I think it's pretty likely that Trump will just accept Putin's maximalist demands as reasonable.

All the vids have them masked up.

Russian fake.

With Norks supporting Russia, it would make sense for Poland to deploy to guard Ukraine's border with Belarus, freeing up some AFU troops to go east.

Yeah. Look at the rest of the page.

Ukraine = nazis.
Fighting for Christianity.

Sad part is I know some folks who see that then get all fired up as it was on the internet.

Trump plays for image, and his image is mud if there's an oil shock causing a 20-40% hike in crude prices. I have no idea what the actual impact of cutting 2/3 of Russia's western oil exports would look like.

But of course, Trump is unpredictable, which is both a strength and a weakness. It's an improvement, anyway.

Freezing the war on current lines and continuing to receive military aid from the West is probably Ukraine's best near to medium term outcome at this point. Realistically, they don't have the capabilities to take back much occupied territory, and NATO membership is not happening any time soon (this was the case in 2022 and is especially the case now). We saw how difficult getting Sweden and Finland in was, and Ukraine under the current circumstances would be a different beast. Orban could essentially delay the process indefinitely.

My main concern lies in how this is actually achieved, especially considering who is in the upcoming administration. I can easily foresee Putin "negotiating" by advocating for his maximalist demands, Trump viewing them as reasonable, and then viewing Ukraine as being the unreasonable party for not accepting them. I also highly question whether Trump is actually committed to sending Ukraine more aid if Russia refuses to negotiate. I can also see Trump not wanting to look weak or potentially getting offended by Putin and then surging support (this is, after all, the same man who got pissed off at Assad and proposed killing him, only to get reigned in by members of his administration).

Now why would an account named 'Orthodox Canonist' promote Russian propaganda?

Russians bought campaign swag and they’re using it.





Well, Trump, as expected, won.

Now let's see how he will change his tune in mid-air.

And he will, definitely. These are the rules of the game.
Because elections are elections, and the cast-iron ass of reality is cast-iron.
Let me remind you that Trump promised to stop the war within 24 hours and lift sanctions against Russia if he wins.

But of course, somewhere very deep inside my soul as a callous realist, I really want to believe that things will get a little easier for us with his arrival. Well, or at least not get worse.)

https://t.me/fighter_bomber/18667

Don't worry, that's never stopped someone from sharing it as truth before.



One of the biggest early successes was the bridge not being blown, giving Russia a quick way to get inside the city.



That's something I brought up a year and a half ago. A peacekeeping force, if you will.



Tom Cotton would actually be a good move. That's why I wouldn't expect Trump to do that.



Entirely probable and likely.

The MIC was evil from 2020-2024. Now it's back to being in the good graces of people.



That depends. If Ukraine secures Nato membership when the war is over with the lines more or less frozen where they are I'd count it as a win.



Despite the pro-Russian commentators crooning about a Trump win I think your first point is correct.

Trump rightly called Biden out for his disastrous Afghan debacle.

What would Trump look like if his first year in office saw his own Afghan debacle?



The war started with the demands of Ukraine's complete capitulation and now is down to 4 oblasts.

Subject to change.



Ukraine is simply a poland from the early 90s. Once they become more westernized the economy will take off.



Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan are watching closely because they are one info op away from being the next "Deep state playground"


I agree. 83% of Ukraine is beyond Russia control. They still have port access and the famed "novorossiya" trumped by some of the pro-Russian crowd never materialized.

Now force Ukraine into Nato so Europe has to do their part

I don't have any beliefs that the Trump administration will support Ukraine at the level it needs. I am hesitant to write him off completely though. Obama made a few campaign promises that he backpeddeled on shortly after receiving his first post-election classified briefing. Hopefully he steps up and helps the Ukrainian people win the liberty they want and deserve.

If you read this thread you would know by now that Ukraine has only received 10% of the military aid the US has authorized this year.  That $6 billion Biden will authorize but will not make it to Ukraine before Trump gets into office.

Fiber optic cable is wound on a spool in a Chinese factory, for controlling Russian FPVs.
It takes 50 minutes to wind 10km of fiber.
The Russians claim 1300 coils were shipped last month, and the Chinese are adding more winding machines. https://t.co/khYj0izqLd pic.twitter.com/gi6dSWMVnp

— Roy\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GrandpaRoy2) November 6, 2024

Videos.

