. The computer should never have silently averaged the two inputs when they were so far opposite each other. 2. It should have alerted the crew to the input discrepancy via control feedback and/or alarm. 3. The left seat's input should have won by default. Sensors will fail, you must account for them in procedures, but disconnecting the pilots from each other and allowing them to cancel each other's input to the point they fly the plane into the ocean is unacceptable and should have been foreseen. Kharn Kharn View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Modern airliners fly on the edge of falling out of the sky. Literally. They are inherently unsafe. No passenger airplane should require 87 sensors to maintain a stable flight profile. Watt? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 The 737 is taking all the press right now, but it's not a new issue with modern airplane design. It's the same ignorant bullshit that is everywhere. Must computerized and connected to the internet all the things!!! Why does your car have 87 sensors? Does it NEED 87 sensors? How did we ever survive in the dark days, before computer chips? But modern airplanes really are safe... they totally never crash, unless one of 870 sensors goes back. And when they do crash, it's "pilot error" for not havintg instant recall to follow one of 10,000 different protocols to deal with a possible bad sensor. They'll blame anyone but the engineer who designed the damned thing. That was a design fault. 1. The computer should never have silently averaged the two inputs when they were so far opposite each other. 2. It should have alerted the crew to the input discrepancy via control feedback and/or alarm. 3. The left seat's input should have won by default. Sensors will fail, you must account for them in procedures, but disconnecting the pilots from each other and allowing them to cancel each other's input to the point they fly the plane into the ocean is unacceptable and should have been foreseen. Kharn Kharn Thank you, fly-by-wire should be reserved for military jets, not airliners. |
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Quoted: This is complete bollocks. The planes want to fly. The Max had a special design flaw - that doesn't mean all the other planes do as well. View Quote I'll give an example, a high wing aircraft is highly stable in flight, except it's also more susceptible to the spiral of death under adverse conditions. Airplanes want to fall out the fucking sky. Maybe Hot Air Balloons are what you ment? |
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Quoted: Sensors are all you have at 35,000 feet, at night, in a storm. Did you read about the French flight I posted? A design not balanced on the edge of falling out of the fucking sky would have done fine. "in the old days we just increased power to the engines and maintained altitude and bearing". There was a time when you didn't have to fly within such a narrow flight profile. Why not make airplanes safer? I guess that lady in the old Clint Eastwood film "The Gauntlet" was right, people DID become be cattle, shuttled around in airplanes. Scanned and searched and violated just for the privilege of flying on an (unsafe) commercial jet. It's sad, really. View Quote You mean Air France Flight 447 where the pilots, or at least one of them ignored the plane telling them they were in a stall and worsened it? That’s your example of computer failure, really? You could maybe argue something about the dual input but they should have used crew resource management to solve that. So again it’s at least partially a pilot issue not a computer one Also lol |
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Quoted: I'm too lazy to math right now, but a commercial jet flying at ~40,000 ft and doing the "cruize" thing at ~550 mph according to the computer that is actually flying the airplane, is only going about 30 knots above stall speed. I know that sounds weird, but, keep in mind, the air is thinner. So more speed is required to maintain stable flight at that altitude. That's why when sensors go out/malfunction, these airplanes fall out the fucking sky. And then it's blamed on "Pilot Error", instead of Engineering Error. Or more like Corporate Profits Error. View Quote |
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I've been on this site for nearly 20 years and rarely do I see a series of posts with so much bullshit as I just read from cherokeerose.
