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My background is posted in this thread. You're welcome to find it and read it. If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... |
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Left almost completely unspoken is that an experienced crew fights a vehicle in a way to maximize its advantages and minimize its weaknesses.
Kind of like the Flying Tigers learned not to get in a low speed turning fight with Japanese fighters, but do high speed boom and zoom attacks. If you have a gun with more penetration, you defend from forward slope. If you have less penetration, you defend reverse slope, with the crest situated where by the time the enemy can see you, he is already in range. Or you have a pre-planned obscuration artillery mission, or smoke pots, or mine fields, to minimize the enemy's range advantage. If you have a tank with a great gun and armor, but shitty reliability, you might prefer a static defense. If, on the other hand, you have great reliability and maneuverability, in addition to decent optics, stabilization, and a power traverse, but you are fighting enemy vehicles with more frontal armor and a bigger gun, you might more quickly opt for a mobile defense, to get the target aspects you need to kill the vehicles. You have to penetrate to kill, for the most part. If you generate enough spall, you might take out the crew or fragile equipment. You have to hit to penetrate or generate spall.. You have to shoot, preferably first, to hit. You have to aim to shoot. You have to see the enemy to aim. YOU HAVE TO GET THERE to see the enemy. Better if you bring a bunch of other tanks with you. You have to NOT BREAK, (or be quickly repaired) and not run out of fuel, to get there. You have to reload to shoot again. You have to survive being shot to jump track and continue the fight. The M4 was hands-down the best in the world at those things in WWII. For most of that war, it brought a good enough gun, with a good enough shell, to accomplish the mission. If you are attacking experienced enemy with decent equipment into the teeth of a fortified and prepared defense - you are going to take your lumps, regardless of frontal armor thickness or gun penetration capability. |
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Left almost completely unspoken is that an experienced crew fights a vehicle in a way to maximize its advantages and minimize its weaknesses. View Quote ![]() The Tank Duel at St. Vith, Belgium |
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Left almost completely unspoken is that an experienced crew fights a vehicle in a way to maximize its advantages and minimize its weaknesses. ![]() |
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LOL. So you want to lose the war, and have a high chance of not surviving. Bold strategy. Most Sherman crews survived the war. Most German crews did not. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Up gunned Shermans were killing modern Soviet armor in the Middle East while the vaulted Panthers and Tigers rusted in the dustpile of history. Hell, research and read what the French thought of the Panther, post war, when they operated them. Arabs would get shot down flying US Air Force spec F-35's.... Israel had better tanks than the Arabs did. It also helped that the Israelis were better tankers. Interesting when the Germans got a long barreled 75mm gun, T-34’s were slaughtered. Everyone brags about the Sherman yet nobody would want to be in one during WWIi. How is moral for a replacement crew when you are now crewing a tank with blood still inside? Shitty tank. So you want to lose the war, and have a high chance of not surviving. Bold strategy. Most Sherman crews survived the war. Most German crews did not. |
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That's too bad. The Inside the Hatch videos are great, I really enjoy them and have learned a lot. View Quote |
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Yes, but that also had allot to do with numbers as well. Would you rather be in a Sherman say if the odds were reveresed? I'm betting no. If there were 10 plus Panthers for every Sherman, and I'm betting the numbers were three or four times that of Sherman's against Panthers, your odds of surviving are not very good either. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Up gunned Shermans were killing modern Soviet armor in the Middle East while the vaulted Panthers and Tigers rusted in the dustpile of history. Hell, research and read what the French thought of the Panther, post war, when they operated them. Arabs would get shot down flying US Air Force spec F-35's.... Israel had better tanks than the Arabs did. It also helped that the Israelis were better tankers. Interesting when the Germans got a long barreled 75mm gun, T-34's were slaughtered. Everyone brags about the Sherman yet nobody would want to be in one during WWIi. How is moral for a replacement crew when you are now crewing a tank with blood still inside? Shitty tank. So you want to lose the war, and have a high chance of not surviving. Bold strategy. Most Sherman crews survived the war. Most German crews did not. |
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. |
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Quoted: If you are attacking experienced enemy with decent equipment into the teeth of a fortified and prepared defense - you are going to take your lumps, regardless of frontal armor thickness or gun penetration capability. View Quote In modern day combat, if you have ATGMs, you can stand off and perhaps get the enemy in a crossfire. As the range decreases that may be harder to do. Your first volley may get some tanks in the flank, but that may not last long. If they pivot on you, you are SOL. If you have decent equipment, but you cant penetrate the enemy frontal armor. you must maneuver to a flank. If you are stationary, cant maneuver, and cant punch through enemy frontal armor, you are going to get slaughtered. The attacker isnt going to take lumps. The attacker will take no lumps. The AT rounds will bounce off the frontal armor and then the defender will die. You can look at the 82nd Airborne at Biazza Ridge in Sicily in 1943 The 2nd Marine Division on D+1 at Tarawa The 25th ID attacking the Gifu perimeter on Guadalcanal in 1942 Task Force Smith in 1950. Desert Storm, such as Eagle Troop at the 73 Easting, or 1st AD all overthe place, in 1991. You can pull out David Zucchino's Thunder Run, describing Baghdad in 2003. 2nd Battalion 37th Armor, Sadr City in April 2004. The Marines in Fallujah in 2004. What you will find is that if you are a stationary defender, like the infantry usually is, and you cant penetrate the enemy armor, you will get hammered but good. All of the lopsided fights I describe above are crunchies and grunts getting hosed by big heavy tanks with big heavy front armor, that couldnt be penetrated. Go educate yourself. |
