Originally Posted By AlmightyTallest:

European leaders are starting to respond to the US election.

Topline pitch this morning:

- Increased domestic defense spending

- Heavy European cooperation without US support

- focus strategy on deterring Russia https://t.co/Lg5AKk69zQ

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) November 6, 2024

Originally Posted By GoldenMead:
Looks like it’s Trump going forward starting January 20th.  It’s going to be a wild two and a half months.

Originally Posted By silverstate55:
My wife actually had a good prognostication this morning: Since Trump hates war & doesn’t want any during his tenure, he will do what’s necessary to help Ukraine drive ruzzians out of Ukraine to end the war as quickly as is feasible.

Originally Posted By Prime:
The Perfect Has Become the Enemy of the Good in Ukraine
Why Washington Must Redefine Its Objectives

By Richard Haass    November 4, 2024



Well into the September 10 debate between the U.S. presidential candidates, ABC News anchor David Muir posed a question to Republican nominee Donald Trump: “Do you want Ukraine to win this war?”

Trump refused to answer directly. “I want the war to stop,” he said. When Muir repeated the question, Trump again evaded: “I think it’s in the U.S. best interest to get this war finished and just get it done.”

Many observers were critical of Trump’s refusal to espouse support for Ukraine in its war against Russian aggression. Yet the former president is hardly the only person refusing to directly answer such a query. Most American national security experts, including U.S. President Joe Biden’s foreign policy team, have said they want Ukraine to defeat Russia. But they have refused to define what, exactly, that means, often saying it is for Ukraine to decide.

If pressed, most would indeed probably define winning in a way similar to how Kyiv defines it, including in its most recent “victory plan”: ousting Russian troops from the entirety of Ukraine’s territory, Crimea included, and reestablishing control over its 1991 borders. There is good reason for adopting this definition. The most basic, if not always honored, norm of international order—one that has endured for some 400 years—is that borders are to be respected. Territory is not to be acquired through the threat or use of armed force. This was one of the main reasons why the United States and other countries rallied to defend South Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990.

Yet although this definition is desirable, it is ultimately unworkable. In principle, Ukraine could liberate its lost territory if the United States and its European partners intervened with forces of their own. But this would require jettisoning the indirect strategy they chose in 2022. It would come at great human, military, and economic cost. And it would introduce far greater risk, as it would mean war between NATO and nuclear-armed Russia. For this reason, such a policy will not be adopted.

Instead of clinging to an infeasible definition of victory, Washington must grapple with the grim reality of the war and come to terms with a more plausible outcome. It should still define victory as Kyiv remaining sovereign and independent, free to join whatever alliances and associations it wants. But it should jettison the idea that, to win, Kyiv needs to liberate all its land. So as the United States and its allies continue to arm Ukraine, they must take the uncomfortable step of pushing Kyiv to negotiate with the Kremlin—and laying out a clear sense of how it should do so.

Such a pivot may be unpopular. It will take political courage to make, and it will require care to implement. But it is the only way to end the hostilities, preserve Ukraine as a truly independent country, enable it to rebuild, and avoid a dire outcome for both Ukraine and the world.

WHAT IS AND WHAT WILL NEVER BE

For Kyiv, a return to 1991 borders is militarily unachievable. The disparity between the manpower and equipment of Russia and Ukraine is simply too great. History suggests that to expel Russia from Crimea or the Donbas, Ukraine would need forces some three times more numerous and capable than Moscow’s, and Russia has a population at least three times larger and a much bigger industrial base. Russian defensive positions are well fortified, and it has received arms and technical assistance from China, Iran, and North Korea. There is no reason to assume it will not receive more such help over time. In October, after all, North Korea deepened its involvement by deploying thousands of its troops to Russia for use in the war effort.