rose, what is your technical background in aerospace/aviation? |
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Quoted: The same dot gov org that changes rules year to year depending on who is The same organization that killed the first commercially viable "Flying Car", in the 70's, for failure to bribe the correct politician/bureaucrat. They did the same thing to airplanes that they did to cars. https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-greenhouse-gas-emissions-aircraft FWIW modern airplanes aren't landed by pilots, they are landed by computer algorythms. The Space Shuttle has only been landed one time by a human, after decades of service. Airline pilots are just trouble shooters. It's all computer numeric controlled by algorithms. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: How about blaming idiotic EPA policies that make modern commercial airplanes inherently unstable in flight? They are forced to be designed for "low emission and gas mileage" instead of safety and stability in flight. What specific EPA policies are those? Emissions are an engine driven metric, and fuel efficiency is mostly a business driven one. Modern aircraft are far more safe and stable than first generation ones. That's a demonstrated fact. The same dot gov org that changes rules year to year depending on who is The same organization that killed the first commercially viable "Flying Car", in the 70's, for failure to bribe the correct politician/bureaucrat. They did the same thing to airplanes that they did to cars. https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-greenhouse-gas-emissions-aircraft FWIW modern airplanes aren't landed by pilots, they are landed by computer algorythms. The Space Shuttle has only been landed one time by a human, after decades of service. Airline pilots are just trouble shooters. It's all computer numeric controlled by algorithms. Every airline related statement you make is wrong. It’s disturbing. |
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Quoted: I've been on this site for nearly 20 years and rarely do I see a series of posts with so much bullshit as I just read from cherokeerose. rose, what is your technical background in aerospace/aviation? View Quote It’s interesting. His writing is a mishmash of aeronautical related terms that sorta flow together, but don’t make any sense to anyone with real aviation knowledge. Nobody could manage to be that wrong just by accident. Therefore, we can only conclude one or more of the following: Possibly a Bot, purposely designed to confuse and mislead. Or, trolling, for laughs or some other purpose. Or, simply, a Cliff Clavin type with a very tenuous hold on reality. I’m not trying to be insulting, but the style of writing is very reminiscent of some of the famous manifestos I’ve read. Formerly intelligent people, who have lost their sanity, but still have a lot to say. We have to be empathetic and not disrespectful. |
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Quoted: Quoted: LockMart got stung doing the dump the whole project team as well after the A12 debacle. Took them a looong time to recover from that idiocy. @planemaker A12 debacle? LockMart design for a carrier-based stealth fighter. Rumor was it was referred to as the Flying Dorito. It failed to impress Navy leadership due to a number of technical, cost, and schedule issues. It was cancelled. They actually went to court over that one. LockMart at the time needed to downsize so they took the opportunity to dump the vast majority of the project team. Stupid on their part since that team had just gone from concept to flight, something rare in the industry now. |
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Quoted: There would be a "home" group of same-discipline engineers like weights (oh, sorry "mass properties"), structures, controls, aerodynamics, reliability, maintainability, avionics, etc. Junior engineers would start off there and "learn a trade", sometimes more than one until they settled on one. Typically, the home group would also develop analysis tools for that discipline. When a paying project were to come along, a certain number of folks from that discipline would be "matrix-ed" out to that project to work on whatever it was. They wore two hats, they were the discipline specialist but the discipline specialist for that project. When that project was done, they'd rotate back to their home discipline so the lessons learned and future analysis tool needs would come back with them. Generally worked pretty well. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: The concept of a matrix-ed organization was to prevent the loss of skills, best practices, and to improve the tools used by that technical discipline (sharpening the axe). It also helped newbs learn the discipline area without having to charge what essentially would be training time to an actual paying customer. As more and more bean counters started taking over, the paying customer ended up paying more and more of the training bills and getting very project specific training rather than a more well-rounded engineer. Sad, really. @planemaker What exactly do you mean by a "matrixed organization" ? There would be a "home" group of same-discipline engineers like weights (oh, sorry "mass properties"), structures, controls, aerodynamics, reliability, maintainability, avionics, etc. Junior engineers would start off there and "learn a trade", sometimes more than one until they settled on one. Typically, the home group would also develop analysis tools for that discipline. When a paying project were to come along, a certain number of folks from that discipline would be "matrix-ed" out to that project to work on whatever it was. They wore two hats, they were the discipline specialist but the discipline specialist for that project. When that project was done, they'd rotate back to their home discipline so the lessons learned and future analysis tool needs would come back with them. Generally worked pretty well. That’s the basic model we followed (much different industry) that has no been cast aside. |
