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I missed it, but was anyone sitting in the seat next to that plug/door that failed?
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Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. View Quote The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ |
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Quoted: The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he’s getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector’s oversight. “People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership,” he said. “They are stamping it saying, ‘This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don’t need somebody else to come and check it.'” |
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Quoted: @Mariner82 What does that mean? Asking because I do not know. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Wow. Her coveted MoPed Endorsement really shows through in this briefing. She's an absolute shit-tier briefer. @Mariner82 What does that mean? Asking because I do not know. She can drive a moped. She's not a pilot or truck driver. Kharn |
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Quoted: Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he's getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector's oversight. "People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership," he said. "They are stamping it saying, 'This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don't need somebody else to come and check it.'" View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he's getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector's oversight. "People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership," he said. "They are stamping it saying, 'This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don't need somebody else to come and check it.'" A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. |
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Quoted: A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every model manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he's getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector's oversight. "People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership," he said. "They are stamping it saying, 'This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don't need somebody else to come and check it.'" A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every model manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. Its a dangerous road to go on, Boeing and every other aviation company lost a lot of talent and experience the past few years. Lots of new hires with little to no experience, I see it daily at the airline I work at as an Inspector. |
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They should give one of those planes a thorough major inspection. What else was slopped together?
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Quoted: A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every model manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he's getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector's oversight. "People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership," he said. "They are stamping it saying, 'This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don't need somebody else to come and check it.'" A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every model manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. Let's call it what it is .....absence of a quality control program. Without a 2nd set of eyes it's smoke and mirrors to reduce headcount. I've seen it in my industry as well. Fortunately our failures have slitlgly less severe consequences this is scary. |
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I wonder what Boeing found when they inspected the planes currently in production.
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Quoted: Seeing the stop pins in this photo for the first time, how did this door shift while pressurized? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Seeing the stop pins in this photo for the first time, how did this door shift while pressurized? The pins simply rest on door pads inside the aircraft structure. Something failed to that plug or structure (hinges) to allow it to move up and out. |
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Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That’s interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. View Quote The door is still locked in place by a selanoid, only a middle panel opens during a decompression event. All doors have been like that after they were redesigned after 9/11. |
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Quoted: Let's call it what it is .....absence of a quality control program. Without a 2nd set of eyes it's smoke and mirrors to reduce headcount. I've seen it in my industry as well. Fortunately our failures have slitlgly less severe consequences this is scary. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he's getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector's oversight. "People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership," he said. "They are stamping it saying, 'This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don't need somebody else to come and check it.'" A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every model manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. Let's call it what it is .....absence of a quality control program. Without a 2nd set of eyes it's smoke and mirrors to reduce headcount. I've seen it in my industry as well. Fortunately our failures have slitlgly less severe consequences this is scary. what gets me is this.....when I was starting out at Lockheed years ago as a stress engineer, making mistakes and not catching them was a big worry of mine. My boss sat me down and actually used a boeing pitch deck where they analyzed and statistically proved the need for a 3 tier check. If you have only the person who prepared the work, there is over an 80% chance a significant flaw will escape detection. 2nd set of eyes drops that to about 3%, 3rd set of eyes makes it vanishingly small. in my mind, boeing wrote the book on or at least solidified my agreement for needing multiple redundant check. Seeing them toss that out in the name of cost churns my stomach |
