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Originally Posted By michigan66: https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/501718/Screenshot_2023-11-10-10-29-56_kindlepho-3022425.JPG View Quote They should have thought about that before they sent their military to start a war. |
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Trusting your life to the benevolence of an armed criminal is not a strategy, it is stupid!
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Originally Posted By realwar: Democrat Rep. Rashida Tlaib Says There's Been A "Distortion" Of Her Call To Genocide Against Israel https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OSLlXyW6DOc View Quote Fuck her and all her likes and supporters. Hell is too good for those critters. |
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Originally Posted By xd341: State department thinks that's a win, IDF thinks that's how you find the hidey holes. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By xd341: Originally Posted By SoCalExile:
I would also think that some pauses on the explosions would help detecting sounds and where they come from. |
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Originally Posted By Rossi: If the SCADA control is interconnected with others in the tunnel system, the Israelis should be able to do very interesting things by taping into it and hacking it. View Quote Start messing with all the input tables so they don't know they need exhaust fans to run |
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Remorse is for the dead
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Originally Posted By michigan66: https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/501718/Screenshot_2023-11-10-10-29-56_kindlepho-3022425.JPG View Quote How about Hamas cowards not hiding behind civilians for start. |
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In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not.
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Haaretz | News Analysis | Israel-Hamas War: IDF Says It Needs Months, U.S. Signals No More Than Weeks
Highlights: The war in Gaza entered its 35th day this morning, November 10 – one day more than the 2006 Lebanon war, which at the time was described as a frustrating stalemate in which Israel found it difficult to vanquish the enemy, Hezbollah. The circumstances this time, in a war that is currently focused on Hamas, are harder. After 2006, Defense ministers and IDF chiefs of staff realized the need to subdue the enemy quickly. The IDF understood that the weak point resides in the Israeli home front, which would endure massive missile and rocket attacks, and that the most effective way to tip the scales entails battering the enemy fiercely within a short time. The evening of November 10th the IDF sent three divisional forces into the northern Gaza Strip. The massive aerial attacks of the first weeks became even fiercer from the moment the air force began to provide close support for the ground forces. The progress since then has been slow and devastating, using the “shredder” method. The armored and infantry forces unleash extremely heavy fire in the face of every manifestation of resistance. That is apparently the main reason for Hamas’ decision, in many cases, to remain in the tunnels and avoid a direct military clash. The IDF is sustaining losses when it enters a static mode, or when it attacks facilities that are critical for Hamas. IDF is now operating in the densest area so far. The difficulty – compared to the American-Iraqi offensive against ISIS in Mosul around five years ago – is compounded by an extraordinarily ramified network of tunnels below ground, and many tall buildings above ground, though a considerable portion of them were destroyed in Israeli attacks. The United Nations estimates that nearly half the buildings in the northern Gaza Strip were hit or leveled in the attacks. There are positive signs. The rocket fire from Gaza was much reduced this week, possibly reflecting difficulties in Hamas’ command structure. Some 15 battalion- or equivalent-level commanders in the organization have been killed in the IDF’s actions, and in some cases their deputies were also killed. The flow of refugees fleeing from the north to the south in the Gaza Strip is growing apace, despite interference by Hamas. That too is a sign of distress in its ranks. The IDF is showing signs of inflicting more systematic damage on the tunnels. The goal of the war, as set forth to the IDF, is the destruction of Hamas’ military capability and governing infrastructure. In the desired concluding state of affairs, it’s stated, “no security threat emanates from the Gaza Strip for an indefinite period.” This goal is ambitious and the ability to achieve it epends on three factors: wielding effective military might, allocating sufficient time, and the ability to operate in the southern Gaza Strip. The IDF must not impose Western logic on the analysis of the enemy’s intentions and capabilities. After all, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar went into the campaign knowing full well that Gaza would take a blow powerful enough to stir echoes of the 1948 Nakba. Nevertheless, in deciding to hugely escalate the struggle against Israel despite the tremendous damage that would certainly be caused to the 2 million people under his rule, Sinwar never blinked. It would be a serious mistake to infer from the difficulties he now faces that he will surrender or even be deterred under the pressure he is now under. We’ve already heard enough about a “weakened and deterred Hamas” from the government and from the IDF after the earlier, smaller operations in Gaza. No one will buy those used goods again. A former army chief told an audience in London that Israel needs several months to complete an effective operation against Hamas. After that, he thought, there will be no choice but to deal with the problem of the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s commando unit, which is deployed along the Lebanon border and possesses greater military abilities than its Hamas. Northern Command and in the Galilee Formation (91st Division) are not enthusiastic about the fact that the front against Hezbollah has dropped to second place in importance, given the events in Gaza. They understand that the continuing presence of the Radwan Force along the security fence will not allow the inhabitants of the border communities to return home. The United States is now putting out initial feelers toward working out a diplomatic mechanism which will again keep Hezbollah stationed north of the Litani River. The prospects here are not great, because Iran continues to view Hezbollah – Radwan, and especially the organization’s large arsenal of missiles – as its insurance policy against an Israeli or American attack targeting its nuclear facilities. The danger in the north is of a mistake being made (an attack on Lebanese civilians) or of an inordinate success. Too many losses for Hezbollah – to date more than 80 Lebanese fighters have been killed, including from Palestinian organizations – is liable to prompt the organization’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, to escalate the fighting. In this regard, it’s worth mentioning the uselessness of UNIFIL, the United Nations force in southern Lebanon. View Quote Article: Click To View Spoiler Israel-Hamas war: IDF says it needs months, U.S. signals no more than weeks After 2006, and the multiple rounds that took place afterward in the Gaza Strip, defense ministers and IDF chiefs of staff tended to talk about the obligation to subdue the enemy quickly. The IDF understood that the weak point resides in the Israeli home front, which would endure massive missile and rocket attacks, and that the most effective way to tip the scales entails battering the enemy fiercely within a short time. That discussion was always accompanied by a dispute over the need and the possibility to move the fighting to the enemy’s territory, relying on the ability of the ground forces, whose units hadn’t been tested in massive combat in an urban environment since the Lebanon War of 1982. The army’s commanders swore that a ground maneuver was a vital necessity to achieve victory, and that only its implementation would demonstrate that the combat level of the ground troops was higher than what people thought. Both the air force and the political decision-makers were skeptical. In practice, Israel waited almost three weeks before sending the ground forces into the Gaza Strip, due to various constraints. The evening of November 10 will mark two weeks since the start of the ground offensive. The IDF sent three divisional forces into the northern Gaza Strip and demanded that the Palestinian civilians there leave their homes and make their way to the south of Gaza. The massive aerial attacks of the first weeks became even fiercer from the moment the air force was called upon to provide close support for the ground forces. The progress since then has been slow and devastating, using the “shredder” method. The armored and infantry forces unleash extremely heavy fire in the face of every manifestation of resistance. That is apparently the main reason for Hamas’ decision, in many cases, to remain in the tunnels and avoid a direct military clash. The IDF is sustaining losses when Hamas snipes at forces who enter a static mode, or when it attacks facilities that are more critical for Hamas, around which a more intensive defensive effort takes place. Senior figures in the military General Staff have told Haaretz that the area where the IDF is now operating is the densest in which such a move has ever been undertaken. The difficulty – compared to the American-Iraqi offensive against ISIS in Mosul around five years ago – is compounded by two elements: an extraordinarily ramified network of tunnels below ground, and many tall buildings above ground, though a considerable portion of them were destroyed in Israeli attacks. The United Nations estimates that nearly half the buildings in the northern Gaza Strip were hit or leveled in the attacks. Foreign analysts, relying on satellite images, reported on Thursday that in the seafront sector in western Gaza City, a small opening remained in the Israeli encirclement, about four kilometers wide, but it too leads only to the sea, which is controlled by Israeli vessels. There are several quite positive