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Quoted: The vertical winglets on the end of wings limit air 'rolling off' the end of the wing surface. That tiny change improved efficiency by a significant amount. A little more lift at speed for a very small increase in drag. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Why is it necessary to design new planes? There are existing designs to cover all different endurance and passenger requirements. Why dont they just keep existing designs? That last improvement comes from eliminating built up sheet metal structures by using large machines, cutting touch labor costs. The next step is Full Scale Determinant Assembly, cutting labor another huge increment. Aerodynamic improvements are tough. Small drag reductions come more and more with shapes that are costly to fabricate. . The vertical winglets on the end of wings limit air 'rolling off' the end of the wing surface. That tiny change improved efficiency by a significant amount. A little more lift at speed for a very small increase in drag. There is at least one aviation forum where you will have no problem finding people that will tell you they are simply a cosmetic feature that doesn't do anything for the aircraft's performance. |
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Quoted: There is at least one aviation forum where you will have no problem finding people that will tell you they are simply a cosmetic feature that doesn't do anything for the aircraft's performance. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Why is it necessary to design new planes? There are existing designs to cover all different endurance and passenger requirements. Why dont they just keep existing designs? That last improvement comes from eliminating built up sheet metal structures by using large machines, cutting touch labor costs. The next step is Full Scale Determinant Assembly, cutting labor another huge increment. Aerodynamic improvements are tough. Small drag reductions come more and more with shapes that are costly to fabricate. . The vertical winglets on the end of wings limit air 'rolling off' the end of the wing surface. That tiny change improved efficiency by a significant amount. A little more lift at speed for a very small increase in drag. There is at least one aviation forum where you will have no problem finding people that will tell you they are simply a cosmetic feature that doesn't do anything for the aircraft's performance. It’s not night and day. I remember sitting through a pitch to a customer where they (Boeing) told the customer the winglets wouldn’t offset their own weight unless the flight was more than X miles. X miles being more than this customer would normally ever fly. They wanted them anyway because they looked neat. That was almost twenty years ago though, could have refined them a little since then. |
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Quoted: The same dot gov org that changes rules year to year depending on who is The same organization that killed the first commercially viable "Flying Car", in the 70's, for failure to bribe the correct politician/bureaucrat. They did the same thing to airplanes that they did to cars. https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-greenhouse-gas-emissions-aircraft FWIW modern airplanes aren't landed by pilots, they are landed by computer algorythms. The Space Shuttle has only been landed one time by a human, after decades of service. Airline pilots are just trouble shooters. It's all computer numeric controlled by algorithms. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: How about blaming idiotic EPA policies that make modern commercial airplanes inherently unstable in flight? They are forced to be designed for "low emission and gas mileage" instead of safety and stability in flight. What specific EPA policies are those? Emissions are an engine driven metric, and fuel efficiency is mostly a business driven one. Modern aircraft are far more safe and stable than first generation ones. That's a demonstrated fact. The same dot gov org that changes rules year to year depending on who is The same organization that killed the first commercially viable "Flying Car", in the 70's, for failure to bribe the correct politician/bureaucrat. They did the same thing to airplanes that they did to cars. https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-greenhouse-gas-emissions-aircraft FWIW modern airplanes aren't landed by pilots, they are landed by computer algorythms. The Space Shuttle has only been landed one time by a human, after decades of service. Airline pilots are just trouble shooters. It's all computer numeric controlled by algorithms. This is a rare gem of an occasion to see someone so completely wrong and out of their element who continues to defend and propagate their massive lack of understanding. I vote you Lord of GD. |