Kyiv, meanwhile, needs most of its forces just to defend the approximately 80 percent of Ukrainian territory it still controls. It especially needs them right now: in recent weeks, Russian forces have gained control of additional territory in the east. Ukraine is trying to build up a more formidable arsenal, but it lacks much in the way of defense manufacturing capability. Its Western partners are helping, but they lack the ability to produce enough arms and ammunition to give Kyiv all it wants while meeting their other commitments. The United States needs enough arms to help not just Ukraine but also partners such as Israel and Taiwan (as well as to provide for itself). Washington could and arguably should provide Kyiv with more sophisticated systems and loosen the constraints on U.S. provisions for their use. But there is no game-changing weapon or lifted restriction that would allow Ukraine to simultaneously defend what it already controls and liberate what it does not.

Many analysts refuse to publicly acknowledge these realities, in part out of fear that doing so would embolden Russia and demoralize Ukraine. But articulating an impossible definition of winning creates its own political problems.

Doing so has, for example, handed American and European opponents—or, more generously, skeptics—of providing Ukraine with additional military aid a powerful argument. The West, they say, is spending tens of billions of dollars on a policy that has little or no chance of succeeding while threatening to reduce its readiness in other theaters, where some analysts say greater U.S. interests are at stake.“Fundamentally, we lack the capacity to manufacture the amount of weapons Ukraine needs us to supply to win the war,” wrote Republican vice presidential nominee JD Vance, in April. “These weapons,” he continued, “are not only needed by Ukraine.”

By not offering a realistic definition of victory, the West is also reducing the pressure on Russia by leaving little room for serious diplomacy. Each protagonist is left free to pursue its maximalist aims. This is not to suggest Russia and Ukraine are morally equivalent; they are not. But without a real Western diplomatic effort, Russian President Vladimir Putin can argue that his regime is not the principal obstacle to ending the war, citing the United States’ and Europe’s refusals to negotiate. The result is less international and internal pressure on the Kremlin. Western sanctions against Russia are widely ignored, and Putin is increasingly welcome at major international forums—including, for example, the October BRICS summit.

The continuation of the war, meanwhile, is devastating Ukraine. The country has suffered over 300,000 casualties, a staggering number—even if only half of Russia’s losses. The Ukrainian economy is expected to grow by only three percent this year after having contracted by some 30 percent in 2022. Continued conflict makes it impossible for the country to begin serious rebuilding, as few will want to invest in structures that could again be reduced to rubble. It also increases the ultimate cost of rebuilding, which has already reached an estimated $500 billion. And the endless fighting is immiserating Ukrainian citizens, who now suffer from regular shortages of electricity caused by Russian attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure and the open-ended military service required of many Ukrainian men. It is thus no surprise that Ukrainians are increasingly leaving their state. Roughly six million of them now live elsewhere, a number that includes many military-age men.

In short, Ukraine and its supporters find themselves pursuing a policy that is unlikely to succeed but sure to be costly. Time will not make things better. Fatigue is setting in, both inside Ukraine and among its backers. The war’s trajectory is neither desirable nor sustainable.

Ukrainians are aware of these facts. It is why, in October, President Volodymyr Zelensky released his “victory plan.” But despite the accompanying fanfare, Zelensky’s proposal provides little guidance on how Ukraine can overcome the many challenges the country faces. The plan lists the security guarantees and economic support Ukraine wants, but not the outcome it desires. It calls for the “madmen in the Kremlin to lose the ability to continue the war,” but it fails to define any diplomatic objectives other than that “Russia must permanently lose control over Ukraine and even the desire for such control.” It offers, in other words, no realistic strategy that Ukraine’s partners can support. It is not a plan for victory, but a prescription for continued war. If Kyiv’s allies walk away, it could end up being a prescription for defeat.

THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE

The prospect of Ukraine losing—or ceasing to be a truly independent country, out from under Russia’s sway—would constitute a serious blow to international order and to European security. It would increase the risk from Russia to other parts of Europe, weaken the confidence of the West, and signal to China (and possibly North Korea) that the West may not have the ability and resolve needed to defeat aggression. It would weaken the norm against conquest. And it would, of course, be terrible for the Ukrainian people.