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Quoted: I'm school trained as an 1811, 1812, and 0352. The similarities between armor and anti-armor MOSs, are substantial in that we live and die by our ability to kill enemy hard targets by exploiting weaknesses in their armor. Of course, wheeled assets firing ATGMs are a whole different ball game than running about the battlefield in a tracked AFV with two feet of armor in front of you, but you quickly learn that engaging enemy armor with a missile that gives away your position every time you fire it has to be done with considerable tactical consideration lest you become hors de combat very quickly after the enemy MBT sees your launch signature. I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. View Quote ![]() Not worth the effort. |
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Quoted: Well, no. Not really at all. Quite the opposite, in fact. In modern day combat, if you have ATGMs, you can stand off and perhaps get the enemy in a crossfire. As the range decreases that may be harder to do. Your first volley may get some tanks in the flank, but that may not last long. If they pivot on you, you are SOL. If you have decent equipment, but you cant penetrate the enemy frontal armor. you must maneuver to a flank. If you are stationary, cant maneuver, and cant punch through enemy frontal armor, you are going to get slaughtered. The attacker isnt going to take lumps. The attacker will take no lumps. The AT rounds will bounce off the frontal armor and then the defender will die. You can look at the 82nd Airborne at Biazza Ridge in Sicily in 1943 The 2nd Marine Division on D+1 at Tarawa The 25th ID attacking the Gifu perimeter on Guadalcanal in 1942 Task Force Smith in 1950. Desert Storm, such as Eagle Troop at the 73 Easting, or 1st AD all overthe place, in 1991. You can pull out David Zucchino's Thunder Run, describing Baghdad in 2003. 2nd Battalion 37th Armor, Sadr City in April 2004. The Marines in Fallujah in 2004. What you will find is that if you are a stationary defender, like the infantry usually is, and you cant penetrate the enemy armor, you will get hammered but good. All of the lopsided fights I describe above are crunchies and grunts getting hosed by big heavy tanks with big heavy front armor, that couldnt be penetrated. Go educate yourself. View Quote Or, to look at it another way, since you like historical examples, why did the Battle of the Bulge end in a German defeat, despite the fact that Germans had numerous Tiger and Panther tanks, being opposed largely by the supposedly inferior Sherman tanks? Why did they not sweep to Antwerp? |
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Were I tasked to defend France for the Third Reich, and I had Eastern Front veterans, Stugs, Tigers, and Panthers at my disposal, I guarantee you my defense will situated such that an attacker primarily armed with Shermans in the amounts the Allies could get there will take their lumps.
On the other hand, should I be in an alternate universe where the Germans were using Shermans, and the Allies were invading with Stugs, Panthers, and Tigers, I guarantee my defense ... will make the attacker take his lumps. Defense might be situated a little different, but remember this - the attacker only gets to pick the date and time, tactically. The DEFENDER gets to pick where, and terrain, engineer effort, counter-mobility operations, and a fire support plan can really help a defender. |
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I'm school trained as an 1811, 1812, and 0352. The similarities between armor and anti-armor MOSs, are substantial in that we live and die by our ability to kill enemy hard targets by exploiting weaknesses in their armor. Of course, wheeled assets firing ATGMs are a whole different ball game than running about the battlefield in a tracked AFV with two feet of armor in front of you, but you quickly learn that engaging enemy armor with a missile that gives away your position every time you fire it has to be done with considerable tactical consideration lest you become hors de combat very quickly after the enemy MBT sees your launch signature. I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. |
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I would like to add a point, tangential as it might be.
If the Allies had augmented the armor on their (Sherman) tanks early-on, that would necessarily have led to decreased fuel mileage of such tanks, and therefore a slower pace of pursuit of the retreating German Army through France; of course, this says nothing about tank reliability given the increased weight of such additional armor. Reliability could only have been decreased by the addition of armor, past a trivial point In such a case, with Allied fuel supplies already strained during the pursuit of the German army across France, perhaps the Germans could have found and maintained a reasonable defensive front line somewhere in France, had they not been hotly pursued by Allied tanks that burned less fuel per mile than the proposed "Heavy" Shermans. This is all speculation, but nevertheless, informed speculation. Had the Germans not been so relentlessly pursued, as they were, the course of the war in France could have turned out very differently. As it turned out, the Allies were constrained by supplies--mostly fuel-- at the end of the race across France. Having heavier tanks, which would have necessarily burned more SCARCE fuel would probably have turned out to be counterproductive. Oh, and I almost forgot. I watched an episode of "Tank Overhaul" where a German tank's transmission was found to have a wooden plug inserted into one of its vital oil/lubricating passages. Very clever sabotage. The Tank could rumble out of the factory, get on the train to the front, and then have transmission failure thousands of miles from the factory Very brave person who did that, as the penalty for sabotage was summary execution. The Germans had a lot of reliability issues to face. Some were due to their "Batch" method of production, which resulted in non-standardized vehicles, and the nightmare which resulted in spare parts issuance and field maintenance. Speer did his best to remedy this very Nazi (craftmanship) outlook on industrial production, but he was opposed by very significant forces within the Nazi political regime. Speer was far less successful than he hoped he would be. The point of this being that fewer armaments were produced by Germany than might have been possible otherwise. Other reliability issues were encountered by the use of slave labor during the manufacture of many components of German armaments. How much is impossible to say. But that single wooden plug pulled out of that German tank transmission says a great deal, I think. |