signs resulting from the Israeli troops’ progress. It’s evident that the IDF has recovered from the initial shock and is now operating better in the Gaza Strip. The rocket fire into the south of Israel, and more so into the center, was very much reduced this week, possibly reflecting difficulties in Hamas’ command structure. Some 15 battalion- or equivalent-level commanders in the organization have been killed in the IDF’s actions, and in some cases their deputies were also killed. Hamas is disseminating fake news about the killing of senior IDF officers and massive destruction of armored vehicles, apparently attesting to difficulties in displaying genuine achievements to date. The flow of refugees fleeing from the north to the south in the Gaza Strip is growing apace, despite interference by Hamas. That too is a sign of distress in its ranks. The IDF is showing signs of inflicting more systematic damage on the tunnels (though a move is still needed that will help transform them from an asset into a burden for Hamas). Ranking figures in Hamas, such as Saleh Aruri, are complaining to Hezbollah for its refusal to mobilize fully in the battle for the benefit of the Palestinians. But it’s also worth remembering that victory in war is achieved when one side ceases to function, whether in the form of an outright surrender or because of the collapse of its systems. Hamas looks far from that at the moment. Its functioning in the northern Gaza Strip has been badly hurt, but surrender is not in sight. In the meantime, the talks about a deal to free captives have resumed. Egyptian and Qatari sources are talking about a small-scale deal in which Hamas will release some 15 hostages in return for a relatively short truce. Israel would naturally like to see a larger number of captives set free. According to the Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar, which is close to Hezbollah, Hamas is demanding a four-day cease-fire and the release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel in exchange for the captives. The United States wants two days, Israel is willing to accept a one-day truce. This episode, too, which is at the heart of the war, is far from ending. Brutal message The first goal of the war, as set forth to the IDF, is the destruction of Hamas’ military capability and governing infrastructure. In the desired concluding state of affairs, it’s stated, “no security threat emanates from the Gaza Strip for an indefinite period.” The army is also being called on to beef up the sense of personal security and national resilience among the country’s citizens, to restore the sense of security to the residents of the Gaza Envelope – the Israeli communities adjacent to the Gaza Strip – to establish security buffer zones in the Gaza Strip, to create conditions for the return of the captives, to deter enemies and project strength in all sectors and to prepare for possible escalation in the northern arena. That is more professional and substantive language than the bellicose public rhetoric being spouted by the political decision-makers. IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi prefers to speak in terms of dismantling Hamas’ capabilities, and is also being careful not to scatter promises about eradicating the seed of Amalek (referring to an enemy of the Israelites mentioned in the Bible). But even the official goals are ambitions, and the ability to achieve them depends on three factors: wielding effective military might, allocating sufficient time, and the ability to operate in the southern Gaza Strip as well, where attacks on Hamas have been relatively few because of the large-scale movement of civilians to that area. Haaretz chief editor Aluf Benn wrote on Thursday that Israel has already executed another dramatic move, stemming from the sheer fact of evacuating the civilians to the south and the immense destruction that has been wrought in the northern Gaza Strip. These results will preclude a reasonable way of life in the northern area for a lengthy period, the more so as Israel will likely prevent the return of people as long as the confrontation with Hamas continues. That too is part of the brutal message that Israel is sending the region following the blow it sustained, and in an attempt to prevent the fighting from spreading to additional arenas. Still, the same trap that Israel fell into in the past lurks here as well, in the form of trying to impose Western logic on the analysis of the enemy’s intentions and capabilities. After all, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar went into the campaign knowing full well that Gaza would take a blow powerful enough to stir echoes of the 1948 Nakba. Nevertheless, in deciding to hugely escalate the struggle against Israel despite the tremendous damage that would certainly be caused to the 2 million people under his rule, Sinwar never blinked. It would be a serious mistake to infer from the difficulties he now faces that he will surrender or even be deterred under the pressure he is now under. We’ve already heard enough about a “weakened and deterred Hamas” from the government and from the IDF after the earlier, smaller operations in Gaza. No one will buy those used goods again. Extensive reports this week in the New York Times and the Guardian detailed Hamas’ secret preparations for the terrorist attack and the underlying strategy. According to the Times, the assault was so murderous that it served one of the central aims of its planners: to decide the dispute within Hamas about the organization’s purpose – as a ruling body in Gaza, or a fighting body. The leaders in the Gaza Strip, Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, won that argument, and Hamas is now trying to impose a permanent state of combat against Israel, in the territories and on the borders, and to drag in the radical Shi’ite axis and Arab states. From Israel’s standpoint, the time element of the operation is critical. The IDF commanders in the field are talking about a time frame of months to rid the northern Gaza Strip of military capabilities, but Washington is signaling that there won’t be more than a few weeks, even after a limited deal for the release of captives. After that, the U.S. is pressing for the fighting to take place in a different format. Halevi’s predecessor as chief of staff, Aviv Kochavi, has been completely absent from public appearances in the media since the war began. This week he visited Britain as part of Israel's efforts to secure European support for prolonged military action in the Gaza Strip. Participants who took part in a meeting Kochavi held with London's Jewish community told Haaretz they understood from the former army chief that Israel needs several months to complete an effective operation against Hamas. After that, he thought, there will be no choice but to deal with the problem of the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s commando unit, which is deployed along the Lebanon border and possesses greater military abilities than its Hamas counterpart, the Nukhba Force, which Hamas sent to carry out the massacre on October 7. Like his successors in the IDF, Kochavi also admitted that the army had failed in its mission to protect the country’s citizens. It was, as one participant said, "a sad, sobering and a slightly frightening evening." High-ranking IDF personnel are drawing encouragement from the strong public spirit, which rests on the perception that this is definitely a just war, in the light of Hamas’ atrocities, and is reflected in exceptional motivation and determination on the part of the regular and reserve forces. The officers cannot talk publicly about the other side of the coin: This extraordinary effort is being overseen by a failed leader who has lost the remnants of his legitimacy due to his performance in the disaster, and in particular his persistent evasion of responsibility. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is now waging a rearguard political battle and is not balking at any dirty trick, even at the expense of the security personnel who are subordinate to him. Not only is the government failing in regard to addressing the needs of the citizens, but the strong parties in it (the far right and the Haredim) are continuing to insist on maintaining wasteful, superfluous ministries and on the continued flow of the coalition funds, even though the situation in the country has been totally transformed. What stands out above all is that Netanyahu is incapable of showing any type of empathy toward his hurting, distraught citizens, and is continuing to bombard them with empty, pointless clichés. U.S. President Joe Biden deserves another medal from the Jewish people, not only for the military aid he sent to Israel immediately after the disaster, but also for the infinite patience he is now displaying toward Netanyahu’s deviousness. High motivation Visits to Northern Command and the Air Force in the past week provided some relief from the still harsh situation in the south. In both venues, which were not directly responsible for the October 7 debacle, one sees a faster recovery than was registered in the General Staff, Military Intelligence, Shin Bet and Southern Command, amid the guilt feelings and the shock that the massacre fomented. Even so, the feeling of responsibility for the failure is collective. “I’ve been in uniform more than 35 years,” says a senior officer, “and all my life I was taught that my role is to be a barrier between the citizens and danger. On October 7 we failed. That’s not something you snap back from easily.” Nevertheless, there’s no escaping the conclusion that the great offensive war machine that was upgraded in recent years in the IDF and in the intelligence community has resumed functioning. Those in Northern Command and in the Galilee Formation (91st Division) are not enthusiastic about the fact that the front against Hezbollah has dropped to second place in importance, given the events in Gaza. Like Kochavi, they too understand that the continuing presence of the Radwan Force along the security fence will not allow the inhabitants of the border communities to return home. The understanding in the north is that Gaza takes precedence at the moment, amid awareness of possible escalation with Hezbollah – and the need to deal with that problem afterward. The United States is now putting out initial feelers toward working out a diplomatic mechanism which will again