Sweden rejects Baltic Sea wind farms, citing defence concerns By Reuters November 4, 2024



Attached File

Iraqi Channels are claiming that Sirens can be heard sounding at the U.S. Consulate near the City of Erbil in Northern Iraq, the last time this happened was the Night of the Israeli Attack against Iran. pic.twitter.com/BP3UjApewy

OSINTdefender  (@sentdefender) November 7, 2024

If trump stops the money and weapons? As soon as our help runs out the Ukraine military will be destroyed and Russia will burn, rape and loot where they want. Then they will install their own government to rule the country.

Yeah, no shit.

Trump has said that we are wasting billions of dollars because Zelensky refuses to accept a deal. And that any deal, even the worst deal, would be better than what is happening now. He has made his feelings on crystal clear. There isn't any reason to believe that voting for trump would get a different result.

Very smart. This thing doesn't have to be prolific all over the battle front. It just needs to be available for use against a Ukrainian position that can't be toppled because they have good active anti-drone electronics.

Oh wow. IDF found a Hezbollah a missile launching tunnel.

It no longer exists. Watch this strike. @MarioLeb79 pic.twitter.com/ZU44WbGiBV

Open Source Intel  (@Osint613) November 7, 2024

Scenes of the wreckage of an American drone that was shot down while carrying out hostilities in the airspace of Al-Jawf Governorate

#The news

https://t.me/YNmedia/1804

You're most likely correct.

Yet another U.S. Air Force MQ-9 “Reaper” Surveillance Drone is claimed to have been  Downed tonight by the Houthis over Western Yemen. pic.twitter.com/pdq3YUJJJ9

OSINTdefender  (@sentdefender) November 8, 2024

Click the tweet for links. Colby is a fucking douche lord imho.

If you’re curious about what a 2nd Trump term means for the Indo-Pacific & countering the China threat, check out @IndoPacPodcast with:

• Trump’s former NSA @LTGHRMcMaster (E31)
• 29th Australian Prime Minister @TurnbullMalcolm (E28)
• Trump’s Dep. Asst. Secretary of Defense… pic.twitter.com/rj2pWr7Z6k

Ian Ellis  (@ianellisjones) November 8, 2024

If you’re curious about what a 2nd Trump term means for the Indo-Pacific & countering the China threat, check out
@IndoPacPodcast
with:

• Trump’s former NSA
@LTGHRMcMaster
(E31)
• 29th Australian Prime Minister
@TurnbullMalcolm
(E28)
• Trump’s Dep. Asst. Secretary of Defense for Strategy
@ElbridgeColby
(E11)
• Retired Maj. Gen.
@WarintheFuture
& RADM
@MikeStudeman
(E7)
• Former Japanese Ambassador to Australia
@YamagamiShingo
(E17)

With co-hosts
@GordianKnotRay
& Jim Carouso. Produced by
@iejmedia
. Links below.

I'm curious about the comment someone left earlier suggesting Trump wants to partner with South Korea to build ships. IMO, that is one of the best ideas I have heard in a long while. But does anyone know the details of this plan? And how can they get around the Jones Act?

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/11/08/EGVWKW5OYRETZIUEFLH6LWDZFU/

The US has been buying 155mm and 105mm shells from South Korea.  We have purchased a significant amount of 155mm for training and to replenish some of our stockpiles.  Our artillery units have been firing these shells during training since last spring.  All new US production appears to be going directly to Ukraine.  I was told we bought so much 155 from South Korea that we probably won’t see South Korea give any to Ukraine.  We have also bought other munitions from South Korea the last year to help resupply ourselves.

Thermobaric warheads on russsian shaheds used to strike Odesa today. Sounds like they did that to Kyiv yesterday.

couple points :

South Korea has a law prohibiting selling munitions to active war participants.  hence -- up to this point -- no munitions supply DIRECTLY to Ukraine.  (they have supplied non-lethal aid...)

to circumvent this -- it's as you mention.  WE supply Ukraine with OUR shells.  We re-fill those stocks by purchasing from S. Korea.  Its basically laundering artillery shells.  lol

Interestingly -- S. Korea is discussing CHANGING that law now that North Koreans are deployed combatants vs. Ukraine.  the idea being -- North Korea is gaining access to Russian aid / technology / systems in return for their manpower supplied for meat assaults.  

crazy stuff

America’s allies brace for brinkmanship, deals—and betrayal

From Ukraine to Israel there is a frantic scramble to flatter and sway Donald Trump


Nov 7th 2024 | WASHINGTON, DC



Like quiz-show contestants trying to bash the buzzer first, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, and Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, raced to congratulate Donald Trump on his victory—though each for very different reasons. The rush by these and other leaders around the globe, such as Emmanuel Macron of France and Lai Ching-te of Taiwan, to ingratiate themselves with America’s next president reveals much about the perils and opportunities they foresee under Mr Trump, whose only constancy in foreign policy is his unpredictability.