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Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That’s interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. View Quote If I'm in a plane that experiences rapid decompression, I'd like the pilots to a have a bit more time to don their masks, thank you very much. |
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Quoted: what gets me is this.....when I was starting out at Lockheed years ago as a stress engineer, making mistakes and not catching them was a big worry of mine. My boss sat me down and actually used a boeing pitch deck where they analyzed and statistically proved the need for a 3 tier check. If you have only the person who prepared the work, there is over an 80% chance a significant flaw will escape detection. 2nd set of eyes drops that to about 3%, 3rd set of eyes makes it vanishingly small. in my mind, boeing wrote the book on or at least solidified my agreement for needing multiple redundant check. Seeing them toss that out in the name of cost churns my stomach View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he's getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector's oversight. "People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership," he said. "They are stamping it saying, 'This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don't need somebody else to come and check it.'" A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every model manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. Let's call it what it is .....absence of a quality control program. Without a 2nd set of eyes it's smoke and mirrors to reduce headcount. I've seen it in my industry as well. Fortunately our failures have slitlgly less severe consequences this is scary. what gets me is this.....when I was starting out at Lockheed years ago as a stress engineer, making mistakes and not catching them was a big worry of mine. My boss sat me down and actually used a boeing pitch deck where they analyzed and statistically proved the need for a 3 tier check. If you have only the person who prepared the work, there is over an 80% chance a significant flaw will escape detection. 2nd set of eyes drops that to about 3%, 3rd set of eyes makes it vanishingly small. in my mind, boeing wrote the book on or at least solidified my agreement for needing multiple redundant check. Seeing them toss that out in the name of cost churns my stomach Its alarming and scary that the VP of Quality Control at Boeing is an idiot. You can't tell me that the FAA is good with this. |
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Quoted: Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he’s getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector’s oversight. “People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership,” he said. “They are stamping it saying, ‘This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don’t need somebody else to come and check it.'” View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he’s getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector’s oversight. “People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership,” he said. “They are stamping it saying, ‘This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don’t need somebody else to come and check it.'” That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. |
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Quoted: If I'm in a plane that experiences rapid decompression, I'd like the pilots to a have a bit more time to don their masks, thank you very much. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That’s interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. If I'm in a plane that experiences rapid decompression, I'd like the pilots to a have a bit more time to don their masks, thank you very much. You are delaying the transient by a less than a handful of seconds, if that, at the expense of greatly increasing pressure differentials and the airflow through all the other flight deck penetrations and exposing structure and equipment to pressures and accelerated airflows for which they aren't rated. In fact, you may not delay the transient at all. If you make the door an immovable object ... something else is probably going give ... and possibly take some wiring with it. |
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Quoted: The door is still locked in place by a selanoid, only a middle panel opens during a decompression event. All doors have been like that after they were redesigned after 9/11. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That’s interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. The door is still locked in place by a selanoid, only a middle panel opens during a decompression event. All doors have been like that after they were redesigned after 9/11. This. Explosive decompression, the crews first thought would be of a bomb. Inadvertent sabotage from lazy Boeing workers and beancounters, would be a distant third. Any small opening in the door would raise concern. |
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Quoted: If I'm in a plane that experiences rapid decompression, I'd like the pilots to a have a bit more time to don their masks, thank you very much. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That’s interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. If I'm in a plane that experiences rapid decompression, I'd like the pilots to a have a bit more time to don their masks, thank you very much. That’s not how it works. The whole outside skin of an airplane is one big pressure vessel. There are no “Pressure Bulkheads” like you’d see on a Warship. I like your idea though, and will forward it to the relevant authorities. It will require the complete replacement of every aircraft ever built. |
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Quoted: That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. View Quote Hell, we don’t let code go out the door until it has been desk and functioned checked by two sets of additional sets of eyes. Large changes get even more. The idea that a company in the aviation industry would even think about instituting a policy like what Boeing did is mind blowing. |