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Quoted: LockMart design for a carrier-based stealth fighter. Rumor was it was referred to as the Flying Dorito. It failed to impress Navy leadership due to a number of technical, cost, and schedule issues. It was cancelled. They actually went to court over that one. LockMart at the time needed to downsize so they took the opportunity to dump the vast majority of the project team. Stupid on their part since that team had just gone from concept to flight, something rare in the industry now. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: LockMart got stung doing the dump the whole project team as well after the A12 debacle. Took them a looong time to recover from that idiocy. @planemaker A12 debacle? LockMart design for a carrier-based stealth fighter. Rumor was it was referred to as the Flying Dorito. It failed to impress Navy leadership due to a number of technical, cost, and schedule issues. It was cancelled. They actually went to court over that one. LockMart at the time needed to downsize so they took the opportunity to dump the vast majority of the project team. Stupid on their part since that team had just gone from concept to flight, something rare in the industry now. That was a MacDac/General Dynamics program, not Lockmart. It was canceled in Jan 1991 and the lawsuits weren't finished until Jan. 2014. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_A-12_Avenger_II ETA: WTF, it's 2021 and this POS forum software is unable to auto turn links hot. |
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Quoted: It’s not night and day. I remember sitting through a pitch to a customer where they (Boeing) told the customer the winglets wouldn’t offset their own weight unless the flight was more than X miles. X miles being more than this customer would normally ever fly. They wanted them anyway because they looked neat. That was almost twenty years ago though, could have refined them a little since then. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Why is it necessary to design new planes? There are existing designs to cover all different endurance and passenger requirements. Why dont they just keep existing designs? That last improvement comes from eliminating built up sheet metal structures by using large machines, cutting touch labor costs. The next step is Full Scale Determinant Assembly, cutting labor another huge increment. Aerodynamic improvements are tough. Small drag reductions come more and more with shapes that are costly to fabricate. . The vertical winglets on the end of wings limit air 'rolling off' the end of the wing surface. That tiny change improved efficiency by a significant amount. A little more lift at speed for a very small increase in drag. There is at least one aviation forum where you will have no problem finding people that will tell you they are simply a cosmetic feature that doesn't do anything for the aircraft's performance. It’s not night and day. I remember sitting through a pitch to a customer where they (Boeing) told the customer the winglets wouldn’t offset their own weight unless the flight was more than X miles. X miles being more than this customer would normally ever fly. They wanted them anyway because they looked neat. That was almost twenty years ago though, could have refined them a little since then. It's a mix. Of the two winglet designs I have worked with, I haven't hesitated to voice my opinion on the aesthetic shortcomings of one of them. It failed to make it through development to the point of completing the flight test program, twice (two different aircraft - I was involved in the second attempt, which upper management cancelled even quicker). I didn't hear any details of the performance numbers on the first attempt, but the initial evaluation flights on the second attempt showed that the performance gains at altitude were similar to the other winglet design on a roughly similar aircraft (both winglets did roughly the same thing, but they looked different). Main reason for cancellation of development of that aesthetically challenged winglet, both times, was upper management didn't like the expected cost of certification vs their expectation of sales. On the topic of the forum I was referring to, there are posters that will claim that the other winglet I have worked with does absolutely nothing but add weight, take money from the customer's pocket, and change the looks of the plane. They will also claim that the design owner's refusal to publish performance numbers is proof of their claims (doesn't matter if you tell them who to call if they want performance numbers from the flight test program). They are apparently taking flight data for cruise at lower altitudes, where the winglet doesn't really make much of a difference, and deciding that it doesn't do anything at other altitudes or airspeeds. |
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In related news, Boeing's Starliner spacecraft has likely been delayed to 2022.