Mr Zelensky praised Mr Trump’s “decisive leadership” and commitment to “peace through strength”, perhaps hoping that flattery might do better than an appeal to principle. He moved quickly to try to win the incoming president’s favour ahead of any prospective deal that Mr Trump might try to impose on Ukraine to end the war it has been fighting since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Mr Netanyahu’s message was also fawning as he hailed “history’s greatest comeback”, quite a compliment from the original comeback king, and gushed that Mr Trump’s return offers “a powerful recommitment to the great alliance between Israel and America”. Mr Netanyahu may hope that Mr Trump will give him even more of a free hand in the wars Israel is fighting in Gaza, Lebanon and against Iran, but he must also worry whether Mr Trump’s pledge to “stop the wars” might be achieved by squeezing support for Israel.

Mr Trump’s election comes as America and its allies face their most daunting threats since at least the end of the cold war. These include “the potential for near-term major war”, a bipartisan commission mandated by Congress warned earlier this year. And the risks are mounting, as adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea increasingly make common cause. A further escalation in the conflict between Israel and Iran, for instance, could well draw American troops directly into another war in the Middle East. Yet at this moment of heightened peril, America’s friends and foes alike are preparing for the possibility that Mr Trump may upend its foreign policy and weaken the network of alliances that have been the pillars of Western security.

The danger will begin well before Mr Trump is sworn in on January 20th, as allies and adversaries probe President Joe Biden’s resolve and authority during the remaining “lame duck” months of his term. The first test will probably be the Middle East on November 12th, the deadline the Biden administration has set for Israel to vastly increase the flow of food and aid to Gaza or risk having its supply of American arms and munitions cut. Mr Netanyahu, whose government is accused of not doing enough to improve the humanitarian situation, may reckon that Israel can withstand any temporary delays in arms deliveries until the inauguration of Mr Trump, who probably does not care. But as Israel faces the possibility of full-scale war with Iran, it needs more than just bombs. It also needs close co-ordination with America’s armed forces to fend off Iranian missiles and to launch its own counter-attacks.

In the uncertain period before the next administration takes over, America’s allies are scrambling mitigate some of the risks that may arise from the election of a president who regards allies as a burden and approaches mutual defence with the calculus of a gangster. “They want protection, they don’t pay us money for the protection,” Mr Trump has said. “The mob makes you pay money.” Mr Trump boasts that he coerced NATO countries to spend more on defence during his first term, with some justification. Many expect the pressure to intensify further in his second.

Europe’s response will be to try to Trump-proof aid to Ukraine and to bolster the region’s ability to defend itself without American help. Little wonder, then, that in the hours after the election result Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defence minister, and Sébastien Lecornu, his French counterpart, called an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss security. Mr Macron, once dubbed a “Trump whisperer”, has long championed Europe’s collective defence and “strategic autonomy” and will probably do so again at a summit on November 7th. Over the past year Mr Macron has become one of the continent’s most outspoken hawks on Ukraine, refusing to rule out putting boots on the ground there and arguing for the use of French SCALP missiles to strike military targets in Russia.

The mood in Asia is more phlegmatic. Taiwan is concerned that Mr Trump might fail to come to the island’s aid or cut a deal with China over its head. South Korea worries that Mr Trump might, as he did in his first term, demand more money—or even a “profit margin”, as he once put it—to cover the cost of American troops stationed there. Australians take heart that Mr Trump is thought to be supportive of AUKUS, the submarine deal between America, Australia and Britain. Though some fret that Mr Trump might seek a grand bargain with Xi Jinping, China’s president, most Australian officials believe that defence co-operation will continue.