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Were I tasked to defend France for the Third Reich, and I had Eastern Front veterans, Stugs, Tigers, and Panthers at my disposal, I guarantee you my defense will situated such that an attacker primarily armed with Shermans in the amounts the Allies could get there will take their lumps. On the other hand, should I be in an alternate universe where the Germans were using Shermans, and the Allies were invading with Stugs, Panthers, and Tigers, I guarantee my defense ... will make the attacker take his lumps. Defense might be situated a little different, but remember this - the attacker only gets to pick the date and time, tactically. The DEFENDER gets to pick where, and terrain, engineer effort, counter-mobility operations, and a fire support plan can really help a defender. View Quote Defending is almost always easier than attacking, as long as the defense is adequately set-up, and the Attacker follows the Defender's plans. In some cases, the Attacker does NOT follow the Defender's plans, and so things go awry for the Defense. History is replete with such instances. Recently, see Dien Bien Phu, and perhaps Sherman's Atlanta Campaign, as well as his march through the south. In sum, it is not who is defending or attacking, what is essential is who has the initiative. This can be an attacker severing lines of communication of a defender, or a defender moving as to interpose themselves on the lines of communications of an opponent who is must then attack the defender. Saying the Defense always has the advantage is saying too much, given an intelligent Attacker. See Grant's Vicksburg Campaign for a brilliant example of how an outnumbered general (Grant) outfought Confed forces, and cut the South in half, and thereby winning the war. By all rights, Grant should have been crushed during the Vicksburg campaign, except that he out-thought, out-maneuvered, and beat his more numerous Confed opponents--and suffering less casualties than they did. Napoleon, himself, would have been proud of that campaign. |
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I'm sure he is knowledgeable. However, his argument compared to Manic_Moran makes him sound like he would be at home behind the counter at a gun shop. He lacks the scholarly bona fides possessed by Manic_Moran. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. |
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For what its worth, I have taught at the grad school level and have been published in Armor magazine. You are incorrect. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. |
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I don't believe anyone here is questioning your integrity, but simply some of your conclusions. Surely there is room for open and respectful debate, as has been the case so far in this thread. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. |
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In a perfect world, the entire fleet going in to the ETO should have been uparmored prior to June 1944. The tanks in the Pacific theater were totally adequate. In a practical sense, the fact is that the Army had no heavy tanks worthy of the definition. I have posted this earlier, somewhere back in this thread, that at a minimum the US should have had heavy breakthrough brigades, similar to the breakthrough brigades the Soviets were using, ultimately with JS-2s. Optimally, since in the real world, with real engines, suspensions, and springs, more armor will impose a cost, I would have recommended either:
A heavy armor regiment per corps (probably 2000 additional tanks) Heavies in the infantry division support battalions. Which isn’t that far off the British use of Matildas, Churchills, or Soviet use of SU152s, for example. I disagree with the straw man argument you pose in that most of the time, tanks supporting infantry were divisional battalions, supporting infantry divisions. It was extremely rare for US infantry divisions to attack panzer or panzergrenadier formations on the defense, to begin with, and to attack with German tanks sitting on the OBJ with infantry is more unlikely. An Israeli style Golan heights defense with tanks bermed up wasn’t the German style, really wasn’t, and it would be more likely to see an armored counterattack after the infantry took their lumps. The German defensive doctrine was still an elastic defense, tanks counterattacking, not in the FLOT or on the OBJ. While admittedly he was describing actions in the east, I recommend Timothy Wray. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/wray.pdf Certainly no compromise was apparent at the Panzer Training School in Wiinsdorf, where in February 1943 “Instructional Pamphlet on Cooperation Between Panzers and Infantry in the Defense” sounded a particularly militant note. This tract, for example, announced the following principles for employing tanks in the defense:
Tanks should only be employed in counterattacks and never as part of the stationary defense. Tanks should be held sufficiently far behind the front so they can respond to enemy penetrations across a wide sector of responsibility. Tanks should always be employed en masse: the commitment. of individual tanks alone is forbidden. The smallest unit for immediate counterattacks with infantry support is the tank battalion (minimum of forty panzers). View Quote If you pull out Jarymoycyz, he mentioned quite explicitly that in battles such as Operation Spring, on 25 June 1944, the German counterattacks on Verriers ridge caused the Allies and specifically Canadians to emphasize synchronizing infantry advances with moving forward AT assets to wear down the inevitable counterattacks. So your piece on TDs vs tanks is based on a premise I disagree with, but anyone searching for the doctrinal quote to justify their position can find one, somewhere. Back to the first question. The Army needed a tank heavy enough to defeat the most common AT weapons at the most predictable ranges, especially in the infantry support role where the requirement to maneuver in proximity to infantry meant pH was increasing. Good enough beats perfect. A heavy tank that could withstand 75mm