Tards are ingenious.  Tard defeat experience and constant vigilance is required.

That policy was in place well before the crashes or the article was written.

An offensive policy from the start, and doesn't scratch the surface of the internal rot.

Nearly every subassembly in an airplane.

I know the reason.  Underlying talent compounded by sorry education and unwarranted trophy awards.

Probably before next weekend.  The hold up will be stealing a door slated for a new airplane down the line.

Unless the investigation concludes that all of the doors are bad.

AE's are a microscopic fraction working on these airplanes.  The majority in the structures world are ME's and CE's, a few with rare Engineering Mechanics degrees, and an occasional physicist or masters degree mathematician.

Chemists, metallurgists, ME's and others support the Materials and Processes groups.

Hell week does not exist in engineering schools, and how would a new student be eliminated after a week of classes that are barely spinning up for the semester.  Besides that, thousands that barely get by receive degrees.  I had a young black female recent hire that was so sorry that I checked to find out if she came from an ABET accredited school.  She had an ME from Tuskegee.  Part of the issue was that she hadn't worked for a lead that could train her, she had been assigned to a glamor spot (an initiative designed to place new hires in jobs that were not where the boring day to day work occurred so they would stay longer than a year or two) working for a manufacturing engineer that was equally clueless and best at assembling PowerPoint charts in any case - saleswoman, not engineer.

Then you would be surprised by the review process.  There is no assessment of airworthiness between drawing sign off and assembly or installation unless an assembly problem crops up that can't be ignored.  On top of that, there are plenty of malicious actors in the shop that will fabricate bad parts strictly according to planning with errors and the parts in front of them to make engineering and planning look bad.

The commercial side has slightly more thorough reviews, but don't count on them to dig deep enough into an analysis to uncover the "analysis looking analysis" that doesn't hold up to scrutiny.

A real problem in Seattle are a few structural practices that are "we always do it this way", and they don't know the reason.  On 747-8 I asked someone if a hinky detail had been tested, the answer was "0n the B-52".  Well, that was a long time ago, the wing sweep was different, and this part crossed a line of incredulity that warranted a closer look.

I also challenged a repeated detail subject to nuisance fatigue cracks, easily fixed at no more cost or weight.  But as usual, it's easy for the designer to draw quickly.  The airworthiness directives and and old design guide full of "do this, don't do that" examples for -200 airplanes backs me up.

A nuisance fatigue crack (my terminology) is one that does not affect immediate airworthiness, but requires attention and cannot be ignored.  The problem is usually less critical in sheet metal assemblies where the crack grows a short distance to the edge of (a small) part and is arrested.  Now that sheet metal assemblies are becoming more and more rare, crack arresters are gone.  A crack in a machined part grows farther to find an edge.  If the crack reaches critical length the part fails.  The loads in that part are redistributed to surrounding structure that is not capable of carrying the additional load.

Folks should abandon the false notion that Boeing commercial was a once great engineering company.  It was never better than a grade C.