There is, however, an alternative strategy to both indefinite war and Kyiv’s defeat. It involves continued Western support for Ukraine and opposition to Russia. But it also requires straight talk with Ukraine’s leadership along with limited incentives for Moscow.

At the core of such a revamped strategy is a more modest definition of winning—but one that still protects fundamental Western and Ukrainian interests while denying Putin many of his war aims. The objective should be keeping Ukraine an independent, sovereign, and economically viable country. It must be free to choose its political system and leadership. The country must also be free to rearm and maintain a military of whatever size it wants, to join the European Union, and to accept security commitments from outsiders. It needs to have economic access to the Black Sea.

Kyiv does not require 100 percent of its territory to realize these goals. But what, then, does it need? An end to the war, above all. That end does not mandate a permanent settlement that addresses all the issues separating Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, it should not at this juncture, as any overly ambitious diplomatic undertaking would surely fail. Instead, what the country needs now is an interim cessation of hostilities that largely reflects current realities on the ground.

To bring this about, the United States and its partners in Europe should initiate a dialogue with Ukraine. The goal would be to persuade its leaders to accept this more modest definition of winning. They should tell Kyiv that Western support cannot be expected to continue at or near current levels without it. But they should also make an ironclad pledge to do everything in their power to provide Ukraine with arms for the long haul. The bulk of these arms would be made available on the condition that they be used for defensive purposes, but certain longer-range systems could be used by Ukraine against military and economic targets in Russia. The aim would be to signal to Moscow that it will not prevail on the battlefield now or in the future and that it will pay a high price for trying. Additional carrots for Ukraine are most likely to be found in the economic realm.

Diplomacy would take place in two phases. The first phase would seek to bring about a cease-fire, either along current battle lines or with limited adjustments, with a buffer zone separating the two protagonists. It would end the bloodshed and allow Ukraine to rebuild. It would not require the country to give up or compromise on any of its legal or political claims when it comes to borders. There could be some sort of international presence to monitor the agreement. It might be modeled in some ways on the cease-fire that has maintained peace in Cyprus for 50 years.

A second phase of diplomacy would start as soon as the first phase is done. This second phase would be much more prolonged—perhaps lasting decades, until Russia has a post-Putin leadership interested in reintegrating the country into the West. It would address additional arrangements, including what are often termed final-status issues. This phase could involve territorial transfers in both directions and a degree of autonomy for the inhabitants of Crimea and Ukraine’s east. It would also involve the creation of a security guarantee for Ukraine, even though the history of such guarantees is mixed. (The discredited 1994 Budapest Memorandum clearly did not offer real protection.) Ideally, this guarantee would involve NATO membership for Kyiv. But a coalition of the willing, including the United States, could offer Ukraine a security pledge if NATO members prove reluctant to admit Ukraine.

Critics of diplomacy argue that Russia will not abide by any agreement it signs and that it will instead use a cease-fire as a chance to regroup before continuing its offensive. This is, of course, possible. But a credible long-term commitment by the West to provide military help to Ukraine, along with fewer restrictions on how Ukraine could use long-range systems, would increase the cost of the war to Russia and challenge Putin’s assumption that he can outlast the West. At the same time, there is something in this proposal for Putin that might prompt him to respect its terms. It would not require Russia to give up claims to Ukraine. Moscow could continue to rearm. It would keep, for now, most or all of the Ukrainian territory it controls. The West might even agree to lift some sanctions on the Russian economy, and should Russia respect the cease-fire, lift more later—although important sanctions would remain in place to provide leverage for diplomacy’s second phase. As part of that second phase, the West might ask Ukraine to forswear nuclear weapons. NATO, while admitting Ukraine, could pledge not to station its forces on Ukraine’s territory.