AT, really anything other than 88mm flak 41 and pak 43 and 75mmL70, could have accomplished all with 5 inches frontal armor. That was not significantly more then what the base model had. I don’t think the mobility costs would have been prohibitive but just for compromise, give them as support assets to the infantry division, which advanced dismounted. As far as the impact of tanks on infantry fighting, I don’t know that it has been analyzed in the aggregate. Michael Doubler did a good job of describing tank support in the bocage, but again, 1st Army took 100,000 casualties in seven weeks and 85% of them were infantrymen. The majority of tanks were in infantry divisions, and as I have mentioned, the majority of ammunition was HE, (70+%) and the majority of targets were not tanks (85%). Since most tanks most of the time were supporting formations that moved at 3mph, suffering 85% of the casualties, optimizing those vehicles for that mission should not be contentious. It was neither difficult, or for that matter particularly original. The US was conspicuously absent in not producing heavy armor. We could argue how many, for what mission, and what parameters, but anyone who wishes to answer the optimum number is “zero” is simply off base. In fact, lets just chew on that: During a seven week period, June-July 1944: One tank division was committed...maybe two 3rdAD, and 2nd The US Army had no heavy tanks. Every German AT weapon in the bocage could penetrate the main US tank from every angle. The front advanced maybe 50 miles...so maintenance issues were negligible to nonexistent. 100000 casualties. 85% of them being the infantry. That's bad. Really bad. The classic example, which I mentioned obliquely, is D+1 on Tarawa. An armored force in an infantry support role that has frontal protection against stationary infantry threats and targets is the optimal answer, if it can be fielded. In the Pacific, that tank was already there. Getting there in a sufficiently mobile package was feasible. As far as the base sherman was concerned, up armoring the tank would have slowed its ability to maneuver, and while it would not have been impossible to armor up a tank to withstand, say 75mmL70 at 800 meters, the 75mm L40 still can’t do anything. The answer in that case is a better gun, or gun plus armor, but we are talking about 15% of the engagements, and the most efficient way to spend resources in that instance is by producing more HVAP. The answer is "gun plus something" but implictly the gun and ammo. But again, 85% of the problems arent that problem. While your MG White quote is what it is, 3rd Army and 12th AG did not agree. Neither did his subordinate commanders. “German Tanks have better sloped armor and a better silhouette then the American tanks.” BG J.H. Collier “Our tanks armor does not withstand German direct fire weapons of 75mm and higher” COL S.R. Hinds “Armor: Insufficient to prevent penetration by high velocity ammunition” COL Paul A. Disney “[at Faid Pass in Tunisia] our tanks were penetrated by 88, 75, and 50mm caliber in this engagement in all parts of the hull and turret. Tank crews in this battalion are adding sand bags to their tanks, about 170 bags for each tank, in an effort to make up for the tank’s lack of armor…” LTC Wilson M. Hawkins Lastly, there were a couple of different ways tank-infantry coorperation was practiced. Ifthe tanks were worried about being quick to fire they led....infantry followed 50 meters back or so. In terrain where you were worried about AT ambushes, infantry led. You could advamce on separate axes, but this was hard as the crystals in the radios didnt allow the two sides to talk. The big problem is that in general, dismounted infantry could not protect tanks from AT fire if AT guns were outside small arms range, which was almost always the case. And the tanks couldnt maneuver at infantry speeds. This is why infantry support tanks, for the most part, required armor protection as the mission caused them to sacrifice mobility, and in general, they would not get the first shot off against hidden AT. |
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I don't believe anyone here is questioning your integrity, but simply some of your conclusions. Surely there is room for open and respectful debate, as has been the case so far in this thread. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. |
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@Manic_Moran
It occurs to me that the answer to your question regarding infantry support from armor is best performed by subtraction. The classic example that people like to cite is where base shermans are advancing, attack a force of panthers and or tigers, and must maneuver. Frontal armor could increase survivability, but the gun cannot penetrate frontal armor, and heavier armor impedes the ability to maneuver to a flank. Therefore, the answer would be a better gun, or HVAP, and accept we are an eggshell armed with a hammer. In some cases, which I believe Zaloga oversamples but is still valid, you have the "Bulge/Arracourt ambush with flanking fire" where the US is on teh defense. That detracts from the sample...but for consistency I'll leave those instances in. As previously posted by me several days ago, we can look at Zaloga’s numbers and determine that the panther/tiger fleet (I would add jagdpanzer IVs to that number) was a known quantity, approx. 1/3 of the German force, and the example in the previous paragraph was a likelihood 5% of the time. You could model it if you like to determine that these tanks were generally in formations intel could track, many were in the East, and for an infantry division support battalion the number may have been slightly less. In any other then those 5% of situations, an infantry tank is preferable. It could engage from long distance, defeat soft targets, call in artillery, and the weight does not impede mission essential maneuver. With the exception maybe of an 88mm in the Siegfried line, the reduced mobility is not a significant factor. Against the standard German defense, infantry in front with paks, and German tanks in the rear to counterattack as part of a doctrinal German elastic defense, such a vehicle is preferable. Against most tanks, such as Mark IVs and Stugs, the gun was acceptable and the protection provides a decisive advantage. Against something like unprotected flak guns in the ruhr, it is survivable at long range until artillery can be called in to address the tactical problem. So my answer is probably: 93%. But it would be easier to tally up what doesn't apply, and subtract. In those situations, an E2, or Churchill VII or VIII would be preferable. |