The trouble for America’s allies, though, is that nobody knows for sure what Mr Trump’s foreign policy will be. Some things seem certain, such as trade wars with friends and foes alike (see The Telegram). He will probably again accommodate some autocrats and threaten to abandon allies or renegotiate terms with them. Tensions with Mexico will probably rise over trade, migrants and drug-trafficking (see Americas section).

Yet predicting what Mr Trump would do in any given situation is hard. A lot of the uncertainty arises because of disagreements between those who advise him. Broadly speaking he presides over three schools of thought in the Republican Party. What some call the “primacists” seek to preserve America’s global leadership and the international order. In contrast, “prioritisers” argue that America is dangerously overstretched and should concentrate its resources where they matter most, in Asia, and leave Europe and the Middle East to fend mostly for themselves. This school of thought overlaps with a third, the “restrainers”, who want America to generally do less in the world.

Which of these schools predominates will depend on Mr Trump’s picks for the big national-security jobs and whether they are internationalists like Mike Pompeo, Mr Trump’s former secretary of state, and Robert O’Brien, his former national security adviser, or more isolationist figures. It may also depend on how much influence is wielded by J.D. Vance, his vice-president, who hails from the more isolationist wing of the party and who blames Republican and Democratic elites alike for dragging America into wars. While this plays out foreign diplomats in Washington are involved in a frenetic sort of Kremlinology, as they scramble to distinguish influential courtiers from peripheral figures.

Given Mr Trump’s repeated criticism of aid to Ukraine and his refusal to say whether he wants Ukraine to win the war, many worry that one of his first moves in office would be to capitulate to Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president. Yet people in his entourage—or at least people who hope to be in it—suggest that Mr Trump would not be such a soft touch (see Europe section). Republican insiders argue that he knows that defeat in Ukraine would be a political liability, just as the withdrawal from Afghanistan was for Mr Biden.

Mr Pompeo argued in an opinion article that “there’s no evidence that such capitulation will be part of President Trump’s policy and much evidence to the contrary”. He and his co-author, David Urban, pointed out that Mr Trump supplied the first Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine and that in late September, Mr Trump received Mr Zelensky at Trump Tower in New York.

A diplomatic deal crafted on decent terms may yet be welcomed by Ukraine, whose position on the battlefield is weakening. Ukraine would, however, want membership of NATO to guarantee its security. Mr Pompeo is an advocate of that but other advisers may resist it, as would Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor.

Another whisper from Republican insiders is that Mr Trump’s administration would be more willing to confront Iran and weaken its clerical regime, a policy that would be widely supported in the Republican Party, they say (see Middle East & Africa section). Israel’s decapitation of Hizbullah and Hamas, and its ability to parry Iran’s missile salvoes, suggest Iran and its allied militias are vulnerable.

Mike Waltz, a Republican congressman and a contender to become secretary of defence, wrote for The Economist recently that America “should put a credible military option on the table to make clear to the Iranians that America would stop them building nuclear weapons”. Threatening military action against Iran is one thing; starting a war is another. Mr Trump has spent much of his career denouncing Republican hawks who wasted blood and treasure in the Middle East.

Complicating this reading of entrails is the fact that Mr Trump is a fan of the madman theory of international diplomacy. Asked whether he would threaten to use force if Mr Xi were to invade Taiwan, Mr Trump told the Wall Street Journal: “I wouldn’t have to, because he respects me and he knows I’m fucking crazy.”

To be sure, unpredictability may sometimes enhance America’s deterrent power, if foes believe Mr Trump really might take military action. But it could weaken America’s position if adversaries conclude he is all bluster and America’s friends lose trust that it will come to their aid. Fearing abandonment by Mr Trump, some allies may hedge by moving closer to China, especially in Asia (see China section). Alternatively, they may seek their own nuclear weapons, ushering in a new era of proliferation.

Mr Trump was a disruptive force during his first term but the international scene was relatively calm. He returns to power at a time of rising great-power rivalry and destructive wars in Europe and the Middle East. Instead of building on the alliances and institutions that have enhanced American power, Mr Trump seems intent on undermining them. That would damage not just America’s security, but accelerate the disintegration of the post-war order that kept the peace for 80 years. ■

https://www.economist.com/international/2024/11/07/americas-allies-brace-for-brinkmanship-deals-and-betrayal

Ukraine Now Faces a Nuclear Decision
Under a new Trump administration, Ukraine’s government can't avoid considering a nuclear weapon.