keep Hezbollah stationed north of the Litani River. The prospects here are not great, because Iran continues to view Hezbollah – Radwan, and especially the organization’s large arsenal of missiles – as its insurance policy against an Israeli or American attack targeting its nuclear facilities. In this regard, it’s worth mentioning the uselessness of UNIFIL, the United Nations force in southern Lebanon. At the conclusion of the 2006 war, its status was upgraded and its size increased. In Security Council Resolution 1701 it was also tasked with keeping Hezbollah north of the Litani. Not only didn’t that ever happen, with Hezbollah creating a massive military force in the villages of the south, but staring in May 2022 the organization also started to deploy observation posts along the border itself. The United Nations did nothing, and Israel didn’t dare attack the posts, just as it refrained (at the IDF’s recommendation) from taking action against Hezbollah’s manufacture of precision-guided missiles in Lebanon. Since Hezbollah started launching attacks along the fence, on October 8, UNIFIL has been thinning out its forces and distancing its personnel from danger. That’s an important lesson, both for the possible future situation in Lebanon and for the hopes of stationing an international force in the Gaza Strip in the future. In the defenses in the north, the performance of the reserves has been impressive in the management of the sector (subject to Northern Command and the divisional command centers), with the majority of the regular force having been sent south or remaining as a reserve. The systematic blow to antitank and rocket squads of Hezbollah, with the aid of the air force and Military Intelligence, continues. The danger here at the moment is of a mistake being made (an attack on Lebanese civilians) or of an inordinate success. Too many losses for Hezbollah – to date more than 80 Lebanese fighters have been killed, including from Palestinian organizations – is liable to prompt the organization’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, to escalate the fighting, such as by launching rockets at the Haifa region. This week a small volley was fired at the Krayot, Haifa’s suburbs, and intercepted. The air force has emphasized that less than half its force is committed to the Gaza Strip, because it’s possible and necessary to preserve capabilities for fighting in the north. The massive supplies organized by the Defense Ministry, along with the accelerated American aid, enable considerable breathing space. What stands out most in visits to the headquarters and the bases is the total commitment to protect the IDF troops doing battle on the ground. Each brigade moves with close air support and is assisted by drones, helicopters and warplanes that operate in close quarters with the forces. In one case a half-ton bomb was dropped on an enemy squad at a distance of only 140 meters away from a ground force, far below the customary safety restrictions. The aerial photographs received in the command centers show the immense damage wrought by the attacks, with the goal of distancing the danger. Before the war, in conjunction with the judicial coup legislation and the government’s attempts to widen the rifts in the nation, a systematic, toxic campaign was waged against the pilots. At its nadir, a video was posted in which a pilot supposedly refuses to assist a ground force that needs to be extracted, until he finds out where they stand on the coup issue. Nothing could be farther from the reality in Gaza. Every commander I spoke with emphasized that it would be impossible to act successfully without the regular aerial assistance. Fake items are engendered on the left, too. One of them, particularly vile, which was posted in social media, accuses the commander of the air force, Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, of supposedly having waited for a directive from Netanyahu, and therefore of not coming to the aid of the communities in the south for six hours, until the security cabinet could meet. That, of course, is a total lie. But for the sake of accuracy, here are the facts. Between 7:15 A.M. and 10 A.M., namely from 45 minutes after the start of the Hamas attack, 54 attacks by warplanes took place, 43 missiles were fired by attack helicopters, about 2,500 artillery shells from helicopters and another 50 attacks were carried out by drones. That wasn’t enough, of course, and if the air force had received a prior alert, it might have been possible to deploy several pairs of Apache helicopters, which would likely have foiled the attack. But the pilots must not be blamed for what is not in their sphere of responsibility. The failure was a general one, of the entire security establishment, and not specifically of the air force. Bar discovered that the war had started, like all of us (and like Netanyahu), at 6:30 A.M. when alarms interrupted his preparations for his morning run. An hour later, when he arrived at the air force’s command center, the first people he saw were three reserve officers who had taken part in the protest moves against the coup not long before. At 8:17 A.M., one of the leading activists sent the following message in the pilots’ protest group: “In such a broad-scale event, which arrived as a surprise attack from the other side, I face no dilemma – I am going to defend our home.” All his comrades did the same. |
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"A dying culture invariably exhibits personal rudeness. Bad manners. Lack of consideration for others in minor matters. A loss of politeness, of gentle manners, is more significant than is a riot."
Robert A. Heinlein, Friday |
Originally Posted By Element94: Are there any General Officers in the US Military that are worth a shit any more? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By Element94: Originally Posted By Mike_314: "prolonging Gaza operations will drive more civilians to terrorism" Almost all of them are terrorists or supporters, what's a few more. Brown is just another one who seems more concerned with the fate of America's enemies than our allies. Are there any General Officers in the US Military that are worth a shit any more? They were the field officers who lost the WOT. LOSERS. |
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"Everything woke turns to shit" - Donald J. Trump
FUCK JOE BIDEN! |
Originally Posted By Ascendent: How about Hamas cowards not hiding behind civilians for start. View Quote No argument from me. That is the message the US needs to be putting out. Others agree: Egyptian TV Host Slams Hamas Official’s Claim That Gaza Civilians’ Safety Is Responsibility of UN Gazans Evacuating to South Gaza Strip Curse Hamas Leaders: Khaled Mashal Has Destroyed This City! |
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"A dying culture invariably exhibits personal rudeness. Bad manners. Lack of consideration for others in minor matters. A loss of politeness, of gentle manners, is more significant than is a riot."
Robert A. Heinlein, Friday |
Originally Posted By michigan66: https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/501718/Screenshot_2023-11-10-10-29-56_kindlepho-3022425.JPG View Quote No one in this Administration has ever heard of the importance of unity of command, and if they had, they wouldn't give a shit. Not only are different, random administration representatives throwing in their conflicting opinions, but these morons even conflict with themselves. The hallmark of a lying asshole with an infinitely negotiable moral compass. Biden's jackass comment about Netanyahu was par for the course for him of course, but holy shit it's like no one knows the importance of demonstrating a unified front, settling any differences behind the scenes. Compare Churchill and Chester Nimitz against Biden and Kirby...... Equal parts cowardice, corruption, and idiocy. |
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Originally Posted By tnriverluver: Nice straight bomb run! View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By tnriverluver: Originally Posted By AlmightyTallest: No resupply for you.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F-ilkQQWYAAaK1n?format=jpg&name=large Nice straight bomb run! Nice interval, too. |
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"Everything woke turns to shit" - Donald J. Trump
FUCK JOE BIDEN! |
Originally Posted By Rossi: If the SCADA control is interconnected with others in the tunnel system, the Israelis should be able to do very interesting things by taping into it and hacking it. View Quote |
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Originally Posted By Cypher15: What advice? How to lose. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By Cypher15: Originally Posted By PoiDog: What advice could Biden possibly give the Israelis? Brand of pudding? Brand of ice cream? Adult diapers? Methods to skim money 'given' to other countries? That's about his skill set. Netanyahu would do well to 'smile and wave' like those cartoon penguins. And then do what needs to be done. Not exactly "how to lose". The pedophile's specialty is how to sell others off and make money out of it, as demonstrated by his actions. |
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Operations of the 7th Brigade in the Gaza Strip
UAVs, attack drones and hundreds of weapons: operations of the 7th Brigade in the Gaza Strip |
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Originally Posted By Rebel31: Hard to admit you just gave the people funding and controlling these proxies 6 billion USD Edit- and took other groups like the Houthis off the terror watch list. Another Biden foreign policy fuckup. Never would have guessed with this idiot /s View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By Rebel31: Originally Posted By lil_Sig: Originally Posted By SoCalExile:
Looks like we are directly involved in a proxy war. Matter of time. Hard to admit you just gave the people funding and controlling these proxies 6 billion USD Edit- and took other groups like the Houthis off the terror watch list. Another Biden foreign policy fuckup. Never would have guessed with this idiot /s Considering the pedophile's administration's pattern (e.g. Afghanistan, US southern border and general policies, China, etc.), it's not a "fuck-up". It's by design. |
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God's grace is not cheap; it's free.