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Quoted: That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he’s getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector’s oversight. “People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership,” he said. “They are stamping it saying, ‘This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don’t need somebody else to come and check it.'” That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. All part of the oncoming Competence Crisis, I'm afraid. |
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Quoted: Wow. Her coveted MoPed Endorsement really shows through in this briefing. She's an absolute shit-tier briefer. I wonder if the final report will basically reveal that this is what happens when MBAs run an airplane company instead of engineers. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: I wonder if the final report will basically reveal that this is what happens when MBAs run an airplane company instead of engineers. Pilot Error. That's how these ALWAYS go down. |
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Quoted: Let's call it what it is .....absence of a quality control program. Without a 2nd set of eyes it's smoke and mirrors to reduce headcount. I've seen it in my industry as well. Fortunately our failures have slitlgly less severe consequences this is scary. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he's getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector's oversight. "People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership," he said. "They are stamping it saying, 'This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don't need somebody else to come and check it.'" A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every model manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. Let's call it what it is .....absence of a quality control program. Without a 2nd set of eyes it's smoke and mirrors to reduce headcount. I've seen it in my industry as well. Fortunately our failures have slitlgly less severe consequences this is scary. If the QC guys don't give a damn, that won't matter. QC signed off on the drill shavings and collar remnants left behind in KC-46A more than one instance at a location that had been squawked previously. If QC is using a checklist, there's a good chance that anything else that needs to be addressed will be self reported by the mechanic, or noticed by a lead that is checking. |
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Quoted: If the QC guys don't give a damn, that won't matter. QC signed off on the drill shavings and collar remnants left behind in KC-46A more than one instance at a location that had been squawked previously. If QC is using a checklist, there's a good chance that anything else that needs to be addressed will be self reported by the mechanic, or noticed by a lead that is checking. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he's getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector's oversight. "People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership," he said. "They are stamping it saying, 'This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don't need somebody else to come and check it.'" A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every model manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. Let's call it what it is .....absence of a quality control program. Without a 2nd set of eyes it's smoke and mirrors to reduce headcount. I've seen it in my industry as well. Fortunately our failures have slitlgly less severe consequences this is scary. If the QC guys don't give a damn, that won't matter. QC signed off on the drill shavings and collar remnants left behind in KC-46A more than one instance at a location that had been squawked previously. If QC is using a checklist, there's a good chance that anything else that needs to be addressed will be self reported by the mechanic, or noticed by a lead that is checking. No doubt but a 2nd set of eyes has always been the preferred method but them again its all in context. Make the QA dept report to manufacturing instead of an independent organization and you'll still end up with pencil whipping. |
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Quoted: No doubt but a 2nd set of eyes has always been the preferred method but them again its all in context. Make the QA dept report to manufacturing instead of an independent organization and you'll still end up with pencil whipping. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he's getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector's oversight. "People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership," he said. "They are stamping it saying, 'This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don't need somebody else to come and check it.'" A great illustration of the underlying problem. Boeing managers can't or won't say the truth. If Beltran believes that nonsense he needs to spend a year in the shop drilling holes and setting rivets, fitting shims, assembling substructure and fitting skins. With the plant superintendent and every model manager below him clamoring about schedule four times every day. The ability to think out of the box by twisting and cleverly interpreting a rule (regulation, contract, common ethical behavior), or inventing baloney in this case, is the path to promotion amongst managers and the two upper grades of worker bees. Let's call it what it is .....absence of a quality control program. Without a 2nd set of eyes it's smoke and mirrors to reduce headcount. I've seen it in my industry as well. Fortunately our failures have slitlgly less severe consequences this is scary. If the QC guys don't give a damn, that won't matter. QC signed off on the drill shavings and collar remnants left behind in KC-46A more than one instance at a location that had been squawked previously. If QC is using a checklist, there's a good chance that anything else that needs to be addressed will be self reported by the mechanic, or noticed by a lead that is checking. No doubt but a 2nd set of eyes has always been the preferred method but them again its all in context. Make the QA dept report to manufacturing instead of an independent organization and you'll still end up with pencil whipping. I never liked the mechanic inspector concept just due to that. I think they need a chain of command separate from ops, just like engineering. I've witnessed things even worse than either of these 737 fiasco's that I am firmly convinced would never have happened if it weren't for that. |