That puts it 3 years behind SpaceX in spite of getting almost double the money... |
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Quoted: It's a mix. Of the two winglet designs I have worked with, I haven't hesitated to voice my opinion on the aesthetic shortcomings of one of them. It failed to make it through development to the point of completing the flight test program, twice (two different aircraft - I was involved in the second attempt, which upper management cancelled even quicker). I didn't hear any details of the performance numbers on the first attempt, but the initial evaluation flights on the second attempt showed that the performance gains at altitude were similar to the other winglet design on a roughly similar aircraft (both winglets did roughly the same thing, but they looked different). Main reason for cancellation of development of that aesthetically challenged winglet, both times, was upper management didn't like the expected cost of certification vs their expectation of sales. On the topic of the forum I was referring to, there are posters that will claim that the other winglet I have worked with does absolutely nothing but add weight, take money from the customer's pocket, and change the looks of the plane. They will also claim that the design owner's refusal to publish performance numbers is proof of their claims (doesn't matter if you tell them who to call if they want performance numbers from the flight test program). They are apparently taking flight data for cruise at lower altitudes, where the winglet doesn't really make much of a difference, and deciding that it doesn't do anything at other altitudes or airspeeds. View Quote YAWN, I can't even. You're so smart, have you seen our stock price this quarter? Do something about THAT, smart guy! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nb, I sympathize. “We, the unwilling, led by the unknowing, are doing the impossible for the ungrateful. We have done so much, for so long, with so little, we are now qualified to do anything with nothing.” |
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Quoted: That was a MacDac/General Dynamics program, not Lockmart. It was canceled in Jan 1991 and the lawsuits weren't finished until Jan. 2014. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_A-12_Avenger_II View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: LockMart got stung doing the dump the whole project team as well after the A12 debacle. Took them a looong time to recover from that idiocy. @planemaker A12 debacle? LockMart design for a carrier-based stealth fighter. Rumor was it was referred to as the Flying Dorito. It failed to impress Navy leadership due to a number of technical, cost, and schedule issues. It was cancelled. They actually went to court over that one. LockMart at the time needed to downsize so they took the opportunity to dump the vast majority of the project team. Stupid on their part since that team had just gone from concept to flight, something rare in the industry now. That was a MacDac/General Dynamics program, not Lockmart. It was canceled in Jan 1991 and the lawsuits weren't finished until Jan. 2014. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_A-12_Avenger_II I thought GD had sold the Ft Worth group to Lockmart by then. Guess not. I know a guy who was involved in the lawsuits as an SME. The lawsuits were a shitshow evidently. I also know several folks that went to work at Vought in Dallas because they got dumped from over there. |
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Quoted: Thank you, fly-by-wire should be reserved for military jets, not airliners. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Modern airliners fly on the edge of falling out of the sky. Literally. They are inherently unsafe. No passenger airplane should require 87 sensors to maintain a stable flight profile. Watt? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 The 737 is taking all the press right now, but it's not a new issue with modern airplane design. It's the same ignorant bullshit that is everywhere. Must computerized and connected to the internet all the things!!! Why does your car have 87 sensors? Does it NEED 87 sensors? How did we ever survive in the dark days, before computer chips? But modern airplanes really are safe... they totally never crash, unless one of 870 sensors goes back. And when they do crash, it's "pilot error" for not havintg instant recall to follow one of 10,000 different protocols to deal with a possible bad sensor. They'll blame anyone but the engineer who designed the damned thing. That was a design fault. 1. The computer should never have silently averaged the two inputs when they were so far opposite each other. 2. It should have alerted the crew to the input discrepancy via control feedback and/or alarm. 3. The left seat's input should have won by default. Sensors will fail, you must account for them in procedures, but disconnecting the pilots from each other and allowing them to cancel each other's input to the point they fly the plane into the ocean is unacceptable and should have been foreseen. Kharn Kharn Thank you, fly-by-wire should be reserved for military jets, not airliners. No modern plane can survive without fly by wire, high performance requires the designs fly on the edge of stability, where the computers are constantly adjusting the control surfaces. Physically or electronically linking the yokes or side sticks is all that would be needed. Kharn |
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Quoted: I've been on this site for nearly 20 years and rarely do I see a series of posts with so much bullshit as I just read from cherokeerose. rose, what is your technical background in aerospace/aviation? View Quote Graduated from the CM Johnson National Academy of Aviation Sciences, B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering, Summa cum laude |