If accepted, the first phase of this diplomatic initiative would help preserve Ukraine’s independence and allow it to start rebuilding. But even if rejected, the initiative should make it less difficult to galvanize continued military and economic support for Ukraine. It would highlight that it really is Putin’s ambitions, not Zelensky’s, that stand in the way of an end to the fighting. Either way, Ukraine would be better off than it is now.

To some, what is described here may not sound like winning. It is arguably neither fair nor just. It does not promise peace. But it would be incomparably better than the alternative of Ukraine losing the war or fighting endlessly. This approach would deny Putin much of what he seeks, which is to bring most or all of Ukraine back under Moscow’s thumb. Foreign policy must be doable as well as desirable. The comparison analysts should make is not between what exists and the ideal, but between the possible and the alternative.

FIGHTING CHANCE

As of this writing, there are approximately 75 days remaining in Biden’s presidency. Biden should use that time to do all he can to increase the odds that the United States adopts this new strategy for Ukraine, one that is accepted by both U.S. allies and Kyiv.

He should do so no matter who wins on November 5. A president-elect Kamala Harris would benefit from Biden having taken the difficult but necessary step of revoking Ukraine’s veto over Washington’s war aims. It would be better for her if he is the one who stops insisting on goals that cannot be met. Biden would take the heat, giving Harris space to carry out what would be a controversial but necessary strategy change.

Biden would also be wise to embrace a diplomatic settlement following a Donald Trump victory. Trump, after all, is on record advocating for one himself. But by outlining a new strategy for Ukraine, one predicated on advancing a reasonable diplomatic proposal coupled with the promise of long-term military support, Biden could help set the bar for U.S. policy in a manner that would help protect Kyiv’s core interests from an individual less inclined to back Ukraine against Russia. And hopefully, Trump would ultimately see that continuing to support Ukraine while pushing for diplomacy is actually necessary to ending the conflict. The alternative—selling out Ukraine—would be rejected by Kyiv, resulting in a one-sided but open-ended war between it and Russia. A rejection by Trump of this approach or something like it would pin the moral and political responsibility for a Russian victory and Ukraine’s defeat on his administration and the United States.

The 47th U.S. president, of course, will ultimately enjoy considerable discretion. No policy can be entirely locked in by a predecessor. But assisting Ukraine in repelling Russian aggression has arguably been Biden’s greatest foreign policy accomplishment. In the time he has left, he should do whatever he can to protect it. And adopting a new, more sustainable strategy for Kyiv is the best way to do so—and to therefore ensure Ukraine continues to exist as a thriving, sovereign, independent nation.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/perfect-has-become-enemy-good-ukraine-haass

Originally Posted By AlmightyTallest:

A Ukrainian kamikaze drone "Switchblade 600" hit a gathering of Russian reconnaissance UAV "SuperCam" operators in the Donetsk region. Work by the 14th Regiment. pic.twitter.com/HyEUBMiXm6

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) November 4, 2024

Originally Posted By HIPPO:
Germany’s coalition gov’t is collapsing. Scholz will be lucky to hold on to it for the next 24 hrs.

BREAKING: Germany’s three-party ruling coalition collapsed after Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced he would fire his Finance Minister Christian Lindner over persistent disagreements about economic reforms. Full story: https://t.co/tTzoSsJIWQ pic.twitter.com/1fzQdqBge5

POLITICOEurope  (@POLITICOEurope) November 6, 2024

snap elections coming in early 2025.

Originally Posted By silverstate55:
My wife actually had a good prognostication this morning: Since Trump hates war & doesn’t want any during his tenure, he will do what’s necessary to help Ukraine drive ruzzians out of Ukraine to end the war as quickly as is feasible.