By Casey Michel

November 7, 2024, 3:12 AM



With Donald Trump’s election victory this week, it’s clear that the president-elect will not be nearly as supportive of Ukraine’s fight against Russia as the current administration—and may well abandon Ukraine entirely. Such a reality is already resounding in Ukraine, with plenty of hand-wringing in Kyiv about how Trump will pull the United States back from its fight. As a result, Ukrainians will be forced in the coming weeks and months to search for solutions beyond Washington’s support—and consider a potentially nuclear solution that had been only hinted at previously.

Last month, with little fanfare, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made the stakes of the ongoing war in Ukraine as clear as possible. With Russian troops bearing down on Ukraine’s east, and with Western support continuing to flag, Zelensky clarified the potential outcomes of the war. “Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons and that will be our protection or we should have some sort of alliance,” he said. “Apart from NATO, today we do not know any effective alliances.”

It was the first time the Ukrainian president had revealed an outcome that has become, for the war’s observers, increasingly inescapable. In this war for Ukraine’s survival, with Kyiv facing both declining men and materiel, the only surefire way of preventing Ukraine’s ongoing destruction is NATO membership—a reality that has gained more supporters since the war’s beginning but still remains years away. Barring such an outcome, as Zelensky outlined, only one option remains: developing Ukraine’s own nuclear arsenal and returning it to the role of a nuclear power that it gave up some three decades ago.

For Western interlocutors, Zelensky’s revelation may have come as a shock. But for anyone paying attention to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s accelerating designs, the revelation that Kyiv may pursue its own nuclear arsenal is anything but. Putin, after all, has only grown increasingly messianic and monomaniacal in his efforts to shatter Ukraine. Previous designs on simply toppling Kyiv have given way to outright efforts to “destroy Ukrainian statehood,” especially following Ukraine’s successful occupation in Russia’s Kursk region, as the Moscow Times recently reported. With Ukrainian statehood—and even Ukrainian identity, given Russia’s genocidal efforts—at stake, any nation would understandably pursue any option available for survival.

Perhaps more importantly, Zelensky is resurfacing an important part of Ukrainian history that many in the West seem to have forgotten but that the West bears significant responsibility for. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, Ukraine emerged as one of a handful of nations to claim a segment of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. And almost immediately, the United States and Russia led a joint effort to strip Ukraine of its new weapons, succeeding in 1994 via the now infamous Budapest Memorandum. It was a move that, at the time, resulted in rounds of condescending self-congratulation around Washington—and that, in time, set the stage for Russia’s later invasion of Ukraine. Now, as Zelensky has made clear, that bill is coming due—and the West now faces the option of finally welcoming Ukraine into NATO’s ranks or risking it becoming a nuclear power once more.

When the Soviet Union imploded in 1991—undone, in large part, via anti-colonial, pro-independence efforts from Ukrainians—the Soviet nuclear arsenal was split among a number of new nations, including Ukraine. And almost immediately, U.S. officials decided that Kyiv could not, and should not, be trusted to maintain its own nuclear arsenal.

This reality has been made blindingly clear by recent archival work from a number of scholars, poring through overlooked U.S. and Ukrainian documents. For instance, Columbia University’s George Bogden has recently published extensively on the internal debates in both the United States and Ukraine surrounding Kyiv’s post-Soviet arsenal. In so doing, the documents have revealed not only the arrogance of U.S. officials, who prioritized relations with Moscow over all else, but also the clear consternation, and clear warnings, of officials in Ukraine who realized what they were giving up.

In both the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations, U.S. officials placed continued emphasis on reassuring Russia that Moscow could have regional primacy—and that the United States was not trying to take advantage of the power vacuum emerging in the Soviet rubble. And part of that was giving in to Moscow’s demands that all of the Soviet nuclear weaponry be returned to Russia. That is, while Russia would be allowed to retain its status as a nuclear power, countries such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—those brutally colonized, decimated, and victimized by generations of Kremlin colonialism—would have to divest themselves of their post-Soviet nuclear arsenal.

It was a reality that few in Washington appeared to question. “Ukraine could not keep nuclear weapons,” Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, later said. “No one in the U.S. government questioned [this reality].” That’s not quite accurate; dissenting voices such as former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney argued against forcing Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons, and even Henry Kissinger flagged that places such as Ukraine were “puzzled by [the U.S.] passion” to get Kyiv to give up its nuclear weaponry. But such concerns crumbled in the face of the supposed comity emerging between Washington and Moscow—and the United States’ expanding willingness to give the benefit of the doubt to Russia, time and again.