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Quoted: Sensors are all you have at 35,000 feet, at night, in a storm. Did you read about the French flight I posted? A design not balanced on the edge of falling out of the fucking sky would have done fine. "in the old days we just increased power to the engines and maintained altitude and bearing". There was a time when you didn't have to fly within such a narrow flight profile. Why not make airplanes safer? I guess that lady in the old Clint Eastwood film "The Gauntlet" was right, people DID become be cattle, shuttled around in airplanes. Scanned and searched and violated just for the privilege of flying on an (unsafe) commercial jet. It's sad, really. View Quote What do you think such a design would look like? I'm genuinely curious. |
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Quoted: No modern plane can survive without fly by wire, high performance requires the designs fly on the edge of stability, where the computers are constantly adjusting the control surfaces. Physically or electronically linking the yokes or side sticks is all that would be needed. Kharn View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Modern airliners fly on the edge of falling out of the sky. Literally. They are inherently unsafe. No passenger airplane should require 87 sensors to maintain a stable flight profile. Watt? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 The 737 is taking all the press right now, but it's not a new issue with modern airplane design. It's the same ignorant bullshit that is everywhere. Must computerized and connected to the internet all the things!!! Why does your car have 87 sensors? Does it NEED 87 sensors? How did we ever survive in the dark days, before computer chips? But modern airplanes really are safe... they totally never crash, unless one of 870 sensors goes back. And when they do crash, it's "pilot error" for not havintg instant recall to follow one of 10,000 different protocols to deal with a possible bad sensor. They'll blame anyone but the engineer who designed the damned thing. That was a design fault. 1. The computer should never have silently averaged the two inputs when they were so far opposite each other. 2. It should have alerted the crew to the input discrepancy via control feedback and/or alarm. 3. The left seat's input should have won by default. Sensors will fail, you must account for them in procedures, but disconnecting the pilots from each other and allowing them to cancel each other's input to the point they fly the plane into the ocean is unacceptable and should have been foreseen. Kharn Kharn Thank you, fly-by-wire should be reserved for military jets, not airliners. No modern plane can survive without fly by wire, high performance requires the designs fly on the edge of stability, where the computers are constantly adjusting the control surfaces. Physically or electronically linking the yokes or side sticks is all that would be needed. Kharn Most Boeings flying today, including the 737,are not fly-by-wire. They're hydraulically actuated with manual reversion available. Even the Airbus 320 series which is true fly-by-wire has mechanical back ups to keep us flying while resetting computers in the event of a catastrophic electrical failure (which has never happened). But all the Boeing aircraft except for the 777, 787, and I think the 747-800 are all flying around in what would be the equivalent of Airbus direct law, i.e. no built in protections available with the exception of a stick pusher, and it's hydraulic. |
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Quoted: Graduated from the CM Johnson National Academy of Aviation Sciences, B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering, Summa cum laude View Quote Folks, all is well and good, but unless you are retired, your knowledge is severely outdated, or you well and truly don't give a fuck, please think before you put your CV out there. I genuinely love all you engineers and old curmudgeons (but I repeat myself). But I also selfishly wish for the USA to keep whatever edge it can, for as long as it can. And all this personal data can be cross referenced automatically by all the AL-GORE-rythms from all these young whipper snappers. And we all aren't plaster saints, are we? So don't give anyone one inch of rope. **For those of you who know what's up and what you're about, pay no mind to the calls from the peanut gallery, and I tip my hat to you** |
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Quoted: I'm too lazy to math right now, but a commercial jet flying at ~40,000 ft and doing the "cruize" thing at ~550 mph according to the computer that is actually flying the airplane, is only going about 30 knots above stall speed. I know that sounds weird, but, keep in mind, the air is thinner. So more speed is required to maintain stable flight at that altitude. That's why when sensors go out/malfunction, these airplanes fall out the fucking sky. And then it's blamed on "Pilot Error", instead of Engineering Error. Or more like Corporate Profits Error. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Watt? I'm too lazy to math right now, but a commercial jet flying at ~40,000 ft and doing the "cruize" thing at ~550 mph according to the computer that is actually flying the airplane, is only going about 30 knots above stall speed. I know that sounds weird, but, keep in mind, the air is thinner. So more speed is required to maintain stable flight at that altitude. That's why when sensors go out/malfunction, these airplanes fall out the fucking sky. And then it's blamed on "Pilot Error", instead of Engineering Error. Or more like Corporate Profits Error. |
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This the software thing that keeps pushing the nose down because the system thinks the plane is going to stall out but nose pitching up? MCAS or something? Been playing on TV for like a week now.
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