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Originally Posted By davis9588: Yeah…. There is no way of voting our way out of this… View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By davis9588: Originally Posted By BM1455:
Yeah…. There is no way of voting our way out of this… The "elections" results since 2020 (and similar historical events in other countries) more than clearly demonstrated this, isn't it? |
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Originally Posted By Chokey: blue RPG's? I want one.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F-k44tOXAAAEiYX?format=jpg&name=large https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F-k44tMXcAArXf0?format=jpg&name=medium View Quote The color blue in a war zone identifies "press", non-combatants. The cocksuckers are using blue on the RPG's to make any surveillance think they're just carrying camera equipment. Yet another tactic that will make the world scream when Israel kills some "journalists", just like using ambulances to transport troops and weapons. They're using the humane/ethical rules of war against us. |
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Everything posted above is factual. Maybe.
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Pure Chaos - First Hand Account Of Hamas Targetting Festival-Goers |
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God's grace is not cheap; it's free.
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Originally Posted By Cypher214: The color blue in a war zone identifies "press", non-combatants. The cocksuckers are using blue on the RPG's to make any surveillance think they're just carrying camera equipment. Yet another tactic that will make the world scream when Israel kills some "journalists", just like using ambulances to transport troops and weapons. They're using the humane/ethical rules of war against us. View Quote I thought blue means training "inert" |
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Originally Posted By Mike_314: "prolonging Gaza operations will drive more civilians to terrorism" Almost all of them are terrorists or supporters, what's a few more. Brown is just another one who seems more concerned with the fate of America's enemies than our allies. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By Mike_314: "prolonging Gaza operations will drive more civilians to terrorism" Almost all of them are terrorists or supporters, what's a few more. Brown is just another one who seems more concerned with the fate of America's enemies than our allies. Like anyone from this inept and corrupt administration, I would not put past him being more concerned about enemies than the American population itself. |
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Originally Posted By Element94: Are there any General Officers in the US Military that are worth a shit any more? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By Element94: Originally Posted By Mike_314: "prolonging Gaza operations will drive more civilians to terrorism" Almost all of them are terrorists or supporters, what's a few more. Brown is just another one who seems more concerned with the fate of America's enemies than our allies. Are there any General Officers in the US Military that are worth a shit any more? They are worth a shit as 5th columns to whoever pays them. |
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Originally Posted By SoCalExile:
View Quote Something something useful idiots. |
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Hard drugs, guns, and nuclear stuff does not mix to well together. - R_Fury
Masturbation is a valid option - Naamah La liberté consiste à ne dépendre que des lois. - Voltaire R.I.P. tnsparky |
Originally Posted By michigan66: Haaretz: What Hamas' Meticulous Battle Plan for Kibbutz Nir Oz Looked Like Documents left behind by Hamas in Kibbutz Nir Oz – a quarter of whose inhabitants were murdered or abducted – shows the high level of intelligence aquired by the terrorist organization. The IDF, which invested billions on technology and physical obstacles, failed to notice Highpoints: Complete article: Click To View Spoiler What Hamas' meticulous battle plan for Kibbutz Nir Oz looked like Documents left behind by Hamas in Kibbutz Nir Oz – a quarter of whose inhabitants were murdered or abducted – shows the high level of intelligence aquired by the terrorist organization. The IDF, which invested billions on technology and physical obstacles, failed to notice Nov 9, 2023 11:39 pm IST The major difference between the massacre in Kibbutz Nir Oz and the atrocities that Hamas perpetrated in the other communities of the Gaza Envelope – the kibbutzim, moshavim and towns adjacent to the Gaza Strip – lies in the conditions under which the terrorists left the kibbutz on that Black Saturday. Kibbutz members who were there relate that the gunfire and the talk in Arabic that they were able to hear from their besieged safe rooms stopped about an hour before the Israel Defense Forces arrived on the scene. According to people who examined the footage from the security cameras of the kibbutz, the terrorists even had time to collect their dead, apart from one body that was exceptionally heavy and was left lying on the green grass of the kibbutz. Still, even though the terrorists in Nir Oz were not subjected to hot pursuit by the IDF, there was one item they forgot at the scene: a group of aerial photographs accompanied by an abridged version of the operational order for the massacre that Hamas unleashed against the kibbutz, which left about 100 of its members either dead or in captivity. The documents left behind by the terrorists are instructive about the orderliness of the operation, the degree of the planning that went into and the extent of the intelligence information in the possession of Hamas. They also suggest that the October 7 attack was not necessarily planned to take place on that day. One aerial photograph that was found lying on the ground in the kibbutz, accompanied by text and a diagram, delineates the structure of the force that invaded the kibbutz and the division of its areas among the different sub-groups within the force. The operational plan divided Kibbutz Nir Oz into two sectors: northern and southern. On the map, the northern sector was colored green, the southern was shaded in red. A “group” of terrorists was assigned to each sector – the size of the groups is not specified on the document – with each group divided into two teams. The “mode of invasion” of the kibbutz was elaborated at the bottom of the document: “Group 1 will move via Route 133 as far as Route 299 and will cross over via the fence that is southwest of the kibbutz, where it will split into two teams for a raid on the population from the southwest.” As for “Group 2,” it “will move via Route 133 and then 299, and will split into two teams for a raid on the population from the northwest.” The route numbers here are part of Hamas’ internal code, in the same way that the IDF uses codenames for roads on its maps. The Hamas documents added, “The invasion will take place via the fence of the kibbutz and not by way of the gates opposite the targets, which are the population concentrations.” The documents apparently belonged to a member of Group 1, as the text refers in detail to the area that was assigned to that squad, the red territory. “The areas in red,” the text states, refer to places “where it is expected that residents will be at the time the mission is executed.” The authors of the order anticipated that the residents of the kibbutz “will automatically evacuate the regions of the gardens, the farms [apparently referring to the field crops], the factories and all the public areas, should it happen that the time of the mission’s execution coincides with working hours.” Clearly, whoever drew up the operational order did not know that the attack would end up taking place on a Shabbat and on the festival of Simhat Torah, when most workplaces would be empty. Accordingly, the author of the document also did not anticipate the scenario that unfolded in real time: Most of the residents of the kibbutz were at home on the morning of the incursion, and instead of running through the public areas they rushed to their safe rooms. As recounted by survivors, the terrorists spared no effort to force them out of those rooms. Many houses were set ablaze and when those inside tried to escape the flames they were shot, while others were seized alive and taken to Gaza as captives. Horrifically, a number of charred bodies were found in kibbutz homes. Most of those who survived the onslaught did so because they hid themselves well in the secure spaces until the attack ended, some of them, to their good fortune, in houses that the terrorists did not attack, for one reason or another. Paint by dots Ten different locations in the kibbutz are marked on the Hamas map. The significance of these markers isn’t entirely clear, though the text at the bottom of the page – “targets in the kibbutz” – may refer to them. The “targets” include “population concentrations, shelters, the security secretariat” and “the gates.” An examination, with the aid of a kibbutz member, of the places marked on the map reveals that they designate, among other things, a playground, an open space facing the kibbutz dining hall and a bus stop – in other words, what might have been locations of “population concentrations” on a regular weekday. Also marked are the kibbutz’s emergency command center – a target that might correspond to what’s listed as the “security secretariat” – and also a position close to the home of the community’s head of security, Shachar Butler. The IDF noted in press