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I understand your point, and agree--up to a point. The Attacker gets to choose where and when the attack is made, and if using an indirect approach, can negate most, if not all, of the Defenders preparations. Going around is always easier than going through. Defending is almost always easier than attacking, as long as the defense is adequately set-up, and the Attacker follows the Defender's plans. In some cases, the Attacker does NOT follow the Defender's plans, and so things go awry for the Defense. History is replete with such instances. Recently, see Dien Bien Phu, and perhaps Sherman's Atlanta Campaign, as well as his march through the south. In sum, it is not who is defending or attacking, what is essential is who has the initiative. This can be an attacker severing lines of communication of a defender, or a defender moving as to interpose themselves on the lines of communications of an opponent who is must then attack the defender. Saying the Defense always has the advantage is saying too much, given an intelligent Attacker. See Grant's Vicksburg Campaign for a brilliant example of how an outnumbered general (Grant) outfought Confed forces, and cut the South in half, and thereby winning the war. By all rights, Grant should have been crushed during the Vicksburg campaign, except that he out-thought, out-maneuvered, and beat his more numerous Confed opponents--and suffering less casualties than they did. Napoleon, himself, would have been proud of that campaign. View Quote Its great when you can pull it off. However, to set the conditions to do so, someone has to get a break-through (usually) and keep it going. That means you have bust the defense, before the grand turning movements and envelopments are possible. Sometimes, there are no gaps to exploit, until you turn a surface into a gap. Sometimes you have to fight. Maneuver warfare is awesome when you can get, but lives primarily at the strategic and operational level. AT the tactical level, sometimes you have to assault a defended objective - yes? |
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Quoted: Ah, yes, the Maneuver Warfare dictum. Its great when you can pull it off. However, to set the conditions to do so, someone has to get a break-through (usually) and keep it going. That means you have bust the defense, before the grand turning movements and envelopments are possible. Sometimes, there are no gaps to exploit, until you turn a surface into a gap. Sometimes you have to fight. Maneuver warfare is awesome when you can get, but lives primarily at the strategic and operational level. AT the tactical level, sometimes you have to assault a defended objective - yes? View Quote The fact is there were massive holes in the German lines because they didn’t have enough tanks to fill them. Allowing the Allies to easily out maneuver German units. |
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If you think QCMGR is participating in anything approximating open and respectful debate, feel free to read his posts. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. |
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If ifs and buts were bullets and guns Germany would have won. The fact is there were massive holes in the German lines because they didn’t have enough tanks to fill them. Allowing the Allies to easily out maneuver German units. View Quote I seem to recall Montgomery having a lot of trouble getting moving. Things didn't bust loose until Third Army started "turning surfaces into gaps", and that was a while after D-Day. |
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Well, then - how did the Operation Watch On The Rhine take place? I seem to recall Montgomery having a lot of trouble getting moving. Things didn't bust loose until Third Army started "turning surfaces into gaps", and that was a while after D-Day. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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If ifs and buts were bullets and guns Germany would have won. The fact is there were massive holes in the German lines because they didn't have enough tanks to fill them. Allowing the Allies to easily out maneuver German units. I seem to recall Montgomery having a lot of trouble getting moving. Things didn't bust loose until Third Army started "turning surfaces into gaps", and that was a while after D-Day. I doubt that Patton could have managed the Bocage country/terrain better than Bradley, but he was not there to exert his influence, so there's no telling. I doubt if Patton could have managed it any worse than Bradley. I also understand that the Allied deception plan of having the "Patton" First US Army Group held ready to invade the Pas de Calais region (where the Germans believed the primary invasion would take place) was wearing thin by the end of July 1944. In sum, the synergy concerning 3rd Army and XIX TAC air Command was crucial to the ground-taking of 3rd Army, and its' relatively light casualties. It was, and is, a model of co-operation between the two commanders, and their commands. It is fair to say that without both commanders so being mutually supportive, the fortunes of Third Army might have very different. Koch, Patton's Intel officer, had figured out that something might be up in the Ardennes, and reports were sent to Bradley's staff, who dismissed them. Then the Battle of the Bulge began; Patton had already reckoned that he would have to call a halt to his ongoing attack to the East, and turn North, and had made his staff make 3 different plans for doing so in advance of the meeting of Allied Commanders in Verdun, France. The scene there, and how it appears, depends on whose story one believes. Patton says that he promised that he could move divisions with a phone call. Everyone else disbelieved him, including Ike. Almost all of the Allied Commanders were in a funk. The truth of the matter is that Patton was right, made the phone call, gave the code word to his Staff, and began the relief of Bastogne. The Germans were probably overshooting what they had the means to achieve, and the American GI, in most instances, put up roadblocks in the way of the overwhelming German attack. The Germans never did capture the Allied fuel supplies that they counted on to continue their offensive, but only by a few miles. Of course, one can ask whether an offensive is reasonable if it requires captured fuel stocks to succeed. Submitted for discussion. |
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17 pages that sound like a Ford vs Chevy debate between 18 year olds. We won. That's the ONLY thing that counts.