Indeed, the U.S. push to get Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal is that much more puzzling given that, even by the mid-1990s, Russian leadership was showing clear signs of the kind of revanchism that would later take root under Putin. While the United States was pressuring Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons, the Russian military was still backing pro-Russian separatists in Moldova and had already launched a program of armed meddling in northern Georgia—as well as finalized plans for an invasion of Chechnya after that colony had the temerity to vote for independence from Moscow. Moreover, Russian President Boris Yeltsin had already “threaten[ed] Ukraine and Kazakhstan with revision of borders … if they insisted on independence,” as historian Serhii Plokhy noted, with Yeltsin’s office pointing specifically to Ukraine’s Crimea and Donbas regions as areas for potential “revision.” All of this while luminaries such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn publicly called for Russia to reclaim swaths of eastern Ukraine—calls that found broad appeal across Russia.

None of that, however, seemed to matter to U.S. officials. Indeed, when Ukrainian counterparts raised concerns about Russian revanchism with U.S. partners, they were viewed as “whiners,” according to a former member of the White House National Security Council. Anthony Lake, Clinton’s national security advisor, even “ridiculed Ukraine’s trepidation in giving up” its nuclear capabilities, Bogden found, adding that “Kyiv didn’t understand its true ‘long-term interest,’ Mr. Lake insisted; only he and his colleagues did.” (Ironically, former Soviet officials had a far better understanding of Ukraine’s security concerns than the Americans; as outgoing Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said, just “one nuclear missile” in Ukraine could serve as a deterrent against Moscow.)

Eventually, the Americans got their way, steamrolling Kyiv’s concerns about Russian imperialism. The resulting Budapest Memorandum pledged nebulous “security assurances” for Kyiv, with the Kremlin declaring it would never push any “threat or use of force” against Ukraine. In return, Kyiv gave up its remaining nuclear arsenal—a move that is now not only seen by many Ukrainians as a clear misstep but that left a lingering distaste in the mouth of Ukrainian officials about America’s role in the region and even trustworthiness as a partner. “I would understand Russia’s nastiness,” then-Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said, as Bogden discovered. “But Americans are even worse—they do not listen to our arguments.”

Decades on, America’s insistence that Ukraine divest its nuclear weapons—and give them all to Russia—is now seen as a blunder of historic proportions. Even Clinton himself has expressed regret at the move. And now, with hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians dead and Europe destabilized to a greater extent than we’ve seen in decades, the price of Washington’s push to strip Ukraine of nuclear status has become clear.

Which brings us back to Trump’s reelection and Zelensky’s recent comments. In revealing that Kyiv could pursue nuclear weapons if it doesn’t join NATO, the Ukrainian president is simply saying the quiet part out loud—all the more now that Trump will replace Biden. After all, it’s not as if Ukraine doesn’t have the history, or the technical know-how, to develop its own nuclear arsenal. If a nation such as North Korea—one now participating in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, no less—can develop its own nuclear systems, then a country such as Ukraine should have a far easier path forward. It wouldn’t happen overnight, but if NATO keeps closing the door to Ukrainian membership—and to the U.S. nuclear umbrella—then a nuclearized Kyiv would be the only logical outcome remaining.

Indeed, this was part of the impetus for NATO expansion in the post-Cold War period in the first place. As one U.S. interlocutor recently recalled, around the time the United States was forcing Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons, Polish officials were making noise about jump-starting their own domestic nuclear program—regardless of U.S. wishes. “We talked to the Poles,” the official remembered, “and they said: ‘If you don’t let us into NATO, we’re getting nuclear weapons. We don’t trust the Russians.’” NATO, of course, expanded to include Poland in 1999, abrogating the need for a Polish nuclear arsenal—one of the welcome, and completely unappreciated, advantages to expanding NATO in Europe.

But Ukraine no longer has the luxury of waiting for NATO membership. With every passing day, and especially with the reelection of Trump, the reality increasingly dawns that if we’re to guarantee Ukrainian statehood, the West must welcome Ukraine into NATO—or it must start getting ready for Ukraine to rejoin the same nuclear club it was once a part of all those years ago.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/07/ukraine-now-faces-a-nuclear-decision/

Kharkiv Governor

There are already three victims.