briefings that Hamas possessed intelligence about the location of the homes of the security chiefs in the different kibbutzim and aimed to strike at them at the start of each the attack. Butler in fact encountered a large group of terrorists opposite his home at the very start of the attack, at around 6:30 A.M. He tried to join up with the others in the emergency team that went into action to defend the kibbutz, but unsuccessfully. Butler is currently on reserve duty, under the authority of the army, and so could not be interviewed for this article. However, from conversations he held with several kibbutz members it emerges that he found himself in a lengthy shooting battle with the terrorists, during which he was lightly wounded by shrapnel or a bullet. Finally, he retreated, bleeding, into his home’s safe room together with his family. As a result, the emergency team had to operate during the hours of the fighting without its commander. The document the terrorists left behind states that the commander of “the a-Sadiq forces will form from them a team that will be tasked with conducting an ambush at the intersection of routes 133 and 128 [a junction close to the kibbutz, according to the maps]” and will appoint “a team to purge the Nirlat factory,” the kibbutz’s well-known paint manufacturer. The document does not specify who the “a-Sadiq forces” are. This part of the plan, too, suggests that the assumption was that the attack would take place at a time when Nirlat was operating, hence the need to “purge” it. In other words, the operation was planned to take place, or might take place, on a weekday and not on the morning of October 7. Above the radar The Hamas maps attest to a close acquaintance with the topography of the kibbutz and its surroundings, and to an impressive level of intelligence collection, in contrast to what we knew about the organization on the eve of the seventh of October. Thus, for example, at the northeast edge of the map is a site that is labeled as “Rada radar.” It’s here, an investigation by TheMarker found, that the radar of the Red Alert warning system is located. “Rada” probably refers to Rada Technologies, a company that radar devices to the security establishment for the Red Alert warning systems against mortar shells. Another pair of aerial photographs that were contained in the package left behind, show an additional route the terrorists could have used to breach the border fence and head for the kibbutz. One image, which seems to have been taken from a relatively low altitude, probably by a drone, marks the exact spot of a breach that Hamas’ operatives did indeed create in the border fence – a sophisticated technological obstacle that cost Israel billions of shekels to build. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the terrorist squads that burst through the fence at tens of other places also received a similar set of maps, and that if Israeli intelligence had intercepted that aggregate of maps in time, the October 7 disaster would have been prevented. Visits to a number of open-source Israeli map websites reveal that a large number of the coordinates on Hamas’ aerial photographs are in the public domain. The location of shelters, mobile shelters, playgrounds and other places in Nir Oz and in the other communities in the region appear in the form of pins on some of the popular map sites. Other details, such as the location of the Red Alert radar stations, can be identified by analyzing aerial photographs that are posted on other freely accessible websites. Even so, the possible use of open sources does not necessarily resolve the question of how Hamas knew that the radar system had been supplied by Rada Technologies, or the proximity of one of the markers to the home of the kibbutz’s security head. In any event, it’s clear that Hamas’ collection of information was systematic, well-organized and minutely detailed. Another aerial photograph – a close-up of the southern part of the kibbutz – contains precise markings of key locations there: the dining hall, the tennis court, the swimming pool and others. An additional aerial photo details important sites in the landscape around Nir Oz, with an orderly list referencing the locations of “shelters,” “breaches,” “balloon” (apparently an IDF observation balloon), “collection rooms,” “radars,” “communications poles,” “camera,” various gates, “signals disruption system,” “monitoring system” and more. And these are just points of interest that appear within a few square kilometers that surround the kibbutz. Under their nose Among all the communities in which people were murdered that day, the fiasco at Nir Oz was probably the most shameful of the IDF’s performances. Of the 400 or so residents of the kibbutz on the morning of October 7, more than a quarter were murdered or abducted. To date, 38 bodies from Nir Oz had been identified, and Hamas is known to be holding captive another 75 others from the kibbutz. In addition, two elderly women from the kibbutz who were taken hostage, Yocheved Lifshitz and Nurit Cooper, were released by Hamas on October 23. The terrorists encountered resistance from the nine members of the kibbutz’s defensive squad, who fought bravely and probably saved lives. But as far as is known the IDF did not wage a battle on the grounds of the kibbutz. The survivors say that at around 2 P.M. the voices of the terrorists were no longer heard, and that the army arrived only about an hour later. The material described in this article reveals Hamas to be well-organized, with an intelligence arm that not only collects information but also doesn’t leak what it knows. A ranking IDF officer was asked what happened exactly in Nir Oz, and whether the army engaged the terrorists there in battle. He was unable to answer the question. “What happened in Nir Oz is a black hole from our point of view,” he admitted. While the IDF lacks intelligence, even retrospectively, about the battle it did not fight in Kibbutz Nir Oz, the material described in this article reveals Hamas to be well-organized, with an intelligence arm that not only collects information but also doesn’t leak what it knows. Hamas was able to collect the information and formulate the operational orders and share it with thousands of its men, without losing the element of surprise. The aerial photographs reveal that the main points of the operational order were even set forth in written form, and included such graphic elements as arrows and reference points; indeed, the precise plans were worked out using digital programs and were sent for printing. All this happened under the nose of the vaunted Unit 8200 and Shin Bet. The Gaza terrorists showed one of the world’s leading cyber powers how it’s done. https://img.haarets.co.il/bs/0000018b-b4b8-d3c1-a39b-bef921be0001/8d/02/983eb89d4f5eb36bb0b793968ffb/nir-oz-1-desk.png?precrop=1778,2194,x0,y0&height=1133&width=918 https://img.haarets.co.il/bs/0000018b-b4b8-d3c1-a39b-bef922470001/8d/f3/a3b331ad487db3c9d4cd12c037a6/nir-oz-2-desk.png?precrop=1778,1714,x0,y0&height=885&width=918 https://img.haarets.co.il/bs/0000018b-b4b8-d3c1-a39b-bef927370001/92/03/85a27e7d4fed8de711503ebba0c3/nir-oz-3-desk.png?precrop=593,572,x0,y0&height=885&width=918 View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By michigan66: Haaretz: What Hamas' Meticulous Battle Plan for Kibbutz Nir Oz Looked Like Documents left behind by Hamas in Kibbutz Nir Oz – a quarter of whose inhabitants were murdered or abducted – shows the high level of intelligence aquired by the terrorist organization. The IDF, which invested billions on technology and physical obstacles, failed to notice Highpoints: Hamas was able to collect the information and formulate the operational orders and share it with thousands of its men, without losing the element of surprise. The aerial photographs reveal that the main points of the operational order were even set forth in written form, and included such graphic elements as arrows and reference points; indeed, the precise plans were worked out using digital programs and were sent for printing. All this happened under the nose of the vaunted Unit 8200 and Shin Bet. One aerial photograph that was found lying on the ground in the kibbutz, accompanied by text and a diagram, delineates the structure of the force that invaded the kibbutz and the division of its areas among the different sub-groups within the force. The operational plan divided Kibbutz Nir Oz into two sectors: northern and southern. On the map, the northern sector was colored green, the southern was shaded in red. A “group” of terrorists was assigned to each sector – the size of the groups is not specified on the document – with each group divided into two teams. The “mode of invasion” of the kibbutz was elaborated at the bottom of the document: “Group 1 will move via Route 133 as far as Route 299 and will cross over via the fence that is southwest of the kibbutz, where it will split into two teams for a raid on the population from the southwest.” As for “Group 2,” it “will move via Route 133 and then 299, and will split into two teams for a raid on the population from the northwest.” The route numbers here are part of Hamas’ internal code, in the same way that the IDF uses codenames for roads on its maps. The Hamas documents added, “The invasion will take place via the fence of the kibbutz and not by way of the gates opposite the targets, which are the population concentrations. . “The areas in red,” the text states, refer to places “where it is expected that residents will be at the time the mission is executed.” The authors of the order anticipated that the residents of the kibbutz “will automatically evacuate the regions of the gardens, the farms [apparently referring to the field crops], the factories and all the public areas, should it happen that the time of the mission’s execution coincides with working hours.” Ten different locations in the kibbutz are marked on the Hamas map. The significance of these markers isn’t entirely clear, though the text at the bottom of the page – “targets in the kibbutz” – may refer to them. The “targets” include “population concentrations, shelters, the security secretariat” and “the gates.” An examination, with the aid of a kibbutz member, of the places marked on the map reveals that they designate, among other things, a playground, an open space facing the kibbutz dining hall and a bus stop – in other words, what might have been locations of “population concentrations” on a regular weekday. Also marked are the kibbutz’s emergency command center – a target that might correspond to what’s listed as the “security secretariat” – and also a position close to the home of the community’s head of security, Shachar Butler. Hamas possessed intelligence about the location of the homes of the security chiefs in the different kibbutzim and aimed to strike at them at the start of each the attack. The material described in this article reveals Hamas to be well-organized, with an intelligence arm that not only collects information but also doesn’t leak what it knows. Complete article: Click To View Spoiler What Hamas' meticulous battle plan for Kibbutz Nir Oz looked like Documents left behind by Hamas in Kibbutz Nir Oz – a quarter of whose inhabitants were murdered or abducted – shows the high level of intelligence aquired by the terrorist organization. The IDF, which invested billions on technology and physical obstacles, failed to notice Nov 9, 2023 11:39 pm IST The major difference between the massacre in Kibbutz Nir Oz and the atrocities that Hamas perpetrated in the other communities of the Gaza Envelope – the kibbutzim, moshavim and towns adjacent to the Gaza Strip – lies in the conditions under which the terrorists left the kibbutz on that Black Saturday. Kibbutz members who were there relate that the gunfire and the talk in Arabic that they were able to hear from their besieged safe rooms stopped about an hour before the Israel Defense Forces arrived on the scene. According to people who examined the footage from the security cameras of the kibbutz, the terrorists even had time to collect their dead, apart from one body that was exceptionally heavy and was left lying on the green grass of the kibbutz. Still, even though the terrorists in Nir Oz were not subjected to hot pursuit by the IDF, there was one item they forgot at the scene: a group of aerial photographs accompanied by an abridged version of the operational order for the massacre that Hamas unleashed against the kibbutz, which left about 100 of its members either dead or in captivity. The documents left behind by the terrorists are instructive about the orderliness of the operation, the degree of the planning that went into and the extent of the intelligence information in the possession of Hamas. They also suggest that the October 7 attack was not necessarily planned to take place on that day. One aerial photograph that was found lying on the ground in the kibbutz, accompanied by text and a diagram, delineates the structure of the force that invaded the kibbutz and the division of its areas among the different sub-groups within the force. The operational plan divided Kibbutz Nir Oz into two sectors: northern and southern. On the map, the northern sector was colored green, the southern was shaded in red. A “group” of terrorists was assigned to each sector – the size of the groups is not specified on the document – with each group divided into two teams. The “mode of invasion” of the kibbutz was elaborated at the bottom of the document: “Group 1 will move via Route 133 as far as Route 299 and will cross over via the fence that is southwest of the kibbutz, where it will split into two teams for a raid on the population from the southwest.” As for “Group 2,” it “will move via Route 133 and then 299, and will split into two teams for a raid on the population from the northwest.” The route numbers here are part of Hamas’ internal code, in the same way that the IDF uses codenames for roads on its maps. The Hamas documents added, “The invasion will take place via the fence of the kibbutz and not by way of the gates opposite the targets, which are the population concentrations.” The documents apparently belonged to a member of Group 1, as the text refers in detail to the area that was assigned to that squad, the red territory. “The areas in red,” the text states, refer to places “where it is expected that residents will be at the time the mission is executed.” The authors of the order anticipated that the residents of the kibbutz “will automatically evacuate the regions of the gardens, the farms [apparently referring to the field crops], the factories and all the public areas, should it happen that the time of the mission’s execution coincides with working hours.” Clearly, whoever drew up the operational order did not know that the attack would end up taking place on a Shabbat and on the festival of Simhat Torah, when most workplaces would be empty. Accordingly, the author of the document also did not anticipate the scenario that unfolded in real time: Most of the residents of the kibbutz were at home on the morning of the incursion, and instead of running through the public areas they rushed to their safe rooms. As recounted by survivors, the terrorists spared no effort to force them out of those rooms. Many houses were set ablaze and when those inside tried to escape the flames they were shot, while others were seized alive and taken to Gaza as captives. Horrifically, a number of charred bodies were found in kibbutz homes. Most of those who survived the onslaught did so because they hid themselves well in the secure spaces until the attack ended, some of them, to their good fortune, in houses that the terrorists did not attack, for one reason or another. Paint by dots Ten different locations in the kibbutz are marked on the Hamas map. The significance of these markers isn’t entirely clear, though the text at the bottom of the page – “targets in the kibbutz” – may refer to them. The “targets” include “population concentrations, shelters, the security secretariat” and “the gates.” An examination, with the aid of a kibbutz member, of the places marked on the map reveals that they designate, among other things, a playground, an open space facing the kibbutz dining hall and a bus stop – in other words, what might have been locations of “population concentrations” on a regular weekday. Also marked are the kibbutz’s emergency command center – a target that might correspond to what’s listed as the “security secretariat” – and also a position close to the home of the community’s head of security, Shachar Butler. The IDF noted in press briefings that Hamas possessed intelligence about the location of the homes of the security chiefs in the different kibbutzim and aimed to strike at them at the start of each the attack. Butler in fact encountered a large group of terrorists opposite his home at the very start of the attack, at around 6:30 A.M. He tried to join up with the others in the emergency team that went into action to defend the kibbutz, but unsuccessfully. Butler is currently on reserve duty, under the authority of the army, and so could not be interviewed for this article. However, from conversations he held with several kibbutz members it emerges that he found himself in a lengthy shooting battle with the terrorists, during which he was lightly wounded by shrapnel or a bullet. Finally, he retreated, bleeding, into his home’s safe room together with his family. As a result, the emergency team had to operate during the hours of the fighting without its commander. The document the terrorists left behind states that the commander of “the a-Sadiq forces will form from them a team that will be tasked with conducting an ambush at the intersection of routes 133 and 128 [a junction close to the kibbutz, according to the maps]” and will appoint “a team to purge the Nirlat factory,” the kibbutz’s well-known paint manufacturer. The document does not specify who the “a-Sadiq forces” are. This part of the plan, too, suggests that the assumption was that the attack would take place at a time when Nirlat was operating, hence the need to “purge” it. In other words, the operation was planned to take place, or might take place, on a weekday and not on the morning of October 7. Above the radar The Hamas maps attest to a close acquaintance with the topography of the kibbutz and its surroundings, and to an impressive level of intelligence collection, in contrast to what we knew about the organization on the eve of the seventh of October. Thus, for example, at the northeast edge of the map is a site that is labeled as “Rada radar.” It’s here, an investigation by TheMarker found, that the radar of the Red Alert warning system is located. “Rada” probably refers to Rada Technologies, a company that radar devices to the security establishment for the Red Alert warning systems against mortar shells. Another pair of aerial photographs that were contained in the package left behind, show an additional route the terrorists could have used to breach the border fence and head for the kibbutz. One image, which seems to have been taken from a relatively low altitude, probably by a drone, marks the exact spot of a breach that Hamas’ operatives did indeed create in the border fence – a sophisticated technological obstacle that cost Israel billions of shekels to build. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the terrorist squads that burst through the fence at tens of other places also received a similar set of maps, and that if Israeli intelligence had intercepted that aggregate of maps in time, the October 7 disaster would have been prevented. Visits to a number of open-source Israeli map websites reveal that a large number of the coordinates on Hamas’ aerial photographs are in the public domain. The location of shelters, mobile shelters, playgrounds and other places in Nir Oz and in the other communities in the region appear in the form of pins on some of the popular map sites. Other details, such as the location of the Red Alert radar stations, can be identified by analyzing aerial photographs that are posted on other freely accessible websites. Even so, the possible use of open sources does not necessarily resolve the question of how Hamas knew that the radar system had been supplied by Rada Technologies, or the proximity of one of the markers to the home of the kibbutz’s security head. In any event, it’s clear that Hamas’ collection of information was systematic, well-organized and minutely detailed. Another aerial photograph – a close-up of the southern part of the kibbutz – contains precise markings of key locations there: the dining hall, the tennis court, the swimming pool and others. An additional aerial photo details important sites in the landscape around Nir Oz, with an orderly list referencing the locations of “shelters,” “breaches,” “balloon” (apparently an IDF observation balloon), “collection rooms,” “radars,” “communications poles,” “camera,” various gates, “signals disruption system,” “monitoring system” and more. And these are just points of interest that appear within a few square kilometers that surround the kibbutz. Under their nose Among all the communities in which people were murdered that day, the fiasco at Nir Oz was probably the most shameful of the IDF’s performances. Of the 400 or so residents of the kibbutz on the morning of October 7, more than a quarter were murdered or abducted. To date, 38 bodies from Nir Oz had been identified, and Hamas is known to be holding captive another 75 others from the kibbutz. In addition, two elderly women from the kibbutz who were taken hostage, Yocheved Lifshitz and Nurit Cooper, were released by Hamas on October 23. The terrorists encountered resistance from the nine members of the kibbutz’s defensive squad, who fought bravely and probably saved lives. But as far as is known the IDF did not wage a battle on the grounds of the kibbutz. The survivors say that at around 2 P.M. the voices of the terrorists were no longer heard, and that the army arrived only about an hour later. The material described in this article reveals Hamas to be well-organized, with an intelligence arm that not only collects information but also doesn’t leak what it knows. A ranking IDF officer was asked what happened exactly in Nir Oz, and whether the army engaged the terrorists there in battle. He was unable to answer the question. “What happened in Nir Oz is a black hole from our point of view,” he admitted. While the IDF lacks intelligence, even retrospectively, about the battle it did not fight in Kibbutz Nir Oz, the material described in this article reveals Hamas to be well-organized, with an intelligence arm that not only collects information but also doesn’t leak what it knows. Hamas was able to collect the information and formulate the operational orders and share it with thousands of its men, without losing the element of surprise. The aerial photographs reveal that the main points of the operational order were even set forth in written form, and included such graphic elements as arrows and reference points; indeed, the precise plans were worked out using digital programs and were sent for printing. All this happened under the nose of the vaunted Unit 8200 and Shin Bet. The Gaza terrorists showed one of the world’s leading cyber powers how it’s done. https://img.haarets.co.il/bs/0000018b-b4b8-d3c1-a39b-bef921be0001/8d/02/983eb89d4f5eb36bb0b793968ffb/nir-oz-1-desk.png?precrop=1778,2194,x0,y0&height=1133&width=918 https://img.haarets.co.il/bs/0000018b-b4b8-d3c1-a39b-bef922470001/8d/f3/a3b331ad487db3c9d4cd12c037a6/nir-oz-2-desk.png?precrop=1778,1714,x0,y0&height=885&width=918 https://img.haarets.co.il/bs/0000018b-b4b8-d3c1-a39b-bef927370001/92/03/85a27e7d4fed8de711503ebba0c3/nir-oz-3-desk.png?precrop=593,572,x0,y0&height=885&width=918 Now extrapolate that to all the information collected by the likes of Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, the .gov itself, and several other of their likes, and sold to whoever pays them. |
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Originally Posted By SoCalExile:
View Quote What is Tufts doing to deal with the threats to Jewish students? That's a good question. So I decided to find out. On the home page at Tufts, I found a block linking to "Eileen Babbitt, who specializes in international conflict management, has been facilitating discussions on campus about the Israel-Hamas war." She says, among other things like "talking face to face"... "One of the things that concerns me is that people are feeling unsafe. I don’t think it’s only about their physical safety. I think people are very worried about being judged in a particular way or confronted in a particular way by other people in the community, of being put on the spot in a way that’s very uncomfortable. So how do we help each other feel safer in our community? In addition to institutional steps, what are the interpersonal steps that we can take? I think that is something to ask people: What would it take for you to feel safer? What can we as a community do to reassure you somehow? Because I don’t think it’s just a question of policing. Maybe for some that’s the case, but I think it’s deeper than that." Bold added by me. So they want to talk, talk, talk. But it seems it would be hard to talk to Hamas supporters if they are in a mob and want to beat you down. It sounds like institutional busy work designed to accomplish nothing. ETA: Link for those who are interested. |
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Originally Posted By realwar: I thought blue means training "inert" View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By realwar: Originally Posted By Cypher214: The color blue in a war zone identifies "press", non-combatants. The cocksuckers are using blue on the RPG's to make any surveillance think they're just carrying camera equipment. Yet another tactic that will make the world scream when Israel kills some "journalists", just like using ambulances to transport troops and weapons. They're using the humane/ethical rules of war against us. I thought blue means training "inert" Not in this instance. |
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Everything posted above is factual. Maybe.
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Originally Posted By burnka871: Start messing with all the input tables so they don't know they need exhaust fans to run View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By burnka871: Originally Posted By Rossi: If the SCADA control is interconnected with others in the tunnel system, the Israelis should be able to do very interesting things by taping into it and hacking it. Start messing with all the input tables so they don't know they need exhaust fans to run Depending on that it controls, that would be just for starters. |
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Originally Posted By tabraha: Yeah seems like after watching what the Israeli's did to Iran with stuxnet I don't think I'd want my tunnel system on SCADA. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Originally Posted By tabraha: Originally Posted By Rossi: If the SCADA control is interconnected with others in the tunnel system, the Israelis should be able to do very interesting things by taping into it and hacking it. They probably never thought Israel would have access to a control panel. |
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IDF soldiers discover Hamas operation and calibration systems
IDF soldiers discover Hamas operation and calibration systems |
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God's grace is not cheap; it's free.
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Originally Posted By Cypher214: The color blue in a war zone identifies "press", non-combatants. The cocksuckers are using blue on the RPG's to make any surveillance think they're just carrying camera equipment. Yet another tactic that will make the world scream when Israel kills some "journalists", just like using ambulances to transport troops and weapons. They're using the humane/ethical rules of war against us. View Quote What a dichotomy. There is no such thing. There will be no such thing. In a short period of time, The Geneva Convention mattered. It does not when dealing with the majority of North/East Africa, The Middle East, Russia, China and North Korea. It just doesn't. You can accept that or you can reject it, but that is fact. We can also win wars or lose them. We've chose to lose them under the guise of "we are civilized" when in reality we, as a country, have been hijacked and taken over by communist and Muslim sympathizers. |
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Originally Posted By SoCalExile:
View Quote Imagine that for a lot less than that, all the police, alphabet-soup agencies, MSM and whatnot are all out if the target was a party's protected species. So, one more evidence for the list. |
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Basic article on tunnels. Mentions Egyptian 's use of seawater on smuggling tunnels.