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17 pages that sound like a Ford vs Chevy debate between 18 year olds. We won. That's the ONLY thing that counts. View Quote The professionals would be looking at what was done right, and what was done wrong, in preparation for the next war. That's what we pay them to do. Sometimes they get it right. |
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If you believe anyone in this thread has violated Site Code of Conduct, than I suggest you contact a GD Mod or Staff and provide them with links to the offending comment(s). View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. ![]() What a strange thing to post. |
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Quoted: Well, then - how did the Operation Watch On The Rhine take place? I seem to recall Montgomery having a lot of trouble getting moving. Things didn't bust loose until Third Army started "turning surfaces into gaps", and that was a while after D-Day. View Quote You also left out how the battle ended. It ended with the Allies out maneuvering the entire German force, cutting them off from their supplies and forcing them to abandon most of their tanks and retreat. In the end the Germans lost far more tanks then the Allies despite a tremendous operational advantage at the beginning of the battle. It really illustrates all of the failures of the German tank program with poor mobility, low numbers, poor reliability, poor fuel economy and logistics all combining into a massive defeat. The Battle of the Bulge is probably the worst example of German tank warfare that you could have found. You should have stuck with the problems breaking out of Normandy. But of course the Allied loses then were mostly due to anti-tank guns not other tanks so that falls apart there too. |
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Quoted: How did it take place? The Germans pulled front line tank units from the eastern front as well as mostly dedicating months of new tank production in order to have a small advantage in numbers against the weakest part of the Allied lines in an attack that stalled in large part because the German tanks could only cross a limited number of bridges due to their size and weight. Creating a huge traffic jam on the single road that went to their objectives. You also left out how the battle ended. It ended with the Allies out maneuvering the entire German force, cutting them off from their supplies and forcing them to abandon most of their tanks and retreat. In the end the Germans lost far more tanks then the Allies despite a tremendous operational advantage at the beginning of the battle. It really illustrates all of the failures of the German tank program with poor mobility, low numbers, poor reliability, poor fuel economy and logistics all combining into a massive defeat. The Battle of the Bulge is probably the worst example of German tank warfare that you could have found. You should have stuck with the problems breaking out of Normandy. But of course the Allied loses then were mostly due to anti-tank guns not other tanks so that falls apart there too. View Quote |
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Your post makes a strong argument that the Sherman was indeed the proper tank for the European Theater. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
Quoted: How did it take place? The Germans pulled front line tank units from the eastern front as well as mostly dedicating months of new tank production in order to have a small advantage in numbers against the weakest part of the Allied lines in an attack that stalled in large part because the German tanks could only cross a limited number of bridges due to their size and weight. Creating a huge traffic jam on the single road that went to their objectives. You also left out how the battle ended. It ended with the Allies out maneuvering the entire German force, cutting them off from their supplies and forcing them to abandon most of their tanks and retreat. In the end the Germans lost far more tanks then the Allies despite a tremendous operational advantage at the beginning of the battle. It really illustrates all of the failures of the German tank program with poor mobility, low numbers, poor reliability, poor fuel economy and logistics all combining into a massive defeat. The Battle of the Bulge is probably the worst example of German tank warfare that you could have found. You should have stuck with the problems breaking out of Normandy. But of course the Allied loses then were mostly due to anti-tank guns not other tanks so that falls apart there too. Peiper's assigned route, or Rollbahn, had many hairpin turns and traversed steep hillsides that delayed his already slow-moving towed artillery and bridging trains.[74] It included narrow, in many places single-track, roads which forced units of the Kampfgruppe to tail each other, creating a column of infantry and armor up to 25 kilometres (16 mi) long. Peiper complained that the road assigned to his Kampfgruppe was suitable for bicycles, but not for panzers.[73] Fritz Krämer, Chief of Staff for the 6th Panzer Army responded, "I don’t care how and what you do. Just make it to the Meuse. Even if you’ve only one tank left when you get there." These roads weren't any different than the roads that the Germans used to attack France in 1940 and the Panzer III & IV were very successful in crossing those roads. Just like the Shermans were when responding to the German attack at the Bulge. But a Tiger tank is nearly 12ft wide and a Tiger II nearly 12 and a half feet. It's literally wider than many of the roads in Europe at the time, even many of the roads now. The Laws of the Twelve Tables, dated to about 450 BC, required that any public road (Latin via) be 8 Roman feet (perhaps about 2.37 m) wide where straight and twice that width where curved. These were probably the minimum widths for a via; in the later Republic, widths of around 12 Roman feet were common for public roads in rural regions, permitting the passing of two carts of standard (4 foot) width without interference to pedestrian traffic.[11] Actual practices varied from this standard. ![]() ![]() The fist picture is one of the roads into Bastonge, the second is one of the roads into St. Vith. Both are representative of the roads tanks would be traveling down. For reference the car in the first picture is less than half the with of a Tiger II. |
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And even if you did that, it was easier to make bigger and bigger AT guns rather than better armored tanks. Weapons were just outpacing armor in late WWII. Same thing was happening to naval artillery. Better AP rounds plus longer-ranged plunging fire made possible by radar guidance was rendering battleship armor obsolete. Even the 12 inch guns from the Alaska class large cruisers could reliably penetrate battleship armor at certain ranges. View Quote Always. There's no way to make armor better as cheap and easy as it is to make better guns and ammo. |
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Quoted: Which is quicker/easier for the engineers to build/repair - a bridge for a 30 ton tank or a 40 ton? View Quote Engineers are amazing. ![]() This here is combat engineering. Tomorrow isn't included in the preliminary environmental impact study. ![]() |
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For what its worth, My father in law, a 92 year old veteran of the Battle of the Bulge and the push to the Elbe River, told me that he came up on Sherman tanks that were sitting outside a town and the tank commander said to his squad, there are Tigers up there, go up there and take them out. He said he and his squad told the tankers, you have the tanks, you go and knock them out....