Originally Posted By Prime:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Gbl_TloaIAAvFBN?format=jpg&name=900x900

Boom, there it is. The J-35A. Been waiting a while for this. Official debut at the Zhuhai Airshow. Export potential? Yes. pic.twitter.com/20sy7H2G1A

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) November 5, 2024

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GbmMi1XagAAU6Uv?format=png&name=small

It's not a production version guys, it's still got yellow primer on the front wheel-well doors. That would not be there on a serial production aircraft. This is just an engineering development test bed. pic.twitter.com/W6QyNiCbLo

Astral Refugee  (@MarkerMagic8) November 5, 2024

Originally Posted By Prime:

Putin's leaked surrender plan for Ukraine was nothing short of insane. It proposed reducing the Ukrainian army to a mere 50,000 troops, required everyone to lift sanctions on Russia and affiliated individuals, mandated Russian as an official language, and even allowed the Russian…

— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated) November 5, 2024

Russia’s “peace plan” demands Ukraine reduce its military to 50,000 (ask yourself why), adopt Russian as official, and pay reparations for Donbas. The West to lift post-2014 sanctions. It’s easy to call Zelensky’s plan unrealistic, but where’s the same scrutiny for Russia’s plan?

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) November 4, 2024

A) Russia is winning; winners get to dictate outcomes.

B) Why would Ukraine need more than 50,000 troops if they already lost to Russia?

C) The majority of Ukraine speaks Russian; it’s only natural that it is an official language protected under law.

D) Ukraine broke the Donbas in 2014; Pottery Barn rules: you broke it, you fix it.

E) Why keep sanctions if Ukraine and the West acknowledges their collective defeat?

F) See A), above. Don’t start a fight then whine win you end up on the losing side.

A) Russia is winning; winners get to dictate outcomes.

B) Why would Ukraine need more than 50,000 troops if they already lost to Russia?

C) The majority of Ukraine speaks Russian; it’s only natural that it is an official language protected under law.

D) Ukraine broke the…

Scott Ritter  (@RealScottRitter) November 4, 2024

Originally Posted By Prime:
A) Russia is winning; winners get to dictate outcomes.

B) Why would Ukraine need more than 50,000 troops if they already lost to Russia?

C) The majority of Ukraine speaks Russian; it’s only natural that it is an official language protected under law.

D) Ukraine broke the Donbas in 2014; Pottery Barn rules: you broke it, you fix it.

E) Why keep sanctions if Ukraine and the West acknowledges their collective defeat?

F) See A), above. Don’t start a fight then whine when you end up on the losing side.

A) Russia is winning; winners get to dictate outcomes.

B) Why would Ukraine need more than 50,000 troops if they already lost to Russia?

C) The majority of Ukraine speaks Russian; it’s only natural that it is an official language protected under law.

D) Ukraine broke the…

Scott Ritter  (@RealScottRitter) November 4, 2024

Originally Posted By 4xGM300m:


Armed civilians in Israel?

Originally Posted By GoldenMead:

Congratulations to @realDonaldTrump on his impressive election victory!

I recall our great meeting with President Trump back in September, when we discussed in detail the Ukraine-U.S. strategic partnership, the Victory Plan, and ways to put an end to Russian aggression against…

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / ????????? ?????????? (@ZelenskyyUa) November 6, 2024

Congratulations to @realDonaldTrump on his impressive election victory!

I recall our great meeting with President Trump back in September, when we discussed in detail the Ukraine-U.S. strategic partnership, the Victory Plan, and ways to put an end to Russian aggression against Ukraine.

I appreciate President Trump’s commitment to the “peace through strength” approach in global affairs. This is exactly the principle that can practically bring just peace in Ukraine closer. I am hopeful that we will put it into action together.

We look forward to an era of a strong United States of America under President Trump’s decisive leadership. We rely on continued strong bipartisan support for Ukraine in the United States.

We are interested in developing mutually beneficial political and economic cooperation that will benefit both of our nations. Ukraine, as one of Europe's strongest military powers, is committed to ensuring long-term peace and security in Europe and the Transatlantic community with the support of our allies.

I am looking forward to personally congratulating President Trump and discussing ways to strengthen Ukraine's strategic partnership with the United States.