NY Times. Tunnels of Gaza Click To View Spoiler The Tunnels of Gaza
The Gaza Strip has all the harrowing pitfalls soldiers have learned to expect from urban warfare: high-rise ambushes, truncated lines of sight and, everywhere, vulnerable civilians with nowhere to hide. But as Israeli ground forces inch their way forward in Gaza, the bigger danger may prove to be underfoot. The Hamas militants who launched a bloody attack on Israel last month have built a maze of hidden tunnels some believe extend across most if not all of Gaza, the territory they control. And they are not mere tunnels. Snaking beneath dense residential areas, the passageways allow fighters to move around free from the eye of the enemy. There are also bunkers for stockpiling weapons, food and water, and even command centers and tunnels wide enough for vehicles, researchers believe. Ordinary-looking doors and hatches serve as disguised access points, letting Hamas fighters dart out on missions and then slip back out of sight. No outsider has an exact map of the network, and few Israelis have seen it firsthand. But photos and video and reports from people who have been in the tunnels suggest the basic outlines of the system and how it is used. The source material includes photographs taken inside the passageways by journalists, accounts from researchers who study the tunnels, and details of the network that emerged from Israeli forces when they invaded Gaza in 2014. Tactical tunnels These concrete-reinforced structures are more than a transit pipeline. They serve as shelters against attacks, planning rooms, ammunition warehouses and spaces for hostages. Reinforced concrete Power lines About 6.5 ft Ammunition Shells Chambers Some rooms serve as command centers. Others are used to store equipment or, in recent weeks, hostages. Dismantling the tunnels is a key part of Israel’s goal of wiping out Hamas’ leadership in the wake of the Oct. 7 attack. Israel has used the existence of the tunnels as justification for bombing civilian areas, including after a large Israeli airstrike hit a densely populated area in the Jabaliya neighborhood. Hamas has denied its tunnels were under some of the specific sites struck by Israel, and it is often impossible to verify Israel’s claims. To destroy tunnels on the ground, Israeli troops in Gaza will need to find entrances that are often hidden in the basements of civilian buildings, leading into concrete-lined tunnels, imagery suggests. They are typically just six and a half feet tall and three feet wide, experts said, forcing fighters to move through them single file. One 85-year-old Israeli woman who was held hostage for 17 days in the tunnels after being kidnapped on Oct. 7 described being marched through a “spider web” of wet and humid tunnels. She eventually reached a large hall where two dozen other hostages were being held, she said. There are still believed to be more than 200 Israeli hostages being held by Hamas, and many are likely in the very tunnels Israel aims to destroy. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that bringing them home is one of the two main aims of the invasion, the other being to “destroy Hamas.” The tunnels used for hiding Hamas equipment and fighters are not the only hidden passageways in Gaza. After Hamas came to power in 2007, and Israel tightened its blockade of the territory, an extensive network of smuggling tunnels grew under the border between Gaza and Egypt. These tunnels are used to circumvent the blockade and allow the import of a wide variety of goods, from weapons and electronic equipment to construction materials and fuel. The Egyptian authorities have made extensive efforts to destroy these smuggling routes, including pumping seawater to flood the network and collapse many of the tunnels. But some smuggling tunnels are still believed to be in operation. Smuggling tunnels These tunnels have been documented in the Rafah area, where they are used to bring all types of goods and products into Gaza from Egypt. Multiple levels In parts of Rafah, according to some workers’ accounts, there are so many tunnels that some crisscross at different depths. Although the Israeli military far surpasses Hamas’ in both size and equipment, fighting an enemy with its own network of tunnels is a high-risk undertaking. John W. Spencer, who studies urban warfare at the U.S. Military Academy’s Modern War Institute, describes it as more like “fighting under the sea than it is on the surface or inside of a building.” “Nothing that you use on the surface works,” he said recently on the Modern Warfare Project podcast. “You have to have specialized equipment to breathe, to see, to navigate, to communicate and to deploy lethal means, especially shooting.” One of the main dangers of going into the tunnels is that Hamas has booby-trapped the entrances with explosives, experts say. “The moment they realize the Israelis have entered the tunnels, they will just press the button and the entire thing could collapse on the Israelis,” said Ahron Bregman, a senior teaching fellow at King's College London who specializes in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The challenge of disabling tunnels The danger does not end after a tunnel is detected. Hidden entrances Booby traps The entrances are often equipped with remotely triggered bombs or explosives rigged with tripwires. Many entrances are hidden in buildings’ basements, but even the ones outside are very difficult to spot. The only way to find them is to send soldiers to scour areas on foot. Israeli forces will probably not be able to destroy the entire tunnel network. “It is just too big, and there's no point in dismantling all of it,” said Dr. Bregman. Instead, they will focus on blocking the entrances to the tunnels, likely by calling in airstrikes, or having engineers destroy them with explosives. They are also unlikely to take their fight underground — unless they believe they have no other choice. Entering the tunnels would strip Israeli forces of their advantages, Dr. Bregman said. At the moment, the Israelis are making headway with a mass of troops, tanks and helicopters. “The moment you get down to the tunnel, it is one against one,” he said. Sources: The Israel Defense Forces; testimony before the United Nations by Eado Hecht, a military analyst who teaches at the Israeli military’s Command and General Staff College and at Bar-Ilan and Haifa Universities; video reports from Deutsche Welle News, VICE News and social media; reference photographs from EPA Images, Getty Images and Agence France-Presse. Adam Goldman, Helene Cooper and Justin Scheck contributed reporting. |
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"A dying culture invariably exhibits personal rudeness. Bad manners. Lack of consideration for others in minor matters. A loss of politeness, of gentle manners, is more significant than is a riot."
Robert A. Heinlein, Friday |
Originally Posted By Chokey:
View Quote He speaks the Truth |
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Originally Posted By Chokey:
View Quote Democrats and their supporters are worse than Nazis. So, that's no surprise. |
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Just found out that my commander when I was in IDF basic training - her husband - has been identified and confirmed killed by Hamas on Oct 7. Previously thought to be kidnapped.
Never again Am Yisrael Chai |
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God's grace is not cheap; it's free.
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Originally Posted By Chokey:
View Quote Douglas Murray has picked up the baton from George Orwell and Christopher Hitchens. I pray for his safety and success in defending western civilization. |
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Originally Posted By Extorris:
I've only gotten two warnings in almost 15 years and over 91,000 posts...and I'm an asshole. I don't know how guys rack up all these warnings and temp locks. |
“A real man does not think of victory or defeat. He plunges recklessly towards an irrational death. By doing this, you will awaken from your dreams.” -- Tsunetomo Yamamoto
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Originally Posted By Extorris:
I've only gotten two warnings in almost 15 years and over 91,000 posts...and I'm an asshole. I don't know how guys rack up all these warnings and temp locks. |
As the IDF get closer to the Hamas strongholds and C&C the ceasefire screaming will get louder.
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Coyote with 40 people crammed into a minivan gets into a chase with DPS, Paco over estimates his driving abilities and *whmmo!* the Astrovan of Immigration becomes a Pinata of Pain, hurling broken bodies like so many tasty pieces of cheap candy...
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In the feeds that show the hospital on the far right, what is the tall building on the far left?
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EXCLUSIVE : Exploring Israel's Military Strength in Golan Heights | News9 |
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"you ought to listen to our resident Swede, he's genetically superior." -Bohr_Adam
"They are superior beings those Swedes." -RockHard13F "Everyone knows that geese are notorious liars ... and whores." -DK-Prof |
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