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Quoted: That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he’s getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector’s oversight. “People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership,” he said. “They are stamping it saying, ‘This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don’t need somebody else to come and check it.'” That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. So you’re noticing the fundamental transformation of our society? |
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Quoted: I never liked the mechanic inspector concept just due to that. I think they need a chain of command separate from ops, just like engineering. I've witnessed things even worse than either of these 737 fiasco's that I am firmly convinced would never have happened if it weren't for that. View Quote We use the term "disinterested third party". I can't care less if it sits here till it's covered with spider webs and daddy long legs, it isn't going anywhere till it's sorted out. |
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Quoted: what gets me is this.....when I was starting out at Lockheed years ago as a stress engineer, making mistakes and not catching them was a big worry of mine. My boss sat me down and actually used a boeing pitch deck where they analyzed and statistically proved the need for a 3 tier check. If you have only the person who prepared the work, there is over an 80% chance a significant flaw will escape detection. 2nd set of eyes drops that to about 3%, 3rd set of eyes makes it vanishingly small. in my mind, boeing wrote the book on or at least solidified my agreement for needing multiple redundant check. Seeing them toss that out in the name of cost churns my stomach View Quote This was my post back on page 8 when I read that piece about cutting 900 floor QA inspectors and going to a "process" that eliminate mistakes. "This is, quite literally, the craziest fucking thing I ever read in my life. After 25 years in AF maintenance I saw assemblers in that factory that do things that boggled my mind. My cherry got busted early when QA caught one of my guys filling countersinks drilled too deep on a wing root panel with putty and using a phillips to "press-in" a bolt head. The tool control program got my blood pressure so high I punched the button one morning and walked out. Eliminate the only people keeping the wheels on, eh? We may have finally found the answer" I told my wife when I left I wasn't going to be used as the "accountable person" when FOD put a B-flight into Lake Washington. This, after upper management decided to have the floor managers start inventorying the union employees tools, and signing the kits off as complete...when I knew damn well that their buddies in supply were marking and slipping them replacements for what they'd lost. I wonder how much of the actual bar sign-off is now being done by the first level managers. It wouldn't surprise me at all if some poor fucking first level is about to take a very hard fall. |
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I'm supposed to be flying back from Alaska next week, we'll see if that happens lol.
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Quoted: First time I did it, I wondered how the 70 year old F/A’s were demonstrating it. I’m glad they aren’t like that anymore. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Loose bolts not withstanding Hi…..I’m from the government and i want these doors to swing out……i know you build planes for a living and are really smart and all but…..swing out. Want to bet it is a cheaper build choice on that? Other doors are supported by the pressurization and will swing out, but require a swing in before they come out. Since this is a plug, I am betting this is a cheaper option instead of having a stronger design in the door frame to support an push out design. The overwing exits Pop Out with authority(spring loaded). (A pin automagically locks them at a certain speed or when in Flight mode) This is a nice feature to have, because 1. The people seated at the exits may be old and weak, with no experience, and, 2. It’s difficult to manhandle an old school plug style exit door, inward, then rotate, and Out, or In, and put it on a seat. It would be impossible to do in an emergency with people pressed against you. 3. I think the extra aft fuselage exit would be designed to work like the over-wing.(?) It’s probably been discussed already. I have done it ( bring in doors) in training, it is not easy to maneuver due to the seats, and that is being familiar with how it works, your average person in a cabin fire situation is probably going to take a long time to get it done, if ever. First time I did it, I wondered how the 70 year old F/A’s were demonstrating it. I’m glad they aren’t like that anymore. you are glad the doors arent like that or the flight attendants arent like that? |
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Quoted: That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he’s getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector’s oversight. “People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership,” he said. “They are stamping it saying, ‘This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don’t need somebody else to come and check it.'” That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. yep. because been counters are running these companies, they know nothing of the safety history and great strides made with blood. we had a CEO that thought he was running a bank, which is what he was used to doing and drove the company into the ground so to speak, because ou cant run an airline like a bank. |
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Quoted: You are delaying the transient by a less than a handful of seconds, if that, at the expense of greatly increasing pressure differentials and the airflow through all the other flight deck penetrations and exposing structure and equipment to pressures and accelerated airflows for which they aren't rated. In fact, you may not delay the transient at all. If you make the door an immovable object ... something else is probably going give ... and possibly take some wiring with it. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That’s interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. If I'm in a plane that experiences rapid decompression, I'd like the pilots to a have a bit more time to don their masks, thank you very much. You are delaying the transient by a less than a handful of seconds, if that, at the expense of greatly increasing pressure differentials and the airflow through all the other flight deck penetrations and exposing structure and equipment to pressures and accelerated airflows for which they aren't rated. In fact, you may not delay the transient at all. If you make the door an immovable object ... something else is probably going give ... and possibly take some wiring with it. just what everbody wants, a great pressure differential at the bulkhead. |