Originally Posted By CMOS:



MOST of NATO are shuddering right now, knowing full well The Bill is about to come due.  They know it.


CMOS

Originally Posted By silverstate55:
My wife actually had a good prognostication this morning: Since Trump hates war & doesn’t want any during his tenure, he will do what’s necessary to help Ukraine drive ruzzians out of Ukraine to end the war as quickly as is feasible.

Originally Posted By HIPPO:

Ukrainians have been incredibly brave and strong. But ultimately, what we're funding is a stalemate war that needs to end, says Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chair Marco Rubio in an NBC interview.https://t.co/AtBI6FWoMR pic.twitter.com/cyKUADh59v

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) November 6, 2024

Originally Posted By silverstate55:
My wife actually had a good prognostication this morning: Since Trump hates war & doesn’t want any during his tenure, he will do what’s necessary to help Ukraine drive ruzzians out of Ukraine to end the war as quickly as is feasible.

Originally Posted By GoldenMead:

Congratulations to @realDonaldTrump on his impressive election victory!

I recall our great meeting with President Trump back in September, when we discussed in detail the Ukraine-U.S. strategic partnership, the Victory Plan, and ways to put an end to Russian aggression against…

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / ????????? ?????????? (@ZelenskyyUa) November 6, 2024

Congratulations to @realDonaldTrump on his impressive election victory!

I recall our great meeting with President Trump back in September, when we discussed in detail the Ukraine-U.S. strategic partnership, the Victory Plan, and ways to put an end to Russian aggression against Ukraine.

I appreciate President Trump’s commitment to the “peace through strength” approach in global affairs. This is exactly the principle that can practically bring just peace in Ukraine closer. I am hopeful that we will put it into action together.

We look forward to an era of a strong United States of America under President Trump’s decisive leadership. We rely on continued strong bipartisan support for Ukraine in the United States.

We are interested in developing mutually beneficial political and economic cooperation that will benefit both of our nations. Ukraine, as one of Europe's strongest military powers, is committed to ensuring long-term peace and security in Europe and the Transatlantic community with the support of our allies.

I am looking forward to personally congratulating President Trump and discussing ways to strengthen Ukraine's strategic partnership with the United States.

Originally Posted By ITCHY-FINGER:

So basically
"We fucked it all up, but...it wouldn't have been worth the risk to do more...."

I think that's bullshit. They did every fucking thing wrong. Xiden et al may have said the right lies "we want them to win" but did absolutely jack shit to help them win. They should have been honest and said "we want to win the '24 election so fuck ya'll". FJB and FKH.

Originally Posted By stgdz:

So you going to casually gloss over the house cutting funding last fall?

Originally Posted By stone-age:
I expect Putin is looking forward to having a 4 year breather to rebuild the Soviet military machine after the battle lines are frozen. 4 years.

Originally Posted By Orion_Shall_Rise:

In 4 years Poland and ukraines convetional military will be more capable then ours.

Originally Posted By Orion_Shall_Rise:

In 4 years Poland and ukraines convetional military will be more capable then ours.

Originally Posted By stgdz:

So you going to casually gloss over the house cutting funding last fall?

Originally Posted By BigGrumpyBear:


Yeah we're in a damned if ya do damned if ya don't situation.

They need to take more responsibility for their own security, but they won't as long as we do it, which isn't in our interest.

But to get them to do it, we have to abandon them, which isn't in our interest.

Originally Posted By Jaehaerys:
One of the first statements on British defence policy from a libdem MP post-Trump win. It's pretty standard stuff about boosting defense spending, strengthening NATO, etc., but I find it noteworthy that he's explicitly stating that the UK should avoid "confronting global threats" (read: Iran and its proxies, and probably China). I've been saying it for a while, but one of the most impactful aspects of a second Trump term will be that American allies distance themselves from conflicts they don't have a direct vested interest in. So, likely less collaboration on Iran, less willingness on the part of the EU to cooperate with the US on China policy (particularly economically), etc. It is what it is.