He also said when in boot camp, they were told that all of the American equipment was better than the German stuff....his encounters with MG 42's changed his thinking....He said the Browning 30's sounded like bang bang bang and the 42 was bangbangbangbang....you get the image Im sure He was a member of Roosevelt's SS...the 30th Infantry Division. He was captured by the Germans on April 14, 1945 after the failed crossing of the Elbe River in Elbenau, Germany. He said a German soldier told him Roosevelt had died..... |
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Quoted: "Could be". Sure. But there was a war on. You wanna wait until summer 45 to do Overlord? Lots of real bad consequences to that, like London getting pelted with V1 and V2 for another year, and Germany building multiple fortified defensive lines.. As it is, we BARELY made the weather window in 1944. No delay time for upfitting the ship cranes. _ don't think trying to assault over the beach with tanks you can't use until you assemble them on land is a great idea. View Quote |
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Quoted: When you get pushed, you just make up stuff. I really am skeptical how much you know about this. The obvious answer is you put the 40 ton tank on an LST. This is how I know you have no practical experience with this. Airplanes were shipped dissaembled into the UK, then assembled. With a jumbo, you would have to weld the extra plate ont he front of the tank, then go to depot level maintenance and put an uparmored turret, on the chassis. There are may winches and maintenance assemblies designed to pull turrets and engine packs. Or, just appropriate a factory and retrofit the armor plate. Time exists. Fucking Higgins was cranking out boats on a scale never seen in all of history and we were still short in the event. "Yeah, hey, Kaiser? We need about 37 more LST's by two weeks from Mother's day, cool?" How do we ship Abrams nowadays? We use RO-RO ships. Roll on, roll off. You dont winch the 70 ton tanks into a port. How did they tactically ship tanks across the Channel? They used RO-RO ships then as well. They are called LSTs. Landing Ship Tanks. Big door, beach the ship, and drive tanks off. Off course, the LSTs had to sail across the Atlantic anyway. YOu could have filled them with heavier tanks. The reality is that due to some miracle we shipped 200+ jumbos into Europe. SO increasing the scale of a proven concept isnt that difficult. There is no logical way you can build the Shermans we built, ship them to war, and then argue that increasing the weight of the tank by 15-17% would have lengthened D-Day by 12 months. We could also have a discussion about the British Churchill. It weighed the same as the Jumbo, and had the same frontal armor of approx 6 inches. The problem is that its main gun was weaker. But again, the Brits build 5000. Heck, the Mark V and Mark VI had 75mm, but the point being that the difficulty of moving a tank 17% heavier then the ones we moved thousands of is strategically insignificant. View Quote |
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Quoted: Look at the encirclement of Nancy in September. It was a perfect demonstration of the exploitation after breakthough American doctrine. Two battalions of the 80th ID crossed the Moselle River north of Nancy with CCA of the 4th AD close behind. With the defending German infantry pressed hard by the attacking US infantry, CCA bulldozed through and raced deep into the German rear areas. They destroyed 12 AFVs, 85 other vehicles and some artillery. By the end of the day, the division threatened to encircle the defenders at Nancy. The 3rd and 15th PzGrn Division were committed to destroyed the American forces, but over the next two days did not succeed and lost so much manpower that all forces at Nancy had to be withdrawn or be surrounded. The 80th and Free French forces occupied Nancy on the 15th of Sept. In all of September, 3rd Army traded 151 Medium Tanks and Tank Destroyers in exchange for 101 PzIVs, 118 Panthers, and 221 assaultguns lost, and 148 more of all kinds withdrawn for repairs. That's a 3.9:1 exchange ratio in favor of the US & FF. CCA of 4AD alone shattered two Panther Brigades for the loss of 7 M4s and 25 killed in the battles around Arracourt prior to the Nancy encirclement. The Free French 2AD around Dompaire shattered PzBrig112, killing 69 of 90 tanks for the loss of 5 M4s. View Quote |
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https://i.ibb.co/hyXbFxr/grandpa.jpg Its funny how this comes up every once in a while.... Between the German fanboys and the "T-34" Mafia you'd think we were speaking German or Russian.. Outside of reading Belton Coopers flawed book, how many of you have actually spoken to US tankers who actually rolled a M4 or its variants? My Grandfathers only bitch (original cadre 4th/37th when they formed in Pine Camp in 42) with the M4 and A1's was the fouling of plugs on the Continental Radials in the original M4 variants due to continued idiling. By A2 (USMC and Lend-Lease) and A3 with the GAA that had been rapidly addressed, as well as all the other real issues that occurred (the direct vision traps, dry stowage, improved hatches). Keep it in perspective, had the balloon went up in 83ish, how do you think those original 105 Abrams would have done against T80's? Everyone seems to overlook the American Armor Corps ability to rapidly improve based on their real world experience. Yeah did we take the utterly best Medium Tank to war in 42, probably not, but we took the best one from 1940 and rapidly evolved it from there. Armor was saddled by a isolationist mentality in Congress, their entire development budget for the M4 family was what 100K? They used aircraft radials since they we're plentiful and cheap and used on the M3, as was the running gear. Plus Jib cranes on ships were limited to around 30 ton, I believe. Even with all those limitations, still the M4 and A1 was a better tank than their actual piers, Mk3 and Mk4. There is a reason why it stayed in service for so long and formed the initial backbone of the IDF armored forces with the M50-M51. Not apples to apples since now being up-gunned by the AMX 105 and re-powered, but how did it do against T55's and T-62's? Reading a good deal of these comments, you'd be lead to believe it was junk the first day it came off the line.. VS the T34, M4A3E8 vs T34/85... Korea period. The pinnacle of those tanks designs from a WW2 perspective and which one came out on-top. Also have any of you read Loza's or even Bessonov's memoirs and books on the subject? Specifically Loza's, who Commanded M4A2's with the Red Army for the entirety of the Eastern Campaign. He has allot more to say for the M4 vs MkIV, Panther and Tiger than Cooper (and was a tank commander, not a collection point officer). I just never get the negativity towards the M4, especially given its actual service history across the entire war and its statistically high crew survival rate. Not just sprinkling in data from its first outing in North Africa. Nor, the mythic German Armor cult worship. It's akin to the bizarre "Yamato" worship. I hate to break it to everyone but Yamato and Mushashi are on the bottom of the ocean and somewhere there is still an M4 still in service in South America. Yeah, there are 34/85's running around somewhere in Africa but... "Africa has got to Africa" and it's all Generalisimo "Buck-Naked" or "Rambo" have at their disposal. I think German Armor is cool also but, what, you think I want to get out and heat my Maybach Engine with a propane torch every day so it will start, or the litany of other issues that plagued them? Whats the scene from Band of Brothers when they are driving on the Autobahn? "Meet Ford and General Fing Motors you savages" (or something like that) View Quote ![]() |