A 12-story apartment building was hit as a result of the shelling of the KAB. The entrance to the building from the 1st to the 3rd floor was partially destroyed. Damaged buildings around.

https://t.me/synegubov/11962



At this moment, there are five victims.

The rescue operation in the high-rise building is ongoing.

https://t.me/synegubov/11963



The number of victims increased to eight.

https://t.me/synegubov/11964



Nine victims in the Saltiv district. Rescue work in the house continues.

In the city center, as a result of hits at two addresses, administrative buildings were damaged, windows in residential buildings, shops, and other civilian objects were broken. At this moment, there are no casualties.

https://t.me/synegubov/11965

Guerre d'Ukraine | 06/11/24

Secteurs :
\uD83C\uDF10 Kupiansk-Pischane\uD83D\uDD39U241106-1838
\uD83C\uDF10 Niu-York-Toretsk\uD83D\uDD39U241106-1832
\uD83C\uDF10 Selydove-Krasnohorivka\uD83D\uDD39U241106-1820
\uD83C\uDF10 Kurakhove-Kostiantynivka\uD83D\uDD39U241106-1828#UkraineRussianWar #GuerreEnUkraine pic.twitter.com/6u6V8lknEy

Poulet volant  (@Pouletvolant3) November 7, 2024

Updated map showing further Russian advances on the Kurakhove-Pokrovsk front.https://t.co/9l3JIA7y1g https://t.co/qMrfNwcdde pic.twitter.com/ZQaQOpt7za

Rob Lee  (@RALee85) November 7, 2024

Just back from a trip to Ukraine, Mike sits down with Rob Lee (@RALee85) and Dara Massicot (@MassDara) to discuss what they saw, what they learned, and how their views of the conflict have changed.https://t.co/WUyVLyNJ0R

War on the Rocks  (@WarOnTheRocks) November 6, 2024

https://warontherocks.com/2024/09/the-meaning-of-creeping-ukrainian-losses-in-the-east/

Trump was always a lousy negotiator and terrible deal maker. That is his weakness....

Photos from the Ukrainian National Guard’s Peaky Blinders unit of destroyed Russian T-80BVM and T-80BV tanks and Z-STS MRAP near Selydove.  https://t.co/VH5SdWjpRL pic.twitter.com/kpLDCuTO7R

Rob Lee  (@RALee85) November 7, 2024

Video of an assault by Russia’s 33rd Regiment on Antonivka with support from FPVs, TOS-1A MLRS, UAV-dropped munition strikes, and Su-25 rocket strikes. The proximity of Su-25 to the front line possibly indicates a lack of Ukrainian air defense capabilities.… pic.twitter.com/KWk44rshWi

Rob Lee  (@RALee85) November 7, 2024

Ukrainian brigades are trying to recruit soldiers who have gone AWOL from their units. In some cases, this happens because soldiers are not allowed to transfer between units.https://t.co/9RJhe6VfNA pic.twitter.com/5gsKAbk4s1

Rob Lee  (@RALee85) November 5, 2024

A thousand OWA drones a day into energy infrastructure is something Ukraine can do without a single thing from the USA. That could take a third to half of Russian oil and gas offline for years. It is not an insignificant threat, but it's one of the tools in the UA toolbox. We've been speculating that the only reason UA hasn't done more on refineries and transshipment points is dire threats from the US and western states on that affecting what aid the west would provide.

No aid? Let the drones fly, and damned be him that first cries, “Hold, enough!”

Today saw another nuclear capable B-52 mission over Finland (ie along Russias border), supported by FI & SE air forces.

Today's flight was likely by 61-0010. Nuclear capability is highly likely.

I have not managed to find more specific area info, nor a sure ID.… https://t.co/gVkyRyEGvK pic.twitter.com/qrFGCZ4ztw

auonsson  (@auonsson) November 7, 2024

There is a typo in OP. Reg should be 61-0010, not 60-0010. The latter is not flying. pic.twitter.com/4xw6Dc5wJz

auonsson  (@auonsson) November 7, 2024

pic.twitter.com/bNWJNL1Xrg

auonsson  (@auonsson) November 7, 2024

Here is a handy identification guide to ascertain whether or not a B-52 is only conventional or also nuclear weapons capable:https://t.co/HRMhKJb9ra

auonsson  (@auonsson) November 7, 2024