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Quoted: That’s not how it works. The whole outside skin of an airplane is one big pressure vessel. There are no “Pressure Bulkheads” like you’d see on a Warship. I like your idea though, and will forward it to the relevant authorities. It will require the complete replacement of every aircraft ever built. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That’s interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. If I'm in a plane that experiences rapid decompression, I'd like the pilots to a have a bit more time to don their masks, thank you very much. That’s not how it works. The whole outside skin of an airplane is one big pressure vessel. There are no “Pressure Bulkheads” like you’d see on a Warship. I like your idea though, and will forward it to the relevant authorities. It will require the complete replacement of every aircraft ever built. but it is my understanding there is a structural bulkhead at the cockpit cabin junction, is that not true? |
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Quoted: Hell, we don’t let code go out the door until it has been desk and functioned checked by two sets of additional sets of eyes. Large changes get even more. The idea that a company in the aviation industry would even think about instituting a policy like what Boeing did is mind blowing. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. Hell, we don’t let code go out the door until it has been desk and functioned checked by two sets of additional sets of eyes. Large changes get even more. The idea that a company in the aviation industry would even think about instituting a policy like what Boeing did is mind blowing. clearly cost reduction has a higher priority than established safety SOP idiots. |
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Soon, the cheapest way to acquire a Boeing aircraft will be to purchase a small plot of land and simply wait a few weeks.
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If these bolts were not properly installed and/or checked, what is to say that the same problem does not exist elsewhere on the aircraft?
Perhaps a more extensive review is justified. |
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Quoted: All part of the oncoming Competence Crisis, I'm afraid. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: It is all lining up to be a failure of the assembly at Spirit Aerosystems and a final inspection at Boeing that the plug was not installed correctly with the locking bolts and the airframe failed only 2 months into service with Alaskan airlines. The video posted earlier said the plug is removed by Boeing during final assembly, the opening is used to bring in components, and then Boeing puts the plug back in place. Boeing laid off hundreds of quality control inspectors as a cost saving measure, so they may not have inspected the reinstalled plug. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-overhauls-its-quality-controls-more-high-tech-tracking-but-fewer-inspectors/ Here's what the VP of Quality had to say, Gonzalez-Beltran, however, insists he’s getting positive buy-in from mechanics who take pride in performing their work without an inspector’s oversight. “People feel good about it, feeling they have ownership,” he said. “They are stamping it saying, ‘This is good. I built it. I did it right. Move on. I don’t need somebody else to come and check it.'” That goes against the entire philosophy of commercial Aviation. A philosophy which was written in blood, since the beginning. All part of the oncoming Competence Crisis, I'm afraid. I've seen that my entire 40-year career in software, it happens whenever the "B team" mostly replaces the "A team". The "A team" leaves when innovation slows down, then the "B team" is brought in. Not all at once, and not necessarily everyone, but enough that it's hard to keep a product viable for very long. In a way, this is fine for the company as long as the "A team" is still around and working on something new. Maybe Boeing made the mistake of dragging out the 737 lifecycle beyond the skills of their employees. |
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"Yes, We Have No Bolts" 9 Jan 737 Max-9 Update |
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Quoted: but it is my understanding there is a structural bulkhead at the cockpit cabin junction, is that not true? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That's interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. If I'm in a plane that experiences rapid decompression, I'd like the pilots to a have a bit more time to don their masks, thank you very much. That's not how it works. The whole outside skin of an airplane is one big pressure vessel. There are no "Pressure Bulkheads" like you'd see on a Warship. I like your idea though, and will forward it to the relevant authorities. It will require the complete replacement of every aircraft ever built. but it is my understanding there is a structural bulkhead at the cockpit cabin junction, is that not true? There are technically pressure bulkheads at the very front of the cockpit, where the radar is mounted, and behind the rear galley. There aren't separate pressure bulkhead inside of the cockpit or cabin however. |
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Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That’s interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. View Quote The enemy is always watching. |
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Quoted: https://i.imgur.com/53WoCT1.jpeg That’s interesting. I bet than info was never supposed to be made public. View Quote It's design aspect that's been known for over twenty years. |
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