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Ah, yes, the Maneuver Warfare dictum. Its great when you can pull it off. However, to set the conditions to do so, someone has to get a break-through (usually) and keep it going. That means you have bust the defense, before the grand turning movements and envelopments are possible. Sometimes, there are no gaps to exploit, until you turn a surface into a gap. Sometimes you have to fight. Maneuver warfare is awesome when you can get, but lives primarily at the strategic and operational level. AT the tactical level, sometimes you have to assault a defended objective - yes? View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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I understand your point, and agree--up to a point. The Attacker gets to choose where and when the attack is made, and if using an indirect approach, can negate most, if not all, of the Defenders preparations. Going around is always easier than going through. Defending is almost always easier than attacking, as long as the defense is adequately set-up, and the Attacker follows the Defender's plans. In some cases, the Attacker does NOT follow the Defender's plans, and so things go awry for the Defense. History is replete with such instances. Recently, see Dien Bien Phu, and perhaps Sherman's Atlanta Campaign, as well as his march through the south. In sum, it is not who is defending or attacking, what is essential is who has the initiative. This can be an attacker severing lines of communication of a defender, or a defender moving as to interpose themselves on the lines of communications of an opponent who is must then attack the defender. Saying the Defense always has the advantage is saying too much, given an intelligent Attacker. See Grant's Vicksburg Campaign for a brilliant example of how an outnumbered general (Grant) outfought Confed forces, and cut the South in half, and thereby winning the war. By all rights, Grant should have been crushed during the Vicksburg campaign, except that he out-thought, out-maneuvered, and beat his more numerous Confed opponents--and suffering less casualties than they did. Napoleon, himself, would have been proud of that campaign. Its great when you can pull it off. However, to set the conditions to do so, someone has to get a break-through (usually) and keep it going. That means you have bust the defense, before the grand turning movements and envelopments are possible. Sometimes, there are no gaps to exploit, until you turn a surface into a gap. Sometimes you have to fight. Maneuver warfare is awesome when you can get, but lives primarily at the strategic and operational level. AT the tactical level, sometimes you have to assault a defended objective - yes? This particular battle straddles the tactical/operation realm in itself, and so fits in well under your comments above. Stategically, the Battle was of immense impact. Of course, it was to Grant's advantage that his opponent, Bragg, was so over-confident that he sent away some of his best troops to try to invest Burnside at another location, thus reducing the troops available in the Chattanooga area. Bragg was highly favored by "King" Jeff Davis, and was shortly thereafter promoted to the position of Military Advisor to President Davis. In almost every case, there is an indirect approach. Sometimes this involves maneuver, sometimes other things, like misdirection, deception, feints, and so forth. I understand your fundamental point; warfare is about fighting--and killing. With an unskilled or inexperienced commander, sometimes troops are given little option but to "Charge that position!". Given a little time, sufficient resources, and a skilled commander, indirect approaches are always less costly in lives lost. Again, I understand your statement written above, and, with all due respect, reject it. Throughout history, the 'indirect approach" has always won battles, campaigns, and wars. I might add that while necessarily more difficult, the "indirect approach" wins tactical battles as well. |
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. ![]() What a strange thing to post. @USMCTanker |
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Please tell me how this is a "strange thing to post". @USMCTanker View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
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Quoted: How many years were you an Armor Office and can you post a link to your video? If you have any commentary on the sources, analysis, conclusions, feel free. Standing by. ![]() That's what I thought... I can't speak for the Army, but lots of armor officers in the USMC do or did end up commanding TOW units because of the understanding they had for armored warfare. I've been on this site long enough to know CharlieR doesn't talk out of his ass. ![]() What a strange thing to post. @USMCTanker CharlieR was simply responding to someone questioning his credentials in a very measured, matter of fact manner. At no point was he soliciting or hinting for your "moderation". |
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Quoted: The tone of your response was ridiculous. CharlieR was simply responding to someone questioning his credentials in a very measured, matter of fact manner. At no point was he soliciting or hinting for your "moderation". View Quote Now that that is explained, please tell me how I have failed to exercise my role here. @USMCTanker |
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I don't ordinarily Moderate, or exercise Staff functions, in GD, unless it is an emergency situation. My point, in making my comment, was intended to be broadly meant, and not specifically for the individual poster(s). Perhaps that was unclear, and that is my mistake. Now that that is explained, please tell me how I have failed to exercise my role here. @USMCTanker View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted:
Quoted: The tone of your response was ridiculous. CharlieR was simply responding to someone questioning his credentials in a very measured, matter of fact manner. At no point was he soliciting or hinting for your "moderation". Now that that is explained, please tell me how I have failed to exercise my role here. @USMCTanker Whatever. |
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